

ON THE PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT (PRIVATE WORK) (A.I. TRANSLATION)

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INCLUDED IN THIS WORK:

Part 1: The Five Discourses on the Holy Spirit

Translated from the French edition of Hieromonk Theophilos Kislas, *Nil Cabasilas, Sur le Saint-Esprit: Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes*, Théologie byzantine, Les Éditions du Cerf, Paris 2001, pp. 174–416.

Part 2: The Refutation of the Latins first Thirty-Four Chapters

Translated from the Greek as preserved in Panagiotis (Théophile) Kislas, *Nil Cabasilas, Réfutation des prémisses des Latins par lesquelles ils veulent montrer que le Saint-Esprit procède aussi du Fils* (Λύσις τῶν προτάσεων τῶν Λατίνων ἐξ ὧν οἴονται δεινῶναι τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεσθαι) (typewritten dissertation), Strasbourg 1998, pp. 521–662.

Part 3: The Refutation of the Latins last 15 Chapters (The Syllogisms)

Translated from the Latin edition by E. Candal, *Nilus Cabasilas et theologia S. Thomae De Processione Spiritus Sancti*, Studi Tomistici 116, Vatican City 1945, pp. 188–385.

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PART 1: THE FIVE DISCOURSES ON THE HOLY SPIRIT

FIRST DISCOURSE AGAINST THE CONCLUSION OF THE LATIN

Methodological Principles.

1. This, then, is what the Latin Church upholds as its doctrine: it employs the aforementioned premises and draws from them the conclusion that the Son is also the cause of the Holy Spirit. When the premises are unsound, it does not necessarily follow that the conclusion is false, for sometimes truth is grasped even when the premises do not contain it. However, when the conclusion itself is unsound, it necessarily follows that one or both of the premises are tainted with falsehood. Therefore, we must first assert that the conclusion itself is entirely contrary to the ancient theology of the Fathers. After demonstrating this, we will attempt to prove that what the Latins have asserted is not free from falsehood. Then, with God's help and through careful, patient examination, we will demonstrate that such claims are false and that there was no prior necessity compelling the Latins to adopt the aforementioned conclusion.

St. Basil: The Spirit Does Not Proceed from the Son.

2. Basil the Great, in his fourth book *Against Eunomius*, states: "God begets—not as man begets—but truly, and He who is begotten from Him manifests not a human word but the true Word proceeding from Him; He breathes forth the Spirit from His mouth, not as a man does, for the mouth of God is not corporeal. Rather, the Spirit proceeds from Him and not from elsewhere. God works with incorporeal hands; He creates and fashions creatures not from His own being but operatively, just as one who works with his hands does not produce the work from himself." Now, when the great Basil says that the Spirit proceeds "not from elsewhere," he either uttered this needlessly or defined it in relation to the Word or to the creatures. But he would not have said it needlessly, for that was not his custom, nor did he construct his discourse in reference to the creatures—for how could anyone of sound mind entertain such a notion? It remains, then, to understand his words simply as referring to the Son and nothing else. For example, if someone says of Peter that "he is from Jonah and not from elsewhere," he necessarily restricts the phrase "not from elsewhere" to the fact of kinship, meaning that Jonah alone, and no other man, is his cause. He does not invoke a horse, an ox, or a dog—such thinking would be absurd. Moreover, such reasoning would defy common sense, for no one would make such comparisons. Likewise, if someone said of a horse or any other animal, "This horse comes from that horse and not from elsewhere," we would certainly understand that it does not come from another horse—for it obviously does not come from a lion, an eagle, or an olive tree. This is reasoning common to all men. In the same way, the theological statement that "the Spirit proceeds from God" means that He proceeds from the Father and not from elsewhere. Therefore, the phrase "not from elsewhere" must not be referred to the creatures, for this is utterly absurd

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and contrary to the logic of analogous cases. Rather, the mind must necessarily ascend to that which is of the same nature, as in the other examples. Thus, [that which is of the same nature] is the Son and nothing else. For one engaged in theology might well question whether the Son is also the cause of the Spirit.

3. [Objection: And if they were to respond that, on the contrary, those who opposed the Holy Spirit regarded Him as a creature, and that this was the meaning of St. Basil's words—] [Solution:] the argument would be worthless. For even if they believed the Spirit to be a creature, He would be so far superior to other creatures that no comparison could be made. For the Spirit, they allowed that He "searches the depths of God" (1 Cor. 2:10), while for the other creatures, they did not even permit such nearness. Furthermore, even concerning the lowliest creatures, they did not profess that they come from one another but that all things come from God. Who, then, while affirming that all things come from God, would believe that the Holy Spirit derives His existence from the earth, the wind, or fire? Therefore, St. Basil, recognizing this, declared that "the Spirit proceeds from God and not from elsewhere." If one were to interpret his words as referring to the creatures, one would oppose both common reason and the universal understanding of men, as well as the heretics' own doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit. Yet if someone does not consider his intellect capable of conforming to common reason and insists that "not from elsewhere" must be attributed to the creatures, let him clearly understand this: "not from elsewhere" is a common apophatic attribute that excludes everything surrounding God the Father—whether the Son or the creatures. Thus, when the phrase "not from elsewhere" is stated in a general sense, it excludes the creatures as the cause of the Spirit, just as it excludes the Son. If this is the doctrinal affirmation, how then can one justify the opinion that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son?

4. [Objection: And if someone were to say that the phrase "He proceeds from Him" must be understood as referring to the mouth—] [Solution:] I do not know what he intends by this or how he would interpret "not from elsewhere." He will find no escape, for he will not be able to say "from the mouth and not from elsewhere"—that is, from the ears or the eyes. Such an invention is impermissible, even if their assertions inevitably lead to such absurdities. If "He proceeds from Him" is to be understood in terms of causality, then the contrasting phrase "not from elsewhere" must necessarily follow the same logic. But if "from Him" is understood not as causality but as locality—for this is what they directly assert, those who claim that "He proceeds from Him" refers to the mouth—then "not from elsewhere" would indicate another bodily member, perhaps the ears, hands, or eyelids! No one speaking in pursuit of truth would permit himself to think such things.

5. Moreover, theological doctrines oppose those who falsely interpret—contrary to the spirit of the theologian [Basil]—the phrase "proceeds from Him" as referring to locality. For his intent

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was clear: to demonstrate that God the Father is the cause of the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and the cause of creatures. And on this subject, the distinction is far from insignificant—he does not omit that the Father is the cause of the Son and the Spirit by nature, but the cause of creation by operation. Just as he had said of the Son, "the begotten proceeds from Him," he says again: "He manifests a true Word proceeding from Him." Likewise, concerning creatures, he follows the same order when he states that God operates and adds that "He operates, yet not from Himself," and further that "the work He produces does not proceed from Him." Repeatedly, he appeals to the Father, thereby completing what is lacking and illuminating the summit of doctrine. He speaks in the same manner regarding the Spirit: he says that He "sends forth the Spirit by His mouth"—that is, the Father—"not as a human [breathes], for the mouth of God is not corporeal." And in the same harmonious order, he adds: "the breath (the Spirit) proceeds from Him and not from elsewhere," meaning [that He proceeds] from the Father. Here, he directly employs the same principles he used for the Son, and in every instance, he attributes "proceeds from" to the Father, for he manifestly grants to Him alone the role of cause.

The Theology of Unity and Distinction in God.

6. Next, among the divine names, we distinguish those that refer to the essence and those that refer to the person. When we speak of names pertaining to the essence, we mean those that are common to the thearchic hypostases and singular to the Trinity—attributes of the one God, such as God, King, Creator, Good, and all divine properties that apply to the divine and pure nature. On the other hand, by personal names, we mean all those that do not fit this category but refer properly to one person, or that may be perceived in two or three and are never expressed in the singular but in the plural. Examples include unbegotten, begetting, begotten, proceeding, caused, as well as life, light, goodness, glory, uncreatedness, holiness, perfection, infinity. Among these designations, some—[unbegotten, begetting, begotten, proceeding]—pertain to one person alone, while being caused applies to two: the Son and the Holy Spirit, whom we do not profess as one caused but as two. Likewise, when we refer to "life," "light," "good," "holiness," and others—not as pertaining to the essence but to the hypostases—we speak of the Trinity as three lives, uncreated realities, lights, good and holy realities, and three glories.

7. St. John of Damascus, in the fourteenth chapter of his Theological Treatises, clearly testifies that this doctrine is true concerning what pertains essentially to God. There, as the title indicates, he intends to enumerate the properties of the divine nature. Furthermore, in the hundredth chapter of the same work, he states: "'Ageneton' and 'geneton,' spelled with one 'n,' are properties of nature, signifying the uncreated and the created. 'Agenneton' and 'genneton,' spelled with two 'n's, are properties not of nature but of hypostasis—that is, being unbegotten and being begotten." And again: "'Unbegotten' applies to the Father, for He was not begotten;

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‘begotten’ applies to the Son, for He is eternally begotten by the Father; ‘procession’ applies to the Holy Spirit.” He further states: “Thus, we know that ‘being begotten’ is not a property of nature but of hypostasis. For if it were a property of nature, we could not consider ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ within the same nature.” The Latins also hold this view. It is evident that they, too, divide the divine names into two kinds: those concerning nature and those concerning persons. This is clear from the exposition of their foremost theologian, Thomas [Aquinas], who, in the second book [of his *Summa Theologiae*], examines whether “Image” and “Gift” are personal names, and in other chapters of the same treatise, whether even the name “God”—which pertains to the essence—can be expressed in the plural for the three persons.

8. Theologians in many places agree that being caused is common to the Son and the Spirit. The divine Gregory [of Nyssa] demonstrated this clearly to Heron the philosopher, saying: “Indeed, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share in not having come into existence and in the divine nature. The Son and the Holy Spirit share in deriving their origin from the Father.” Concerning life, light, goodness, infinity, and similar attributes that may be expressed in the plural, the same Gregory, in his second Irenic Discourse, praises the divine nature, describing it as “devoid of quantity and determinate duration, uncreated and unlimited, never less than itself either in the present or the future; it is many lives and one life, many lights and one light, many goods and one good, one glory and many glories, true and truth and spirit of truth, many holy beings and holiness itself.” Elsewhere, he speaks of the Trinity as “an infinite cohesion of three infinite realities,” and again in the second Irenic Discourse, he says: “a perfect Trinity from three perfect realities.”

Cause: An Attribute of Person, Not Nature.

9. Given all this, emanation and being a cause in theology do not apply to each of the three persons, nor are they attributed as names common to the three persons as one. Therefore, they must in every case refer to what is personal and not to what pertains to nature or essence.

Furthermore, the Latins (like us) distinguish the Father and the Holy Spirit by emanating and being emanated. They distinguish the divine persons by being cause and being from, and this is the only distinction they acknowledge as proper to theology. Thus, it is evident that the attributes they use to differentiate the divine persons from one another refer to what is personal.

Moreover, Thomas [Aquinas] states [in *Summa Theologiae*]: “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are distinct persons, but not as creation does, since the Father and the Son are one in essence.” Consequently, he, too, recognizes emanating and being a cause as personal attributes and in no way as essential ones.

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Lastly, no personal attribute has a relation to an essential attribute—that is, it does not correlate with it. On the contrary, it opposes its counterpart through a relational opposition, as being begotten stands in relation to begetting. Being emanated is a personal property; if it were not, procession would likewise not be a property of the Spirit. Therefore, emanating must necessarily be such, for it is with this that proceeding is correlated.

10. Causality is a personal attribute because it does not belong to all three [persons]. If it belongs to one person—the Father alone—it does not necessarily follow that it belongs to the Holy Spirit or to one or two other persons. This is the point under investigation. Nor can it be granted to the Son alone, given the Father's declaration to the Son: "From the womb before the morning star, I have begotten You" (Ps. 110:3), and the Son's own words: "The Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father" (Jn. 15:26). We have already demonstrated that no personal attribute observable in two or three persons is expressed in the singular but always in the plural. Therefore, if causality did not belong to one person alone but to both the Father and the Son, they could not be considered a single cause of the Spirit. The number of causes corresponds to the number of persons: if there are two persons, there must likewise be two causes. This conclusion is one even the Latins could not accept. To clarify, consider this example: since being caused applies to two persons, it necessarily implies two caused realities. This is the common doctrine of both our Church and the Latin Church. Similarly, if causality is attributed to both the Father and the Son, this implies two causes of the Spirit—the Father and the Son. And if two causes are admitted, then two principles must also be acknowledged. Yet I know of no Christian who could tolerate the notion of two principles of the Spirit.

Responses to Objections.

11. [Objection: If they defend themselves by arguing that two caused realities necessarily exist because being caused applies differently to the Son and the Spirit, whereas in the case of causality, it is not the same, since the Son is also an emitter like the Father—] [Solution:] The argument is unconvincing; indeed, it is false. It has already been shown that being caused is common to the Son and the Spirit. If it is common, it is not different; thus, they are not differentiated as caused realities. Rather, they are both caused realities—one as begotten, the other as proceeding. A parallel can be found in other examples: a man and a horse are both called animals, yet they do not differ in their essential definition as animals. The distinction lies in the fact that one is a rational animal, the other an irrational animal. Returning to our subject: since, according to the theologians, the shared attribute of being caused (however defined) belongs to both persons, the difference is that one is caused by generation (as Son), while the other is caused by procession.

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12. Moreover, what could they say concerning goodness, uncreatedness, light, and other attributes, for which no difference can be established, yet when spoken of the three persons collectively, they are expressed not in the singular but in the plural—precisely because they are referred to the persons?

13. It is absurd to claim that the commonality of being caused is merely nominal, for such a notion belongs to grammarians and sophists, not theologians. Therefore, either causality applies to the Father alone (and there is no contradiction), or it is also attributed to the Son—in which case the resulting absurdities cannot be avoided.

14. [Objection: If they reply again that the Son is the cause of the Spirit because He received this from the Father, just as He received His own being, and thus, by virtue of the Son's relation to the Father, the cause remains one—] [Solution:] This argument is incoherent. Such reasoning has no place in discussions of the persons. For example, the hypostasis of the Son derives His existence from the hypostasis of the Father, yet no one holding to Orthodox faith would say that the Father and the Son are a single hypostasis by virtue of their relation—or by any other means.

15. [Objection: If they say, "Since you speak of three uncreated realities and three good realities, you thereby introduce three principles, for uncreated, good, and principle are identical"—] [Solution:] The argument fails. If these were identical, the theologians would not, on the one hand, consider their own reasoning sound while rejecting the fables of the Greeks. They explicitly affirmed three uncreated realities, three goods, and three lives—yet they utterly refused to speak of three principles, three causes, or three Gods. Thus, to reason soundly, we must acknowledge that speaking of three principles is not equivalent to speaking of three uncreated realities—they are distinct concepts.

Two Emitters of the Holy Spirit Imply Two Principles.

16. Furthermore, Thomas [Aquinas], in his second book (Chapter 4), where he discusses the Holy Spirit, states: "One may say there are two emitters—the Father and the Son—due to the number of subjects. Yet there are not two persons emitting, since there is only one procession." O my dear friend, if the Father and the Son were in some way a single emitter of the Spirit, it would necessitate a single principle for the Spirit. By the same logic, if there are two emitters (the Father and the Son), there must also, of necessity, be two principles. For if one emitter (the Father or the Son alone) constitutes a principle, how can two emitters (the Father and the Son) not constitute two principles?

The Danger of Sabellianism.

17. [Objection: If they argue that because there is a single power of emission in both, the Father and the Son are truly one principle, since the emitter is one—] [Solution:] This is absurd.

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A single power of emission does not imply a single subject. If the power of emission is personal (as already demonstrated), this reasoning would force the conclusion that the Father and the Son are one in person—a view entirely Sabellian. Just as we devoutly confess the one nature of the Father and the Son based on the identity of their essential attributes, so too, by this logic, we would be compelled to affirm their oneness in person if the Father and the Son are one by a personal power of emission.

Absurdities of the Thomistic Thesis

18. How could it not be absurd to assert that the Father and the Son are at times two emitters (due to the number of subjects) and at other times one (by virtue of a single power of emission)? Does this not entail that the two emitters—the Father and the Son—are not two who emit? At the very least, operations must correspond to their subjects; if the subjects are two, then those who emit must likewise be two.

Emitter and Emitting in the Trinity Are Identical.

19. Furthermore, if one could discern the hypostasis (which possesses the power of emission) from the emitter, and from the one who emits (not the hypostasis but the act of emitting itself), the argument might hold. But in reality, it is impossible to discern the hypostasis from the emitter based on the operative power of emission. The blessed John [of Damascus], in the fifty-eighth chapter of his Theological Treatises, states: "Nature has a capacity to operate, from which operation proceeds; operation is the active and essential movement of nature. The operator—that is, the hypostasis—possesses the operation." If this is true, and if the one who possesses the operation is also the one who emits (i.e., the hypostasis), why then can we discern the hypostasis (which possesses the operation) from the one who operates, but cannot discern the hypostasis (which possesses the power of emission) from the one who emits—only the act of emitting itself?

20. Moreover, John explicitly states that the operation is entirely distinct from the one who operates. Consequently, emitting (i.e., the power of emission) is entirely distinct from the one who emits (i.e., the hypostasis that acts according to the power of emission). And if from the one who emits (as well as from the emitter), we can discern the hypostasis—and if, as Thomas claims, the emitters are two because the hypostases are two—then we must necessarily admit that those who emit are also two.

21. Additionally, in other cases where resemblance is found, a distinction can still be observed—for example, between a geometer and one who practices geometry, or a scribe and one who copies. Nothing prevents a geometer from not practicing geometry (possessing the capacity but not exercising it). But concerning the divine persons, how could such reasoning not be utterly

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absurd? For God, who is an eternal emitter by faculty, does not emit only after exercising His intellect. In these matters, if the one who emits and the emitter are identical, and no difference can be posited between them, then the emitters are two, and those who emit are likewise two.

22. Furthermore, no one has ever dared to claim that the principle of the Spirit is the power of emission, or that the principle of the Son is the power of begetting. For it is the hypostasis that is regarded as the cause of the hypostasis—not the capacity. The Latins teach that the principle of the Spirit is the two hypostases (the Father and the Son). Yet if one were to agree that the power of emission is the cause of the Spirit, or the power of begetting the cause of the Son, many absurdities would follow. Such reasoning cannot evade the duality of principles, for the power of begetting and the power of emitting are distinct.

Two Distinct Hypostases Imply Two Causes, Not One

23. Moreover, St. Gregory of Nyssa, in his work *On the Knowledge of God*, states: "The Spirit proceeds from the hypostasis of the Father." If, then, the Spirit also proceeds from the Son as He does from the Father, He must therefore proceed from the hypostasis of the Son as well. Just as the hypostasis of the Father is the principle of the Spirit, so too, presumably, is that of the Son. This is what Thomas means when he says: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are distinct persons—but not as creation does, since the Father and the Son are one in essence." If this is true, then because the Father and the Son are two distinct persons in relation to a personal attribute, they cannot in any way be considered one but must be regarded as two. It necessarily follows, then, that the principles of the Spirit must likewise be two in number. If, according to the theologians, God is one because the Son and the Spirit refer to a single cause, whereas in this case it has already been clearly shown that the Spirit refers to two hypostases, how is it not evident that the Latins thereby reject the celebrated monarchy [of the Father]? Thus, shipwreck awaits in both directions: whether one claims that the Father and the Son are two principles of the Spirit or that the two persons are a single principle. In no case is the Son the cause of the Spirit, for this is the beginning of blasphemies.

The Father and the Son Are Confused into a Single Person

24. Furthermore, if—according to the Latins—the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and also from the Son, does He proceed as from a single cause and principle or from two? If from two, the absurdity is self-evident, and no further argument is needed. But if they claim He proceeds from one cause, what do they imagine this cause to be? A single God? A single begetter? A single emitter? There are no other options. If it were from a single God, the Spirit would not be God—for the Spirit does not proceed from Himself, nor is He the cause of another, lest He be simultaneously creature. For it is the Trinity (that is, the one God) who is the

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cause of creatures. If the cause were a single Father, the argument would be absurd, for there would then be two Fathers and two Sons in the Trinity. And if it were a single emitter? Since the name "emitter" pertains to the person, it would follow that, in this respect, the Father and the Son are a single reality, united by a personal bond—one being, both Father and Son. One would then be forced to regard the Father and the Son as two persons in relation to the ineffable begetting, yet as one person in relation to the wondrous procession (since this refers to the person). We speak of the Father and the Son as one eternal, one good, and so forth—all attributes proper to the essence—and these names necessarily follow the natural identity of the persons. Why, then, if we call the Father and the Son one emitter, one cause, and one principle of the Spirit, would these personal names not likewise lead to personal identity? Thus, if in none of the aforementioned ways can the Father and the Son be a single principle of the Spirit—and if they cannot be two (even the Latins do not think so)—then it remains that the Son must not be elevated to the rank of cause of the Spirit. For this is how absurdities arise.

25. [Objection: If they reply that we too fall into the same trap—namely, that being caused (a personal attribute) is something we also say is common to the Spirit and the Son—] [Solution:] the cases are not parallel. For while being caused is indeed common, we do not claim that the Spirit and the Son are a single caused being but two. Given this, there is no absurdity. We conclude, then, that the Son and the Spirit share a personal communion without abolishing the distinction of persons.

26. [Objection: And if they respond: "We do not simply treat 'emitting' as a name pertaining to the person, but as a name pertaining to the person with an addition—that is, [the name] of two persons"—if this is established, no absurdity would follow.] But the argument is empty. [Solution] For if we claimed that 'emitting' refers to the person in the following way—that is, as proper to a single person—and if this were joined to the proposition, we would have taken as an answer what we are seeking, and the objection would be correct; it would overturn the argument and grant to the Father and the Son the act of emitting, and the interlocutor would not arrive at absurdity! But if we say that 'emitting' refers to the person, and if you also say it refers to the person, disregarding this proposition, in which of the two ways is it personal—as coming from one or from two? If the statement remains as is, absurdity follows. It is clear that impiety remains in them as long as they also use the other proposition. For they react as if, when someone says "man is an animal," they were to object with a similar reproach: "We do not call man 'animal,' but 'rational animal.'" But this is not a contradiction, for both are true. How could truth contradict itself, through which the rest remains sound? Moreover, if someone were to interpret the statement as follows: "Is 'emitting' personal or not?"—must one not necessarily answer one of the two? If one answers negatively, how can one affirm what even you do not believe? And if one answers positively, how do you oppose what you are obliged to profess? Furthermore, even

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if this is accepted, the absurdity is no less. For it is deduced that a personal attribute being common to two persons, the Father and the Son cannot be two persons but one. To elaborate on these things otherwise is thus a worthless pretext.

27. [Objection:] Faced with the resulting absurdity and severely struck by the difficulties, they concede a kind of difference between the Father, who emits without having received the act of emitting from any, and the Son, who has received it from the Father. Thus, 'emitting' remains a personal attribute, and the Father and the Son do not become one. [Solution] First, with the difference they introduce—when they claim that the Father emits in a different way than the Son—they necessarily arrive at saying that the Father and the Son are like two emitters. This clearly means they introduce two principles. Second, the argument is also unreasonable. For, similarly, the Father and the Son would not be one "good" or one "creator" or one "God," since the Father has received this from no one, whereas the Son has received it from the Father.

Are the Begetter and the Emitter Different?

28. Moreover, if the Father and the Son are one cause of the Holy Spirit, as one emitter, and if the Father alone is the cause of the Son, as one begetter, given this, it will necessarily follow to consider two principles and two causes of the divinity. Hence, the one and only begetter—that is, the Father—is not of the same number as the one emitter—that is, the Father and the Son. Why? Nor can they be interchanged. For only those of the same number can be interchanged. It is thus clear that they cannot be interchanged. Therefore, the one—that is, the Father—is necessarily the only begetter and emitter, even though the other—the Son—is not also an emitter. Thus, the one begetter and the one emitter are not identical in number. If they are not identical, they are different. And if it is not the same thing, it is another thing. Consequently, there will be two in number: one the begetter, the other the emitter. And each of the two is a principle, source, and cause of the divinity. Given this, how could one not arrive at two principles and sources of the divinity, distinct from one another in number?

29. [Objection: And if they respond that we could also conclude the equivalent by saying that the Father is the one creator of creation and the Trinity is also the one creator of the same creation, and that this same and one Father is not the same as the one creator (the Trinity), and thus that He is another—leading to saying that the creators of the universe are two?] [Solution] The argument is not compelling, nor is it equivalent. For each person creates, and the Trinity also [creates] as one God, from the one and common nature, according to which each person has nothing more than the three together—as Augustine declares in his book *On the Trinity*. On the contrary, the Father and the Son emit, and the Father begets (as already shown), each according to His own hypostasis. According to these hypostases, the Trinity is not a duality, and the duality is not a unity—that is, as a oneness referring to the person. Therefore, if one considers the

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distinction in these, one must not say that the one who begets is the same in number as the one who emits. As for the act of creating, the argument does not hold, for the common existing nature of the divine hypostases is one and the same in number.

The Risk of Duality in God

30. Moreover, if the Father and the Son are the one cause of the Holy Spirit, and if the Holy Spirit is one caused, God will not only be unity and Trinity but also duality. For one cause plus one caused being, each referring to the person, introduces in any case duality. That God is Trinity and unity is well known, but that He is duality—I do not know if anyone considers this sound. For the error is Sabellian and long contrary to the Church, and it is unbearable to Christian ears. [Objection: And if they respond, "But this one cause we call two persons, not one"?] [Solution] Let them also know clearly this: we are not easy in everything; we will not easily yield to those who act wickedly and try to remain unnoticed. This is what we say: in the case where one divine person has begotten and the other is begotten, there are unquestionably two persons. And in the case where each of these is the cause of the Spirit—not as Father and not as Son, but these two as one cause of the Spirit, as one emitter—there will certainly also be one person, as long as 'emitting' refers to the person.

31. And if they say there is one cause but two emitters? With one, they annihilate the other, and they shatter against themselves. For if two emitters are accepted, how can two causes not be accepted? If the one emitter is the cause, the cause is necessarily one. And if there is one cause, how could it be interpreted other than as one emitter? This is how the lie contradicts itself, and because of the one cause, one risks saying that the Father and the Son are one emitter and introducing a fusion of the persons. And if two emitters are accepted, the causes of the Spirit will be of the same number. Now, if a child were to argue in such a way, he ought naturally to blush.

Does the Cause Refer to the Essence or the Person?

32. Moreover, when you say that the Father and the Son are one cause of the Spirit, how do you understand it? As the Trinity, which is one cause of creation, understanding the "one" as referring to the nature and not to the person—as, for example, "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one"—or do you understand that the one cause of the Spirit refers only to the Father or only to the Son, the "one" here clearly referring to the person—as, for example, when the apostle says: "One God the Father, from whom all things are, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things exist"? There is no other possibility. Concerning the first possibility, the blasphemy is evident, for in this way the Spirit is separated from the common nature. For if the Father and the Son possess the cause due to the common nature, the Holy Spirit not possessing it (since He cannot be the cause of Himself but only of another person), how is He not alien to the

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common essence of the Father and the Son? According to the second possibility, the Father alone or the Son is one cause of the Spirit, for necessarily [the one who is the cause] is one person. Those, therefore, who say that the Father and the Son are one cause of the Spirit will arrive at considering the two persons as one. And if for them the one cause is not understood according to the common nature, nor does it refer to the person—apart from this, theology is not permitted to invent any other way [of conceiving things]—how is it not false to say that the Father and the Son are one cause of the Spirit? [Objection: And if they respond that there remains another way of conceiving unity, according to which the Father and the Son are together one cause of the Spirit?] [Solution] First, let them show it to us. Then let them clearly know that they present us with two principles of the Spirit, conceiving differently the oneness—one referring to the person, the other not. This, even for them, is absurd.

The Community Between the Father and the Son Stronger Than Between the Father and the Spirit

33. Moreover, those who say that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son inevitably grant more identity between the Father and the Son than between the Father and the Spirit; and the Father and the Son are more one than the Father and the Holy Spirit. For all that is common to the Father and the Spirit is also common to the Father and the Son. Furthermore, they possess the act of emission to such an extent that, according to the [Latins'] claims, the Father and the Son become one reality, in which the Spirit cannot participate. One thus risks considering, on the one hand, that the Father and the Holy Spirit constitute one reality only in relation to the essence, and on the other hand, that the Father and the Son form one reality not only in relation to the essence but also in relation to a personal attribute—that is, the cause. It thus appears that, on the one hand, the unity between the Father and the Son is double in relation to the unity of the Father and the Spirit, and on the other hand, the Father has more differences with the Spirit than the Son with the Father. If all this is absurd, and if the difficulty is great, and if what results from it is opposed to apostolic traditions, it will therefore be necessary to attribute to the Father alone the cause of the Spirit—if, at least, one is interested in finding a way to safeguard the ancient theology. For St. Basil, in fighting against Eunomius, said: "All that is common to the Father and the Son is also common with the Spirit," and the divine word also professes: "All that is common to the Father and the Son and in unity with them is also [common] with the Holy Spirit." Therefore, if the act of emitting were common to the Father and the Son, it would also be so for the Spirit. If this is completely absurd, [the act of emitting] will not be common to the Father and the Son either.

34. [Objection:] And if they respond that the argument is not compelling because, according to this interpretation, what is common to the Father and the Son is not greater than what is common

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to the Father and the Spirit—since, in exchange for the act of emitting not belonging to the Spirit, the attribute of not being begotten is common to the Father and the Spirit, and it is absolutely intolerable to attribute this to the Son (for the Father is unbegotten, and so is the Holy Spirit)—if they claim this, they speak the truth, but it adds nothing to our argument.

35. [Solution:] First, our argument does not concern this kind of commonality. For who has ever said that the Father and the Holy Spirit are one reality insofar as they are unbegotten, in the same way that you claim the Father and the Son are one cause? And if no one claims this, what necessity does the argument impose—that we must not profess the Father and the Holy Spirit as two unbegotten persons? This is what you so strongly uphold, even to the point of asserting that the Father and the Son are two principles and two causes of the Spirit. Therefore, the commonality referring to the person we consider true (and you think so too), and it does not make the Father and the Holy Spirit one. On the other hand, you grant to the Father and the Son what pertains to emitting, which clearly refers to the persons and, according to your claim, makes the Father and the Son one cause. Thus, the commonality is not identical in both cases. One leads to absurdity, for it necessarily characterizes the identity as personal and establishes the Father and the Son as one reality rather than the Father and the Holy Spirit. In the other case, none of these personal attributes is shared between the other two persons, and the commonality maintains the thearchic persons—that is, the Father and the Holy Spirit. This, then, is the first argument.

36. Second, concerning the Father, how do you understand not being begotten? If you understand it in the way the theologians speak of unbegottenness—that is, as identical to having no principle or cause—then it is clear that in no way can not being begotten be common to the Spirit. For this applies only to the Father, and thus, even concerning not being begotten, the Father and the Holy Spirit remain distinctly two. Perhaps you concede this, since it is compelling, but you insist that not being begotten is common to the Father and the Spirit in the sense of the privation of being begotten. On this point, Aristotle rightly asserts that this is not a name or a verb but an indefinite verb, for it applies even to non-being. And how could it be reasonable to attribute the indefinite—in order and determination—to the divine persons who bring others to order? For the definition holds the same value here as in other cases.

37. Moreover, it is not just, when faced with commonality, to introduce a highly dissimilar shared usage. On the contrary, in response to this commonality—that is, the not being begotten of the Father and the Spirit—it is consistent to consider that not proceeding applies to the Father and the Son. Not proceeding is likewise privative, just as not being begotten is, and no one could say that, in relation to this (not proceeding), the Father and the Son are one. Similarly, in relation to that (not being begotten), the Father and the Spirit are also not one person. In this case as in the other, one would say, almost analogously, that the Father and the Son are two persons who do not proceed. Therefore, even if the commonality of the Father and the Son due to

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privative attributes is equal to that of the Father and the Spirit, it is the capacity to emit that renders the Father and the Son as one reality and establishes the commonality of the Father and the Son as stronger than that of the Father and the Spirit. Consequently, to avoid the resulting absurdities, no other satisfactory solution can be found than to not claim at all that the Son is the cause of the Spirit.

The Father and the Son: Uncaused Cause or Caused Cause?

38. Furthermore, if the Father and the Son constitute one cause of the Holy Spirit—since cause here refers to the person, and as already shown, for the Father and the Son, emitting pertains to the hypostasis—then when we say the Father and the Son are one cause of the Spirit, what must we understand by this cause? Is it an uncaused cause, having no prior cause (as if one said the Father alone is the cause of the Spirit)? Or is it derived from a combination of principles (as if one said the Son alone is the cause of the Spirit)? Or is each cause partly uncaused and partly derived from a principle—now this, now that? Or neither? If the first, the Son will inherit the property of being uncaused. If the second, are we to demote the Father, stripping Him of the property of being unbegotten and assigning Him the place proper to a caused being? If the third, how can the same be both uncaused and caused? It is the same as saying uncaused and not uncaused, or from someone and not from someone. This is a contradiction in terms. Likewise, the fourth case is impossible—if not impious—and the absurdities multiply. Here lies the problem: this cause (belonging to the Father and the Son) is certainly not uncaused (unless one wishes to become Manichaeian), nor is it subject to a principle (for evil does not arise from good). Therefore, since all this is impossible, and the irrationality is great—along with the blasphemy—it is likewise impious to say that the Father and the Son are one cause of the Spirit.

The Father and the Son Are One God but Not One Principle of the Holy Spirit

39. [Objection: But what do they reply? "We profess that the Father and the Son are one God. And this one God we call neither cause nor caused, nor partly each, nor neither. For from any of these assertions would follow the starting point of blasphemies, producing the same absurdities. Yet no pious man refrains from saying 'one God, the Father and the Son.' If, then, it is absurd to say the Father and the Son are one cause of the Spirit, so too is it absurd to say they are one God. And if the latter is in no way absurd, how could the former be?"]

40. [Solution:] But, my dear friend, the propositions are neither alike nor even close. For when you say the Father and the Son are one God, you mean the incomprehensible essence—you do not mean oneness numerically, nor as referring to the person (for this is Judaic), but you refer it to the nature, which, being one and the same, is neither cause nor caused. For the divine essence

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is neither the cause of the divine hypostases nor itself caused. If we follow what some say—that the essence of the Father is the cause of the essence of the Son and the Spirit—we would necessarily have to profess multiple essences within the Trinity: one causal (the Father's) and the others caused (the Son's and the Spirit's). But if we accept this, we are not far from the madness of Arius. For we know the divine essence is uncaused and one and the same for all three hypostases. On the other hand, cause and being caused are proper to the hypostases, concerning which—if we wish to remain in the Orthodox faith—we must necessarily profess distinct realities. Therefore, when we say one God, the Father and the Son, and someone asks whether this one God is cause or caused, we are not compelled to answer either but rather neither. And in this way, no absurdity follows. But when they say the Father and the Son are one principle of the Spirit, is this one principle (attached to the person) an uncaused cause or a caused reality? Here, an answer is required. And for those who do not deny the principles of theology, every answer is absurd.

41. St. John [Damascene] testifies to the truth of these points. In the hundredth chapter of his Theological Treatises, he says: "'Unbegotten' (agennēton) and 'begotten' (gennēton) do not concern the nature but the hypostasis—that is, being begotten and being unbegotten, spelled with two 'n's.'" He also says in the same chapter: "Thus, we know that being begotten does not concern the nature but the hypostasis, for if it did, 'begotten' and 'unbegotten' could not be observed in the same nature." And the divine Maximus says: "The essence is spoken of as something common and uncircumscribed, and it can never be circumscribed in a person, for it never manifests itself as the cause of the hypostasis." Do you see that cause and being caused are not affirmed of the essence? For he says that being begotten is not an attribute of the nature, and he also says the essence would never manifest as the cause of the hypostasis. All this clearly shows that both (unbegotten and begotten) are excluded from the affirmation of the essence.

42. And the Latins, too, have long seemed of the same opinion. For Augustine, in the first book *On the Trinity*, speaks of the divine essence thus: "Nothing begets itself, and if the essence begets the essence, it would have begotten only itself, for in God there is nothing separate from the divine essence." And Thomas adopts this statement, concluding: "Therefore, the essence does not beget the essence." Likewise, in the same book (chapter...), where he discusses the divine names, he says: "The divine nature in the Son is not begotten—neither by itself nor by accident." And Hugh [of St. Victor], though incorrect on other points, appears sound here, for he says: "The essence itself does not emit, does not beget, nor is it begotten; for what is proper to the divine nature belongs to every person. Therefore, if the nature were proper to generation, the Son and the Spirit would beget—which is far from the truth." It is thus entirely evident that the Father begets not as essence but as Father.

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43. [Doubt: And if someone doubts the meaning of what the theologians say—"essence from essence" (i.e., the Son from the Father), or "wisdom from wisdom," or that the Son is "begotten from the essence of the Father"—here is the response:] [Solution:] First, this is to demonstrate consubstantiality, which repeatedly indicates from the essence. For if it were not so, the Father would not be Father by nature. Second, in certain passages of the theologians, the name essence and existence are used in place of hypostasis, as they themselves explain. For St. Cyril writes to the Asians: "The nature of the God-Word became incarnate"—that is, the hypostasis. [On this, consult what the Theologian (Gregory of Nazianzus) says to Heron.] And Thomas, interpreting the theologians, adds meticulously: "The Son, as essence and wisdom of the Father, is from Him, who is true essence and wisdom." Therefore, it would be sound to consider that the analogy is not at all the same, and those who say the Father and the Son are one God do not fall into the same absurdities as the Latins who claim they are one principle of the Spirit.

God Possesses Hypostatic Attributes in a Proper Manner

44. Moreover, the Father is properly cause, for He is only cause and certainly not caused. The Holy Spirit is properly caused, for He is only from the principle and certainly not the principle. Thus, St. Gregory says in his first discourse on the Son: "He is Father in the proper sense because He is not also the Son. Likewise, the Son is so in the proper sense because He is not also the Father. As for us, these terms are not used properly, for we are both father and son—indeed, we are neither one nor the other." And the same [Gregory] says to Heron: "The Son is not unbegotten, for the Father is unique, and the Spirit is not conflated with the Son, for only the Son is uniquely Only-Begotten. Indeed, they must also possess this property proper to the divine: uniqueness—the Son in His filiation, the Spirit in His procession (which differs from filiation). And the Father is truly Father—much more truly than what is among us—for He is Father in a unique way, that is, properly and not as corporeal realities, and alone (i.e., without conjugal union); and He is Father of one, for He is the sole Father of the Only-Begotten Son, and He is Father only, for He was not first a son."

45. Therefore, the Father properly possesses causality, and the Spirit properly possesses being caused. If the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, the Son, like the Spirit, will properly be a caused being in relation to Him who begat Him and to His kindred Spirit—and in this, He will preserve the likeness of being so properly, never deviating. But if the Spirit does proceed from the Son, the latter cannot properly be caused. For He is also cause of the Spirit, without being properly cause; and He is also caused (from the Father), just as the Holy Spirit is. But this is certainly absurd. For what can God have in His hypostasis that He does not have properly?

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46. Furthermore, if this were conceded, there would be a change and alteration in the hypostasis of the Only-Begotten Son. St. Cyril writes in his Thesaurus: "No sensible man would say that the Son appears dissimilar to the Father because He has not begotten and has not become Father of a Son; rather, precisely for this reason, he will observe in the Son a marvelous and perfect image of the Father. Just as the Father, being without change or alteration, remains always Father and is not transformed into the Son, so too the Word, the Son who proceeds from Him, remains thus—it is the Father's quality to exist without alteration—and He manifests this quality while being in this also like the Father."

47. If all this is true, we also say with reason that the Father exists without change or alteration, remains always cause, and is not transformed into a caused being. Likewise, He who proceeds from Him remains what He is—namely, caused—and shows in Himself the unalterability of the Father. Therefore, the Son is not also cause but only caused. If He were also cause, this would imply a change and alteration in Him—but this would be absurd. For the Only-Begotten Son is God, "with whom there is no variation nor shadow of turning" (James 1:17), as the Scriptures say.

Is the Son Simultaneously Cause and Caused?

48. Moreover, if the Son is also cause, then He cannot properly be a caused being, nor can the Father properly be cause toward Him. For what does not apply to one of the opposites necessarily cannot apply properly to the other either. And if the Father is not properly cause, it is possible that sometimes He is not—this is the meaning of "not properly." Faced with this abundance of absurdities, one thing alone suffices to remedy it: when seeking the cause of the divinity, we must say the Son is properly caused and only caused, and that cause does not apply to Him in any way whatsoever.

49. [Objection: And if they respond that the Son possesses both properly—not being cause and caused for the same person but being cause for one and caused for another—] [Solution:] This is not how the theologians have defined "properly" in contrast to "not properly." They say: "What concerns us is not proper, because it is both." And we are not called one of two in relation to the same person, but this in relation to one and that in relation to the other. And St. Cyril writes: "No sensible man would say that the Son appears dissimilar to the Father because He too has not begotten and has not become Father of a Son." He did not say "because He has not begotten the Father" but that "He has not become Father of a Son." He understood the difference of relation toward one and the other.

50. [Objection: And if they add: "The Son is properly caused, but as begotten He is not Father—rather, emitter"—] [Solution:] This is not compelling. For even if the Son is caused as Son, it is nevertheless different to be Son and to be caused. Just as, for example, it is different for man to

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be animal and to be rational animal. For the Son and the Spirit, being caused (however defined) is common, affirmed equally of both. On the other hand, as already shown, being Son or being Emitted is not a quality common to both persons but proper to each.

51. [Objection: And if they say: "The Son, as Creator, is properly cause of all, and as Son, He is properly caused—thus He properly possesses both attributes, and so there is no absurdity in our case"—] [Solution:] Even with this explanation, the argument is not compelling. First, they have accepted that cause pertains to creation and being caused to divinity. These statements are not contradictory; if the argument is reasonable, one must either accept them as referring to creatures or as referring to divinity. Second, the Son possesses being caused according to His hypostasis, but He does not create according to His own hypostasis. This is why the Father or the Holy Spirit are creators only according to the common nature, by which the Trinity is one creator. And on this, Thomas agrees, for he says: "Creation proceeds from the Father and the Son as one, with respect to essence." Therefore, the Son is in one way cause of all and in another way caused—that is, in hypostasis. And hypostasis is one thing, essence another—they are absolutely not the same. And this is not absurd.

52. We have shown above that it is absurd to believe the Son possesses both realities—being caused and cause—as hypostasis. If this were accepted, the Son Himself would have neither properly, and He would undergo change and alteration. Therefore, if anyone claims that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, this implies multiple accusations, and by this hypothesis, a multitude of absurdities afflicts the Church of God. Our argument has made this clear.

SECOND DISCOURSE AGAINST THE CONCLUSION (OF THE LATINS) OR ON THE HOLY SPIRIT

Introduction.

1. The apostolic tradition stands opposed to the Latin innovation, for it knows only the Father as the emitter of the Holy Spirit. Here are the proofs. Let us begin with the Lord's words in their proper order and examine what concerns the dogma. In the Gospel of John, the Lord says: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father" (Jn 15:26). And the blessed Paul, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians: "We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God" (1 Cor 2:12). Let us therefore inquire whether it was said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father as though there were no issue if someone said He proceeds also from the Son, or as though this new procession in no way referred to the Son. The answer may be found by observing how the blessed apostles received the Lord's words, how they themselves directly transmitted the word of the mystery to their disciples, and how they, in turn, passed on the radiant light of the Orthodox faith to those in need—without adding anything or straying from this ancient theology. And let us consider how the Latins have behaved in relation to it.

The Filioque Implies Unions and Distinctions in the Trinity That Dionysius the Areopagite Ignores.

2. The Latins, insofar as they say the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, would not deny that the Son is likewise an emitter of the Holy Spirit. This, they would say, serves to distinguish these thearchic persons by cause and that which proceeds from it. And if someone were to ask them whence they derived this kind of distinction, they would surely respond that the divine Scriptures are the source of this opinion. Yet Dionysius and Hierotheus—whose words have been called by apostolic men "second Scriptures"—know nothing of this distinction. This is evident, for it is impossible to find it anywhere in their writings. Or if the Latins demonstrate the contrary, we will remain silent. If no such union or distinction is found in their words—nor anything else believed to be supernaturally fitting for the Trinity—then necessarily the Scriptures also abstain from it. Why? Because their intention and constant principle remained unshaken: to omit nothing concerning divine unions or distinctions that may be found in Scripture. And concerning these (unions and distinctions), they carefully examined what they could say. They write in the chapter On Common and Particular Theology: "Theology delivers to us certain truths common [to the three Persons] and others particular [to one Person]. Now, it would be sacrilegious to separate what is common or to confuse what is distinct. But, docile to the teaching we have received, it befits us, according to our strength, to rise toward the divine splendors. For it is there

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that, receiving the divine revelations as the most beautiful rule of truth, we will zealously guard the deposit of these revelations—without increasing, diminishing, or altering them in any way."

3. These holy men, then, took care neither to add what theology itself rejects nor to omit any union or distinction found in Scripture. Their surest principle was this: to maintain the truths found in Scripture without increasing, diminishing, or altering them. Yet this new distinction—which claims that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, which is great and important, and which, according to this new doctrine, alone can distinguish the thearchic persons—nowhere appears in the words of these holy men. Is it not evident that such a distinction appears nowhere in divine Scripture? And if the Latins concede truth to the successors of the apostles, even they would not attribute this distinction to their words but would say they know it and persuade others of it based on certain Church doctors. But the argument is dangerous and insufficient to persuade even themselves of such things. For theological doctrine and apostolic tradition declare that nothing should be dared—or even thought—about God beyond the sacred sayings divinely expressed for us.

4. The same (Hierotheus and Dionysius) say in the same treatise: "But we believe it important to go back and better expound all kinds of divine union and distinction, so that our reasoning may be perfectly clear, leaving no room for ambiguity or obscurity, and that its proper object may be defined precisely, clearly, and methodically." They promised to expound all kinds of divine distinction and union and, moreover, to define the divine realities—that is, neither to add nor omit anything fitting. Yet they appear to omit the kinds of distinction and union that the Latins now introduce: the distinction by which the Spirit is distinguished from the Son as cause and that which proceeds from Him, and the union by which the Father and the Son are one emitter. How, then, is it not easy to recognize that such a union and distinction are deceptive, false, and utterly foreign to the apostolic spirit?

The Drawbacks of Latin Theology Compared to That of Dionysius.

5. Furthermore, the Latins, when they claim that the Father and the Son are one cause of the Spirit and one principle (*unum principium*), cannot deny that they attribute a certain union to the Father and Son that the Holy Spirit does not share. Yet it appears these blessed men (Hierotheus and Dionysius) were wholly ignorant of this union—precisely when they set out to expound both distinctions and every form of union. For had they known it, they would not have said: "All that is common to the Father and the Son is surely common to the Spirit." The same author writes in the same chapter: "All that belongs jointly to the Father and Himself, the Word also attributes to the thearchic Spirit as a common and unique reality." And if both opinions are true—theirs and the Latins'—who would oppose making the Spirit likewise an emitter? Or perhaps we must ask them for another person in the Trinity? For the Spirit certainly cannot emit Himself. And who

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could endure such absurdities, or whence would the necessity arise to uphold an impossibility? But the major premise is not so, for it is the thearchic Word who professed it. Therefore, the other must be false—for these men either did not know it or, rather, they did know it and recognized that it leads to absurdity. For if this were justified, one would either risk disbelief in the Triune God or, if one did not renounce the most glorious Trinity, deprive the Holy Spirit of perfect union with the Father and the Son. And surely, one would attribute to the God-Word—who is Truth itself and the source of Truth—the very opposite of what He is.

Therefore, emitting is not common to the Father and the Son, the Son is not an emitter, and the Holy Spirit does not proceed from Him.

6. Moreover, the same authors, in the chapter On Divine Union and Distinction, draw the following conclusion: "Thus, in our reasoning, we strive to unite and distinguish the divine properties according as these same properties correspond in God to union or distinction." And if they distinguish the Son and the Spirit only by a different procession—namely, by what they receive and by nothing else—and if they took special care [to define] what belongs to perfect and accomplished theology, and if their affirmation is that the divine realities are as they have transmitted them—what rational and intelligent being would seek another distinction of the thearchic persons? Or if one should appear, would he not judge it foreign to the Church and cast it out, since it leads far from God?

7. Furthermore, the teacher (Dionysius) promised to expound all kinds of divine union and distinction—that is, not to omit any union or distinction found in Scripture but to maintain them neither multiplied, diminished, nor changed. For example, the distinction by which the Word of God is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit by becoming man—he does not pass over it in silence. It has been clearly manifested to us on many occasions and was so evident that the apostles almost touched it with their hands. On the other hand, the distinction by which the Son is properly distinguished from the Spirit (according to the Latins) is without cause before all ages and incomprehensible, requiring divine revelation. It would seem that he forgot his promises and omitted it to the detriment of perfect Christian theology. But no—this is not the case. Rather, the one (distinction), though clear and known, he did not refrain from transmitting, for he knew it was firmly established in Scripture. The other, he did not dare profess, for it does not exist in Holy Scripture. As he himself says: "We must not dare to say or think anything about the supersubstantial divinity beyond the sacred divine words that have been professed to us."

8. Moreover, if the blessed Dionysius had intended other things and spoken of divine union and distinction as a kind of digression, it would surely be evident to anyone that he had reported some kinds of distinction or union while omitting others. But since he stands within the apostolic framework, it is clear that this is precisely where he remains, and his entire effort consists in enumerating all kinds and omitting none of those transmitted by Scripture—as well as

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in developing, elaborating, and illuminating what the divine Hierotheus had said briefly, rendering the word clear and coherent, and, most importantly, in defining, as he says, these realities. And it is evident that he, more than anyone, delved deeply and carried this to completion—to such an extent that none of those who have meditated on divine things has dared to reach his level or even approach it. How, then, is it reasonable for him—a man inspired by God—to be ignorant of or deliberately omit any kind of distinction or union, especially after so many commitments and promises, and after such study and meditation on divine things?

9. Furthermore, Dionysius and Hierotheus not only passed over this distinction in silence (as nowhere found in Scripture) but even rejected and cast it far from the Church, saying the very opposite. If, then, the Latins' hypothesis remains valid, it necessarily rejects apostolic teaching. And if one sought to salvage it, one ought not to relate it to this teaching. It is evident that if the Spirit derives His existence also from the Son (as they would say), it is impossible for the Son not also to be an emitter of the Holy Spirit. And if so, He must necessarily also be called source and cause of the Spirit. And if He is the source of the Spirit, it follows that He must be considered the source of divinity—if, at least, the Holy Spirit is supersubstantial divinity. And if the Son is the source of divinity and the Father likewise, these thearchic persons cannot be distinguished by being source [i.e., by the fact that one is source (the Father) and the other is not (the Son)]. Or else it would be pure madness to believe that the Father and the Son both share and are distinguished by the same things. But Hierotheus and Dionysius—who devoted all their attention to apostolic teaching—do not believe this. For they clearly distinguish the Father and the Son by being source. The divine Dionysius says in the same treatise: "In the theologies of the supersubstance, the distinction, as I have said, consists not only in that each of the Persons who are principles of unity subsists in the Unity itself without confusion or mixture with the others, but also in this: that the properties belonging to supersubstantial generation within the divinity are in no way interchangeable. In the supersubstantial divinity, the Father alone is source, and the Son is not father, nor the Father son. To each of the thearchic Persons belongs the inviolable privilege of His own praises." Thus, the teaching of apostolic tradition stands opposed to the Latins.

10. And if they wish to preserve both truths—to believe the Spirit proceeds from the Son and to distinguish the Father and the Son by the source of divinity (as stated above)—it follows that they must either resolve the contradiction within themselves or banish the Holy Spirit from divinity. For the Father and the Son could not then be distinguished by being source. And if, each being cause of divinity, a distinction were added, this would be plainly denounced by apostolic affirmation. It would amount to resolving the contradiction by conflating everything. And if this seems untenable to them (for even among them it is not accepted by their principles), then if they persist in the same opinion, they oppose the divinity of the Spirit. For if the Father is source of

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divinity—and if it is by this that He is distinct from the Son—then the Son cannot also be so. Just as the Son is distinguished from the Father by the unbegottenness and begetting [proper to the latter], and it is not permitted to call Him either unbegotten or Father, so too the Son is distinguished from the Father as source of divinity, and it is impossible for Him simultaneously to exist as source of divinity. And if He is not the source of divinity, yet the Holy Spirit proceeds from Him, then necessarily one must not believe the Holy Spirit is divinity. To believe the Spirit proceeds from the Son is to produce absurdities; one must therefore flee this opinion rather than fall into the abyss. Consequently, it is impossible for the Spirit to proceed from the Son.

The Orthodox Doctrine: The Father as Sole Source, Sole Begetter, and Sole Emitter

11. Indeed, just as supposing what the Latins believe produces many absurdities from their hypothesis, so too, if one supposes what we believe, no difficulty arises from this latter position. For if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son, then neither is the Son an emitter of the Spirit. And if He is not an emitter, He is likewise not at all a source of the Spirit. And if so, it follows that He must not be believed a source of divinity either. And if He is not the source of divinity, this will necessarily result in the Son being perfectly distinct from the Father. This is the conclusion of those who wish to safeguard the divinity of the Spirit and simply preserve apostolic teaching.

12. Moreover, the truth of apostolic doctrines has come down to us clearly, and we find our solutions therein. Likewise, since we proceed from this foundation, everything follows justly, for harmony extends throughout. For if we distinguish the Father and the Son by the divine source (as the apostles would say), and if the Father possesses being source as His property, no sound mind would then also call the Son a source of divinity—as already demonstrated above. And if this is impossible, how could one call Him an emitter of the Spirit? For if the emitter is necessarily also the source, then he who is not the source is likewise not the emitter—as the laws of conversion would most soundly affirm. Just as something that is not a triangle cannot be an isosceles triangle, or as one who is not a man cannot be a philosopher, or as one who utterly denies being an animal cannot in any way be a man—so too he who is not the source of divinity cannot possibly be the emitter of the Spirit. This is what we sought to demonstrate from the beginning.

13. Furthermore, to say the Father is the sole source of supersubstantial divinity is to affirm that, just as He is the sole begetter, He is also the sole emitter. For source encompasses both assertions, as Basil the Great says in his treatise Against Sabellius and the Anomoeans: "The Father exists in perfect being, lacking nothing, the root and source of the Son and the Holy Spirit." Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is supersubstantial divinity (as is the Son), and if one wishes to avoid the heresy of Macedonius, and if the Father remains the sole source of supersubstantial

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divinity (as theological affirmation explicitly requires), why then should one not necessarily believe the Father is the sole source of the Spirit? And if the Father is the sole source of the Spirit, He is also the sole emitter. And if He is the sole emitter and sole source of divinity, it is impossible for the Son to be so as well. For if the Son is also an emitter and source of divinity, the Father will not be the sole source of divinity, and the Son will not be distinguished from the Father by this—rather, because of this, they will become one. But apostolic teaching demands two things: (1) to distinguish the persons by source, and (2) that only the Father is acknowledged as source of divinity. How, then, are the Latins not adversaries of the apostles if they do not uphold these affirmations?

14. And certainly, if emitting the Spirit is equivalent to being the source of divinity (as already shown), if this is both a personal attribute and one belonging to the Father alone, if it serves to distinguish the Father and the Son (as the successors of the apostles have piously affirmed), and if such things are properties of the Father—yet one then believes the Son also possesses them—this amounts to destroying Christianity or rejoicing in the impiety of the Libyan [Sabellius]. Who would be so self-contradictory as to believe the Son an emitter of the Spirit?

Examples of Logic

15. Moreover, just as one who claims only man is an animal (distinguishing him from other animals) necessarily lies—since this quality also applies to the lion, the horse, and others—so too is there no denial by the apostles' successors as long as one claims the Father is the sole source of divinity to distinguish Him from the Son. But if one also attributes to the Son being source of divinity, this is absurd.

16. And surely, just as one who seeks to distinguish man from stone by the quality of being an animal does not simultaneously assert that the stone is in some way an animal—or who, wishing to distinguish man from horse by the quality of laughter, claims only man possesses this quality, not permitting the horse to possess it—so too does he soar toward impossible and vain hopes who thinks the Son is also a source of divinity, while the Father is the sole source of divinity and is distinguished from the Son by this.

Unity and Distinction in God

17. Furthermore, why conceal the blasphemy either of him who distinguishes the Father and the Son by divinity or of him who claims the Father is sole God to separate Him from the Son? Especially since the Father is God just as the Son is, and the two persons are one God, and to distinguish the two persons thus is to banish the Son from divinity. For this reason, Dionysius and Hierotheus are bound by similar propositions: while distinguishing the Father and the Son by source in divinity, they attribute being source solely to the Father. For if the Father is source of

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the Spirit's divinity, and if the Son is likewise source in the same way, the two persons will be one source and one principle of the Spirit. And to thus distinguish the supernatural hypostases, one would have to banish the Son from the divine source. But there are no Christians who could think such things about apostolic theology. They belong only to those who drive out Christianity under the pretext of piety. Therefore, the Son is not an emitter, and being source of divinity is in no way attributed to Him hypostatically.

18. Moreover, the same author writes in the same treatise: "Theology delivers to us certain truths relative to union, others relative to distinction. Now, it would be sacrilegious to divide what is united or to confuse what is distinct." Have you heard? To dare divide what is united is as grave as to confuse what is distinct. According to the same author, the Father is distinguished from the Son by the fact that the Father is source—and sole source—of divinity. And if the Son becomes source, this will introduce confusion into the divinity—the very divinity that has brought order to all else. Thus, the Latins associate source with the Father and the Son, considering them one emitter, one principle, and one source of the Spirit (*unum principium*). Apostolic tradition rejects this confusion and calls it sacrilegious, knowing it as the finest species of atheism.

Summary: Dionysius as a Criterion of Orthodoxy

19. To summarize briefly: we have shown that the Latins unite the Father and the Son by source, saying the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one source. On the other hand, those who immediately received the divine oracles from the apostles' own voices, learned their writings from them, and meditated with the apostles on apostolic truths—these distinguish the Father and the Son by source. Thus, the former [the Latins] claim the Son is also a source of divinity, while the latter [the apostles' successors] acknowledge only the Father as such. And the former maintain that this distinction—by which the Son is distinguished from the Spirit as cause and as that which proceeds from Him (the Son being considered cause of the Spirit, and the Spirit as proceeding from the Son)—is abundantly found in Scripture. But the latter promised to expound all kinds of divine unity and distinction, maintaining them exactly as found in Scripture—without increase, diminution, or alteration—expounding them clearly and methodically so that each may be well-defined. They say the Father is the sole source of divinity and do not distinguish the Son and the Spirit by the former being cause and the latter proceeding from Him. It is in any case manifest that they did not read Scripture or hear the apostles as the Latins have understood them. And the former [the Latins] do not distinguish the Son and the Spirit by a different procession, for they confess this distinction is imperfect and insufficient to distinguish the divine persons in a manner worthy of God. But the latter [the apostles' successors] consider it entirely fitting. They distinguish the Son from the

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Spirit by a different procession and thus conclude their discourse: "Thus, in our reasoning, we strive to unite and distinguish the divine properties according as these same properties correspond in God to unity or distinction." This is how the Latins have waged an undeclared war against apostolic traditions.

20. Furthermore, if the Holy Spirit did proceed also from the Son, and if this must necessarily be deduced from Scripture (as the Latins say), then many grave accusations would have to be leveled against the disciples of Dionysius and Hierotheus—as if they were not disciples of the apostles, nor teachers and masters of Orthodox faith, nor martyrs for the truth unto the shedding of blood, but rather deceivers and crude thinkers, more sophists than wise in divine things, and false witnesses of God and Scripture. For the Father and the Son would not be distinguished by being source, nor would the Father be the sole source of divinity. The divine persons are not distinguished by the distinctions they posit, but by those found in Scripture—and these, which we discuss, they did not maintain without increase or diminution, contrary to their promises. Rather, their entire discourse on divine union and distinction unfolds in contempt of conventions. On the contrary, reverence for their theological writings surpasses all, and these august commandments concerning theology are but actor's play and theatrical performance. And in the work of their deception, they enlist Timothy, Titus, and every apostle of the Lord who depends on their thought and tongue. But if this is absurd, leads to impiety, and is seen as a prime source of blasphemy (since the Church has honored their theology as second Scriptures), then what the Latins think is not true. The Spirit does not proceed from the Son, and for the emission of the Son, it is not the Father who transmitted it to the Son, nor is the Son associated with the Father in this. And it is not permitted to deny that the Church has been crowned by their words as by a kind of second Scripture appended to that which God Himself dictated. These men, a second choir after the apostles, became teachers and instructors of theology. The divine Dionysius, in the chapter *On Prayer*, says: "We believe that the treatise of Hierotheus, master of perfect and accomplished reasoning, must be reserved for an elite, as a kind of new Scripture appended to that which God Himself dictated. As for us, our role is to explain, in our own way and by analogy, the divine truths to minds at our own level." And the same Dionysius testifies that he writes in no other spirit than Hierotheus'. He concludes the chapter *On Prayer* as follows: "We too have entered the theological arena, not to bring anything new, but simply, by more meticulous and detailed research, to analyze and expound to others all that the excellent Hierotheus has reduced to essentials."

21. Furthermore, concerning the theology of distinctions, it is wrong to think that the blessed fathers would have omitted any common element out of fear of causing confusion. The same author says: "But there are also distinct names corresponding to distinct realities—all equally supersubstantial: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—for these terms are neither

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interchangeable nor common." If, then, among the names that distinguish the divinity, it is in no case fitting to introduce commonality, and if the divine persons are distinguished by being source, and if the Father is the sole source of divinity, then it is not right to attribute to the Son being source in any way. For commonality is strictly forbidden. And if being source does not belong to the Son, how is it possible for Him to be again a source of divinity and emitter of the Spirit, and for the Spirit to proceed from Him?

22. [Objection: And if they say that in the briefly expounded distinction, he (Dionysius) did not definitively exclude the possibility of commonality—] [Solution:] Their thinking is unsound. For he did not wish to distinguish here and confuse there the supersubstantial hypostases. But why did he completely exclude commonality? Certainly to avoid confusion. For he says: "It is not permitted to divide what is united, nor to confuse what is distinct." Therefore, it belongs to those who confuse to attribute being source also to the Son. And indeed, concerning the briefly expounded distinction, even if there is no additional specification in the divine names—I mean the mention of "alone"—nevertheless, the fact that this is called "theology of distinction" entails the total prohibition of imagining any commonality whatsoever. How, then, would the same not be even more valid in this distinction, which he himself called "perfect theology" and to which he assigned the specification of the word "alone"?

23. And certainly, just as when one says that only man is capable of laughter, or of intelligence, or of knowledge, one indicates no other animal besides man who is capable of laughter or knowledge—for the propositions can be reversed, and it amounts to the same thing—so too does reality itself affirm this, as does common reason. And he who has tasted, however little, of logical method—as well as those who have taught others logical methods—have often in their discourse taken one affirmation for another, because it amounts to the same. Thus, when someone says that only the Father is the source of divinity, he necessarily does not attribute being source of divinity to any other person in the Trinity besides the Father. And the blessed (Dionysius and Hierotheus) affirm that the divine persons are distinguished as they themselves have transmitted. Therefore, it is not necessary that being source be attributed to the Son. If, then, the Son is not necessarily the source of divinity, and if for Him being emitter undoubtedly means being source of divinity, how then could the Son be an emitter?

The Meaning of Latin "Monopatristism"

24. But what do the Latins reply? [Latin objection:] What may be conjectured from the teachings of the blessed Dionysius—namely, that the Holy Spirit does not also proceed from the Son—is not compelling. For first, when it is said that the Father is the sole source of divinity, this refers only to the Son and not to the Spirit. That is to say, the Father alone is the source of the Son. And this is evident from the fact that he here calls the Father "origin of God", and in saying

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He is the sole source of divinity, he deduces: "the Father is not the Son, and the Son is not the Father." Second, suppose someone forces the expression to show that when we say the Father is the sole source of divinity, this extends also to the Spirit—well then, here is how the Father is the sole source of divinity: He is the sole source of the two persons together and in common, but not the sole source of one of them. For the Father is not the sole cause of the Spirit, but the Son is also. Third, here is another way one may say the Father is the sole source of divinity: the Father is only source and certainly not from a source; the Son is source and from a source. If one accepts believing the Father is the sole source of divinity in these various senses, nothing prevents believing the Son is also a source of divinity. Those who love truth must not reject some interpretations and introduce one that necessarily deprives the Son of the greatest good He possesses, having received it from the Father. This is not just.

Response to the First Objection: Is the Father Sole Source of the Son?

25. This, then, is what they say. But in our defense, here is what we reply: First, it must be examined that the Latins admit their interpretation is not at all compelling. It remains for us to demonstrate that it is not even admissible, but rather adds impossibility to falsehood. And indeed, this has already been demonstrated—not only in the First Discourse, where the Latin hypothesis was exposed and many absurdities drawn from it, but also in this present discourse, where apostolic affirmations have been expounded. Reason has shown the impossibility of attributing source in any way to the Son—or, on the contrary, of conceiving any kind of commonality among the divine names that distinguish, for such a thing would be gross confusion and the beginning of many absurdities. As I have said, this has already been shown. And now we will demonstrate it in greater detail, for clarity's sake and to leave no room for heresy.

26. First, here is our response to the first objection: We know the Father as begetter and emitter. It has already been shown that the name "source" includes both. When we hear that the Father is the sole source of divinity, this is without any qualifying addition. We also know that it relates as source to the capacity to be source, and that for the theologians, the statement referred to the existential procession of the thearchic persons, and that just as the Son is supersubstantial divinity, so too is the Holy Spirit. With source, we come to mention of the Son and the Spirit, clearly acknowledging not only the divinity that brings forth the Son but also that which brings forth the Holy Spirit. And when we add "alone", we believe no other person in the Trinity [but the Father] possesses the source—without adding to what is written, nor subtracting, nor staining theology with the notions of petty minds. The Latins, however, even if these arguments are compelling, do not—by necessity of reason—acknowledge the Father as sole source of divinity absolutely and without qualification, but they add: "sole source of the Son's divinity." This is to equate the general with the particular—which is absurd. For if the

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Father is simply the sole source of divinity, He is also necessarily the sole source of the Son's divinity. But if He were the sole source of the Son, it would not at all be true to call Him source of divinity without qualification, as this blessed one did.

27. Moreover, if the theologian had said the Father was the sole source of the Son, and if, because of this statement, we were to take it as referring to the entire divinity, would they not be indignant and say we oppose both common reason and the teaching of the Spirit? Let them hear it from us—they who tolerate assertions of this sort. For the blasphemy is equal whether one claims the Father, as sole source of divinity without qualification, is only source of the Only-Begotten's divinity, or whether one says simply that He is source of divinity when He is only source of the Son. [Objection: And if someone accuses us for the same reason, saying that even we do not interpret "the Father is simply the sole source of divinity" without qualification—for He is certainly not the sole source of His own divinity, but only of the divinity that springs from Him—here is what we reply:] [Solution:] There is no place here for considering the Father's divinity. For the Father is called source of divinity, and source refers to what proceeds from the source; it does not turn back on itself. Therefore, the coherence of the statement compels us to accept that if this were added, it would be superfluous.

28. Next, among the divine names, we distinguish those that refer to the essence and those that refer to the person. When we speak of names referring to the essence, we mean those that belong to each thearchic person and to the three Persons together. Such names are expressed in the singular, not the plural. On the other hand, by personal names, we mean all those that do not fit this category but, as already said, differ in manner. Among these personal names, those to which the word "alone" is added refer to one person and cannot be applied to several. Names without "alone" do not refer to one person but to many. It is evident that only the Father is called unbegotten, and unbegottenness applies to no other person. The same holds when we say the Father alone is begetter, the Son alone is begotten, and the Holy Spirit alone is He who proceeds. But concerning caused person or Paraclete, no soundly pious person would add "alone". Indeed, you will find nowhere the addition of "alone"; there is no place for it. For the Son is caused, and the Holy Spirit is also caused. The Son is a Paraclete (as the Apostle says), and the Lord declares the Holy Spirit to be another Paraclete. The names source and cause, which we now examine, are among the divine names and are personal. They are not expressed of all three Persons. Therefore, the precision of "alone" has been fittingly assigned to them. It is impossible for such names to belong to multiple persons. What remains, then, but to believe it is impossible to attribute the name source or cause to two persons, and to hold that the designation necessarily refers to one thearchic person—and that those of a contrary opinion wage war against themselves? If this is true, then necessarily neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit may be considered sources of divinity, since only the Father is named source of divinity. And if the Son

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is not a source of divinity, it is vain to interpret the theological statement to mean the Father is sole source of the Son's divinity but not also of the Spirit's.

29. Moreover, this being posited, it consequently annuls the promise of the blessed Dionysius and asserts things contrary to the evidence. Here is how: Earlier, he transmitted the word on union and distinction in God briefly, not perfectly and fully. Later, he promised to transmit it completely, so that the statement would be easy to understand, clear, and the theology secured by certain definitions—so that no one might presume to think from his own notions. Here is what he says in the brief teaching on distinction: "But there are also distinct names corresponding to distinct realities—all equally supersubstantial: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—for these terms are neither interchangeable nor common." In this brief passage, he thus transmitted three distinctions in number and distinguished all the divine persons from one another, even if he had not fully expounded his discourse on distinction. Thus, the Father, who begat the Son, is distinguished from the Son and the Spirit—the one (the Son) because He is begotten of Him, and the Spirit because He does not have the capacity to beget. Yet the Spirit is also not the Son, for in them there is no commonality or reversal, since the Spirit is not begotten either. And the third distinction we know most soundly. These are the distinctions we learned in his brief teaching. In the other, we will see the aim of his discourse, what the teacher promises, and what the new theology desires. Here is the promise: "But we believe it important to go back and better expound all kinds of divine union and distinction, so that our reasoning may be perfectly clear, leaving no room for ambiguity or obscurity, and that its proper object may be defined as precisely, clearly, and methodically as possible." This was the promise. And here is the fulfillment: "In the theologies of the supersubstance, the distinction consists not only, as I have said, in that each of the Persons who are principles of unity subsists in the Unity itself without confusion or mixture with the others, but also in this: that the properties belonging to supersubstantial generation within the divinity are in no way interchangeable. In the supersubstantial divinity, the Father alone is source, and the Son is not father, nor the Father son; to each of the thearchic Persons belongs the inviolable privilege of His own proper praises." These are the unions and distinctions according to inexpressible union and existence.

30. If, then, according to this new distinction, the Father is judged to be the sole source of supersubstantial divinity, the Father is distinguished only from the Son by cause [property of the Father] and being from [property of the Son]—not from the Spirit. These distinctions risk being as numerous as those he enumerated earlier in his brief discourse and identical to them. And this being posited, it follows that the theologian's proposition is destroyed. Not only is the complete statement on distinction in God annihilated, bringing nothing more original here, but further, if this interpretation prevailed, what he transmitted in the brief statement would no longer be evident. And there, in the sequel of the argument, with proper names, he made everything clear

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and easy to know. Here, on the contrary, according to this interpretation, having taken general names instead of particular ones, we lack even the courage to ask what the statement means—for [the Latins] understand that source is equivalent to the Father and that divinity which brings forth is equivalent to the Son's divinity. And it turns out that the first teaching contains a more perfect reasoning on distinction in God, for there all the thearchic persons were distinguished clearly and methodically. Whereas the distinction that he characterizes as most perfect, expounded clearly and methodically and perfectly evident, proves to be the most unworthy of all and the least clear—the divine persons having been distinguished with no hope of perfecting this distinction. But this is absurd. He who advances an interpretation must at least strive by all means to preserve the aim of the discourse, lest he resemble one who shamelessly wears a physician's robes while acting as an executioner.

31. Furthermore, the brief distinction transmitted to us (1) the Father of divine persons, (2) the Son, and (3) the Spirit. Nowhere does the Father appear as cause of the Spirit. He is certainly the cause of the Son—common reason demands this. But how could He be so of the Spirit? If the Spirit is not the Son, He never had a Father. This is what St. Maximus testifies in his Dialogue: "The Spirit has no Father, for He is not begotten." If, then, according to the first distinction, we do not know the Father as cause of the Spirit, and if we do not do so according to the more perfect distinction either (as the pending interpretation would have it—for it does not believe the theological statement extends to the Spirit, but only to the Son), these reasonings lead us to conclude that the Father is not distinguished from the Spirit by cause and being from. It would seem the blessed Dionysius was ignorant of the Lord's divine words when He said the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. His greatest concern was to omit no union or distinction found in Scripture, but to maintain them without increase, diminution, or alteration, and moreover to fully transmit what is said of transcendent distinction. Yet he, it seems, would have omitted connecting the Spirit's existence to the Father! If it is utterly thoughtless even to entertain this, then necessarily we are dealing with falsehood when someone upholds this theological statement that granted being source to the Father alone—toward the Son alone—without any reference to the Spirit. And if the argument's exposition is thereby annulled on this point as well, I do not know where novelty will find its footing.

32. Moreover, if we retain their interpretation, we will in no way—least of all this way—preserve what the theologian intends: namely, that each hypostasis retains its proper property, so long as they claim the sole source of divinity applies only to the Son alone, but not at all to the Spirit. For what applies to each hypostasis cannot apply to two of them.

33. And if, their interpretation being sound, this precise proposition is annihilated, then necessarily our interpretation itself preserves the soundness [of faith], so as to (1) safeguard the theologian's aim, (2) dispel the aforementioned absurdities, (3) restore all reason for divine

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distinction, (4) distinguish all thearchic persons—not merely containing the three distinctions counted earlier but recapitulating seven in total. Thus, the discourse's original proposition will be preserved, maintaining what was received earlier while unveiling what had been omitted. This is how every kind of distinction in God will be known. For here is the truth of the matter.

34. If the Father is thus the sole source of supersubstantial divinity—that is, of the Son and the Spirit—of the one as His sole begetter and of the other as His sole emitter, then first, we do not distinguish the Father and the Spirit only by begetting (as previously said), but also by cause and being from.

35. Next, since the Father is the sole source of the Spirit, we will distinguish the Father and the Son by the capacity to emit, for the Son does not possess this property. If the divine persons are only three, and if the Father alone possesses the cause and source of divinity, then necessarily the Father is also alone unbegotten—that is, without cause. And if the Father were not without cause but were from a cause, He would be so either from the Son, or the Spirit, or something else. But if He were from the Son or the Spirit, this would be absurd. For the same persons could not be both caused and cause for themselves. It is likewise impossible to suppose the Father is from someone else. For then the thearchic persons would not be three, and God would not be Trinity—nor would the Father even be sole source of divinity, since it would be far more just that this other [person or thing] from whom the Father proceeds be the source of divinity. But this other would not be from itself, for it would happen to be both caused by itself and cause of itself. If all this is absurd, then necessarily the sole source of divinity must also be without cause—that is, unbegotten—and must be distinguished from the Son and the Spirit by being unbegotten.

36. The brief distinction did not include this. For the Father was not mentioned as sole source of divinity or sole source of the Spirit. And this certainly does not necessarily follow from the fact that one is the Father, another the Son, and another the Spirit—as shown above. Thus, this theology reveals four more kinds of divine distinctions. Before, there were three; now there are seven in total. All kinds of divine distinctions are encompassed, as we had promised to demonstrate from the beginning. And if we also recall the nature that the Word of God assumed, it is likewise from this that He is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit. Nor had the blessed (Dionysius and Hierotheus) passed over this distinction in silence, for it is a constraint of Scripture and due to their promise to expound every kind of supernatural distinction. Dionysius will increase the number of distinctions in God, and he will say what agrees both with us and with the Spirit's teaching. Here, he has named begetting and emission as "generation within the divinity." Therefore, the terms of begetting are "begetter" and "begotten", and those of emission are "emitter" and "emitted." And it is utterly inadmissible to mix them. For the begetter could not change into the begotten, nor the emitted into the emitter.

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37. Let no one be troubled that emission is characterized as generation within the divinity. For generation, like the dignity of being from the source and cause, also refers to the Spirit. For the divine Dionysius writes in the same treatise: "We praise God as Trinity, because of the manifestation in three hypostases of the supersubstantial generation, from which all fatherhood in heaven and on earth receives its being and name." And if generation referred only to the Son and not to the Spirit, God would no longer be Trinity but duality. But the theologian called God "Trinity" because of generation. And even if we speak as they do—since here generation within the divinity refers principally to the Father (just as we say that from the Father comes not only the Son but also the Spirit, and before us, God the Word Himself says this)—there is no obstacle to professing that the Spirit is from the generation within the divinity, just as the Son is also from it, while safeguarding the difference of modes [by which each is so]. And the precision that "the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father" served as an example to clarify the statement, so as to maintain nearly the same reasoning for the other distinctions. Who, desiring to live piously, would not approve this? This is what we had to reply to the first objection.

Response to the Second Objection: Is the Father Sole Source of Both Persons Together?

38. Concerning the second objection, after what has just been expounded, the solution is not difficult. Indeed, if it has been demonstrated that the Father's being sole source of divinity also refers to the Spirit—and if this has no validity—then all reason for distinction in God is destroyed, and the apostles' successors no longer distinguish the Father from the Son by the former being cause and the latter being from Him. And the Father is separated both from the Son and from the Spirit by emitting, just as He is separated from both persons together by begetting. It is impossible for source and cause in theology to belong to two persons. Therefore, it is vain to claim to believe the Father is sole source of divinity in such a way that He alone is the source of the Son and Spirit together—without being the sole source of each—but rather being sole source for the one (the Son), while for the Spirit, He would be so with the Son.

39. Moreover, consider this example: it is impossible to equate the statement "only man is an animal" with "only man is a laughing animal", because the one is always false and the other always true. Likewise, it is impossible, instead of the statement "the Father is sole source of divinity", to understand "He is sole source of the divinity of both Persons together." For the first was stated absolutely, to separate from the Son the being source—which, according to the Latins, is a falsehood—whereas the second was not stated absolutely. And so, how could one equally attribute to the Son the quality of source? This is their first concern. And if it is impossible to take one statement for another, then the Latins, consequently, do not acknowledge themselves united to apostolic teaching, nor to common reason and dialectical rules, but rather force the rule toward their own interpretation.

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40. And apart from this, if the Father is this sole source of divinity, it necessarily follows that He must not be considered simply as sole source of divinity. For example, when we say "man is the only laughing animal", it follows that he is not the only animal. If, then, the statement "being sole source of divinity" acquires a similar interpretation, it follows that one does not believe in a sole source of divinity—and risks concluding that the sole source of divinity is not the sole source of divinity. This is to confound all things, even to believing being is no different from non-being. This is how the Latins speak with ease and imprudence.

41. Moreover, the famous argument that the Latins strive by all means to avoid turns against them in a hidden manner, as long as this exegesis remains evident. If the Father is the sole source of the Son and the Spirit in such a way—being united to both Persons simultaneously—He is certainly not the source of each individually, and the addition of the word "alone" draws the distinction toward the Son by opposition; He too is a source, though certainly not of both Persons, but of the Spirit alone. Consequently, from these words, two sources of divinity necessarily arise. They are so distinct from one another that one is clearly set apart in opposition to the other.

42. And apart from this, such an interpretation of the theological statement does nothing but affirm that the Father alone is the principle of the Son, while the Father and the Son together are considered the principle of the Spirit. Both of these, as already demonstrated, Thomas—in a chapter of the fourth book of *Contra Gentiles*—calls distinct principles. And if these principles are distinct, and if the distinction is hypostatic and located in different Persons, then one principle is one thing and the other is another, not merely in word but undoubtedly in reality. And if in this way one principle is one thing and the other another, how could these words not entail two principles? And if they wish to avoid speaking of two principles by claiming that the qualification does not distinguish the Son by opposition, let them tell us which Person this distinction concerns. They will not say the Spirit, for the word "alone" would be superfluous, since even among them the Spirit is in no way a source. It remains, then, that the addition has been uttered in vain. But for us, since we believe the Father is the sole source of the Son and the sole source of the Spirit, such absurdities, of course, do not arise. Because only the hypostasis of the Father is invoked, the uniqueness of the cause and the numerical oneness of the source are perfectly preserved. And the qualification "alone" is not spoken in vain. For the Father is the sole source of the Son—certainly not the Spirit as well—and the sole source of the Spirit—certainly not the Son as well.

43. Furthermore, Thomas, faced with this interpretation, will not remain calm but will grow indignant and cry out, unable to bear seeing his theology mutilated. First, he will confess that he does not recognize this kind of interpretation. For his interpretation does not distinguish the Father and the Son according to "source" and "that which proceeds from," but it is the term

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"source" that divides the Persons: the Father, who is the sole source of both together, and the Son, who is a source—but not a source in the same way. Yet no one is unaware that this necessarily implies a distinction other than the one mentioned earlier—namely, the division of Persons according to the source and that which proceeds from it. And this Thomas does not accept in the twenty-fifth chapter of the fourth book of *Contra Gentiles*, rigorously maintaining that there is no other distinction between the Father and the Son except that of "cause" and "that which proceeds from." He states that the divine Persons are distinguished from one another "only by the opposition of relation." And further: "The divine Persons can only be distinct by the opposition of relation according to cause." And again: "The Father and the Son are not distinct according to the unity of essence but only insofar as one is Father and the other Son." If we are not satisfied with this interpretation—nor are the most distinguished among the Latins—then who could approve of it?

Arguments and Syllogisms

44. Moreover, wishing to prove that none of their interpretations—with which they dare to assail us—are valid, let us also be permitted to reason with syllogisms. Here it is: If the Father is the sole source of divinity and thereby distinguished from the Son, the Son will absolutely not be a source of divinity. This will be so either because He is not the source of His own divinity or because He is not the source of the divinity of the Father or the Spirit. And it is not permissible to invent the divinity of another Person!

45. [Objection:] And if they respond that just as the Father is called the sole source of divinity because He alone is the cause of both together, so the Son is not a source of divinity because He is not the cause of Himself and the Spirit together but only of the Spirit? [Solution:] It is again necessary to return to the same points. They do not call the Son the source of Himself and the Spirit conjointly, since He is not the source of Himself. But they wish Him to be, in a limited way, the source of the Spirit, without, of course, believing Him to be the source of divinity, since He is not the cause of Himself. Is this not utterly absurd? Such reasoning is far more suited to stage actors and sophists than to theologians. And certainly, the Father is not spared such a designation either, for even He is not the cause of Himself. It follows that He too could be said not to be the source of divinity. Therefore, this would apply to the Son rather than being denied of Him. But this is not the case here. For the purpose of this statement is precisely distinction. Furthermore, given this, according to theological opinion, the Father would also be the sole source, whereas according to this astonishing interpretation, He would also be a non-source—and neither in the proper sense!

46. Moreover, here is the trap they fall into in their third type of interpretation: they claim the Father is the sole source because He alone is the one who causes procession but does not proceed

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from a source. If, then, the Father is the sole source—and also a non-source since He is not the cause of Himself—the Father would be both the sole source and not the sole source. And beyond this, one risks expelling causality altogether, since it is not self-caused. Indeed, to call the Father a non-source because He is not the source of Himself is tantamount to calling Him a non-Father because He did not beget Himself, and a non-emitter because He did not emit Himself. And if it is true to say that the Father is not God of Himself, the reasoning compels us to say that He is non-God. Thus, the First Cause will be both Father and non-Father, emitter and non-emitter, God and non-God. And the same will be said of the Son. For if the Father is a non-source because He is in no way the source of Himself, neither will the Son be "that which proceeds from the source," because He does not proceed from Himself—that is, He is Son because He proceeds from the Father, and non-Son because He does not proceed from Himself. But what could be more absurd, more impudent, or more senile than this theology? For no sane person would call the Father a non-Father, non-cause, or non-God because He is not Father, cause, or God of Himself—nor a non-source of divinity because He does not cause His own divinity to proceed. Therefore, no rational person would sanely call the Son a non-source of divinity simply because He is in no way the cause of His own divinity. Furthermore, if the Father is praised as the source of divinity because He is the source of Himself—something that cannot apply to the Son, since He did not beget Himself—and if this is absurd (because He received this title by His own nature), how could the Son justly be subjected to such claims?

47. But certainly, the Son is not rightly called a non-source of divinity simply because He does not cause the divinity of the Father to proceed. For if He were capable of causing it to proceed—as the Lord testifies—we would expect something entirely different. That each Person does not cause Himself or is not His own cause is entirely true. But to argue that, for this reason, He is not a source is ridiculous. Such reasoning contradicts reality, linguistic usage, and all plausibility. When we say someone has not become a father, it is not because he did not beget himself or his own father (for that belongs to madmen), but because he has not begotten another who proceeds from him. Likewise, when we say of the Son that He is not the source of divinity, we must refuse to understand this concerning His own divinity or that of the Father. Instead, we must seek a supra-essential divinity of another Person who proceeds from the Father and for whom the Son is not the source—thus distinguishing Him in relation to the Son. The Son, who does not cause this divinity to proceed, will not be called the source of divinity. For if the Father is distinguished from the Son by being the source, and if the Father is the sole source of divinity, then necessarily the Son is not the source of divinity—and what was said earlier becomes impossible. Therefore, for this reason, it is impossible to regard the Son as the source of divinity. It necessarily follows that the Son is not the source of divinity because He does not cause the Holy Spirit to proceed. Just as each Person is called a source or cause—not because He is the cause of Himself or His

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cause, but because He causes another Person to proceed from Him—so too the Son is not the source of divinity, not because He does not cause Himself or the Father to proceed, but because He is not the source of the Spirit's divinity. This remaining divinity of the Spirit is therefore other than Him and is also not hypostatically identical to the Father. Consequently, the Latins must choose one of two propositions: either not to profess the Son as a non-source of divinity or not to believe that the Spirit's existence comes through Him. But the first proposition suits those who deny apostolic theology. Therefore, only the second remains—which is correct: to believe in no way that the Son is also the emitter of the Spirit. Otherwise, we would betray apostolic teaching, and it would, moreover, be absurd.

48. Furthermore, it is not permissible to attribute both the cause of relation and the distinction by opposition to the same thing, for this is impossible. For when we say the Son is begotten by the Father alone, the word "alone" does not refer to the Son but to the act of begetting, whereas the distinction by opposition refers to the Spirit because the Son does not also proceed from the Spirit. Therefore, if there were only two divine Persons, we would certainly and without doubt say that the Father begets the Son—but not at all that the Father alone begets the Son. For the distinction by opposition among the Persons refers to the divine Persons themselves and not to anything else. All this being so, when the source is connected to that which proceeds from it, the qualification "alone"—to avoid being meaningless—requires a distinction by opposition to someone else. If, according to the novel interpretation, the Father is the sole source of the Son and the Spirit as being the source of both together—but not the sole source of each separately—let us examine the word "alone": what could it distinguish by opposition? Either the two who are in relation, or one of the two (the Son or the Spirit), or something else. But to make the distinction in relation to those who are in relation together is impossible. For reason demands a distinction by opposition in relation to one and not to those under discussion, since the same Persons cannot proceed from themselves. And if the distinction is in relation to the Son alone—because He is not the source of both together but only of the Spirit—this too does not hold. First, because it is not in relation to someone else (so that the distinction by opposition would be justified), and second, what would be the two Persons for whom the Son is not the source? For God is not a quaternity. There remains only the Spirit, who could attribute causality to the Son.

49. [Objection:] And if they respond that the Son is not the source of both—that is, of Himself and the Father—but necessarily is so for the Spirit? [Solution:] But it has just been shown that it is entirely impossible to believe the Son is a non-source of divinity on the pretext that He is not the source of Himself. But certainly, we will not attribute to the Spirit the distinction by opposition implied by "alone," for the Spirit is also not the source of divinity, and the distinction cannot in any way be made in relation to anything external. And how could this be just, as long as the distinction refers to the Person? It remains, then, that the qualification "alone" has been

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spoken in vain, since there is no one left for whom the distinction by opposition could be made. But this is absurd.

50. And indeed, if it is entirely permissible to add, why do we not advance counter-arguments against theirs? We would have long been freed from these concerns by adding this to the Lord's words: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father—the Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father alone." If this is forbidden (lest we consider as found what is sought), the Latins are even less justified in thinking such things on their own, since the words of the Teacher are definitive. For these concern the qualities of the thearchic Persons. And apart from this, the addition would not be easily accepted, even if admissible—not only because of what has already been said but also because it cannot be sometimes possible and sometimes believed. What, then, must we think of this addition, which involves such incoherence and impossibility, even rising against common reason and insufficient to provide an explanation in itself? Therefore, the common Master of the faith expressed the words simply and without qualification, whereas human qualifications, examined from multiple angles, lead to a dead end. It remains, then, absolutely necessary to understand that the apostolic statement does not admit any qualification or addition—and it is in this way that we must believe the Father is the sole source of divinity, as the sole unbegotten and sole begetter. The apostolic faith cannot be established otherwise.

51. Moreover, if any justification were given to the Latin interpretation, it would be necessary to distinguish the Son and the Spirit by "cause" and "that which proceeds from." And the Father, according to the Latins' claims, would become—together with the Son—a single being in terms of the capacity to emit. But this was never the mind of the apostles' successors, for the Scriptures say no such thing. The proof, as demonstrated earlier, is that the blessed Doctor [Dionysius] does not attribute to the Son the cause of the Spirit, especially since he had promised to transmit the transcendent distinction in its entirety. Therefore, it is absurd to accuse him of things he himself concealed in the Scriptures as unworthy of notice—just as sycophants accuse others of distortions they allegedly produced. And all this permits no commonality in what distinguishes the divine names.

52. Furthermore, whatever God possesses alone, He also possesses absolutely alone. This is clear when we consider both essential and personal names. For example, He is alone good and also alone God in an absolute sense—He knows all things and is omnipotent. But the same principle applies to personal names. The Father is alone Father and alone in an absolute sense; He is not partly "alone" and partly "not-alone," for there is nothing accidental in Him. Likewise, the Son is clearly alone Son and alone absolutely. The same holds for the Spirit. Thus, it is the same with being the source of divinity: if the Father is the sole source of divinity, He is so absolutely. He is not in one way the sole source and in another way not—a notion that, of

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course, suits the Latins. And if the Father is the sole source absolutely, this cannot in any way be shared with the Word.

53. Beyond this, no rational person would claim that someone possesses as proper to himself what does not belong to him absolutely alone but only in a qualified sense. For what is not his absolutely cannot be counted among his distinctive properties—such as the capacity to laugh or the faculty of reason and knowledge. How could these belong to man alone in one respect, yet not in another? Is this not true of all attributes proper to each being? If, then, for created beings, what is proper is so clearly distinguished from what is not, how could we say of the supra-essential Persons that what does not belong to them absolutely under some aspect could truly be their proper quality? How can we properly distinguish what is not proper? This is absurd. The apostles' successors distinguished the divine names just as the divine realities are distinct—that is, by the Persons to which they refer.

54. Moreover, no one treating these matters and examining particular attributes would ever assert an absolute attribute where it does not exist, nor grant it partially where it exists absolutely. For example, one investigating the specific difference of man would not claim that man is the only animal or that the olive tree is the only tree, for these qualities ("animal" and "tree") are shared with others. Indeed, Dionysius—who above all others knew how to define divine realities—would not ascribe to the Father, as a proper quality, the fact of being the source if this belonged in any way to the Son. Consider another example: you cannot distinguish man and horse by "animality," for you recognize the relation is false and impossible. Instead, you distinguish them by a specific kind of animal, for the difference between man and beast concerns being rational or irrational. Would you think it tolerable to believe this blessed theologian [Dionysius] ignored dialectical rules—or that he acknowledged the Son as a source of divinity while distinguishing Father and Son by an absolute source, not a qualified one? If you distinguish earth and fire indefinitely by "burning," you would never say earth burns. Likewise—and far more so—the blessed Dionysius distinguished the thearchic hypostases by the source absolutely, so that the Father is the sole source of divinity, without naming the Son or Holy Spirit as sources.

55. Indeed, what the properties express in the thearchic Persons, in other things we grasp through definitions. For divine realities are utterly beyond definition. The flaw of a definition is to say either too much or too little. How could the Doctor [Dionysius] be ignorant of this? And if he knew it, why would he deliberately omit it? His foremost concern was to safeguard not only truth but also clarity—to present everything methodically, to expand and illuminate all that Hierotheus had briefly expounded.

56. Furthermore, many speak of God, and many are the attributes in God. If theologians ever treated another common attribute as proper to one Person to distinguish the divine Persons, let

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this be granted, and let the other proposition follow. But if no one has ever professed this—quite the contrary—and if a proper attribute is never taken as a common one, then necessarily, being the source was ascribed to the Father alone to distinguish Him, and it belongs to no other. Otherwise, the following absurdity arises: one who claimed the Son is the sole divinity proceeding from the source would necessarily lie, for the Spirit also proceeds from the source. The same rule would apply to one who believed the Father is the sole source of divinity while holding the Son is also a source of divinity. In short, concerning source and cause: if one professes the Father is truly the sole source of divinity and the Son is also a source, why not apply the same principle to what proceeds from the cause and source? If this is absurd—and no sound theologian would say the Son or Spirit is the sole divinity proceeding from the source—why should we count as truthful one who claims the Father is the sole source of divinity while the Son is also the source of the Holy Spirit? This is impossible. Just as "proceeding from the Father" was never treated as a proper attribute but as a common one between the Son and Spirit, so too the Son being a source of the Spirit was never accepted by the theology of divine unity. Thus, what is professed as a common attribute must not be treated as particular in any way, and what is professed as a proper attribute must never be accepted as common. Therefore, being the source of divinity is not a common attribute—especially between Father and Son—but the Father alone is the source of divinity absolutely, the sole principle, the sole cause, and the Son is so in no way.

57. Moreover, if theological doctrine taught that being the source of divinity is a common attribute of Father and Son, and if we had carefully distinguished the Father and Son by being the source of divinity—saying the Father is the sole source of divinity—would not the Latins rightly accuse us of falsehood, impudence, and madness for so boldly contradicting theological affirmations? How, then, can these same Latins claim it is true that the Son is also a source of divinity when theological doctrine distinguishes the divine Persons by the source and affirms the Father alone is the source of divinity? This is impossible. For if it is impossible to twist a common attribute into a proper one, how much worse is it to call a proper attribute common to other Persons?

58. Furthermore, theologians have long practiced classifying: Common names of the Trinity (or those belonging to certain thearchic Persons) under the theology of unity; Proper names, pertaining to one Person separately, under the theology of distinction. To mix a proper attribute with a common one and present the result as a particular distinction—different from the original quality—was rejected by theologians as excessive, superfluous, vain ambition, and outright absurdity. For example: Unbegotten and begotten are clearly proper to the Father and Son; The name God is common, and thus the Trinity is called one God. But you will not find in these theologians' works the name God combined with unbegotten to introduce a novel distinction

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between Father and Son beyond "unbegotten." And this is right. For two outcomes arise: (1) Either the two are equal, and no difference exists in the mode of distinction in God—but this is chatter and endless ambition; (2) Or one differs from the other—but this is false, and discourse on divine distinction spirals into infinity. Indeed, if the proper names in God are few and the common names many (e.g., twenty or thirty), then linking each proper attribute to each common one will generate distinctions beyond the original ones. Suppose five names concern distinction in God, and thirty concern commonality: this yields 150 distinctions. If each distinction is combined with two common attributes, another set emerges—and so on ad infinitum. Yet the apostles' successors regarded theology as concise, clear, and evident. You will not find such complexity in the Doctors of Theology. Dionysius, who promised to profess all distinctions, would scarcely have missed even a few. But the Latins' method produces distinctions beyond counting. If this is absurd—contrary to the theologians' practice, Dionysius' aim, and all theological teaching—it follows that the Latins misread Dionysius' mind.

59. Here is another argument showing the harm of such distinction: If the Latins profess that begetting and emitting together distinguish Father and Son just as the proper attribute of begetting does, then Dionysius is a liar—for he promised to expound the most perfect mode of distinction without introducing novelties, affirming only what is in the concise tradition. But if the Latins insist these introduce different distinctions, then Thomas, their Doctor, is necessarily a liar when he asserts (in *Contra Gentiles* IV.25) that the Father is distinguished from the Son only as Father and Son. Thus, shipwreck awaits on both sides: we cannot accept this interpretation as fitting either our tradition or the Latin Church's.

60. Finally, once each thearchic Person is defined fittingly, every personal attribute containing the word alone distinguishes that Person from the other two. Just as "the Father alone is unbegotten" or "alone is the Begetter" distinguishes Him from the Son and Spirit, so too must we understand "the Son alone is begotten" and "the Spirit alone proceeds." The first phrase separates the Son from the Father and Spirit; the second distinguishes the Spirit from the Father and Son. As shown earlier, when Dionysius professes the Father is the sole source of divinity, his primary aim is to distinguish Him from the Son and Spirit. If, then, we accept the Latins' novel explanation—that the Father alone begets and emits together to distinguish Him from the Son—we cannot do so gladly. For to distinguish the Father from the Son, the "together" is meaningless, since the Spirit has no quality of being a source. Thus, this explanation fails necessarily on both counts: (1) Either it adds unreal distinctions contrary to all usage; (2) Or it proves the addition useless and vain.

61. Here is another reason why the Latin explanation does not align with Dionysius' intent. He declares his reasoning to be clear, perfectly evident, methodical, and well-defined, leaving no room for ambiguity or obscurity. In contrast, what the Latins say is not only equivocal and

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laborious, but this kind of reasoning is also difficult to articulate and comprehend. For in the context of distinction, what could be more obscure than hearing that the Father is the sole source of divinity—without understanding this divine affirmation in the same way as other affirmations of like nature, such as "the Father alone is unbegotten," or "the Son alone is begotten," or "the Paraclete alone proceeds"? Instead, they encircle themselves with convolutions, fabricate additional definitions, mix all things together, and conceal enigmas to arrive at their doctrinal explanation. The Doctor [Dionysius], however, forbids distinguishing what is united, just as he forbids mixing what is distinct. He himself distinguishes the Father and the Son by the fact of the source, whereas the Latins also attribute the quality of source to the Son, attempting to force Dionysius' language into their own opinion. And this transcends all obscurity.

62. But let us examine the aim of their explanation. [Objection:] They profess the Father as the sole source of divinity—not without additional qualification, nor absolutely, but as the sole source "of the Son and the Spirit together"—because He is not the sole source of each individually, since the Son is also the source of the Spirit. [Solution:] No one fails to see that this reasoning destroys the harmony of declarations of like nature, that it is obscure, and that it annihilates the entire judgment of the Doctor. For where does this addition come from? What example can they base such reasoning upon? And how could they reconcile their reasoning with what the blessed Dionysius professes on this matter: "But it is necessary, we believe, to retrace our steps to better expound every kind of unity and distinction in God, so that our reasoning may be perfectly evident, leaving no room for equivocation or obscurity, and that its proper object may be defined precisely, clearly, and methodically." On one hand, this is Dionysius' doctrine; on the other, the Latins offer nothing but the unadorned enigmas of the Sphinx. They have not brought us theological understanding but their own opinion.

63. Furthermore, why should we need so many convolutions, so many qualifications, and such precautionary measures? This blessed theologian, teaching apostolic theology as Dionysius, would never agree to recall—in any way—the divinity as a source in order to distinguish the Father from the Son, but rather to reserve this quality for the commonality and union of the Persons, attributing the specific difference [between Father and Son] not to their relation of origin but to paternity and filiation. Why? Because among the names pertaining to God, some belong to the theology of unity and others to the theology of distinction. Because it amounts to blasphemy to divide the Persons by what is common and united and to unite them by what is distinct. Because it was none other than Dionysius himself who first established these laws for the Church. Because he would not accept his own laws being condemned or himself being so decadent—assuming, of course, that being a source belongs in any way also to the Son. Because his books are the rule of theology, with language far more eloquent than that of Hermes, whom God sent to mankind to assure the truth of the dogmas to those who hear it. And if we wish to

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preserve the clarity he lovingly established for humanity, we have no excuse to show any regard for the Latin novelty. For professing the distinction before all others, he had not only considered the source but had also explicitly professed—in the context of distinction—that the Father is the sole source of divinity. Thus, the Latins must choose one of two paths: either condemn Dionysius for distinguishing the Persons by the fact of being the source of divinity where they believe the Father and Son should be united, or count themselves among the impious for having abandoned apostolic theology by uniting what the apostles distinguished. Aware of their own audacity, [the Latins] turn to their explanations. But we have shown that these explanations oppose both common reason and the laws of dialectic, without which one can scarcely reason. And certainly, these explanations neither align with the intent of the context nor respect the Doctor's words. Instead, they shamelessly annihilate what they claim to explain, proving insufficient even for themselves. Therefore, why should we not regard the Latins' understanding of Dionysian theology as a calamity?

The Patristic Tradition

64. Moreover, we must ask the Latins to understand theological affirmations in the same way the Theologians understood and transmitted them to us out of love for humanity. These Theologians deemed it good and useful to compose treatises interpreting Dionysius' theology, knowing well that only Theologians can wisely interpret Theologians. These Theologians are: Maximus the Great, John the Syrian, and Theodore, one of the Graptoi—men who contended against falsehood unto bloodshed, earning them the name technicians of theology. The divine Maximus wrote a letter to Marinos, a priest in Cyprus, in which he affirms that the Son is not the cause of the Spirit. Maximus knows "one sole cause of the Son and the Spirit—the Father—for the one by generation, for the other by procession," and he accepts those who profess this. The blessed Damascene, in the eighth chapter of his Theological Treatises, says: "We say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and call Him the Spirit of the Father. But we do not say the Spirit proceeds from the Son—though we call Him the Spirit of the Son." Saint Theodore, in the profession of his faith—transmitted by those who were "from the beginning eyewitnesses and servants of the Word" and afterward by their successors, our blessed and divine Fathers, as he himself says—professes this theology concerning our subject: "We maintain the properties of determination without confusion or mixture, unchangeable and unalterable. We attribute to the Father being unbegotten and the cause of the Persons proceeding from Him; to the Son, being begotten; and to the Spirit, proceeding." If the Father's property is being unbegotten and cause of the Persons proceeding from Him, and likewise the Son's property is being begotten, and the Spirit's is proceeding, how can one admit that the Son is cause and source of divinity? And if the Son does not possess the cause of the Spirit, and if the Spirit does not also proceed from the Son,

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why not accept—by absolute necessity—that the Father alone is the cause of the Spirit, the sole emitter, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone? Why not accept that the theological formula must remain simple and absolute: "The Father is the sole source of divinity—of the Son and the Spirit"? He is not only the sole source of the Son but also the sole source of the Spirit. And why not accept that the Father, as source, is distinguished not only from the Spirit but also from the Son? Neither the Spirit nor the Son, of course, possess the quality of being a source. If the Doctors of the Church, who knew the maxims of the blessed Dionysius with precision, understood and transmitted them in this way, then the Latins' noise about additional definitions—which are in fact nonexistent—is in vain, and their crude method is the beginning of blasphemies.

Solution to the Third Objection: Does "Sole Source" Mean "Only Source"?

65. The solution to the third objection is not difficult. If the divine Dionysius had said only that the Father is the source of supra-essential divinity, the Latins—who believe the Son is also the source of the Spirit—would not have a differing opinion. They could reply: "The Father is only the source (and of course is not from a source), but the Son is both the source of the Spirit and from the source of the Father." But in reality, Dionysius did not profess this; rather, he said the Father is the sole source of divinity—absolutely and without qualifying additions. These are two different things: the Father being the sole source of divinity is one thing, and the same being only the source of divinity is another, for the terms are not interchangeable. If He is the sole source, He is also necessarily the only source. But if He is the only source, He is not necessarily the sole source. One could say of the Paraclete that He is only a caused being—and this is correct, for He is not also a cause. But He is in no way the sole caused being, since the Son is also a caused being, and "proceeding from the Father" is common to both. The divine Gregory, in his Sermon on the Holy Spirit, speaking of the Father, calls Him Father—for He is certainly not also the Son—and adds that the Father's being alone [Father] does not lead to the same conclusion as the other affirmation. The Latins would rightly profess the Father as only the source, but they would never profess Him as the sole source—even if they pretend to do so. For one is not equivalent to the other.

Conclusion

66. Since this is the case, and since the impossibility of sustaining these claims has been demonstrated with multiple arguments, we must not call the Latin hypotheses explanations or interpretations but defilement, corruption, the summit of evils, and a seat of opposition to apostolic doctrines. This brings every kind of danger, devours all things, is fervent in its invasion, and mounts its expedition against heaven itself! One might accept the

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explanation if it were not contrary to common reason, if it were admissible, and if it lacked nothing else. But when it is utterly impossible, utterly contradictory, and illogical in relation to the intent of the affirmations and common reason—and, worse still, when it is forced to attack itself—what can be done in the face of such a calamity? I am indignant against those who hoped to convince us with such arguments. And shall I say it? I am most indignant that they abandoned the good path for another. They produce so-and-so as witnesses for beliefs contrary to apostolic doctrines. But, my dearest ones, one might justly advise not to reject the ancient Theology without shame, nor to interrogate explanations under pretense of ignorance to introduce a newer teaching and attempt to attach it to one or another Doctor. The apostolic teaching remains immutable and clear. What, then, do they want? They wish to show they agree with the teaching of others—especially the most ancient—or that, despite the experts, they can at least seek agreement. But if truth concerns us, nothing is truer than the words of the Spirit; if clarity, nothing is clearer than what the word intends to indicate—nothing other than what has just been mentioned: the purpose of the word. All our concern—and theirs—pertains to distinction in God. If it is esteemed a great thing to know the apostles' creed, Dionysius' theology is truly all this for us. But we have also shown manifestly how the interpreters of this Theology understood it. How, then, could we—following the aforementioned exegeses, or rather misunderstandings—think such theology is debatable or draw it toward the disputes of these new doctors? On the contrary, with the aid of this Theology, we must rather adapt the Latins' thinking to the teaching of the Spirit. For what comes from the apostles' successors is a kind of second Scripture, and the intent of these authors was the faith—and all that has been developed previously agrees with them. The weapons with which the Latins attack us—claiming they agree with the Doctors—they cannot show us clearly: that is, they cannot demonstrate that the Doctors, whether in their written confessions of faith or in their orally transmitted Theology of distinction, agree with their innovation. Instead, while the treatise spoke of other matters unrelated to our subject, they extracted statements out of context and thought thereby to wage war against the truth and against us. But this behavior suits not truth-seekers but quarrel-lovers, who shoot at heaven and try to mix all things randomly and in vain. Therefore, let us not be troubled that the Son cannot be the source of divinity, for this is what distinguishes Him from the Father—and why He is also not the emitter of the Spirit, since the Holy Spirit is divinity. The Father alone is the cause and source of the Spirit, for He is called the sole source of divinity, and none of this holds if the Holy Spirit is considered to proceed from the Son. This is how the Doctors' passages must be interpreted. For if done otherwise, here is the result: Suppose the subject were the resurrection of the dead and the Church's teaching on it, as well as Christ's resurrection. One interlocutor finds the solution in the Creed, affirming that he "looks for the resurrection of the dead", believes "the Lord rose from the dead, ascended, and sits at the right hand of the Father", and that "He will

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come again to judge the living and the dead." The other interlocutor replies with the hymn: "The dead shall not see life," and the apostolic passage concerning the Lord: "Even though we once knew Christ according to the flesh, we know Him thus no longer." What was said was rightly said in its context—but wrongly used against the Creed. If we consider nothing superior to the definition of the faith, and if—having accepted it as our foundation—we strive to connect other passages to it, while our opponents attempt to argue from Scripture against the Fathers' transmitted definition, how could it be just to take the opposite path—against all reason, against the apostolic Creed, which even this second choir of apostles accepted as their own faith with joy? How could it be just to try to attach it to the Fathers' passages? This is the example we must keep before our eyes concerning their faith and teaching. But if one thinks to take advantage of passages extracted from writings the Church's Doctors composed during their struggle and combat against the common adversaries of the Faith—where their intent was not to expound Theology, much less to polemicize, but to speculate—and if one thinks to launch these passages against the apostles' Theology, so clear and well-known, does this not suit only those who simply love quarrels and hasten to ensnare? But Basil the Great disagrees. He says the time of combat differs from the time of peace. What suits those fighting foreigners does not suit those discussing the Faith with kin. In the latter case, concern extends even to words, and the fervor of the treated question is great. But in the former, the moment of struggle omits most of these points. Therefore, if we undertake the search for divine things with such thoughts, our theological discourse will not appear sound, nor will we be able to reason about divine realities as we ought. This manner of reasoning turns things upside down and leaves no clear or known point unaltered—those very points from which one ought to seek what is unclear. For our part, we will set aside the teaching of the apostles' successors, which we have examined within the limits of our ability, and turn our discourse to the Ecumenical Councils, seeking what they teach concerning our subject. For there is nothing clearer, holier, preferable, or nearer to the Faith than the dogmas contained therein. This is why the Church, from ancient times, rightly considered them the rule for every separately expressed dogma and judged that utmost obedience must be shown to their decisions.

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The First Ecumenical Council: The Spirit Proceeds from the Father and Belongs to the Son

1. Moreover, the decrees of the holy Ecumenical Councils provide us with an evident solution. The holy Fathers of the First Council assembled at Nicaea, in the [...] chapter of its acts, respond to the unbelieving philosopher as follows: "As we desire and wish for you to turn to the truth, we exhort your wisdom to begin understanding in faith the uncreated and immutable nature—and as we have often said—without daring to meddle indiscreetly, through human reasonings, with what surpasses comprehension, nor to dabble in the erroneous and impious ideas of Arius, you who claim to be a philosopher. Rather, you must accept in faith, as we have clearly explained moments ago, what we have just said and what will be said hereafter. Accept one divinity of the Father who begat the Son in an ineffable manner, and one divinity of the Son who is begotten by Him, and one divinity of the Spirit who proceeds from the Father yet belongs to the Son. As the divine Apostle says: 'If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Him.'" Behold! That divine choir did not profess in vain that the Holy Spirit "proceeds from the Father Himself." It is not our custom to reveal doctrines in this way; but since they first mentioned the Son, saying, "concerning the Son, accept the same divinity begotten of Him," and then added concerning the Holy Spirit: "accept the same divinity proceeding from Him," the blessed Fathers, fearing some might one day connect the expression "proceeding from Him" to the Son, attached "proceeding from Him" to the Father, so that no room might be left for heresy. This addition would be useless if they knew the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son. But certainly, the development of the statement, the distinction employed, the procession attributed to the Father, and the mention that the Spirit belongs to the Son—all these reasons confirm what has just been said.

2. The term "belongs" reveals a natural kinship the Spirit has with the Son and shows that the Spirit is His, but not that He proceeds from the Son. The Fathers cite as proof that the Spirit belongs to the Son this word of the blessed Paul: "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Him." And Basil the Great has transmitted to us that we must call the Spirit the "Spirit of Christ." He says in the eighteenth chapter to Amphilochius: "But He is also called the Spirit of Christ because He belongs to Him by nature." The divine Chrysostom, in his Treatise on the Holy Spirit, clearly shows that it is one thing to profess the Spirit as "of God" and another to profess the Spirit as "proceeding from God." He says of the Holy Spirit: "Spirit of God and Spirit proceeding from God. If ever we hear of the Spirit of God, lest we think 'Spirit of God' refers only to kinship, Scripture introduces the Holy Spirit and adds to the expression 'of God' the expression 'proceeding from God.' It is one thing to be 'of God,' and another to 'proceed from

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God.' Do you hear? Thus, if it is one thing for the Spirit to be 'of God' and another to 'proceed from God,' then necessarily it is also one thing to say the Spirit is 'of the Son' and another that He 'proceeds from the Son.'" But we will discuss this more precisely later, if the Holy Spirit Himself grants us the word. For now, let our discourse maintain its harmonious order.

The Father: Source of Divinity; the Son: River; the Spirit: Living Water

3. The choir of blessed Fathers further says to the same philosopher: "We must profess one nature and three Persons: Source, River, and Water." And lest anyone claim this does not prevent the Son from being the source of the Spirit, the Fathers explicitly profess: "But no one calls the river 'source' nor the source 'river.'" If the name "source" designated only the Father and in no way the "Emitter"—such that the Father is called source of the Son but not source of the Spirit—then one might rightly say that while the Son cannot receive the name "source," this separates Him only from the Father's name but not, of course, from being an emitter. But since "source" applies to both (generation and procession), and since, accordingly, the Father is source of divinity as both Begetter and Emitter, while "source" manifestly does not apply to the Son (for the Fathers say no one calls the river "source" or the source "river"), how is it not evident that, according to the Fathers, to profess the Father as Begetter and Emitter of the Son, and to profess the Son as source (i.e., Emitter and Father), belong to the same principle?

4. The divine Chrysostom later uses this imagery in his exposition of Psalm 93. He calls the Father sometimes the "source of the Spirit," sometimes the "source of the Son"—meaning He exalts the same Person now as Begetter, now as Emitter. He concludes that neither is the river the source (i.e., it neither begets nor emits), nor is the source the river. Here is the passage: "From where does the living water come? Let us seek its source. What is the source? Jeremiah says: 'Thus says the Lord: The heavens were horrified at this, and the earth trembled with dread. For My people have committed a double evil: they have forsaken Me, the fountain of living water.' Do you see that God is the source of the water, and the Holy Spirit the living water? The Father is the source of living water; the Son, the river flowing from the source; the Holy Spirit, the water of the river. And the prophet Isaiah says of the Son: 'The Lord will come like a river into the thirsty land.'" Do you see the source, the river, the living water? Here, the divine Chrysostom clearly connects the name "source" to both Emitter and Begetter. He adds: "And when you consider the origin, you cannot call the source 'river' nor the river 'source.'" This amounts to saying it is not customary to call the Son either "Begetter" or "Emitter." In summary: if the Emitter or Begetter is necessarily also "source," then one who is not "source" cannot be either Begetter or Emitter. Precisely put, the Son cannot be called "source."

Athanasius: The Father Alone Is Unbegotten and Sole Source of Divinity

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5. Furthermore, here is the testimony of Athanasius the Great. When the conflict began, he led that sacred choir of Fathers—not in outward appearance, for he was still among the deacons—but by the power of his words and the zeal of the Spirit. He testifies in his treatise on the eternal existence of the Son and the Spirit: "We are separated both from those who imitate the Jews and from those who adulterate Christianity with Judaism. These deny God from God and profess one God in a manner resembling the Jews. They do not profess one God because He alone is unbegotten and sole source of divinity, but because they consider Him deprived of offspring—the Son—and of fruit—the Word of life." Now if "unbegotten," being a personal attribute, does not—due to the addition of "alone"—permit the Son or Spirit to share in the designation of "unbegotten" (for the distinction refers to them), why would "being source," which is a personal attribute and also carries the added definition of "alone," simultaneously introduce the Son and make Him share in causality? For this reason, it is better not to declare the Son either cause or source of divinity.

The Word "Alone" Pertains to Both Personal and Natural Properties

6. [Objection:] The Latins stubbornly oppose the theological statement and claim the argument does not trouble them at all. They profess that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, since nothing prevents safeguarding both—that the Son is and is called the source of the Spirit's existence, while the Father alone is source of divinity. Scripture testifies that the Father is "the only true God," "the blessed and only Sovereign," and "the only one who has immortality." Yet all this is no less true of the Son. Thus, just as in these cases the affirmation of "alone" does not deprive the Son of divinity, sovereignty, or immortality, so too the profession that the Father alone is source of divinity does not deprive the Son of being source of divinity.

7. [Solution:] It is evident that refuting these arguments is not difficult if we advance certain affirmations the Church considers necessary and clear. First, let us establish what all who speak of God acknowledge: some things pertain to essence and nature, others to person. Second, the added definition of "alone" applies, on one hand, to attributes of essence—as the Lord testifies in John's Gospel: "This is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom You have sent"—and, on the other, to personal attributes (those to which it properly applies). St. Athanasius testifies: "The Father alone is unbegotten and alone is source of divinity." Third, for natural attributes, the added definition of "alone" does not divide the thearchic Persons among themselves but opposes false gods. For personal attributes, however, the division concerns the divine Persons themselves. The divine Gregory declares in his Sermon for Pentecost: "All that belongs to the Father belongs also to the Son, except being unbegotten." He also says in his Sermon on the Holy Spirit: "What is not attributed to the Spirit regarding the

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properties of God, except being unbegotten and begotten?" Thus, "alone unbegotten" is professed to distinguish the Father from the Son and Spirit.

8. The Church's common teaching will clearly show that when "alone" is added to essential attributes, the division concerns those falsely called gods. The divine Athanasius says in his Treatise on the Holy Trinity: "The Arians speak thus: 'The Son Himself confesses the Father is the only true God,' and it happens the Father Himself says: 'I am the first God, and I am after all these,' and 'there is no God besides Me.' How then, alongside the first, only, and true God and Father, do you add that the Son is also God by nature?" First, we must know the Father does not speak thus to exclude the Son—for what would prompt Him to conclude this? In the same treatise, Athanasius says: "Why would the Father speak thus to exclude the Son? We will interpret this as professed against false gods." Again, he says in his Third Discourse Against the Arians: "Since the worshippers of false gods stray from the true God, the good God, who protects men, calls the straying by saying: 'I am the only God,' and 'It is I,' and 'Besides Me there is no God.' He uses such expressions to refute what does not exist and convert all men to Himself." Such was the divine Athanasius' view. Moreover, the divine Gregory says in his Second Sermon on the Son: "The phrase 'that they may know You, the only true God' is professed to refute gods that are not gods but are so called. For 'and Jesus Christ, whom You have sent' would not have been added if 'the only true' did not concern Him."

9. Thus, the Son too is true God like the Father, since "the Father alone is true God" does not oppose the Son. Holy Scripture also teaches this. The Apostle John writes of the Son in his epistles: "This is the true God." Conversely, since "sole source" is manifestly professed to distinguish the thearchic hypostases (for the divine Dionysius says in his theological treatises on the supra-essential: "The distinction consists also in this—that the properties belonging to the supra-essential generation within the divinity are in no way interchangeable, and in the supra-essential divinity, the Father alone is source"), neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit can be source of divinity. Therefore, the arbiters of truth must not conflate personal and natural properties nor profess that personal properties are so for the same reason natural properties are so. Rather, since natural properties unite the divine Persons and personal properties distinguish them, to subordinate union to distinction mixes all things, opposes established laws, and shoots arrows at heaven.

The Second Ecumenical Council in Agreement with the First

10. Next, we will demonstrate our point from the Second Holy Ecumenical Council. First, it is called the Second Holy Ecumenical Council. How could it be so unless it absolutely agrees with the First Council? Its first canon further states: "The holy Fathers assembled at Constantinople decreed that the faith of the 318 Fathers gathered at Nicaea must not be violated but remain

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authoritative." If the Latins wish not to violate their faith—which holds the Father alone is unbegotten and sole source of divinity, and the Son is not source—let them draw the conclusion.

Gregory of Nazianzus, Champion of the Second Ecumenical Council, Excludes Causality from the Son

11. Moreover, this holy Ecumenical Council, in its definition of faith, says: "We also believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, worshipped and glorified together with the Father and the Son." The Latins, having heard that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, received the statement to mean He necessarily proceeds also from the Son. But that most renowned choir intended no such thing—rather, the absolute contrary: that He proceeds from the Father alone and in no way from the Son. This is evident. The father and master of that assembly, the author of its Creed, we know to be Gregory, whose hallmark is Theology. The holy Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, in its address to the Roman emperors, declares: "The Fathers of the Council of Sardica contended against the remnants of Arius and dispelled the crisis of the Easterners; the Fathers here exposed the impurity of Apollinarius and made their decision known to the Westerners. For the former, Hosius was the leader; for the latter, the champions were Nectarius and Gregory." This man of God, uniting and distinguishing the divine Persons in a manner befitting God, says in his discourse titled *The Arrival of the Egyptian Bishops*: "All that belongs to the Father belongs also to the Son, except causality."

12. What could be clearer, truer, or more august than this Theology? It explains that the Son does not possess the cause of divinity, and this distinguishes Him from the Father. Just as "animal" applies to both man and horse (and "non-animal" can be neither), so here "cause" applies to both Begetter and Emitter. The Father is cause of both the Son (as Begetter) and the Spirit (as Emitter). He who lacks causality cannot, quite simply, be either Father or—necessarily—Emitter.

Does "Except Causality" Mean Only "Without the Quality of Begetting"?

13. [Objection:] But how do they respond? They say the Father is cause of the Son—that is, only as Begetter. Thus, when you hear Gregory the Theologian say "except causality," recall "begetting," and no absurdity follows, for our hypothesis is preserved, and the theological statement remains secure. [Solution:] First, this objection is not merely false but impossible—if, of course, the proposed transposition contains truth in itself.

14. Second, the Theologian did not say "except the causality of begetting" but absolutely "except causality." These are not identical and thus cannot be interchanged. According to the Theologian, if the Son absolutely lacks causality, He necessarily lacks both the causality of begetting and of emitting. Yet if He lacks the causality of begetting but possesses that of emitting, then whoever professes that the Son absolutely lacks causality is a liar. The Theologian

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professed it without qualification: "All that belongs to the Father belongs also to the Son, except causality."

15. Moreover, the Father absolutely possesses causality—both of begetting and emitting. If the Son absolutely lacks this causality (as the Theologian says), this distinguishes Him from the Father, and no absurdity follows. For the Father remains manifestly the one cause and principle of divinity—thereby preserving the monarchy. That there is one God is the cornerstone of our Orthodox faith. The theological statement also proves sound, consistent with common usage and the aforementioned apostolic doctrines. Conversely, if this is impossible—if the Father absolutely possesses causality, and this is not shared with the Son in the following way (that the Son only emits but does not also beget)—the reasoning verges on blasphemy. For two principles and two sources of divinity emerge: one possesses both modes of causality; the other, only one. The risk is that one opposes the other—not only in one mode (begetting) but already in both (emitting and begetting), according to the Latins themselves, since the other possesses only emitting. Thus, one must say the Theologian abuses the text, for he means one thing and says another—something those who propose this would not dare say themselves!

16. Furthermore, insofar as they say that the Son is the emitter of the Spirit, they must necessarily call Him a cause. But it is impossible to profess that the same Person is both necessarily a cause and not a cause, and that He both possesses causality and does not possess causality. This is how contradiction establishes itself.

17. But just as if one says that Socrates is an animal, one cannot say that he is not an animal without adding "devoid of reason," likewise the Son who possesses the cause of the Spirit cannot be equally qualified as a non-cause without adding "according to the manner of begetting." And if you pronounce the phrase without an additional definition—that is, that He does not possess causality—of absolute necessity one should say neither that He begets nor that He emits; in the same way that, when you say that a stone is not an animal, you qualify it neither as a rational animal nor as an irrational animal.

18. Moreover, if one necessarily lies when saying "everything that the Son possesses, the Spirit also possesses, except for proceeding from a cause" because proceeding from a cause is a property common to both the Son and the Spirit, how then could it be true to say: "everything that the Father possesses the Son also possesses, except for the property of causality," insofar as the Son shares with the Father the causality of the Spirit? Consequently, when one speaks in this manner, one establishes laws against the Theology of the Fathers and against the rules of logical methods.

19. But the divine Maximus also, who explains the words of the blessed Gregory in the letter addressed to Marinos, clearly accepts those who say that the Son does not possess the causality of the Spirit. As the Latins would also say: He does not have the cause of begetting. So, when the

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Theologian says: "everything that the Father possesses, the Son possesses, except causality," he clearly removes from Him the cause of begetting and the cause of emitting. And it is completely arrogant and highly impudent not to want to understand the holy Symbol according to its authors; but the latter want to understand the fact that [the Holy Spirit] proceeds from the Father as proceeding from the Father Alone and not from the Son. But the Latins want to understand it quite the contrary. And this concerns the Symbol of our own faith, and they too believe in this august Symbol of the orthodox faith. This contradiction is unbearable even for them! Therefore, let them either not read the Symbol or, insofar as they might want to read it, we also require that they not tamper with the words of the saints and not agree with the arrangement of words while standing against the thought, and in a very detestable manner.

20. [Objection:] And if they respond to us that we fall under the same accusations, for the Son possesses the cause of the nature of things, and that of all necessity we too do not accept the theological statement without additional definition. [Solution:] The solution is not difficult. One must take into account the speaker's purpose and the context of the statement. In this case, the properties of nature and everything that applies to the Trinity in a common manner are not concerned. It is about the properties of the Persons and everything that distinguishes the Persons. But the cause of which you speak concerns the essence and unites the divine Persons. Consequently, to take this cause into account here is, according to the proverb, to "weave together what cannot be woven together."

According to Gregory of Nazianzus, the names of source and cause are personal and belong exclusively to the Father.

21. Moreover, with regard to the Father, three properties of the person are considered, different from each other in word, that is, the fact of being unbegotten, which He possesses absolutely and which indicates that He is not from someone else, and the fact of begetting and the fact of emitting, which establish a relation and which the Latins call relatives. For one refers to the Son and the other to the Spirit, and it is for this reason that the Father is called begetter and emitter. These properties possess a common denomination: principle, cause, and source. We must seek to determine whether these three properties belong to the Father and whether they all distinguish Him in relation to the Son and the Spirit, or whether these three properties distinguish Him in relation to the Spirit, while all three would not distinguish Him in relation to the Son, but only two would do so. The Latins therefore would not accept that emitting is a property of the Father, because they consider that the Son also is an emitter and principle of the divinity of the Spirit and that, for this reason, He too is a principle of divinity. They do not profess at all that the principle or the cause or being the source of divinity constitutes an absolute property of the Father.

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22. But the divine Gregory, who was at the head of this blessed council and the most authentic interpreter of its decisions, along with the property of being unbegotten and without principle, also considers that being the principle of divinity, cause, and source belongs to the properties of the Father. And he wants the properties to remain immutable. He judges it absurd that they should transform into other properties because they can no longer safeguard their designation. He says in the discourse "On the Installation of Bishops": "The properties of the Father are that He is conceived and declared to be without principle and to be principle. He is principle as cause, as source, and as eternal light. On the other hand, the Son does not at all possess the property of being without principle, but that of being the principle of all things. You have heard of what the Son is the principle? Then, do not consider Him as the principle of divinity. For this is the property of the Father, as is also being without principle. And it would be quite right to beware of the confusion of Persons, because confusing them constitutes the worst form of atheism." So, above it has been demonstrated that the Son does not possess causality and that this distinguishes Him in relation to the Father. Here, he says that the properties of the Father are being without principle and being principle. Consequently, either the Latins agree with all this, or they consciously wage war against these statements because they do not in any way want to understand the definition of the holy council according to these blessed [Fathers]. For those who wish to judge in truth, the answer is evident.

According to Gregory of Nazianzus, the Father is begetter and emitter.

23. Moreover, the same Theologian, in the first discourse on the Son, enumerates the properties of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; he says: "This is what for us are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit: one is begetter and emitter, I mean without passion and in a timeless and incorporeal manner. The others are, one begotten, and the other, emitted." One must pay attention! The property of the Father of being principle, which we read above, Gregory has just divided into begetter and emitter. And he has clearly shown that he accepts that each of these properties belongs to the Father. We have, moreover, said several times that the names of principle, cause, and source include both begetter and emitter. And we have said several times that it amounts to the same thing to say that the property of the Father is to be principle, to emit, and to beget. And if emitting as well as begetting constitute the property of the Father, and if the property remains immutable—and this is the opinion of the most distinguished Theologian and first of the council—is not the shame already clear when one claims that the Son is also the emitter of the Holy Spirit?

24. [Objection:] But what do they respond? We too say that it is proper to the Father to be called begetter and emitter, but on condition that one sees the two together. The two united together are proper to the Father, but each of the two is not necessarily proper to the Father. Only

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one of the two is, because emitting is common to both Persons. [Solution:] But firstly, after what we have read above, the proof is evident. For Saint Gregory said that the Son does not possess causality, and being principle and without principle is the property of the Father. So, if the Son does not possess causality, he does not possess emitting either. So, just as begetting is proper to the Father, so also is emitting. Consequently, each of the two separately is proper to the Father and not the two together as is claimed.

Moreover, if the Father is cause in this manner, that is, as begetter and emitter together, but if the Son is not cause in this manner, but in another, that is, only as emitter, how is it not clear that there are two causes of divinity?

25. And without counting the two arguments mentioned above, it is evident that one who speaks thus proposes neither a necessary thing nor an acceptable one. Here is why begetter and emitter are not one but two. When we say that several attributes are proper to a person and that among these attributes one is possessed in common with other persons, as is for the Latins the case of the emitter, and the other is proper to one person, as is the case of the begetter, then we produce either a definition or a description. And when we report a description or a definition, we do not say by uniting them that "man is animal, rational and mortal," but "animal, rational, mortal," in an absolute manner. But here the Theologian did not say in an absolute manner that "one of the Persons is emitter, begetter" to precede what is general and common, I mean the name of emitter, and afterward to follow with what is particular and proper, I mean the name of begetter. But he did completely the opposite: "one of the Persons is called begetter and emitter," with the preposition "and." And the emitter follows the begetter. Consequently, what the Latins had professed above is not true, and emitting and begetting are not proper conjointly but each of the two is.

26. Moreover, we will show more clearly what we are saying. "Unbegotten God," we say that this is proper to the Father. And if you profess it in an absolute manner, you will speak the truth. Such an expression is a kind of definition of the Father. And on one side the Father possesses a common attribute: God; on the other side, He possesses a proper attribute: unbegotten. But if you say it by linking them, you will not say anything true; for it is a lie to profess the name of unbegotten and the name of God as proper to the Father without adding the word "together." The case of begetter and emitter is the same. If the Theologian knew that the union of the two together constitutes a property, he would not say "one of the Persons is begetter and emitter," but he would rather say either that "one of the Persons is emitter, begetter," without conjunction, or with an addition, that "one of the Persons is both begetter and emitter." We think that thus the word is sound, and I believe that they themselves and every man will recognize it.

27. Not only that, but if they hear again the same Theologian reporting in the second discourse on Peace the properties of the Father, namely that "for God there exists nothing greater than

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being Father of the Son [that] this signifies an addition of glory and not a diminution; as moreover being emitter of the Spirit," what will they respond? For if they imagine here the "conjointly" and "together" and "the union of the two together" and other similar expressions, then where is such an addition or how does it seem possible for the most distinguished Theologian to omit it? For it is not manifest in other passages of Gregory. For where does one find in his theology that begetting constitutes a property common to the Father and the Son? And the common conception about God does not require such expressions. And if one cannot even think here of an addition, how is it right to do so there? For either the addition exists here too because it is there, or it does not exist there because it is not here either. Even more, for what reason would this blessed one, after having searched through all of Scripture without omitting anything concerning the Only-Begotten, have said everything that gives Him value but hidden the most important, I mean to clearly declare Him emitter of the Spirit? In another way, he sings as something new and in the form of an enigma, in his poems and several times, the Son as principle of all and cause of creation, but nowhere as principle of divinity. It is because he had not attributed to the Father something greater than being Himself the principle of divinity.

28. [Objection:] And if they respond that nothing prevents inventing additions because such a thing of all necessity often makes law? [Solution:] Concerning sentences, this is certainly very necessary, because the language of the Spirit is briefly exposed, small phrases make known many things, and those who deal with Theology have much trouble to clarify for us the notion of the Spirit. On the other hand, concerning the affirmations of the Doctors, if the (alleged) addition is not so clear and known, how is it permitted to reason similarly? We have said it several times, to the point where even a child would understand it, because this is a common conception of the Church! But especially where the Theologians tremblingly announce what concerns unity or distinction in God and expose to a certain extent divine realities, it is completely imprudent to think of such additions! And you could see the Doctors who distinguish similar names and become interpreters of their own sayings, as if they were the words of other people. They bring back and recapitulate everything to make their word clearer. They invent many things and develop everything, for several reasons but especially to never commit any damage due to their most integral affirmations. So, imagining additions in such a case, in another way, signifies a pretext for blasphemy and is not far from innovation.

The doctrine of the Second Ecumenical Council and of Saint Gregory is incompatible with the Latin doctrine.

29. Moreover, the blessed Fathers stated in the Symbol of Faith: "We also believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Life-giver who proceeds from the Father." If the Fathers understood their statement in the manner of the Latins, that is, that He proceeds from the Father in such a way that

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of all necessity He also proceeds from the Son, then the head of this sacred council, Gregory himself, the man of God to whom the Fathers after the end of the war attributed victory and whom they made the symbol of victory, in the discourse "On the Installation of Bishops," would not distinguish the Son in relation to the Father, saying "everything that belongs to the Son, belongs equally to the Spirit except for being Son"; and in the Sermon on Pentecost "everything that belongs to the Son belongs to the Spirit except generation." Such an affirmation is a falsehood if the Son is also emitter of the Spirit. If the Latins were of the same opinion, they would not say that everything that belongs to the Son belongs equally to the Spirit except generation, but they would also add: "except for being principle and source of the Spirit." But they avoided the absurd. How then is it honest to make such hypotheses regarding these holy men and to maintain both that the truth is found in the father of that ancient council and in their own hypothesis? We see that of all necessity one would have to believe that the Paraclete is the emitter of another Person. Whom should one believe among those who believe in the Trinity?

But the testimony that the First and Second Ecumenical Councils bring on the question at issue has been presented.

FOURTH DISCOURSE AGAINST THE CONCLUSION (OF THE LATINS)

The Nestorian Symbol of Faith promulgated by Charisius during the Third Ecumenical Council.

1. But it is also the third holy Ecumenical Council that gives us an answer to what we are seeking. It was convened to punish Nestorius for his impiety. A book containing the symbol of his own faith was presented. The one who had read it was the presbyter Charisius, who came from Lydia. The Fathers, therefore, after having examined this symbol in detail, banished and anathematized everything in it that was false and hostile to the truth; however, they set aside everything that was sound. Let us be clearer. The Christian faith was divided into two: the dogmas concerning Theology and everything concerning the Economy of the Savior. It appears that the blessed Fathers did not accuse Nestorius regarding the dogmas concerning God, neither little nor much. Among these dogmas, in the symbol was added that the Holy Spirit is not Son and does not derive His existence through the Son. However, they accuse the exposition and speak ill of Nestorius concerning what he had said wrongly regarding the Economy of the Savior. So, in order that everything might be clear, I will present both Nestorius's letter and the response of the holy Fathers.

2. Extracts from the Acts of the third Council. Chapter fifty-five: "I, Charisius, have delivered the libelli and have subscribed with my hand.

The Exposition: It is fitting that either those who are now for the first time being educated in the truth of ecclesiastical dogmas, or those who wish to pass from some heretical error to the truth, should learn and confess that we believe in one eternal God the Father, who did not begin to be subsequently, but who from the beginning is eternal God, nor who became Father subsequently, since He has always been both God and Father. We also believe in one Son, God Only-Begotten, who is drawn from the substance of the Father, insofar as He is truly Son and of the same substance as He of whom He is and of whom He is believed to be Son. And in the Holy Spirit, drawn from the substance of God, who is not Son, but God by essence, insofar as He is of the same substance (as the Father), from whom He is drawn by essence and who has conjoined Him to God, from whom He is drawn essentially, by a distinctive reason, apart from all creation which we think does not come from God by essence, but by virtue of creation; and we hold that this Spirit is not Son and does not possess His existence by means of the Son. We confess that the Father is perfect in His person and the Son similarly, and equally the Holy Spirit. We do not consider three different essences, but a single essence recognized by the identity of the deity. Concerning also the Economy for our salvation in the Economy relative to the Lord Christ, it must be known that the Master God Word took a complete man of the seed of Abraham and of David according to the announcement of the Holy Scriptures," as well as all the rest that

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concerns impieties on the Economy, contained in this exposition, for he says that the God Word issued from God before the ages is different in relation to Jesus of Nazareth; he considers our God coming from the Virgin as a mere man.

The council indirectly condemns the Filioque.

3. These texts therefore, one after the other, once read and put to the test according to the custom of ecumenical councils, the holy council took a decree on the above-mentioned exposition: "If any, whether bishops or clerics or laymen, are caught in the act of believing or teaching the doctrines contained in the exposition of faith promulgated by the priest Charisius on the incarnation of the Only-Begotten Son of God, that is, the detestable and perverse dogmas of Nestorius which are indicated below, let them fall under the condemnation of this holy ecumenical council, in the sense that the bishop be deprived of the episcopate and the cleric be likewise deposed from the clergy; if it is a layman, let him be struck with anathema."

4. Here one must pay close attention and with justice! For it thus appears that the divine council clearly accepted that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. So it ranked this among the sound dogmas with everything concerning Theology. Just as it left them immutable, without having anything against Nestorius, so with this dogma, it recognized it long ago as a dogma of ancient theology. However, the dogmas concerning the Economy did not have the same fate. The council, after having distinguished in the exposition the dogmas relating to the Trinity and the dogmas relating to the human nature of the Savior, judged that some were guilty and Nestorius was excommunicated because of this, while the others, relating to Theology, were left apart. For what have they just said? That he be rejected from the Church who believes and tries to win others to the "doctrines contained in the exposition of faith promulgated by the priest Charisius on the incarnation of the Only-Begotten Son, that is, the detestable and perverse dogmas of Nestorius." The blessed Fathers had not professed simply: "he who teaches the doctrines contained in this exposition, let him be rejected"; for they would thus include the doctrines relating to Theology. On the contrary, they said "he who teaches the doctrines contained in the exposition of faith on the Economy of the Savior." Here, if one wants to reason with the truth, one must accept the necessity of the additional condition, for it is thus that the Fathers also promulgated the sentence. And it is not right to invent additional conditions where they do not exist and, where they do exist, to allow oneself to think that they are useless. For that is fitting for those who institute laws and not for those who are taught. Following this, as if someone were perplexed about what could finally be said about Nestorius's teaching containing doctrines relating to Theology and to the Economy, the Fathers reject only what concerns the Economy. According to their words, they separate these dogmas because they are detestable and perverse. They clearly say that the detestable and perverse dogmas of Nestorius are only those

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that concern the Economy of the Savior. Following this, as if they had pointed out these dogmas with their finger, they add what has been indicated in the exposition of the faith, that is to say, that the doctrines relating to Theology are in force.

5. It is thus that they have listened and have responded with precision and not as something incidental, as one might claim. So, the decision against Nestorius (the Fathers of the council) they have also professed in the definition of the faith of the Church and have formulated the seventh canon, so that it remains throughout the universe. Given all this, we will require the Latins first to read the exposition of Nestorius's faith, then also to read the response related to it from the blessed council, and to conceive of it as a rule and a definition of the orthodox faith with catholic authority. And let them adjust to the canon of the Fathers and after that let them put Nestorius's opinion to the test. And what the canon calls detestable and perverse dogmas, let them likewise consider them so too. But what the canon has left immutable and apart because it judged that it was good and [said] with reason, let them not change this either. Why?

6. Because for everything that, during the work of the council, was done, the Fathers want it to remain solid and well-founded and that no one dare to shake anything that was decided there or that no one be under the penalties that are promulgated there. For the sixth canon of this council says: "If any wish to shake in any manner whatsoever anything that the holy ecumenical council decided in Ephesus, the holy council decreed that, if they are bishops or clerics, they be completely deprived of their own dignity and that, if they are laymen, they remain without communion." The canon says "everything that has been decided." The canon does not suggest that this be immutable and that that be put to the test or shaken or sought, but it simply wants everything to remain immutable. And there is nothing so strong, be it a man, or a manner, or a certain cause that could advance against what the council has defined.

Historical context reference.

7. Moreover, the Fathers followed the same attitude by respecting themselves as well as the truth. They do not accuse Nestorius here for certain reasons and they do not apply other decisions on him, especially since they have completely rejected him from the Church by promulgating against him the condemnation in force. On the contrary, you could see here and there the same reasons for condemnation. Behold that the holy Council speaks in a general way of everything that Nestorius dared to do, and it writes to the Roman emperors: "As, held back by his bad conscience, he refused to present himself, having examined his impious dogmas set forth in writing on the incarnation of the Lord Christ, we have anathematized them and we have completely deprived their father of the episcopal dignity." Pay attention! According to the Fathers, Nestorius had made a written exposition on the incarnation of the Savior. He had also set forth in writing that the Holy Spirit does not derive His existence from the Son. The Fathers,

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during the work of the council, read and examined both the one and the other. The latter is a doctrine concerning Theology, the former is a doctrine concerning the Economy. The Latins think that both doctrines are impious and that the Fathers of the council are of the same opinion as them. They will say that the Fathers are not in agreement with us! So, how do the Fathers who distinguish, in the sentences, the theological doctrines from the economic doctrines, qualify the latter as impious while they rank among the sound dogmas the doctrine according to which the Spirit is not issued from the Son? Is it not evident that they knew one as true, but the other not?

8. Furthermore, the blessed Cyril, the master of this holy council, with the synod of the Fathers of Egypt and Rome, writes in his third letter to Nestorius: "But it is fitting that you confess in writing and under oath that you anathematize your impure and impious doctrine, and that you will have in mind and teach the same things that we all believe, the bishops and doctors of the peoples of the West and East." And after having gathered apart in twelve chapters everything they asked him to believe and teach, toward the end of the letter he adds this: "It is with all this that Your Reverence must come into agreement and accord without any artifice. What on the other hand Your Reverence must necessarily anathematize has been inscribed below our present letter." These chapters turn against the folly of Nestorius and there is nothing about the procession of the Holy Spirit, but everything has in view the Economy of the Savior. And if the Fathers do not seem to teach Nestorius, nor judge him, nor condemn him, nor make a friendly reminder to him, because, as far as Theology is concerned, they have nothing to accuse him of, how is it right to take the path opposite to the Fathers and to vainly wage an undeclared war against the holy Fathers? Nestorius said that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. If this opinion was worthy of condemnation, why had the synod which had gathered apart everything that Nestorius had to anathematize not demanded that Nestorius anathematize it? But, if it is a sound doctrine, it is useless to say what the danger is for those who raise the pretexts of scandals against the orthodox faith.

9. The sixth ecumenical council also showed that it is a sound doctrine. In the eleventh chapter of its Acts it made mention of this letter of the blessed Cyril. It says: "We accept especially the conciliar letters addressed to Nestorius, the man detestable to God and the persecutor of God; the second and third letters of Saint Cyril, to which are joined the twelve chapters, which, like coals of the same number as the apostles, have burned all the heresy of Nestorius." And if these twelve chapters, according to the synod's words, reject from the Church all the heresy of Nestorius and all these chapters speak of the Economy of the Savior and if one finds nothing there about the procession of the Holy Spirit, how is it not evident that the fact that the Spirit is not issued from the Son, is not a perverse doctrine of Nestorius nor a novelty of his folly, but the opinion of the ancient theology of the Fathers?

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10. Besides this, he who says that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Son, professes grave and inevitable accusations against the blessed Fathers; they are thus neither doctors, nor pastors, but murderers, impure and hostile to the salvation of men. Imagine that they heard that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son and that this was a lie and a fault committed by negligence against the faith and that they supported this discourse in silence. How unjust is it to hear this? But these blessed ones are not such. What does the divine Cyril say to Nestorius? "How then is it possible to be silent when faith is outraged and so many things are perverse? Shall we not appear before the tribunal of Christ? Shall we not have to give an account of this silence out of place, when we have been established by Christ to say what is necessary?" Likewise, in another letter to the same recipient, he writes: "For if faith is outraged, let the respect due to parents disappear as withered and faltering, let the law of tender love toward children and brothers be reduced to silence, and henceforth for those who are pious let death be preferable to life, that they may obtain a better resurrection, as Scripture says."

11. The same, in his letter to Emperor Theodosius, says:

Excerpts from the Acts of the Third Council. Discourse one hundred and nine. Incipit of the letter "the divine and pure nature that dominates everywhere."

"Each of the priests, since he has been placed by God as a watchman, if he announces to the faithful entrusted to his care that which is likely to cause damage, will procure the crown for himself. But if he remains silent, he will fall into the evils that arise from divine anger, for he will have greatly damaged by his silence the people directed by his voice toward rectitude." And, likewise in the same letter: "What punishment indeed has God suspended over the heads of those who remain silent? 'I will require his blood from you,' he says. You have heard what the blessed Cyril, the master of this holy council, says against those who remain silent when the faith is outraged, following what Nestorius dared to do? Then, the dogma that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son is either sound, and stop contradicting an ecumenical council, or, if it is a lie, the protectors of orthodox faith are entirely guilty of the trials that come from divine anger, according to their own words, and they will answer to the judge for their untimely silence, and the blood of lost souls will be required from their hands."

12. But Cyril would not agree with this. For he says in the Acts of the third council concerning Nestorius; Chapter XXII: "'I will not give sleep to my eyes, nor slumber and rest to my eyelids' until I have fought the fight for the salvation of all." Also in the same chapter he says: "I intend indeed, because of faith in Christ, to take pains and to suffer all things that are considered terrible in the way of tortures, until, because of this, I endure death which will be sweet to me." If the souls of holy persons are similar and if the danger is similar against those who remain silent before the outraged faith, then is it not an obvious impudence to qualify as blasphemy the fact

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that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, when those saints believed it, heard it, and endured it in concord?

Why would the Fathers of the council remain silent?

13. Moreover, according to what the Latins say, the blasphemy against the only Son was twofold: one, that the Spirit does not proceed from Him, and the other, that He had not assumed human nature hypostatically. One concerned divinity; the other, the economy. Nestorius would have explicitly professed both blasphemies in writing before the council. Then, with regard to the economic plan, why have the Fathers so defended their faith against him, until they chose death itself over exile, and why have they run so much, left so many books, and endured calumnies, whereas for the other blasphemy which was major if of course God is major in relation to man they believed it was not even necessary to say a small word? This is indeed close to enigma. If there was no interest in believing one way or another, then why this ardor for a minor thing? And if this, not even the Latins say it, if the faith is not sound, there is no salvation. Let them tell us the cause of this silence and its reason. Have the Fathers shown so much ardor for minor things, while for the most serious things they would not have approved the slightest effort? And especially after what the Lord says, namely that blasphemy against the Son of man is forgivable, which means the plan of the Economy, whereas for the one who has insulted the Spirit there is no mercy, because this he understands as attached to his divinity.

14. But even in the other ecumenical councils, if they can show a perverse doctrine, manifestly proclaimed or passed over in silence, let them show it and the doctrine in question will follow. And if they cannot show such a thing—but I believe that even the devil would not say it—why in this case alone would it be necessary to decide the contrary, to believe the holy and ecumenical council and at the same time suppress the mark of ecumenical councils? For since long ago the habit has been established in ecumenical councils sometimes to leave sound dogmas immutable, sometimes to refute by means of scriptural arguments, public excommunications, and other penalties, all that is not sound. The Latins would not be just to recognize only in this council a certain indifference that those Fathers have so much set aside through love of God, to the point of considering, as they say, death as sweet for the salvation of men.

15. How then is it not extremely frightening that this council not only took such care for the orthodox faith, to the point of driving from the Church the perverse doctrines of Pelagius and Celestius which were not in its objective, but manifested in general a particular care for the good order of the Church for what was passing in justice before the tribunal? For those whom Nestorius had removed from the priesthood, the council made an effort in its judgment not to simply restore to their sees nor to vainly neglect all those who had lost their dignity. The council did not tolerate passing over in silence a certain Reginus, and Zeno and Evagrius, bishops who

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had suffered an injustice, but it regulated everything in a suitable manner. On the other hand, regarding the doctrine on the procession of the Holy Spirit, altered by Nestorius as the Latins would say, the council passed over it in silence! How then could one explain it?

16. [Objection:] But what do they answer to this? It was Nestorius's opinion that the Spirit does not derive its existence from the Son, but how is it right to believe it? [Solution:] The argument is not compelling. For the divine Cyril writes to Euloge: "It is not right to flee and refuse everything that heretics say: for they confess many things that we also confess." But, even in the exposition of faith in question, Nestorius did not say only that the Spirit does not derive its existence from the Son, but also that he believes in one God and that the Father is eternally Father and that the Son is of the same substance as the Father as well as the Spirit, and that the Spirit is not Son. But if we believe that this is false for the reason that Nestorius professed it, we are not far from all impiety. So, the fact that Nestorius said this does not mean that the word is necessarily an absurdity, nor even that because of this the word is sound. It would be foolish for someone to claim it. But what has received God's approval is necessarily true—if indeed the opinion of these Fathers was approved by God—since Nestorius was not the master of such a belief. All that was believed and was worthy of condemnation, they devoted to anathema and for this they judged it preferable not to suffer the same fate. For it is only this dogma that has resisted and escaped condemnation, since it was in no way like the impious doctrines that come to the hands of ecumenical councils. This argument therefore of all necessity is not valid, provided that the judges are not far from those who judge the affairs of God by their frequentation of God. Moreover, it is not enough to say that, since Nestorius said something, it will be necessary to recognize the dogma as invalid. But it must be said that Nestorius spoke to the synod which condemned his own opinion, as moreover it is the custom to do always when someone does not speak piously. Furthermore, as he says for himself, it was not assembled for other reasons than to compare what Nestorius was saying to the ancient Theology of the Fathers.

17. [Objection:] But it is said that the council did not approve the word that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. [Solution:] But as it has already been shown, it approved it, when it made the distinction and anathematized certain dogmas, whereas for other dogmas it did not cause any trouble at all. Then, it was shown that the perverse dogmas of Nestorius concerned the plan of the Economy. But here is a dogma that concerns Theology, not Economy. And if by the word approval you mean that for each thing that was said, it was necessary to vote to approve it as sound, this is not a custom of ecumenical councils, and not even of the council in question. It is evident, for Nestorius had said several things about divinity that were good and just; either they [the Latins] show us the approvals for each truth, or they erase them as bad statements. Furthermore, when we say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son or that the Father is eternally Father or that the Son is of the same essence as the Father or that the Spirit is not

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Son, we require of the Latins only to keep silent and to follow the holy council, and to maintain this attitude in general for every word of the Church and for every theological problem, to contradict where the council knew to contradict and to be silent and not to contradict nor change what it approved in silence. And when the time demands it, to examine what has not reached the ear of these blessed ones. And I believe that if one keeps this, it amounts to keeping the truth.

18. [Objection:] But it is said that the council was not assembled beforehand to examine the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit; but its effort concerned only the Economy. That is why they omitted to mention the Spirit—moreover it is the custom of other councils. [Solution:] It is a lie, as is any explanation of this kind! One must see quite the opposite. For this holy council writes to the emperors of the Romans: "It remained after this to make the test of the doctrines preached by the most astonishing Nestorius, for these doctrines were not unknown; they had been openly preached and in letters from him and in books, and they were proclaimed in public discussions." You see that all the doctrines of Nestorius underwent the examination of the holy Fathers and among these doctrines was that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. Then, if one supposes that the fact that the Spirit proceeds from the Son was a lie and that it was also a lie that the Word of God did not assume human nature according to the hypostasis, why would the Fathers have assembled to confront one, while for the other they would have done nothing? If both lies entail death, the effort is vain, for one lie is sufficient to cause death. Then, why were they assembled to decide only on the Economy? To simply expose the doctrine on the Economy, as if they had a problem to solve and nothing more, or, as they themselves say, not to look with indifference at violating the correct faith, while fearing God's judgment for untimely silence? And if this is true, it is a lie to say that only the Economy interested them. (Commentary on the letter to the emperors). And regarding these holy Fathers, how is it reasonable sometimes, for the salvation of men, to endure so many sufferings, until many have found death in the midst of the effort, and sometimes to neglect these men in the midst of error, when by the word they could heal the disease? In the name of God! If someone calls the doctor to treat the eye and the latter exercises his abilities to treat the eye and becomes aware of the gangrene devouring the brain and neglects the patient who is suffering greatly, when he can treat him with remedies he knows, then will you not say that this one is a public executioner and not a doctor? Or do you think that it will be sufficient for him to respond that he was called to treat the eye? And while the law commands the Hebrew not to pass by a fallen animal without doing anything, would these men who led the apostles' combats have endured to pass over in silence an outraged doctrine? Nestorius said the following two things: that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son and that Christ is a mere man. Why would they have assembled for one and not for the other? For they did not hate the lie here to accept it there. And when it is said that they were assembled for one of these reasons, it shows that our reasoning is true. In truth, if they knew that

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the doctrine was worthy of condemnation, they would have assembled for the other reason also in order to denounce the blasphemy. The fifth ecumenical council constitutes a testimony about this: numerous were those who around Origen did not have piety. For all of those this council was assembled and precipitated them into the abyss. It seems that the council against the Messalians did the same thing. It had caught them in the act of pronouncing several blasphemies and it is evident that it banished everything.

19. [Objection:] But regarding ecumenical councils, the practice is to discuss only what was proposed at the beginning. [Solution:] This is also a falsehood, my excellent friend! They define what is appropriate to define, not only what was proposed at the beginning but also all questions that arise. And this is evident for the council in question. This council addressed several matters, as has been shown, and it pronounced a definition for everything, although at the beginning the proposition concerned what Nestorius dared to do. You can observe this in other councils as well. Thus, the first council was convened regarding the doctrine of the Only-Begotten Son, but since the question of the Holy Spirit was raised and the Fathers heard blasphemies about the Holy Spirit from the followers of Arius, they did not accept this novelty or condemn it in a half-hearted manner, so to speak, but they appropriately affirmed the divinity of the Spirit and they resolved with dignity the problem concerning Easter. They also instituted laws and established definitions on all questions. Similarly, the second council did not only examine the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit which was at issue, but also several other problems relating to theology. And the Fathers did not limit themselves to doctrines, but they also attended to the rest of the Church's order through canons addressing this. It is evident! They worshiped a living God and they thought that it is not sufficient to be sound in doctrine but sick in life. Such faith they considered as dead and entirely unsuitable for a living God. And their zeal reached such and such a degree. And for someone who had wept for the evil he had committed and had raised a lamenting voice before them, the misfortune ceased, and carrying away his good, he departed. Therefore, the Latins are not justified in arguing vainly and without reason, and in pretending ignorance, when the facts cry out in such a manner in favor of the contrary.

20. [Objection:] But the passage about the Holy Spirit had not yet caused harm to anyone, and for this reason, it did not merit special attention. [Solution:] First of all, the argument is not compelling. If you observe history from the beginning and subsequently, you can see that the Church has spoken extensively and cut off the roots from afar, for fear of the fruits of deception. Since this council also had the mind of Christ, as it is written, indeed no one was ignorant of the evils that would follow. Furthermore, the objection is a falsehood, and it is evident that it has no truth to it whatsoever, because in the Creed, the Fathers affirmed concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit that He proceeds from the Father and not from the Son. And that the followers of Nestorius persuaded several heretics from Lydia, who wanted to turn to the light of truth, to

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compose such a creed and to write according to their definitions, nothing like this escaped the notice of the council. This is evident. (Extract from the fifty-fifth chapter of the Acts of the third ecumenical council) "A certain individual named Charisius, who was a priest and steward of the holy Church of the city of Philadelphia, made it known that certain heretics from Lydia had wanted to leave their error, turn toward the light of truth, and be initiated into the correct and pious dogmas of the Catholic Church. But whereas they should have been guided toward the truth, they had been more greatly deceived and had fallen, as it were, from one pit into a deeper pit. He made known that Anthony and James, who had the title of priests, had come from Constantinople having letters of recommendation from a certain Anastasius and Photinus, who were then followers of the heretic Nestorius, and who also had the title of priests, and that, whereas they should have presented to the people turning from error to truth and seeking to pass from darkness to light the apostolic and evangelical tradition of the faith that the fathers gathered at Nicaea had expounded in their time, they had offered a certain exposition of impious dogmas composed in the form of a creed and had persuaded these unfortunate people to subscribe to it, exceeding in this every manner of impiety. To demonstrate the accuracy of what he was saying, the petition submitted by the said priest Charisius and the exposition of this impious error concerning the incarnation of the Only-Begotten Son of God with the signature of the deluded people had been inserted into the Acts. You see here also to what extent the council advanced the reproach addressed to the teaching of Nestorius? It calls the exposition of his own creed "impious" and it added that the impiety concerned the incarnation.

21. And you could see another not insignificant harm that the creed caused. The petitions that Charisius had given to the council say: (Extract taken from the same chapter of the Acts:) "Having indeed reached the city of Philadelphia, that is, Jacob, and having deceived certain simple people—these are clerics—he disdained the exposition of faith of the holy Fathers of Nicaea and arranged for them to subscribe to another formula of faith, or rather of unfaithfulness. They, as simple people, did this and subscribed to it, saying 'We associate ourselves with this orthodox faith.' Now this exposition, which is full of heretical blasphemy and which bears the signatures of those who have been seduced, is preserved, and I ask that it be read as is fitting before Your Holiness, so that you may know the overturning of orthodoxy engineered by them." Here, it is clear that the harm that the creed caused had not only affected those who were outside the Church but had already reached some who were inside the Church. So it does not aim at the truth and is absurd, the argument which says that to the affirmation "the Spirit does not proceed from the Son," the Fathers did not give particular attention because it had not yet led anyone into error.

22. Moreover, it has been shown repeatedly that the synod heard and examined everything, as it itself says, and separated false doctrines from true ones and accepted, among the sound

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doctrines, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. And [it has also been shown] that all the perverse doctrines of Nestorius concerned the Economy, and that it would be impossible for an ecumenical council, a council that attends to the smallest details, to neglect a perverse dogma! So any pretext for contradiction is superfluous, if one wishes to reason correctly.

The 9th anathema of Cyril against Nestorius and the objection of Theodoret.

23. Furthermore, after the appropriate conclusion of the council's work, Nestorius was removed from the Church, while the divine Cyril appeared as the one who occupied the first rank, but he could not be at peace because of malevolence. A slanderous accusation was launched against this blessed man. At the origin were his letters to Nestorius where he rejected all his innovation. The Eastern bishops did not agree until the end with what Cyril was saying, and for this reason, they acted in thought and deed against his chapters. The divine Cyril found their objections through Evopius, among which there is one that accuses him of having professed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. He writes to Evopius to respond to all the accusations together and to show the slanders everywhere. He addresses each chapter separately and makes clear his opinion that he too believes it completely blasphemous to think that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. So that everything may be clear, I will set forth the passage of Cyril, the accusation in question by Theodoret, and obviously also Cyril's response to Theodoret's objections.

24. Ninth anathema of Saint Cyril against Nestorius: "If anyone says that the one Lord Jesus Christ was glorified by the Spirit, as if using a power foreign to himself that came from the Spirit, and that he received from the Spirit the power to act against unclean spirits and to perform his miracles before men, and does not rather say that this Spirit was his own, through which he performed his miracles, let him be anathema." This was the wonderful statement of Cyril. But Theodoret accuses him vainly and without reason, saying: "The Spirit is proper to the Son. If [Cyril] by this phrase expresses the identity of nature and the procession from the Father, we will agree and we will accept the statement as pious. But if he means that the Spirit had his existence from the Son or through the Son, we will reject that as blasphemous and impious. For we believe in the Lord who says 'the Spirit who proceeds from the Father' and in the most divine Paul who speaks similarly: 'We have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that comes from God.'" With respect to this objection and to all the others, the divine Cyril wrote to Bishop Evopius, saying: "To satisfy the goodwill characteristic of your piety, I have received the tome sent, composed against the anathematisms by, it is said, Theodoret of Cyrus. That is what the town is called. I happened to find the content and I dedicated songs of grace to God; but I did not omit to say: 'Lord, deliver me from false lips and a deceitful tongue'; for I discover myself to be slandered everywhere and to be suffering this slander in every chapter."

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25. Indeed, the blessed Cyril calls the Spirit "proper" to the Lord because Nestorius said that the Lord used the power of the Spirit as if it were foreign, since the impious one believed Him to be a mere man. So Cyril, acting well and prudently, contrasts "foreign" with "proper." And Theodoret was full of suspicions that perhaps by saying the Spirit is [the Spirit] proper to the Son, he meant that He derives His existence from Him, and for this reason, he characterized such an opinion as blasphemous and impious. But the blessed Cyril, defending himself against this, responds that he is everywhere slandered by Theodoret and that he suffers this evil in every chapter. So how is it not entirely evident that the opinion of ancient theology and a certain common notion of the Fathers manifest that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son?

Cyril's response to the 9th objection of Theodoret.

26. But let us also move to the rest of the apology that Cyril makes particularly, word for word, to respond to the same accusation. And for the sake of clarity, we will again repeat the proposition: Theodoret did not know the manner in which Cyril said that the Spirit is [the Spirit] proper to the Son. For him, to say that the Spirit is proper to the Son with the meaning that He proceeds from the Son is a blasphemous and impious statement. But if someone says it is proper in the sense of conaturality and consubstantiality, then he believes it to be pious. And Cyril, who removes any pretext for suspicion, responds:

Extract from Saint Cyril's refutation of the ninth objection of Theodoret:

"I have come to write (this ninth Chapter), for the power of the Chapters fights against the stammering of Nestorius, that is, the blasphemies, even those that have not been professed with any care. For when he spoke of the Holy Spirit, granted Christ such great glory, made him terrible to demons, granted him the ascension to heaven, and related such nonsense, saying about Christ that he was like a man of the same sort as us, then the anathema became necessary. Of course, not against those who say that Jesus was glorified by the Holy Spirit, that is, that the Word of God was incarnated, but rather against those who without reservation say that he used a power foreign to him that came from the Spirit. For we remember that he had clearly said concerning the Holy Spirit: 'He will glorify me.' We know that this signifies the operation of the Holy Spirit who breaks the evil and impure powers. But we do not say it in this way as for each of the saints, as if he had used a foreign power that comes from the Spirit. For the Spirit belonged to him and belongs to him, as indeed he also belongs to the Father. And this the divine Paul makes quite clear, when he writes: 'Under the dominion of the flesh, one cannot please God. But you are not under the dominion of the flesh, but of the Spirit, since the Spirit of God dwells in you. If someone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to him'; for the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father according to the word of the Savior, but without being foreign to the Son, for he has all things in common with the Father."

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27. This was what the divine Cyril thought. And whether the blessed Theodoret agrees or not will be known from this: Theodoret had expounded two ways in which the Spirit can be proper to the Son. The first, if he comes from the Son. The second, in relation to kinship and consubstantiality. The first, which indicates the derivation from a cause, he calls blasphemous and impious. The second, he admits as pious. And Cyril, who read and systematically refuted it, had nothing to say about this, even though the instigator of the dispute provoked him with a thousand appeals. Indeed, he saw his own faith, the apostolic faith, under siege, and he completely yielded to his explanation, accepting the Spirit as proper to the Son as signifying that he is not foreign, whereas Nestorius said with much wickedness that he was foreign to the Lord. This "proper" that Theodoret had accepted as meaning "connatural" and as being pious, Cyril interpreted as meaning "not foreign."

28. But certainly Theodoret rejects the other way as being impious and blasphemous, and he affirms that he believes in the Lord who says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. It seems that Cyril does the same thing when he says that "the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father according to the word of the Savior, but without being foreign to the Son." In one clause of a period, he rejects the first explanation (of "proper") which he attached to the Father alone, following Theodoret, whereas the second explanation [of "proper"] he introduced instead, demonstrating also on this point that the head of the council preserves by all means the agreement with himself, with the truth, and with the council. For if he believed in that circumstance, along with everyone, that it is pious not to profess that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, it follows that he believes the contrary to be blasphemous and impious. And concerning his statement, if someone thinks such things about him, it is difficult even to pronounce slanders.

Cyril's Letter to John of Antioch.

29. Since the divine Cyril was obliged to make a second apology regarding that of which the Eastern bishops accused him, and among these accusations was the question that we are now investigating, let us see what he also says there about the procession of the divine Spirit when he refers to the very objection of Theodoret. Thus, he says in the letter to John of Antioch: "We do not in any way tolerate that the creed or symbol of faith which was defined by our holy Fathers gathered in their time at Nicaea be shaken, and we do not permit either ourselves or others to change a word of the text or to transgress a single syllable, remembering the one who says: 'Do not move the ancient landmarks that your fathers have set.' For it was not they who were speaking, but the Spirit of God the Father who proceeds from God, but who is not foreign to the Son in terms of essence." Here precisely one can see the agreement of those blessed ones. The divine Cyril, in a single phrase, makes a distinction. On the one hand, he attributes to the Father the mode of causality, while he removes it from the Son; it is thus, of absolute necessity, that his

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statement must be understood, even if it was not aimed at the objection of Theodoret, which was much more than the pretext for this statement. On the other hand, he concedes to the Son the relation of kinship or conjunction or consubstantiality, or whatever appellation one might wish. And he clarifies the expression "not foreign" by adding the expression "according to essence" and by saying "he is not foreign to the Son in terms of essence."

30. When the divine Cyril said that the Son is proper to the Spirit, Theodoret responded to the proposition, saying: "With the phrase that the Son is proper to the Spirit, if you mean the identity of nature and consubstantiality and the fact that he is born of the Father, then we will also confess it and we will accept the statement as pious. But if you mean that he derives his existence from the Spirit or through the Spirit, we will reject it as blasphemous and impious. For we believe in the Scripture which says that the Son is [from] the Father." Then, the divine Cyril, wishing to put an end to the suspicion, responded thus: "The Son is begotten of the Father, but he is not foreign to the Spirit in terms of essence." Is this not the right moment to speak thus? He dispelled the suspicion and at the same time he preserved the truth of the dogma concerning the Son, and he was thus in perfect agreement with the truth, with himself, with Theodoret, and with the common conception. So, think the equivalent for the Spirit. For either it must apply there also, since it also applies to the Son, or it does not apply to the Son, since it does not apply to the Spirit.

31. In the name of God, answer me! Theodoret, speaking of the proposition in question, advanced against the divine Cyril. And Cyril responded to him systematically before an ecumenical tribunal because piety was in danger. So, what do the Latins think of Cyril's statements? Which of the two are they necessarily in agreement with—Theodoret or, on the contrary, are they in disagreement? Or do the present testimonies not compel either of the two? But if it is neither of the two, then the goal of Cyril's words, originally, was not Theodoret. But this is clearly a falsehood. And if they are necessarily in disagreement with him because he had said that regarding the Spirit, then how is this reasonable? Then we too could use the same formula for similar things to thus show the disagreement. But this is not possible. The laws of orators and those who are skilled in reasoning, as well as those who have a certain experience of the Greek language, would not admit it. It remains that of absolute necessity one must conceive that the proposition is in agreement with Theodoret and that it preserves the similar order with the rest of the statement and that it is possible for all to show this agreement. This truth, moreover, was demonstrated to us above when they were saying the Son is proper to the Spirit.

32. And the most important point, where to contradict is a manifest folly, as we will show a little further on, is that Theodoret accepted Cyril's apology through words concerning the subject in question and letters dealing with this multiple times that testify that Cyril in no way believes that the Spirit derives his existence from the Son. And the blessed Theodoret not only explicitly

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affirms this, but also for this reason gives thanks to God and for this opinion manifestly celebrates the peace of the Church. And Cyril likewise deems worthy of numerous and great praises the Eastern bishops, and principally, the extraordinary Theodoret.

33. Furthermore, the aforementioned letter of Saint Cyril to John of Antioch, the fourth ecumenical council accepted it; thus it did not pass by without admiring it, since it added it to the Definition of Faith and it testifies to this letter in the best possible way. This divine council testifies in its definition after the reading of the divine Symbol: "Now, for a complete knowledge and confirmation of religion, this wise and salutary Symbol of divine grace would have been sufficient because it gives a perfect teaching about the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." In the continuation, after having recalled certain events, it advances: "On the other hand, because of those who attempt to disfigure the mystery of the Economy and who, in their impudent foolishness, say that the one whom the holy Virgin Mary bore is merely a simple man, the council has received the synodical letters of the blessed Cyril, who was pastor of the Church of Alexandria, both to Nestorius and to the Eastern bishops, as very proper on the one hand to refute the insanities of Nestorius and on the other hand to assist in the interpretation those who through religious zeal aspire to the understanding of the salutary Symbol."

34. If the divine Cyril, in the letter to John of Antioch, rejects from himself the accusation, for fear of giving the impression that he professes that the Spirit derives his existence from the Son, and says what was mentioned above, and if the council attaches this letter to the Definition of Faith for those who through religious zeal aspire to the understanding of the salutary Symbol, and if the Latins after these testimonies profess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, then what means could save those who go against the Definition of Faith, promulgated by a great ecumenical council?

35. And if it has been shown that the opinion of the four ecumenical councils was that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, and if the common opinion of the Church is valid, that is, if the words of the Fathers in these councils were not their own voice but certain declarations of the Holy Spirit who had used the tongues of the Fathers; if moreover the entourage of Theodosius and of Sabbas and every other member of that choir anathematize those who do not accept the four ecumenical councils as the four gospels, then who will not be filled with indignation at the affirmation, grasping how frightening the matter is?

The texts after the Reconciliation.

36. Furthermore, let us go back. Since, as has already been said, in the Church a dissension was born through ignorance of what Cyril said, it was necessary that the Churches of the East, spread to all points of the earth, should gather in one same place and, as there exists one God, also declare one faith, in all points of the earth. On the one hand, God grants peace through the

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presence of a good emperor; on the other hand, the blessed Theodoret and Cyril send letters to the Patriarch of Antioch. They transmit to him and celebrate the good news of peace, and after a certain confession, each recognized the faith of the other as his own faith, and they show this clearly. Theodoret, who sends his letter to John of Antioch, concerning what Cyril has professed, expresses himself thus: "God who directs everything with wisdom, who watches over the interests of our concord and takes care of the salvation of the peoples, has brought it about that we should be reconciled and has manifested that the opinions of all are in agreement. Having indeed read together the Egyptian letters and having thoroughly examined their meaning, we have found that what he sent is in agreement with what we have said." And a little further on he says: "In these letters indeed it is declared that Our Lord Jesus Christ is perfect God and perfect man, that there are two natures and that they differ." And after having examined in detail each objection, he advances in speaking on the subject in question: "The Holy Spirit does not hold his existence from the Son or by means of the Son, but is from the Father, while being named proper to the Son as being consubstantial. Having thus established this rectitude in Cyril's letter, we have sung to God who heals the embarrassed tongues and who transforms the discordant voice into pleasant harmony."

37. That the Eastern bishops accepted the teaching of the blessed Cyril that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and not from the Son, this clearly emerges from the preceding considerations. Now what Cyril admits of their teaching, sometimes Cyril himself manifests it by writing to the same John, sometimes they themselves explain it by speaking of themselves. For he says: "The writing is as follows and it is inserted in its own terms in our letter." And a little further on: "We confess therefore that Our Lord Jesus Christ, Only-Begotten Son of God, is perfect God and perfect man composed of a reasonable soul and a body, before the ages begotten of the Father according to divinity, for us and for our salvation, begotten of the Virgin Mary according to humanity. For there has been a union of the two natures: that is why we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord, according to this notion of union without mixture. We confess that the Holy Virgin is Mother of God because God the Word was incarnated, that he became man and that, from the moment of conception, he united to himself the temple that he took from the Virgin. As for the apostolic and evangelical expressions, we know that theologians either apply them commonly to the whole Christ as concerning a single person, or divide them as concerning the two natures, and in this case attribute to the divinity of Christ those that are fitting to God, and to his humanity those that mark his abasement. When we had read these holy words and found that we thought the same for 'there is only one Lord, one faith, one baptism,' we glorified God the universal Savior, congratulating each other that the Churches among us and among you hold a faith that accords with the inspired Scriptures and the tradition of the holy Fathers."

38. Likewise, the same divine Cyril, after the Reconciliation:

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Extract from the letter to Bishop Valerian: "The most pious bishops of all the East, together with my lord the most pious bishop of the Church of Antioch, John, have made it openly known to all, through a clear written confession, that they condemn the futile and profane utterances of Nestorius, that they anathematize them with us, and that they have never taken them into account, but that they follow the evangelical and apostolic dogmas and are in no way adversaries of the confession of the Fathers." And again, from the same letter: "If, therefore, some say, lying, that the bishops of the East hold sentiments other than these, let them not be believed, but let them be driven away as deceivers and liars like their father the devil, so that they may not trouble those who wish to walk uprightly."

39. This, then, was the testimony of divine Cyril to the Orientals. On the other hand, Theodoret and the Orientals expressly say this: "The Spirit is proper to the Son. If Cyril with this phrase expresses the identity of nature and the procession from the Father, we will agree and accept the word as pious. But if he means that the Spirit had its existence from the Son or through the Son, we will reject this as blasphemous and impious." And again the same one: "And the Holy Spirit does not derive His existence from the Son or through the mediation of the Son, but proceeds from the Father, while being named proper to the Son insofar as consubstantial." Thus the fact that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son is either not an impure, meaningless statement of Nestorius, but a tradition of the apostles, and consequently the Latins are condemned; or, on the contrary, Cyril manifestly lied against the truth when saying about the Eastern bishops that they condemn and reject with us the anathema against the impious and meaningless words of Nestorius. For it is clear that they, after the reconciliation, do not believe that one should confess that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. And, more importantly, it seems that they manifestly celebrate the peace of the Churches for this agreement, since they acknowledge that Cyril says that the Holy Spirit does not derive His existence either from the Son or through the Son.

40. Moreover, the fact that divine Cyril said that the Orientals did not attribute any value to the impure and empty words of Nestorius, concerning the Economy of the Savior, is very true—you would never see them allowing themselves to concede a blasphemous dogma. But concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, that He does not proceed from the Son, if we attribute this to Nestorius, then how is it not quite impudent for Theodoret and the others who have spoken with complete freedom about this, both before the concord of the Churches and after the concord, the audience being an ecumenical council? And when divine Cyril adds that the Orientals condemn and reject with us the anathema against the doctrines of Nestorius, is this not clear testimony that the fact that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son is not an opinion of Nestorius? It has been shown that, on this dogma, he was in agreement with the Orientals and that he clearly attributed only to the Father the emission of the Spirit, having heard bad words about this, which he did not believe as they did.

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41. Moreover, if someone said to the Latins: "O most wise ones, the Orientals expressly profess that it is blasphemous and impious to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son," then, which of the two will they respond: that in this they agree with the apostles or with Nestorius? If it is the second response, Cyril will reply with loud cries, for he testifies that they follow the dogmas of the apostles and the Fathers and are in no way adversaries of the confession of the Fathers, and those who believe the contrary about them, he calls deceivers and liars and casts them out of the Church with the devil. But if they choose the first response, the shame is clear and nothing needs to be added.

Cyril: The Spirit pours forth from the Son as from the Father.

42. [Objection:] But what do they say in relation to this? In Cyril's letter to Nestorius, where the Chapters against Nestorius are attached, he speaks clearly thus: "For even if the Spirit exists in His own particular hypostasis and is conceived as separate in Himself insofar as He is Spirit and not Son, nevertheless He is not foreign to the Son. For He has been named 'Spirit of truth,' and Christ is the truth, and the Spirit pours forth from Him [the Son] as from the Father." This clearly means that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, as also from the Father. Cyril wrote this in the letter to Nestorius. The council was silent before the common assembly, because Nestorius was condemned for this. And Cyril was silent when he responded systematically to Theodoret about this, since they believed that the content of the letter was sufficient because the council accepted the letter as if it were its own. And that the verb "to pour forth" is put in place of "to proceed," Cyril himself showed when he said in the explanation of the holy Symbol concerning the Holy Spirit that "on the one hand He pours forth, that is, proceeds from God the Father, and on the other hand He is provided to creation through the Son."

43. [Solution:] First, it is quite petty for those who imagine themselves to be heroes, while manifestly lying against the truth and after so many proofs, to believe that divine Cyril thought that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Son and to say that he was silent about Theodoret's theses. And this, after having spoken so much and after having shown that he was stronger than the calumnies, so that even Theodoret had nothing more to say but confessed his agreement with Cyril. But regarding the cause of suspicion, it is placed not in the mind but in the language of Cyril, as if the meaning of his thoughts was not sufficient. For this is what he implies when describing the concord and declares quite manifestly: "having ascertained the correctness [of the faith] in Cyril's letter, we praised God who heals stammering tongues and transforms discordant voice into pleasant harmony."

44. Furthermore, to profess this is to ignore the purpose of the letter and the chapters that exist in it, and how many there are and what force they have and what point Nestorius aims at, and to which anathema pronounced against him each Chapter relates. One who is about to develop such

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things must not seek everything in an accessory manner. Let us recall that divine Cyril himself says in the Treasures: "One who advances in the search of the divine scriptures must observe the time to which the event refers, the person from whom, through whom, or about whom it is said. In this way, the mind will remain faultless for those who wish to reason correctly." But if they say they are not satisfied with what has been set forth, then those who make use of this letter in favor of their positions should not ignore it. For this letter is not the one which, after being read before the common assembly, was indicated by the council as a measure of faith. That was the second letter to Nestorius, while this is the third. For this last letter, the Fathers of the council thought it right to deposit it among the registers of the council, as indeed they judged necessary also for the letter of Celestine and Capreolus and for many others.

45. On the other hand, concerning the procession of the Spirit, concerning the fact that He does not proceed from the Son, on one side the Fathers were silent since they did not believe that the doctrine was sound, on the other side the Latins refer the incredulous to that letter, because Cyril says that the Spirit pours forth from the Son in the same manner as from the Father. This is entirely a fable and an evident imagination of the Latins' thinking. For nowhere are such things found—this is accompanied by many falsehoods, and it is impossible. For the council had not previously put this letter to the test, from which they claim such things. Then, concerning the procession of the Spirit, it did not concede that He proceeds from the Son so that it would be possible to fashion such things, and with reason, but the opposite. After the rectification of the Symbol and the canonization by the Church, time passed and they read this letter. Therefore, if they claim what was said above, it is the same as if they claimed impossible things. For the council, for questions in doubt, had not referred to this letter which it had never read, not even the beginning. And that this is true is evident from the acts of that holy council.

46. And not only is it not Cyril's opinion that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, as has been shown, but it is not necessary to understand the verb "to pour forth" in the sense of "to proceed." And why do I say that it is not necessary? By all necessity, here it must not be understood thus! Here is why: the intention of this letter is a judgment proposed to Nestorius against his own doctrines. Consequently, it is necessary to accept what is apostolic doctrine, while it is necessary to flee what is not sound. The letter is divided into twelve chapters, and the chapter in question is the eleventh. This chapter, which the Latins have now detached from its context and raise against us, opposes the ninth anathema, just as the other chapters oppose the other anathemas. For Nestorius said with regard to Christ that He was a mere man and that He used the power of the Spirit as something foreign to perform miracles and that He also participated in the Spirit just as each of the saints did. Against this, Saint Cyril expresses the dogmas of truth. He says that "the Holy Spirit is not foreign to Him," that is, according to essence. For he adds this when he explains it himself in the letter to John of Antioch, since he writes there also about the same

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thing. And the cause is found in Scripture, "for He has been called 'Spirit of truth,' and 'truth is Christ.'" He is so far from participating in the Spirit as is the case for each of the saints, that "the Spirit pours forth from Him as well as from the Father"; he means that He is poured forth upon the saints, for he is alluding to the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

47. Moreover, this letter contains the rejection of Nestorius, as has been said, in twelve chapters that refute all his malevolence, according to what the sixth council says. And in these chapters there is nothing about the emission of the Holy Spirit, and simply nothing else that concerns theology, but everything relates to the economy.

48. Then, if Cyril writes to Nestorius and refutes some assertion about the procession of the Holy Spirit, whereas in his own writings Nestorius does not say this, the proposition is very close to an enigma. For that to which Cyril responds, where is it found in Nestorius's letters? But when they read, in a manifest manner during the synod, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, or that it is blasphemous and impious to believe that the Spirit proceeds from the Son—which Theodoret writes to Cyril—then in this circumstance, Cyril with the synod is silent, and especially Cyril is silent again when he responds systematically to this. And not only that, but he says that if anyone thinks of him that he believes something other than Theodoret in this case, he is a victim of calumnies. And finally, he testifies to the bishops of the East, at the head of whom was Theodoret, that they have a faith compatible with divine Scripture and with apostolic tradition, and that for no reason have they ever supported the impious doctrines of Nestorius.

49. And this would be astonishing! What finally? Regarding the Economy of the Savior, Cyril had spoken previously thousands of times, as had Celestine, and it was not sufficient for the divine council, and they again argued against Nestorius with proofs and testimonies more numerous than before, and they showed that their proposition was reliable. But on the other hand, regarding the procession of the Spirit, the short and for this reason not very clear sentence of divine Cyril, without having any proof for it, would be sufficient for such an evident blasphemy!

50. Moreover, since this passage relates to the ninth anathematism, about which Cyril defends himself against Theodoret, it turns out that Cyril claims that it is blasphemous to profess that the Spirit proceeds from the Son; then how could what he considered blasphemous and impious, when he was interpreting his own proposition with many details, would he believe right and accept as sound in short expressions? It is proper to do the opposite: to clarify what is not clear with the help of what is clearer.

51. And since Theodoret, as has been shown, after the apologies, testifies quite manifestly with Cyril that he does not believe that the Spirit derives its existence from the Son, would it not already be clearly a shame for Cyril to contradict Theodoret with whom he had discussed so

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much, to the point of risking dividing the universe, which would have indeed happened if he had not composed these good apologies?

The Holy Spirit on the one hand pours forth, that is, proceeds from God the Father, and on the other hand is provided to nature through the Son.

52. And when it is said that divine Cyril in the explanation of the holy Symbol accepts the verb "to pour forth" in place of the verb "to proceed," saying "the Holy Spirit on the one hand pours forth, that is, proceeds from God the Father, and on the other hand is provided to creation through the Son," Cyril clearly shows that the verb "to pour forth" is not equivalent only to the verb "to proceed," but also to something more. This is what the verb "to be provided" means. Otherwise, for what reason, after saying "pours forth," would he have added the explanation "proceeds," if the verb "to pour forth" always meant the same thing as the verb "to proceed"?

53. Besides this, God says through Joel: "In the last days I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh." And divine Paul in the letter to Titus: "He saved us by the washing of regeneration and renewal that the Holy Spirit produces, poured out on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Savior." Certainly, no one who wishes to remain in the faith would say that these expressions are equivalent to the verb "to proceed."

54. Furthermore, divine Cyril expresses himself with particles of opposition and says with regard to the Holy Spirit that "on the one hand He pours forth, that is, proceeds from God the Father, and on the other hand He is provided to creation through the Son." Is it not clear then that he believes that the Spirit derives its existence only from the Father? For if the provision of the Spirit were from both the Father and the Son, and if the procession were also common to both, then the distinction and explanation of the verb "to pour forth" would be in vain, and what was announced would prove contrary to the common usage of speech. For when certain things are different and belong equally to two persons, if one distinguishes them with particles (of opposition) and attributes one thing to one person and the other thing to the other person, the Greek language does not recognize this. For example, Peter and Paul: Each of the two is an apostle and a martyr. If someone were to speak of them and say: "Peter is an apostle while Paul is a martyr," he would not seem to have a wise mind or a sound tongue. Similarly, you would not say that Pericles is a general while Themistocles is an orator. For in the same way, if one does not think that one quality surpasses the other, each of the two [general and orator] is suitable for both (persons mentioned). And the masters of Christian theology have not ignored this. Several times they have used this distinctive formula in theology to distinguish the thearchic Persons.

Patristic examples of distinction in the Trinity with particles of opposition.

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55. Divine Dionysius, in the discourse on union and distinction, says: "on the one hand the Father is within the divinity the productive element, on the other hand the Son and the Spirit are, so to speak, the divine shoots of the divinity that engenders God and in some way its superessential flowers and radiance," and it is the holy Scriptures that have taught us this. And the first council at Nicaea: "on the one hand the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, on the other hand He is proper to the Son." And Basil the Great in the letter to his brother: "The Holy Spirit is attached on the one hand to the Son, with whom He is immediately grasped, and on the other hand holds His being attached, as to His cause, to the Father, from whom He also proceeds," and again: "The Holy Spirit on the one hand is known with the Son and together with Him, on the other hand He exists from the Father." And divine Gregory of Nyssa in the books to Eunomius: "The Holy Spirit is grasped in an appropriate manner by the Son; He does not come into existence after the Son, as if one could ever think of the Only-Begotten without the Spirit, but on the one hand He also derives the cause of (His) being from the God of the universe, from whom is the only-begotten light, and on the other hand He has shone forth through the true light [Christ]." And again an extract taken from the same book: "We will not think of a ray issuing from the sun, but of another sun issuing from an unbegotten sun, together from the first thought, which shines simultaneously with it in a begotten manner, which equally possesses everything: beauty, power, brightness, luminosity, and simply everything that can be contemplated concerning the sun. And again we will think in the same way of another similar light, which is not separated from the light begotten by a temporal spacing, but which on the one hand shines forth through Him and on the other hand derives the cause of its hypostasis from the original light." And again divine Cyril in the books to Hermias on the Holy Spirit says: "the Father pours Him forth from His own nature, while the Son, He too, distributes Him to those who are worthy."

56. [Objection:] And if they say that there is nothing that prevents dividing certain qualities that exist equally in two or three persons and attaching them separately to each person with particles? For example, when the theologian says in the discourse on Theology: "concerning the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, on the one hand one Person finds it good, on the other hand the other Person cooperates, and the other Person breathes"? [Solution:] What they say is not a necessity. Here is the equivalent: as if someone says that on the one hand the Father finds it good, on the other hand the Son finds it good, and the Holy Spirit finds it good. Here is the custom among the Greeks: one speaks thus either about things absolutely identical or about things that indeed are not very far apart, as seems to be the case with the word of the theologian with these verbs of different form but of meaning not at all different or (only) a little. The proof is that they can be inverted. For if one attaches the proposition to God, the verb "to find good" means to cooperate and to breathe, and the verb "to cooperate" means both to find good and to breathe, and the verb "to breathe" means to find good and to cooperate.

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57. By what has been set forth, it is evident that it is a common doctrine for the catholic Church of Christ that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, and that on this point there was agreement between the Churches both of the East and everywhere on earth. And by what follows, it is evident that the same thing is an ancient opinion of Cyril, and that in every way he rejects this suspicion since he thinks that it is terrible to believe the realities proper to the Father as common also to the Son. In the Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, in the thirty-ninth chapter, he develops the extraordinary word of the Lord: "But if it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons, then the Kingdom of God has come upon you." Here is what Cyril says: "since what you say is not true, it is rather a stale antiquity and an absolute lie but also a product of a slanderous character, it is evident that it is by the finger of God that I cast out demons. With the expression 'finger of God' he signifies the Holy Spirit. For the same has been called the hand and arm of God since he operates everything through him, and likewise, the Son, too, operates in Spirit. Just as the finger belongs to the hand, not being foreign to it, but being in it by nature, so the Holy Spirit by reason of consubstantiality is attached to the Son for union, and He proceeds from God the Father." But if he knew that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, why did he add that He "proceeds from God the Father"? Now this was the testimony of the third and fourth ecumenical councils.

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The Letter of Pope Agathon

1. Excerpts from the Acts of the Sixth Council And of course, we must demonstrate the response that the sixth holy ecumenical council, and also evidently the seventh, give us regarding what we are investigating. Pope Agathon, with the council assembled in Rome, sent a letter to the Roman emperors in which he says: <> And toward the end of the definition, this: "Having formulated these points with complete precision and accuracy, we define that no one is permitted to propose another confession of faith, that is, to write it, compose it, contemplate it or teach it differently. As for those who would dare to compose another confession of faith, to disseminate, teach, or transmit another Symbol to those who wish to convert from paganism, Judaism, or any heresy whatsoever to the knowledge of truth, or to introduce a new language or an invented expression in order to invalidate the points we have just defined, if they were bishops or clerics, they would be excluded, bishops from the episcopate and clerics from the clergy; if they were monks or laypeople, they would be struck with anathema."

3. On one hand, the definition is full of threat and anger and rejects any addition to the Symbol and threatens the worst against those who innovate even down to the words. On the other hand, concerning the addition of words or phrases, the Latins cannot deny having added to the holy Symbol and cannot claim to maintain the definition in force, at least in the phrases, while they recite it with the addition.

The Letter of Saint Maximus to Marinos: An Orthodox Filioque

4. [Objection:] However, they say that they have added nothing to the understanding [of the Symbol] but that those blessed ones, those who gathered in Rome as well as those who gathered from the whole world in Constantinople, professed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father in such a way that of absolute necessity He also proceeds from the Son. [Solution:] But it is completely the opposite. The ecumenical council as well as that assembly of Rome think thus about the procession of the Holy Spirit, that this ineffable origination issues from the Father alone and in no way from the Son. I propose as witness of what I speak, the divine Maximus who assimilated theological knowledge to such a degree that, in his time, while the entire Church was perverse, the alliance of the Spirit with him alone was sufficient to wage war against the whole world. Notably, it would be so fitting that he be called both father and master of this holy council, that even the opponents could not contradict it. The proof: the supporters of Pyrrhus, Sergius, and Honorius and the other leaders of the heresy called the orthodox "Maximians" since all had their gaze turned toward him and neither said nor thought anything that he did not believe (The eighth chapter of the acts of the holy council says this).

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5. This man, therefore, in his letter to Marinos, when the latter asked him his opinion about the problem that concerns us, sets forth the opinion of the Church of Rome on the Spirit and certainly he sets forth our opinion, and before these he sets forth his own opinion. Here is the letter copied literally, which begins: "Dear father, whom God has honored, you have conformed to the law of God according to the divine will, [and] you have despised human law": "Assuredly, those of the queen of cities [Constantinople] have not found fault with as many chapters of the Synodical Letters of the current and most holy pope as you have written to me, but with only two. One concerns theology; they reproach him for saying that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son. The other concerns the divine Incarnation; they reproach him for having written that the Lord as man is exempt from ancestral sin. On the first point, [those of Rome] have presented the concordant usages of the Roman Fathers, and also those of Saint Cyril of Alexandria, extracted from the sacred study that he made on Saint John the Evangelist, from which they have shown that they themselves have not made the Son the cause of the Holy Spirit, for they knew the Father as the unique cause of That One [the Son] according to generation and of This One [the Spirit] according to procession, but that they wanted to manifest the fact [for the Spirit] of going forth through Him [the Son], and establish thereby the connection and non-difference of the essence. For the second point, they have no need for anyone to defend them. For what uncertainty is there in this affirmation, even if those seeking pretexts think so because of their intractable character? For it suffices that they say that [the Lord] did not have in His mind the sin that Adam appeared to suffer first, nor in His body, the action and operation of evil that comes from it." So this is what [those of Rome] have responded about the things of which they are accused without valid reason. On the other hand, it is with good reason that [those of Constantinople] have been accused of that for which they have presented no defense until now, when they have not rejected what they themselves have fraudulently introduced. However, following your request, I have asked the Romans to translate (the formulas) that are proper to them in order to avoid obscurities of the points that are connected to them. However, the custom of writing and sending [the Synodical Letters] in this way having been followed, I wonder if they will ever agree to it. Moreover, there is the fact of not being able to express their thought in other words and in another language than their own mother tongue, a difficulty that we also encounter. In any case, having experienced the accusation, they will come to care about it."

6. Maximus envisions this explanation as a common faith of both Cyril of Alexandria and the Roman Fathers, not only of those who preceded but also of those of the time of Pope Agathon and certainly of the sixth council also, since the divine Maximus was its patron and master. And the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, it is right to understand it in the same way that the Fathers who set forth the Confessions [of faith] understood it and accepted it. And they accepted it thus that the Father possesses the cause of the Son and of the Spirit, of That One [the

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Son] according to generation, of This One [the Spirit] according to the property of procession, while the Son does not possess the cause of the Spirit.

7. Moreover, if ever someone hears a Father of Rome say that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son, let him not consider the Son as cause, for this saying means that He goes forth through the Son Himself. And this, to show the connection and the non-difference of the essence." And if someone willingly agrees to a part of the theological explanation but suffers for the rest and has difficulties because he does not concede the term "procession" to the Son, since the latter does not possess the cause of the Spirit, then let him think about what Saint Denys says, namely that it is absurd and vexing to neglect the importance of the aim for the sake of verbal expression, and that the Holy Spirit despises the pettiness of writing. Then the wise Maximus also adds this, that the Romans cannot express their thought in other words and in another language than their own mother tongue.

Saint Andrew of Crete and the Filioque

8. And certainly the blessed Andrew, Bishop of Crete, also participated in the choir of this holy ecumenical council; it is clear that he too agrees with the divine Maximus and that he accepts the Definition that he himself, along with the others, set forth in the following manner: that only the Father differs from the Spirit according to the principle of causality [of his existence]. For he says in his Sermon on the Transfiguration: "Indeed, one cannot see otherwise; either the Father in the Son, or the Son in the Father, or in the Holy Spirit who on the one hand proceeds from the Father and on the other hand according to essence willingly dwells and reposes in the Son, as being consubstantial with the other two Persons and sharing the same throne and the same honor. And if on the one hand He willingly dwells according to essence in the Father and the Son, since He is consubstantial with both, and on the other hand He also proceeds from both together according to what the new theology says, let the leaders of Latin opinion tell us: those who occupy themselves with theology, finally, do they really attribute on one hand the cause [of the Spirit] to the Father and never to the Son, and on the other hand the kinship of nature, do they attribute it also to the Son and never the opposite? Or else, what do the particles of opposition want to indicate? Because, usually, one does not use common language in this way, when different attributes refer to two persons, and both persons at once are attached to each attribute. Because, if one is reasonable, one does not say that on the one hand the Father is uncreated and on the other hand the Son is good. For this expression removes from the Father or from the Son the attribute either of goodness or of being uncreated. Consequently, with regard to the theological passage in question, the intimate reason explicitly asks to remove from the Father or from the Son, either the kinship of nature or the cause of emission. Since it is completely impossible to remove the kinship, it is absolutely compelling to attach the cause either to the

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Father alone or else to the Son alone. But to attach the cause to the Son alone, even the Latins would say that it is impossible. It remains therefore to attribute it to the Father alone and in no way to the Son. This is what the theologians explicitly profess. For they say that everything that the Father possesses, the Son also possesses, except for being cause," and also that the Son does not possess the cause of the Spirit.

9. And if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father in such a way that the Son in no way possesses the cause, and if this is what the ecumenical councils believe, the Latins however understand the definitions of the councils as if He necessarily proceeds also from the Son, and they have furthermore inscribed it in the symbol. And if the (Latin) addition introduces the addition of a dogma that is both new and strange, and if this consists in an evident reversal of the mind of the Fathers, then how are [the Latins] not the heirs of the threat that is found in the definition of their own faith?

10. [Objection:] But what do they respond regarding Saint Maximus? First, they decry the letter as false and not authentically his. Then, they too do not claim that the Son is a cause similar to that of the Father, but that the Spirit is issued from the Son in a manner different from that of the Father, that is, from the first principle and the first cause. [Solution:] Concerning the first objection, what one could say, and perhaps this is the appropriate moment, is the saying of an ancient: "this is how everything is easy to destroy. Now we will also be permitted to erase your books and Augustine and Jerome and all the rest that we do not have, and to judge that everything is useless as being inauthentic. And if we mutually use this type of argument, between us and you, it risks producing that victory will be with us, since only the God-inspired Scriptures will remain—the rest being a calumny where one does not find that the Spirit proceeds from the Son.

On the authenticity of Saint Maximus' letter to Marinos

11. Moreover, those who claim this not only erase our books but also the books of the Latins. For when I had asked a certain Latin who is well-known, and who was reading in his own language, "what does this mean?", he answered me that this letter had been translated from the Greek language.

12. And besides this, the construction of the words which is ancient and which preserves the same style as the other writings of Maximus, and his stay in Rome, and his association with Marinos, and his justified reproach against our Church because the madness of Sergius and Pyrrhus still found a refuge in this Church, [all] this testifies to the authenticity of the letter.

13. But it is also completely ridiculous for the Latins to wage war against themselves and to profess the same letter, sometimes as authentically from Saint Maximus and not to be ashamed to pronounce it against ourselves, both in writing and in discussions, and from this letter to try to

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make believe that it is an ancient custom in the Roman Church and an opinion of the same age as this one to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and sometimes, when we make our apology drawn from the same letter to expose what we believe, to pronounce the opposite, as if they were ashamed.

14. And that this is true, and that the Latins depart from this letter as a starting point for an expedition against our opinion, Bekkos, the leader of the Latin opinion, testifies with clarity. For, where he makes the apology for the novelty introduced into the Church, he speaks thus: (the incipit of the discourse is: "Come here, O people who love God"): "Photius sets to work against the Roman Church, and after a short time he produces his fruit. In what way? Knowing that the addition of a word made in the symbol had been done by the Italians for some time, as testified by the letter of the great Maximus to the priest of Cyprus Marinos, knowing also all the other customs, which had become normal among them, by which they apparently differ from us, and tacitly accepting all of this, in the very name of justice since it was just in fact that he follow that for which his predecessors had adopted peace with the Romans, after the opening of hostilities, or to better say now, of this fury hateful to God, he exhibits all these practices as being infractions."

15. And here again is an excerpt taken from the discourse entitled: Apologetic with a dogmatic explanation: "What has happened since the reign of the Monomachus [Constantine IX (1042-1055); this refers to the schism of 1053] already mentioned, we find that it goes back to the time of the power of Constans [Constans II Pogonatos (641-668)], grandson of Heraclius (610-641). At the time of this Constans flourished the great Maximus a little less, or exactly four hundred years earlier. We find that at the time of the great Maximus was situated the first reaction, a sort of beginning, against the addition [of the Filioque]. And we do not see it much advanced, except within the limits of Constantinople, on the occasion of receiving the Synodical Letters of the pope of that time [Theodore I (642-649)]. And the pretext for the scandal of that time was that the Orientals were annoyed by the heresy of the Monothelites. This historical account is completely evident to us, and it is so for anyone else who will not pass with indifference over the letter of the great Maximus to Marinos, priest of Cyprus." And likewise (George) Metochites writes the same things. Thus the book of Saint Maximus asserts itself as more authentic than any other, and even the laws (of reason) consider the testimony of opponents as valid. This was therefore the response to the first objection.

The Father as First Cause?

16. Concerning the second objection, we will also speak, with God's help, a little later. For the moment, this will suffice: if the Son does not possess in an absolute manner the cause of the Spirit, according to what (Gregory) the Theologian has said, then he does not possess either the

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cause that you have mentioned. And if he does not possess this cause, but possesses another, it is certainly not true to say in an absolute manner that He does not possess the cause of the Spirit. For if this is not an animal, it is necessarily neither a rational animal nor an irrational animal. And if it is not an irrational animal, it is necessarily not an animal either.

17. And when they say that the Son does not possess this cause of the Spirit, that is, the first one, which Saint Maximus also removes from the Son, but that He possesses that which the Latins claim, then is it not already clear that they fashion two principles of the Spirit? And at the same time they declare war on those who refuse to recognize that the Father and the Son are two principles of the Spirit.

The Definition of Faith of the Seventh Ecumenical Council

18. And if one wants to reflect on the seventh council and the Fathers of that time, one can observe that they maintain the already established sequence and that, with all (the Fathers), the true golden chain continues to be woven without bearing anything false. For example, the Definition of this council says among other things: "Inquiring and examining with all possible exactitude and aiming at the goal, which is the truth, we take away nothing, we add nothing, but we preserve intact the good of the catholic Church; and we follow the six holy and ecumenical councils, first the one that met in the illustrious (metropolis) of Nicaea, then also the one that met in the imperial city, protected by God. We believe in one God, Father Almighty, creator of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten, who was begotten from the Father before all ages, light from light, true God from true God, begotten not created, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made, who because of us men and because of our salvation came down from heaven, was incarnate from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and became man; was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, suffered and was buried, rose again on the third day according to the Scriptures and ascended into heaven, sits at the right hand of the Father and will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead; and His kingdom will have no end; and in the Holy Spirit, who is Lord and gives life, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is co-adored and co-glorified, and the rest of the holy Symbol. And toward the end of the Definition, again: "We follow the ancient legislation of the catholic Church, we preserve the institutions of the Fathers, we anathematize those who add or take away anything from the catholic Church." The Definition thus opposes with anger both those who take away and those who add. But the Latins claim that the Definition blames addition as to the spirit and not as to the words, and they say they have only arrived at the addition of words. However, the audacity does not extend to the words. For the council in question is the seventh. It says it follows the six preceding councils;

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this is how it truly justifies its appellation. And it has already been shown that the common opinion is that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

Saint John of Damascus and the Filioque

19. But if you continue to ask for evidence from the Fathers of that time, I will offer you witnesses, not light words nor drawn from false names, but witnesses who have fought for the orthodox faith to the point of shedding their blood, whose names are in heaven; witnesses who adorn the Church not only with words but also with their own blood. The first of these witnesses is the blessed John the Syrian, who was at risk of the same struggle as the blessed council. On one hand, he had his right hand cut off, on the other hand, he was able above all to recover it from the Mother of the Lord. Although he himself wanted to remain silent, she called him to compose his theological work. He mastered theology to such an extent that even the Latins are not ignorant of his voice. For he is the only one, or certainly he is among the few, to be recognized as a common doctor of theology, both of the Latin Church and of ours. So this man, the very renowned John, the common honor of the Church of Christ, heard from the Lord, from the apostles, and from the holy ecumenical councils that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. He read the word and believed that it was a common dogma of the Church of Christ in such a way that he affirmed that the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone and that in no way does the emission of the Spirit belong to the Son. In the eighth chapter of the Theological [Treatises], he says: "One must know that we do not say the Father issues from someone, but we say He is Father of the Son. And the Son we do not call cause or Father, but we say He is both from the Father, and Son of the Father. And the Holy Spirit we say is both from the Father, and Spirit of the Father; we do not say the Spirit is from the Son, but we call Him Spirit of the Son, and we confess Him manifested and communicated to us through the Son, for 'He breathed and said to His disciples: Receive the Holy Spirit'." And in the letter to Jordan he says: "For us there exists one God, the Father and His Word and His Spirit. The Word is the hypostatic effect of generation; since He is Son. And the Spirit is the hypostatic effect of procession and emission, [coming] through the Son and not from the Son, since He is like the breath of the mouth of God which announces the word. However, the mouth must not be understood as a corporeal member; nor the Spirit as a breath that is lost and dispersed." (Seek other testimonies of the blessed Damascene where he says that all names indicating cause must be applied to the Father alone.)

20. The theological language demonstrates this to us. This blessed one does not speak by himself, but he expresses himself theologically by following the apostles and their successors. It is evident, because he does not say I say, but we say, that he thus attaches these dogmas to the whole Church. It is also evident by the fact that in all his writings he constantly uses the words of the blessed Fathers, I mean Denys, Gregory, Basil, Maximus, and others with them. Sometimes

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he cites passages, sometimes he develops and transforms them and thus makes the statement clearer. Moreover, he does not blush when he himself admits such things. For he says, when he begins his theological work: "As I promised, I will say nothing by myself. All the effort will be to gather the works of the eminent doctors and to make the discourse as short as possible." If therefore the successors of the apostles and the most distinguished theologians, together with this blessed council, have a similar opinion on the Spirit, and if the Latins are opposed to it, I do not know what to think of this.

21. Furthermore, the same doctor, in the thirteenth chapter of the Theologicals, under the title: "On divine names with more precision," says: "the Father is source and cause of the Son and of the Spirit; the Son is Son, Word, wisdom, power, image, radiance, expression of the Father and issued from the Father, but the Son is not issued from the Spirit; the Holy Spirit is Spirit of the Father, who proceeds from the Father because there exists no movement without the Spirit and Spirit of the Son, not in that He is issued from Him, but in that He proceeds from the Father through Him. For the Father is the only cause." And in the discourse on the burial of the divine body of the Lord he speaks thus: "This is what we adore: the Father, unbegotten who begets the Son, without being issued from anyone; the Son, effect of the begetting of the Father in that He is begotten by Him; the Holy Spirit, from God and Father, who proceeds from Him, whom one also calls of the Son because He is manifested and transmitted to creation by Him, but He does not derive His existence from Him." Pay attention! It is not good to pass with indifference over these testimonies! After having said that "the Spirit is not issued from the Son," he concludes thus: "sole cause the Father." This is almost similar to the passage of Denys. For he too, after having said that the Father is distinguished from the Son in relation to the source," concludes that "sole source is the Father." And we know well that the second affirmation does not retain its value if one annihilates the first. Therefore, it is necessary to convert one affirmation toward the other. For either the Father is sole cause of the divinity and [consequently] the Spirit does not derive His existence from the Son, or this [the Spirit does not derive His existence from the Son and consequently] the Father is sole cause. In the same manner concerning the source. For the cause and the source are the same thing. So those who claim that it is possible to maintain both that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that the Father is sole source or sole cause, are mistaken. And the other testimonies are clear and do not at all need a certain elaboration, to such an extent that even the most audacious in contradicting could not contest that this blessed one is hostile to the innovation of the Latins. One can also say that all the doctors and all the councils are also hostile to it, provided that one follows what they say and that one does not say anything that assuredly they do not think.

22. And this blessed council so much admired his theology that it declares him "light that shines in the world and has a value of life. And again: "John followed Christ. He considered the

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humiliation of Christ as a wealth greater than the treasures of Arabia and he chose to be mistreated with the people of God rather than to enjoy sin for a time." And again: "This one therefore has carried his own cross and has followed Him. In the name of Christ and of those who belong to Christ, from the East, he has sounded his trumpet by Christ, for he believed unbearable the novelty come from abroad, and the criminal intrigue and the furious madness against the holy Catholic Church of God. But he had triumphed over it and by exhorting and warning he strengthened everyone in order not to be taken away with the evildoers."

23. If, therefore, the divine council weaves such praises for him and if this one has so much loved Christ that his goodwill went as far as giving his blood, and if the Mother of God has looked upon him with so much benevolence, that she restored to him his right hand which had been cut off, commanded him to write what he wrote and moreover punished in words his spiritual father who had commanded him silence. And if this one has such an opinion on the emission of the Spirit, if he maintains that it has long been the belief of theologians that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son and if the Latins say the contrary, is it not already clear that they wage war not only against the ecumenical councils, but even against the Mother of the Lord? For it is she who restored to him his hand and put an end to his silence, who will certainly inherit the praises or the blame against herself.

Saint Theodore Graptos and the Filioque.

24. Moreover, the divine Theodore, one of the Graptos, was also a protector of the orthodox faith, member of this council, honored with the marks of martyrdom. On this question he is on our side and he attaches the emission of the Spirit in a theological manner to the Father alone. And for those who wonder how this council understands that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, Theodore offers us the explanation. Indeed, we think that one cannot find other more worthy interpreters than these. The orthodox faith inclined toward heresy, they brought it back to the right path with their words as well as with their blood. Because of their life and their doctrines and the struggle against heretics, they have become Fathers and guides of this blessed council. But it has already been said what the blessed John believes with regard to the emission of the Spirit.

25. Saint Theodore who was fighting against the iconoclasts wrote the Confession of his own faith and said (the beginning of the discourse is: "This wise passage of Solomon teaches us Everything in its appropriate time"): "It is time to say briefly what our Confession is, we Christians. So, concerning us, in accordance with what those who were from the beginning eyewitnesses and who have become servants of the word and after these, their successors, our divine doctors who revealed God, have transmitted to us, We believe in one God Father, Almighty, and creator of all things visible and invisible, and Lord, without beginning, invisible,

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incomprehensible, immutable, and without end. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, His Son, the Only-Begotten, who, without beginning and before all ages, shines forth from the substance of the Father. And in one Holy Spirit who comes out from God and Father and who with the Father and the Son is praised and glorified with them as connatural and coeternal with them. We believe in the Trinity in hypostases, that is to say in persons, and we maintain the properties that serve to distinguish (or to define) each of the persons mentioned without confusing them and without any mixture, without them ever being changed or modified. We attribute to the Father the fact of being unbegotten and of being cause of the Persons issued from Him; we attribute to the Son begetting and to the Spirit procession. And we think that the effect of begetting and of procession holds its cause from the radiance of the Father who brings forth each Person as light from light, a light above this world with triple brightness and three suns."

26. It is precisely here that one must pay attention. He speaks of the emission of the Spirit and of His divinity. On the emission of the Spirit he has mentioned only the Father, whereas, in Theology, he has taken in addition the Son. For he says: "Spirit who comes out from God and Father and who is praised with the Father and the Son. This is what one can see being affirmed by each ecumenical council during the Definition of the faith. They say: "Believe also in the Holy Spirit, who is Lord and gives life, who proceeds from the Father and is with the Father and the Son co-adored and co-glorified." If (the Fathers of the councils) knew as equal on the one hand the fact of being praised with the Father and the Son and, on the other hand, the emission from the Father and the Son, then what would happen? This they always say, and in the Confessions of faith and in the Definitions of orthodox faith and everywhere. On the other hand, this they never say! And yet look, the two phrases follow each other immediately. Or it is evident that to be praised with the Spirit is not a property only of the Father but also of the Son. On the other hand, emission is a property of the Father that befits Him Alone. For what does he say? "We maintain the properties of distinction (or definition) without confusing them and without any mixture, without them ever being changed or modified. We attribute to the Father the fact of being unbegotten and of being cause of the Persons issued from Him; we attribute to the Son begetting and to the Spirit procession."

27. Just as the property of distinction (or of definition) of the Son is begetting, and of the Spirit it is procession, likewise of the Father it is the fact of being unbegotten and of being cause of the Persons issued from Him. If this is true, how is it possible that the Son also be cause of divinity? Or if one grants this, how is it possible to maintain the properties of distinction (or of definition) without confusing them and without any mixture? Or why would the properties of the Father be modified, while those of the Son and of the Spirit would have remained without modification? And so that no one can say that the theologian here has professed the cause according to [only] the fact of begetting, he has not said that the properties of the Father are the fact of being

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unbegotten and of being cause, nor the fact of being unbegotten and of being cause of the Person issued from Him. For in that case the Latins would say that the sentence concerns the Son. But he said the fact of being unbegotten and of being cause of the Persons issued from Him. The Father is cause of the Persons issued from Him in that He begets and emits. So, just as the fact of being unbegotten, the fact of being cause constitutes the property of the Father according to the two meanings of the cause according to the fact of begetting and according to the fact of emitting. And when he begins the discourse, he says that this is the Confession of Christians and the tradition of the apostles and of the Fathers, the guardians of their theology. So, I fear to name those who with regard to this have a different opinion, but everyone knows them.

Saint Nicephorus I and the Filioque.

28. And also saint Nicephorus, whom his struggles for Christ have surnamed "Great," he too during that time was general with Christ, placed at the head of the orthodox faith, not without giving his blood nor without great risks. He was banished from his homeland and it is dead that he returned to us. He was a hero, who wore the crown of martyrdom, very sweet for the angels, terrible for the demons, benevolent for those close to him. From his place of exile, he sent to those close to him the apostolic faith. It is the intention of his discourse which says: "So we embrace our illustrious and irreproachable faith. Of all things, there is nothing to which we pay homage as to this, by which we are protected, formed and preserved, in which we stand upright and we glory, with which we prostrate ourselves before a living and true God and we worship sincerely in truth and in Spirit. Certainly, we define this faith as the only true and very pure: (To believe) in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, one divinity and sovereignty, creator of all things visible and invisible, and queen of all apparent and intelligible creation according to which we venerate the three realities perceived as one by intelligence, and we adore one single reality contemplated in the three. This is known by essence, that is manifested by the hypostases. We diminish nothing of it and we place nothing beyond either, but we find unity in essence, as indeed in value, equality of honor and glory [which are common in the Trinity], and we make the distinction according to the hypostases, that is to say the Persons and the properties, each of them existing essentially, in a proper existence perceived without division; paradoxical thing. We know one person as cause and begetter and emitter, namely the Father who is without beginning and without cause, outside of time and eternal; we know the other Person as begotten and Son, without beginning with the Father and coeternal, immutable, impassible, and without flux who holds His begetting from the Father and who is attached in cause and in principle to the Father; we know the other Person as issued from procession, that is to say effect of procession and sanctifying power, the Holy Spirit who comes out always timelessly from the Father, who holds His provenance not by begetting but by procession and who coexists eternally with the Father

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and the Son, who is co-adored with them for He sits with the throne and has the same glory, the same honor and the same divinity, by whom the divine gifts pour out on the angels, on men and on all reasonable nature. And it is thus that the light for us inaccessible and always shining radiates in the thearchy in a triple brightness; by whom one believes in the identity and in the unity of essence and one celebrates the trinity of Persons. On the other hand, the atheism and the absurdity of those who mix and divide the properties not susceptible to mixture and division, have been vanquished and suppressed; that therefore is in accordance with the theologians, with those who are initiated to the ineffable realities and with the mystagogues who have declared and transmitted the tradition in a correct and very divine manner."

29. Indeed, it is not necessary to add long commentaries to what the theological sentences have affirmed, whose position before the problem is evident. For he has clearly divided the cause in two: The One who begets and The One who emits. He attaches each of these attributes as proper to the Father; just as he attaches the effect of begetting to the Son and the effect of procession to the Spirit. Previously he had called the Father "cause," and he has proved that the theories on the cause recall contests and old women's tales and follies of madmen invented by slanderers against the truth. But he also says that the irreproachable, true and very pure faith with which we adore and we venerate a living and true God, is this one. So the one who takes the contrary path and claims that the Son is The One who emits the Spirit, does not have the true and sound faith but certainly bears a bad and blameworthy faith, and which is not worthy of trust. And if it is with this faith that we adore and we venerate a living God, I guard myself from those who think contrary things and I do not know what to say. But also, to transform the proper realities into common realities, that suits those who establish confusion in the mystery of the Trinity. Such a thing, the witness of the truth calls atheism. Is there anyone who can reproach us with justice that we persecute the Latins? Or who will say that their opinion is an addition only of words, when the ecumenical councils and the Fathers who participated in the councils cry so clearly the contrary?

Critique of the monopatristism of the Latins.

30. [Objection:] But the Latins, what do they say new in relation to the words of the theologians? We too with the blessed Denys distinguish the Father from the Son in relation to the source and we do not say that the Son is source of divinity while having in view the divine Gregory, we say that all that the Father possesses, the Son has it too, except the cause; and with the divine Maximus we do not say that He possesses the cause of the Spirit. But we say that in the following manner: as from a principal cause or from a first cause or from a first principle. For these attributes are attached to the Father in an uncaused manner, since this cause, you will say, He possesses it with Himself, from whom the Son draws His existence as well as all that He

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possesses, for example the fact of emitting (the divinity of the Holy Spirit), the fact of creating and every other thing. It is in this manner that we say that the Spirit is issued from the Son and that we believe the latter source, cause and principle of the Spirit. We do not recognize Him as a principal cause but we believe that the Spirit is issued from the Son in the following manner: that (the Son) receives from the Father, first cause, the property of emitting [the Holy Spirit]. Moreover, we say, in accordance with the theologians, that the Father is sole source of divinity and sole cause. And His property is to be without principle and to be principle of divinity, not at all in the manner in which the Son possesses the source or the origin or the cause, for He possesses them in the manner that has already been said not as the first principle for that is a property of the hypostasis of the Father.

31. [Solution:] First of all, in the theological passages already mentioned or in others, you can see that the theologians do not appeal to additional conditions, when for example they say that the Son does not possess the cause of the Spirit or that the Son possesses all that belongs to the Father except the cause, or that the Father is the sole source of divinity or that the property of the Father is to be principle of divinity. And it is not right for us to read with additional conditions what they have said without these conditions. For those who master the laws of dialectic can affirm that a partial manner is not identical with an absolute manner.

32. Or what prevents one from sometimes fabricating additional conditions and believing every true thing to be false, sometimes with these same additional conditions drawing every falsehood toward truth and thus mixing up all things, as if turning toward a battle in the night? So then, what is more true than the begetting of the Son before all ages from the Father, or that he is wise or good or creator or God? But one who speaks in a spirit of rivalry and responds with additional conditions will say that such things are a lie. He will say: "How is the begetting of the Son from the Father in the same way that humans beget one another not a lie? or that He is wise or good when He receives these gifts by participation? or that He is unbegotten God?" Again: What is more akin to impiety than to say that the Son is not consubstantial with the Father or to say that Christ is not begotten by the Virgin? But one who is satisfied with additional conditions and receives such things by himself, can say "Such things are indeed true. For the Son is not consubstantial with the Father, that is, as man, and He is also not begotten by the Mother of God, that is, according to the beginningless and uncreated nature. And if this way (of reasoning) dominated in the Church we would not stop eliminating all dogmas and all Scripture. And moreover, all knowledge and all speech and the same things we honor as true and we blame as false sometimes we leave them aside, sometimes we trouble them with conditional additions. But insofar as there is an order in things and as we understand the Greek language, this is not admissible.

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33. It has been said in an absolute manner that the Son possesses all that belongs to the Father except the cause, that the Father is distinguished from the Son in relation to the source, and that the Son does not possess the cause of the Spirit. If therefore this is true, He does not possess the cause either, you will say. For that which is neither stone, nor diamond, nor magnet, nor amethyst, necessarily will be none of these. And if the Son here is either principle or cause of the Spirit and there is not, of all necessity it is a lie when one says that he possesses all that belongs to the Father except the cause, and that He is distinguished from the Father in relation to the source and that the Son does not possess the cause of the Spirit. Again, it has been said that the Father is the only unbegotten and sole source of divinity and that the same is sole cause, and that the fact of being unbegotten as well as being principle of divinity constitutes a property of the Father. And moreover, the fact of emitting and being cause of the Son and of the Spirit is a sign that determines the hypostasis of the Father. Therefore, since the name of the source, of the cause and of the emitter is personal, provided that there is no other Person in the Trinity who possesses the fact of the source or of the cause or of the origin or the fact of emitting, then what had been said is true and only the Father is such, just as man is also alone capable of laughter and that this is proper to him provided that there exists no other animal capable of laughter. And indeed it is necessary to transpose such things. I say, certainly, what is affirmed with what is excluded. And if the Son too is source of divinity or cause of the Spirit or emitter, if someone claims what had been said above about the Father alone, of all necessity he lies.

34. And moreover, if on the one hand theology removed from the Son a certain cause and if on the other hand someone else deprived the Son of all cause, the latter would not say necessary things; but since he would say possible things, he would obtain pardon [for his eventual fault committed]. On the contrary, since the theologians explicitly remove all cause from the Son, either that of the divinity of the Son, or that of the divinity of the Spirit, and if the Latins strive to attach the latter in some manner to the Son, what word will deliver them (from condemnation), those who claim things that are neither necessary nor probable, but more than impossible, and which no one expected?

35. Moreover, the theologians have called the Father principal cause, first cause and other similar appellations not by virtue of the divinity of the Spirit and not to believe thus that the Son is also cause of the Spirit (certainly not principal cause), but they have attached these names to the Father because they had in view the creatures. For Basil the Great says in the eleventh chapter to Amphilochius: "Grasp for me the principal cause of all that is made: the Father; the demiurgic cause: the Son; the perfecting cause: the Spirit. So by the will of the Father the serving spirits exist, by the operation of the Son they come into existence and by the presence of the Spirit they are perfected." Have you heard? He said "the principal cause of all that has been made." The Son possesses the cause of creation in a manner so close to the Father that the two

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Persons together are and are called a single Creator. Not only that, but "the first cause" and "the first good" and "the first nature" are said of all divinity, that is to say of one God. And it is not right that the Latins say that the common names refer to the Father alone, since they thus take the path contrary to the theologians. For the divine Gregory, in the discourse on Theology, says:

"Thus our mind is exhausted in leaving corporeal things and seeking contact without intermediary with the incorporeal things, as much as it wants to look with its own weakness at what is above its power. Indeed, all rational nature tends toward God and the first cause that our mind is unable to grasp for the reasons I have given." That one must not here refer to the Father alone the first cause, is evident; for here the subject does not concern the Persons, and the Father is not the only desirable one. And from the creature we do not arrive either at divine intelligence. Because God is Trinity? No, it's impossible! But because there exists one God, good, simple, without alteration, without beginning, the cause of all this universe.

36. And if the first cause, or the first principle, or the principal cause is sometimes understood as indicating the hypostasis of the Father, this should not trouble those who disagree. Let them know that among the theologians exists the habit of using divine names sometimes properly, sometimes improperly. And if sometimes they profess proper names instead of common names, other times it is the opposite. For example the name of the Father and the name of the Spirit; each of the two has a proper character. The Father is said and is properly Father of the Son; but improperly our Father. The same also for the Spirit, for the Father too is spirit. For "God is spirit," and moreover also the Son according to what Jeremiah says in the Lamentations "the spirit (breath) before our face, the Messiah Lord, has been made captive in their ruins," while the name of Spirit is granted properly to the Paraclete. On the other hand, both the first cause, and the demiurgic cause, and the perfecting cause apply to God with regard to us and state the common attributes of the thearchic Persons; but many times they are understood as indicating the thearchic Persons. Basil the Great says: "Grasp for me the principal cause of all that is made: the Father; the demiurgic cause: the Son; the perfecting cause: the Spirit." But also the hymn to God which is much sung, instead of "Father" has accepted the name of "God"; and "power" instead of "Son"; and to the Holy Spirit it has granted immortality. That these names are common in all the Trinity, it is not possible to doubt. And the blessed Paul writes: "There is only one God" and he understands the Father "and also one mediator between God and men: Jesus Christ." Here again it is not right to think that the principal cause which belongs to the common names is proper [to the Father] because the Masters of the Church have accepted it to state the hypostasis of the Father. For, from that, there would be many absurdities that would follow Christian theology.

37. Moreover, according to the Latin opinion, if the Son receives from the Father the fact of emitting and it is for this reason that it has been said that He possesses all that belongs to the Father except the cause and that the Son does not possess the cause of the Spirit and that the

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Father is sole source of divinity, that is to say that the statement addresses the Father as first cause and if likewise the Son possesses both the demiurgic act and divine providence and the fact of being God and good and all the names that befit God because the Father has given Him everything as well as existence itself, following the same reason one could say that creation is not issued from the Son, and that He does not possess the providence of all, and that He is neither God, nor creator, things that even the devil would never say. Thus, when one reasons similarly on the theological sentences, one ends up entirely in atheism.

38. And not counting that, the refutation is self-evident. For if we were unbearable and intolerable persons and if we professed the duality of the cause, let them tell us finally what they want to believe: on the one hand that the Father is first cause and first principle of the Spirit, and on the other hand that the Son is not such a cause, but that he is in any case also cause of the Spirit? To claim this is equivalent to clearly claiming two causes of the Spirit. And if such things are absurd, these [the Latins] can articulate nothing. It [is] enough for them only that [one recognizes] that the Son is cause of the Spirit and that without difficulty but with goodwill one accepts the (absurdities) that necessarily arise from these statements. However, these absurdities do not touch us, but concern their statements.

John Damascene and Thomas Aquinas

39. Furthermore, when theologians explain theological statements, it is right to trust not other individuals but rather these theologians themselves. Thus, when we examine problems of geometry, we cannot believe others as superior to geometers. So to explain theological sentences there is nothing more valid than the statements of the blessed Damascene who read what was said and developed it with clarity, so that no one, even among his most fierce enemies, would dare to attack his words. What does he say then regarding the emission of the Spirit? "The Holy Spirit, we say is from the Father, and Spirit of the Father; we do not say the Spirit is from the Son but we call Him Spirit of the Son." And again: "The Spirit is called of the Son, but He does not derive His existence from Him." It is therefore evident that this blessed one has accepted the aforementioned theological sentences. And moreover, we have seen him confess that he was not speaking by himself but that he knew such things by following the ancient theologians.

40. Since this is clear, if they mock the blessed one as if he were ignorant, let them know that they cannot deceive anyone. For it has already been shown that an ecumenical council has come to recognize him; and he is a common doctor of the Church and the most distinguished among the Latins appear to honor his writings. Thomas and his works will testify to this. [Objection:] But if they accept the alliance of additional conditions and again say these usual things that the blessed Damascene is also with us in this because the Spirit is not from the Son and does not draw existence from Him as from a first principle: [Solution:] First of all, those who say this risk

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needing blows rather than proofs, since they have thus manifestly armed themselves against the truth. Then, let them know that such things constitute weak, deceptive and obscure help, which one might call as fragile as the wood of the fig tree; not only because through this blasphemies arrive. For as it was shown above, if this explanation is sound, it follows that Christ is not called God, nor good, nor creator, nor anything else that befits Him. But (it follows) also that the Latins break against themselves and revolt against their own doctors. For Thomas, the foremost of their theology—although when it comes to explanations, he is rather abusive—when he remembers the passage from Damascene affirming that the Spirit is not from the Son, has not even dared to look it in the face, but has understood this sentence as hostile to his opinion. On the one hand, he has left the passage open to calumnies, since he judged it vulgar to disturb what is manifest and created additional conditions that neither the common usage of language nor the father of the word knows. On the other hand, he expressed all his anger against the orator of the truth, although he says that on other points he admires the man and considers him as someone important.

41. This one, in the chapter on Power, when speaking of the procession of the Holy Spirit, says: "It was the position of Nestorius that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son. While in a symbol of the Nestorians, condemned at the first council of Ephesus, it is said thus: 'The Holy Spirit, we do not think that He is Son nor that He receives essence through the Son.'" And again: "Now Theodoret, in a letter to John of Antioch, speaks thus: 'The Holy Spirit neither is from the Son nor possesses His hypostasis or existence through the Son, but on the one hand He proceeds from the Father and on the other hand He is called Spirit of the Son, because He is consubstantial with Him.'" And again: "This sentence of Theodoret, later Damascene followed it. This dogma of Theodoret was also rejected at the fifth council. So on this point the sentence of Damascene is not certain." And again the same author, in another part under the title: "Does the Person who is called Holy Spirit proceed from the Father and the Son?": "It was the Nestorians who first spread this error that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. The proof of this is in a Nestorian symbol condemned at the Council of Ephesus. The Nestorian Theodoret embraced this error, and many others after him, among whom is also John Damascene; on this point therefore, one should not follow his doctrine. Some say however that if Damascene does not confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, he does not deny it either, taking his words in their proper sense."

42. The way Thomas understood the word of Damascene is therefore evident, and we have clearly shown that he believed this to be like an arrow against his opinion. And moreover, he rejected the hypothesis of the first cause and the first principle as simple, vulgar, and quarrelsome, and after showing that this does not fit the context at all, he appears to be in difficulty and adds: "Some say however that if Damascene..." As for these words, they maintain the same distances by believing that the Spirit is from the Son and that He is not from the Son.

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And certainly Thomas, in the chapter on the Holy Spirit, shows that the provenance of the Son is different from that of the Spirit in relation to the principle because the first provenance is from the Father alone, while the provenance of the Spirit is from the Father and the Son. And this the blessed John says he is ignorant of, since in the same chapter on the Trinity, he speaks thus: that there exists a difference between generation and procession, we have learned, but what is the mode of the difference, we do not know at all. Thus it is unbearable and dishonorable for theological matters to make hypotheses where he [Damascene] clearly confesses with others (Fathers) that he does not even know.

43. Furthermore, the blessed John is exempt from these captious explanations to such an extent that in the same chapter he affirms not only that "we do not say the Spirit is from the Son," but also the contrary; he affirms that "we do not say the Son is from the Spirit." So if, in that case, there is nowhere a place for the first cause and the principal cause nor for those who say such foolishness, then how can one justify them in the other case? And if this exists in the latter case, why would it not exist in the former? What cause does the theologian reject? And what cause does he accept? And how is the Son from the Spirit and how is He not from it? Let them not dare anything intolerable!

Epilogue

44. Having clarified this thus, to the extent possible we have responded against the conclusion [of the Latins]. We have shown it guilty of several absurdities and enemy of the apostolic tradition and opposed to the opinion of the ecumenical councils. It is now time, with the alliance of the Spirit, to speak of the prepositions themselves and to come to what remains to be examined. And this so that we do not betray our promises. Once the conclusion has been proven as such, we are capable both of recognizing the cunning of its hypotheses, and for those who desire it, of denouncing in advance and from afar the deceit. This is the appropriate end for us, and we think that the long path of the word was not completely in vain.

**PART 2: REFUTATION OF THE LATIN ARGUMENTS FROM WHICH THEY THINK
TO INFER THAT THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEEDS FROM THE SON**

REFUTATION I.

FIRST CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. First, it is an ancient belief of the Catholic Church that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, not originating from Augustine or some other person as some think, but coming from afar, from the apostles and their successors, descending like a paternal inheritance to those called after Christ. It is an ancient custom in the Church to adhere to the traditions from the beginning, both those transmitted through writings and those through speech, as the blessed Paul says: "stand fast and hold the traditions which you were taught, whether by word or by epistle." Furthermore, this belief can be seen to be confirmed by the Scriptures with absolute necessity.

Refutation of the Aforementioned (by the same holy man of Thessalonica)

1. These claims could hardly be further from the truth. Indeed, the opposite is entirely the case. This is clear: of those things handed down to us by the apostles, some we have learned through the divine Scriptures, while others come from their unwritten communications, set down by those who succeeded them. Neither in the former nor in the latter is any such thing found, but whenever Scripture theologizes about the procession of the Spirit, it consistently agrees with what has been transmitted to us through their successors. This can be examined precisely. For the Lord in the Gospel according to John says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father; and the divine Paul, writing to the Corinthians, says, "For you did not receive the spirit of bondage unto fear, but the Spirit that is from God." And John, the disciple of the Lord, revealing the mystery of faith to Gregory the Great, as the Mother of God was conveying that ineffable vision, says, "One Holy Spirit having existence from God and made manifest through the Son"—that is, to mankind. These are the things we have clearly learned from Scripture concerning the procession of the Spirit. And the blessed Clement, writing the journeys of the divine Peter and indeed the words through which Peter was instructing both others and Clement himself, says: "so that men, having seen clearly, might believe in one God, Father Almighty; and in His Only-Begotten Son, who was ineffably begotten from Him before the ages; and in the Holy Spirit, who ineffably proceeds from Him." And lest the present statement escape the tongues of detractors who would make it exceedingly troublesome if the phrase "from Him" were not referred to the Son due to its proximity to Him in the text, the First Council of Nicaea, as if paraphrasing such a declaration and clarifying the apostolic intention, says: "Accept one Godhead of the Father who ineffably begot the Son, and of the Son who was begotten from Him, and of the Holy Spirit who proceeds from Him, the Father." It directly avoids the deception, so that no one would dare to attribute the procession of the Spirit to the Son as well. For if this were not the case, why would it, having said "from Him," add "the Father," if indeed it knew that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son?

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2. Another person, making the journeys of the Apostle Andrew his own work, says that this blessed one conducted his discourses about the Holy Spirit thus: "Peace to you, and to all who believe in one God the Father, and in His one Son, the Lord Jesus Christ, and in one Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son." Moreover, the divine Justin, the martyr and philosopher, who also says that he was catechized in the pure faith from the successors of the apostles, speaks as follows concerning the Holy Spirit in his theology: "As the Son is from the Father, so also the Spirit is from the Father, except indeed in the mode of existence." These things are also found in the unwritten tradition of the apostles, which maintains consistency with what has been written; for neither in the former nor in the latter is there any mention of the Son as one from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds.

3. If they should claim to be able to show others, who directly succeeded the apostles, theologizing that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, such a claim would be both false and utterly impossible. For we have shown in the second discourse that the divine Hierotheos and the blessed Dionysius, being successors of the apostles, distinguish the Father as the source and cause of the Son and Spirit, and that it is especially impious to unite again the divine persons by the very means by which they are distinguished, and that the Father alone is the source of the super-essential Godhead—all of which clearly demonstrates that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. These things being so, such a tradition is not from the apostles, but one might say from certain false apostles or false brethren, who readily gratify their own opinion. Indeed, concerning other customs in the Church, it might not seem altogether burdensome to resort to certain unwritten traditions, but concerning the super-essential Godhead, "we must not dare to say or even to conceive anything beyond what has been divinely revealed to us from the sacred Scriptures," as the supreme Theologian says.

4. Furthermore, the blessed Damasus, the bishop of ancient Rome, writing to the bishops of the East, says: "We have already once given a ruling, that whoever acknowledges himself to be a Christian should preserve that which was handed down by the apostles, as the holy Paul says, 'If anyone preaches to you a gospel other than that which you received, let him be anathema.'" And the divine Celestine, who was also bishop of the same church, writing against Nestorius, says: "Who has ever not been judged worthy of anathematization who either removes something from, or adds something to the faith? For what has been fully and clearly handed down to us by the holy apostles admits neither addition nor diminution." And the renowned Agathon, who was also a bishop of Rome, writing to the emperors of the Romans, makes it a matter of prayer "that nothing contrary to the canonically defined doctrines should be noted, nor altered or added, but that these things should be preserved inviolate both in words and thoughts."

5. If it has been explicitly handed down by the Lord and the apostles that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and if what comes from them admits neither addition nor diminution,

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and if one who acts contrary to these things is worthy of anathema, and if one who acknowledges himself to be a Christian is by all necessity obligated to abide by these things, who is so brave as to disregard such matters without trembling?

REFUTATION II.

SECOND CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Some who are in error concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit are found saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, and therefore it should be demonstrated that the Holy Spirit does indeed proceed from the Son. It is evident, then, that He is sent by the Son, as stated in the fifteenth chapter of John: "When the Comforter comes, whom I will send to you from the Father." The one who sends must necessarily have a certain dignity in relation to the one who is sent; therefore, it is necessary to say that the Son has some dignity in relation to the Spirit, not of lordship or superiority, but only in terms of causality. If someone says that the Son is also sent by the Holy Spirit, as the Lord says in the fourth chapter of Luke, fulfilling in Himself what Isaiah says: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, for which reason He has anointed me; He has sent me to preach the gospel to the poor," yet one can observe that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit according to the assumed nature; but the Holy Spirit did not assume a created nature, so that according to it He might be sent by the Son, or that the Son might have some dignity in relation to Him. It remains, therefore, that the Son has dignity in relation to the Holy Spirit according to the eternal hypostasis.

Refutation of the Arguments, and Concerning Divine Mission

1. Concerning the mission of the Spirit, some of the Latins have said that it does not differ from the Father's emission, while others say that while it is different from that emission, it is necessarily inferred from it. To the first position, one might say the following, and perhaps at an opportune time. If the emission of the Spirit differs in no way from His mission, then either the existence of the Spirit is in time because of the mission being in time, or the mission is also before the ages because the procession of the Spirit is before the ages—and thus the Lord's voice is false when saying, "When the Comforter comes, whom I will send to you," and again: "If I do not go away, the Comforter will not come," which clearly introduces time.

2. Furthermore, since the mission is to certain persons and for a reason, while the existence of the Spirit is neither to certain persons nor for a reason, either because of the mission the emission is also to certain persons and for a reason—which is utterly impious—or because of the emission, the Holy Spirit is sent neither to certain persons nor for a reason; and again the Lord's voice falls away, for He said, "I will send you the Comforter," and He adds the reason: "because

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when He comes, He will remind you of all things and teach you all truth," and "He will convict the world of sin and of righteousness and of judgment."

3. Moreover, the great Basil says in his treatise On Faith, concerning the Holy Spirit: "He is sent economically, but He acts with self-determination." If He is sent economically, what does the economy have in common with the pre-eternal existence of the Spirit?

4. Furthermore, the divine Gregory says in his First Discourse on the Son: "For if it is great for the Father to have proceeded from nowhere, it is no less for the Son to have proceeded from such a Father." We might say the same about the Holy Spirit. If it is great for the Spirit to proceed from such a Father, and so great just as it is for the Father to be unbegotten and for the Son to be begotten, and if this is the same as being sent or dispatched, then being sent would be above everything you could mention that belongs to the Spirit! But the divine Gregory considers this to be among the humble things in his Discourse on the Holy Spirit, just as he does being given and being apportioned, the grace, the gift, the breath! Therefore, the mission is not the same as the beginningless procession. This is also Thomas's view; for he says in the chapter on mission in the first book of his theological works that the mission is different from the eternal procession, and in the last part of his discussion on mission, he shows that a divine person is sent even by one from whom He does not exist, and he believes that the statement of Isaiah, "The Lord has sent me and His Spirit," applies to this, and he thinks there is nothing absurd in understanding the Son as being sent by the Spirit according to the divine nature. And because of this, it is clear that he knew that emission is neither the same as mission nor follows from it of necessity; otherwise, he would have considered the Comforter to be the cause of the Son.

5. And he cites Augustine as declaring these things, saying: "Augustine says in the fifth book On the Trinity that the Son is sent both by Himself and by the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son. And thus, being sent among the divine persons does not apply to every person, but only to the one who is from another, while sending applies to every person." I wonder, if the Latins know these things about mission, why they then try to persuade us of the opposite. It seems they do not even persuade themselves that they are speaking the truth, but they attempt to deceive us and speak only for deception. And this is the end of their theology. Since Thomas also placed the present argument among the sophisms, in that very last chapter on mission, it is clear that the emission of the Spirit is neither the same as mission nor does it even seem so to the Latins.

6. Concerning the second argument, these points suffice, and the fact that even to them the argument does not seem to reach necessary conclusions. But it is not worse to say the following against their premises: "The Spirit," they say, "is sent by the Son; and the one who sends has some dignity in relation to the one who is sent." Here the minor premise is taken from Scripture, but the major premise, I do not know from where it has flowed to us; for it comes neither from

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Scripture nor from the tongue of the teachers; it remains, then, that the one making these claims has taken it from himself. But the divine apostle does not want this, deeming it proper to compare spiritual things with spiritual, and in his letter to the Corinthians the same apostle says, "We speak not in persuasive words of human wisdom, but in what is taught by the Holy Spirit." And at the same time, it is absurd to both reject the struggle against the same people and to consider the same people so worthy of belief as to regard their opinions as theological utterances; but this is not the case.

7. And indeed, the argument is not necessarily true. For it is written in Acts that Peter and John were sent by the apostles; either there is no need to conceive of some dignity here, and the major premise fails, or let them say what dignity the apostles had in relation to John and Peter, whom they call not only the chief but also the shepherd of the divine company, which they themselves know and persuade everyone of! For the opposite can be seen here: the one who sends has less dignity than the one who is sent.

8. And indeed, if the argument is true among created beings, what necessity is there to consider it true also among divine things? For we should not think that whatever follows in the case of other things also follows in the case of divine things. There is no necessity! For in this way we would subject God to a craft! For the names are said in the same way of us and of God, but they are not understood in the same way. This is clear: the one who sends is separated from the one who is sent. But this is not so with Father, Son, and Spirit; for wisdom is not separated from the wise one, nor power from the powerful one: "Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God." And indeed, the Holy Spirit is power: "until," He says, "you are clothed with power from on high." Again, the one who is sent is not among those to whom he is sent, but the Son, having been sent to the world, was not absent from the world: "He was in the world," it says, "and the world was made through Him"; and the Lord, promising to send the Comforter to the apostles, says that He abides with them. Therefore, it is not because the Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son that there is absolute necessity to conceive of some dignity here.

9. Furthermore, if because the Son sends the Spirit, the Spirit is also from Him, then, by reversing the argument, it follows that the Son is from the Spirit: "The Spirit," says the Lord, "is upon me, for which reason He has anointed me; He has sent me to preach the gospel to the poor." But the second is absurd; therefore, so is the first. If they should say that the Son is sent by the Spirit only according to the assumed nature, and that this has no place in the mission of the Spirit, the argument is not necessary. For even if the Spirit has not assumed flesh, He nevertheless appeared in bodily form, now as a dove at the baptism, now as a tongue of fire at Pentecost. Therefore, if the Son is sent by the Spirit because of the flesh, the Word will certainly also send the Spirit, because He too appeared bodily to us in the manner described. Since the mission is reciprocal between Son and Spirit, how could anyone soundly reason from this to

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causality and derivation? This is Augustine's view as well. For in the fifth chapter of the second book *On the Trinity*, he says: "Scripture has said that the Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son insofar as He too appeared in bodily form, now as a dove at the baptism, now as fire, when also a sound was heard as of a rushing mighty wind, at Pentecost." For these things having been economically arranged showed the mission of the Holy Spirit. And apart from these, if the Son were sent only as man, such arguments would have some place. But if He is sent as man and also as God, as the divine Gregory says, what is the reason for thinking that the Son, even as God, is not sent by the Father as God?

10. Furthermore, if the good pleasure of the Father is one thing and that of the Spirit another, then whoever asserts this will be crushed along with the Arians. But if it is the same—for the Spirit approves of what the Son does in the same manner as the Father—then consider the good pleasure of the Spirit to be the sending of the Son. Therefore, the Lord is sent by the Spirit not only as man, but also as God. If, because the Theologian speaks of the good pleasure of the Father, someone claims that the good pleasure of the Father and the Spirit is not the same, such reasoning is absurd. For by this logic, neither would the essence of the Father be the same as that of the Spirit, because when speaking of essence, we add the name of the Father—but this is absurd. Moreover, if we consider divine good pleasure to be nothing other than God's good and philanthropic will, if the good pleasure of the Father is one thing and that of the Spirit another, then their will would likewise differ. Consequently, there would necessarily be difference in essence as well, but this is thoroughly blasphemous. If the Son cannot be said to be begotten by the Spirit despite being sent by Him as God, how can it be reasonable to claim that the Spirit proceeds from the Son merely because He is sent by Him?

11. Furthermore, Gregory of Nyssa in his discourse on Abraham says that the sending of the Son is "the descent of the Son to our lowly and weak nature, occurring according to the will of the Father." If the will of the Father and the Spirit is the same, the Father does not send the Son in one way and the Holy Spirit in another. And if we likewise define the sending of the Spirit as the descent of the Spirit to our weak and lowly nature, occurring according to the will of the Father and the Son—for the will of the Father, Son, and Spirit is one and the same numerically, since their essence is also one—then it is entirely inappropriate to characterize from this the distinction between cause and that which proceeds from it, but rather the unity of nature.

12. Furthermore, the blessed John the Syrian in his *Theological Works*, in the chapter entitled "Concerning What is Said About Christ," states that the prophetic utterance "He sent His Word and healed them" and the Lord's saying "that they may know that You sent Me" are applicable to Christ "before the Incarnation because of the one movement observed in the Father and the Son." If these are also applicable to the Spirit—for there is one movement of Father, Son, and Spirit—then the Spirit also sends the Son because of the unity of movement and the invariability of

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operation, and likewise the Son sends the Spirit, because one movement is observed in the Son and the Spirit.

13. Furthermore, the divine Anastasius, whom the Sixth Ecumenical Council called a teacher, in his work entitled "Concerning the Orthodox Doctrines of Our Church," explicitly says the following about the sending of the Spirit: "Let no one suppose that we consider the Holy Spirit lesser in essence than the Father and the Son because He is sent; for He is sent not as a servant, but as consubstantial and equal in honor and nature, since we learn that the Son Himself was sent, not only by the Father but also by the Holy Spirit, as He Himself said through Isaiah: 'And now the Lord has sent Me and His Spirit.'" Here it is most evident that both the Spirit sends the Son and indeed the Son sends the Holy Spirit because of the invariability of essence, as the teacher maintains. And it is thoroughly blasphemous that while the teachers of the Church consider sending to be evidence of divine unity, the Latins, moving in precisely the opposite direction, reckon from this a distinction.

14. Furthermore, the divine Cyril in his interpretation of the holy John the Evangelist explained more clearly the doctrine of divine sending, unfolding the Lord's words, "As You sent Me into the world, I also sent them." For he says, "The Spirit of the Father appears as the Spirit of the Son, and when the Father sends, or promises that He will remain with the saints, the Son gives Him again as His own, because of the identity of essence which He has with the Father." Therefore, sending the Spirit is not a personal [hypostatic] property, for this belongs to both Father and Son due to the identity of essence. If sending the Spirit attests to the unity of essence of Father and Son, then it is futile to necessarily seek from this a difference of persons, as if one has the cause and the other proceeds from it. If the equality of essence exists not only between Father and Son, but likewise between Father and Spirit, then when the Father sends the Son, the Holy Spirit will also send Him, because of the invariability of essence which He has with the Father.

15. But if they should say that this argument is not sound—for if these principles hold, then no absurdity would follow if both the Son and the Spirit were to send the Father, which is not found in Scripture. But first, this argument is not directed against us, for what has been said previously is not our own invention, but rather the common teaching of the Church. Next, how is it not found that the Father is sent? If you demand this explicitly, that would be a different matter. But if we affirm that the Son and the Spirit necessarily approve of what the Father does, due to the identity of nature and will—and the teachers of the Church hold that this approval constitutes sending—how would it be just, when the premises are sound, to be troubled by the truth that necessarily emerges from them? Moreover, if, when the Father approves of what the Son does and wills the same things as the Only-Begotten, the Son were somehow factious and hostile to the Father's purposes, in no way approving of what is accomplished by Him, then let the Son be

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sent by the Father, but let this not apply to the Father from the Son. But if this is blasphemous, and not even the devil himself would say such things—for there is one good pleasure and will of Father, Son, and Spirit—then it is clearly small-mindedness to consider the good pleasure, will, and unity of counsel as common to the Trinity, yet to be troubled by the notion of sending, which means nothing other than what has been said before. It would be as if someone were willing to call God the Creator of all things, yet would be vexed by the term "Maker."

16. Again, if they should say: How then did the divine Gregory say that the Spirit sends the Son "in order to demonstrate His own dignity"? Let them know that they are deceiving themselves because of homonymy. For "principle" and "dignity" in theology have a double meaning: one is common and applies to all divinity—this is what each of the divine persons possesses insofar as He is God; the other belongs to the Father alone, who is the principle and cause of the Son and the Spirit. For the divine Gregory says in his work "On the Appointment of Bishops": "One must not diminish the dignity of the Father's principle, which is His as Father and Begetter; for He would be the principle of small and unworthy things if He were not the cause of the divinity contemplated in the Son and the Spirit." Therefore, since dignity is twofold, the Son has the sending of the Holy Spirit as God, not as the one who puts forth or as the cause of divinity, as the divine Athanasius says in his discourse "On the Incarnate Manifestation": "He Himself sent it from above as God, and He Himself received it from below as man." And again, the same author in his first discourse "Against the Arians": "The Lord, showing his divinity and majesty to the disciples, indicating that He is not inferior to the Spirit but greater and equal, gave the Spirit and said: 'I send it.'" Therefore, the Son does not send the Spirit because of causality, but as God, and to show His divinity and majesty to the disciples. For if He sends God, namely the Paraclete, how could He not necessarily be God Himself, by whom God is sent?

17. Again, if they should say that the divine Cyril, explaining the sending of the Son and the Spirit, states that they "are sent as the ray from the sun, or the radiance from fire," and that because of this there is absolute necessity that the Son is the cause of the Spirit just as the Father is of the Son—for the ray comes from the sun as from a cause, and the radiance likewise from fire. If indeed they say these things, let them know that they are not making necessary claims. For the divine Chrysostom says in his interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans in the fifteenth homily: "This must be observed everywhere, that examples ought not to be taken in their entirety, but we should select what is useful in them and leave aside the rest, for the purpose they were introduced. Just as when Scripture says 'he lay down and slept as a lion,' we take the invincibility and terribleness, not the bestial nature nor any other qualities belonging to a lion; and again, when it says 'I will meet them as a bear robbed of her cubs,' we take the punishing aspect." Then, having given many such examples, he adds: "For if we do not understand them in this way, many absurdities will follow." This is what the divine Chrysostom says, and in

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agreement with him concerning examples are both the divine Cyril in his "Thesaurus" and the divine Gregory in his discourse "On the Holy Spirit." With these distinctions established, it is worthwhile to seek the purpose of the divine Cyril, which is as follows: he knows the Father to be inseparable from the Son, and the Son from the Spirit—for thus the consubstantiality and the fact that the Trinity is one God will be preserved—but this created conflict for the heretics who denied the divinity of the Son and the Spirit. Since the Scriptures speak of the Son being sent by the Father and the Spirit by the Son, and since the sender is separated from the one sent, the divine Cyril—and any other teacher of the Church—says that although He is sent, He is not separated, lest this principle be boldly applied to divine matters, which is what the heretics are eager to do. And to demonstrate this, he thought of the ray and the sun, and fire and that which comes from it, so that the inseparability and the unity of nature might be made evident, in order to show the difference from the grosser bodies, not to establish cause and effect, since this is also the teacher's purpose, and the lover of truth must always look to the purpose. But if simply because the ray is from the sun, therefore the Spirit is from the Son, nothing prevents us from thinking that the Spirit is also non-hypostatic, since such is the ray; and that the Spirit is corporeal, since this is observed in the ray; and indeed, that the Spirit is colored and mingled with the air and is not without dimension, and simply that whatever belongs to the ray belongs also to the Spirit! But the divine Cyril speaks in accordance with Scripture, for the Lord has said: "The Father who sent me is with me." Therefore, because of such examples, we shall not consider the Holy Spirit to be from the Son.

REFUTATION III.

THIRD CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, in the sixteenth chapter of the Gospel according to John, the Son says concerning the Holy Spirit: "He will glorify me, for he will take from what is mine." It is impossible for the Spirit to take what belongs to the Son without taking it from the Son, as, for example, if one were to say that the Spirit takes the divine essence, which is the Son's, from the Father. Hence, it is added: "All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you." For if all that belongs to the Father belongs to the Son, then necessarily the dignity of the Father, insofar as He is the principle of the Holy Spirit, belongs also to the Son. Therefore, just as the Holy Spirit receives what belongs to the Father from the Father, so also He receives what belongs to the Son from the Son.

Solution to the argument, and concerning "he will take from what is mine."

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1. But on account of this third point, the conclusion is not necessary. This is clear: "He," says Christ, "will glorify me and will take from what is mine and will declare it to you." These words the Paraclete might also say concerning the Only-Begotten; for just as the Son, glorifying the Father, is in turn glorified by Him—"I have glorified," He says, "and I will glorify again"—in the same way, when the Son is glorified by the Spirit, He might also be glorified in return by the Son. And the great Basil, in his works against Eunomius, says that what the Lord said concerning the Spirit—that for the one who blasphemes against Him it will not be forgiven either in this age or in the age to come, and whatever other lofty and God-befitting testimonies He gave—these are the Holy Spirit glorifying the Son. But if the Spirit receives from the Son and the Son from the Spirit, the same relationship will apply. The evidence is this: "All that the Father has is mine," the Lord said, "therefore I said that he takes from what is mine and will declare it to you." But if it is true that the Spirit also has all that belongs to the Father, the Paraclete might also say concerning the Only-Begotten: "He takes from what is mine and will declare it to you." What necessity is there that, because the Son has all that belongs to the Father, the Spirit takes from Him, but the Son does not take from the Spirit, even though the Spirit also has all that belongs to the Father, just as the Son does? Thus, either the Son is not the cause of the Spirit for these reasons, or the Spirit would certainly also be the cause of the Son. And that all that belongs to the Father and the Son also belongs to the Holy Spirit, the great Basil says in his works against Eunomius: "What is common to the Father and the Son is also common to the Spirit." And again, the same author, in his letter to the daughters of Count Terentius, says this concerning the Holy Spirit: "United with the Father and the Son in all things, in glory, in holiness, in power and kingship, in lordship and divinity." And again, the same in his treatise On Faith: "I said 'Son' and 'Father'; preserve for me these properties; remaining in the state of being the Son, He is all that the Father is, according to the saying of the Lord who said, 'All that the Father has is mine.'" Then shortly after: "There is the Holy Spirit, where the Son is, where the Father is, having all things along with them according to nature: goodness, righteousness, sanctification, life." This is also Augustine's view; for in the fourth chapter of the second book On the Trinity, he says: "Wherefore it is evident that all that the Father has belongs not only to the Son but also to the Holy Spirit."

2. Further, the divine Chrysostom, in a homily interpreting the Gospel according to John, interpreting the passage in question, says: "Therefore He says, 'He will take from what is mine,' that is, 'whatever I say, He will also say.'" And shortly after: "'From what is mine' means 'from what I know, from my knowledge,' for one is the knowledge of myself and the Spirit." And again: "The Holy Spirit 'will take from what is mine,' that is, 'He will say things consonant with mine.'" But if these statements are convertible—for whatever the Spirit might say, the Son will also say, and the Son speaks to us from what the Spirit knows, for one is the knowledge of the

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Son and the Spirit, and the Son speaks in harmony with the Spirit—how would not the Paraclete also say concerning the Son: "He will take from what is mine and declare it to you"? Therefore, from such words, neither is the Son the cause of the Spirit, nor indeed is the Spirit the cause of the Son, but these are indications of the unchangeableness of essence and of knowledge and of activity, which the divine Cyril also showed in his Thesaurus, making his discourse concerning the Holy Spirit; for he says: "For indeed the Son was not indicating a difference of nature between Himself and the Spirit when He said that 'He will take from what is mine and declare it to you,' but rather that He will use His words, through the sameness of essence, and being completely of the same nature, of the same activity, and of the same speech, as if He were to choose to inspire some word to the saints, it would be the word of Christ."

3. Further, how could "He will take from the Son" be the same as "He proceeds from Him," if the former refers to the future tense and is for our sake—"for He will declare to you"—whereas the existence of the Spirit is neither in time nor for our sake? But if they should say, "But the Lord used 'will take' instead of 'takes,'" for He said, "All that the Father has is mine, therefore I said He takes from what is mine and will declare it to you," the argument is not necessary. For it is not "will take" instead of "takes," but on the contrary, "takes" rather instead of "will take." And this is clear from the following: "He will glorify me," He says; and "He will declare to you" leads to the same point. And Chrysostom interpreted "He will take from what is mine" as "He will speak in harmony with mine." And again the same: "Therefore the Lord says, 'He will take from what is mine'; that is, 'whatever I say, He will also say.'" And the divine Cyril, interpreting this evangelical saying, rendered it as "He will use His words." All these expressions—"will glorify" and "will declare" and "will say in harmony" and "will say the same things" and "will use the same"—clearly indicate the future tense, and that the words pertain to the economy of our salvation, and this cannot be denied.

4. Furthermore, the divine Chrysostom is so far from thinking that because of this saying the Spirit proceeds from the Son that he holds that the Spirit is first the provider of those things which the Spirit is going to take from the Lord and announce to us; and that the Lord received these things from the Spirit Himself, on account of the assumed nature; but the Spirit does not receive these things from the Word, but having received them back from His own, distributes them to us. For in his treatise On the Holy Spirit, more fully unfolding the saying about which we are discoursing, he says thus: "I truly agonize and tremble, lest the weakness of the tongue diminish the greatness of what is being proclaimed. The Lord's body and the holy flesh, having received the activity of the Holy Spirit, did not receive it as in the case of the apostles and prophets with one grace or a second; for a human being cannot contain all things, which is why Paul says: 'Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Do all have gifts of healing?' For among us the gifts are distributed. But in the flesh of Christ, all the gifts, all the endowments were present

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according to the nature of the flesh. And take note! He first filled His own temple with all grace; He had the gift of healing diseases, of casting out demons, of raising the dead, of prophesying, of working the works of truth, He could do all things and had the fullness of gifts, from which the master's flesh was filled with all the gifts. And there was need for all of us to receive partially as from a reservoir from the Lord's body, and it is provided also to apostles and prophets from Him; John testifies that 'in Him is all the fullness of divinity'; and Paul: 'For in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily.' He did not simply say 'in Him dwelt the Godhead,' but 'the fullness of the Godhead,' that is, all the gift of the Godhead. And lest anyone think that it dwelt in the God the Word, he says: 'in whom dwelt all the fullness of the Godhead bodily'; in His flesh all the fullness of wisdom, understanding, power, signs of every activity. Consequently, we all borrow from His fullness." And after some things: "And of His fullness we have all received; He is the fullness, we are from the fullness, from which He filled the Master's flesh. From it He drew as from a fountain, and He lent the gift to men. Pay attention, I ask you! He says therefore, 'When the Paraclete comes, the Spirit of truth, He will guide you into all truth, for He will take from what is mine.' Pay attention to the precision! He did not say 'from me,' but 'from what is mine.' He will give to you from what is mine but will not take. He takes, not borrowing. But since He filled the fountain as the beginning of gifts, He draws from the reservoir and provides to all from His own." And after some things: "'He will take from what is mine,' from the things He provided to me; to the human Lord alone, He Himself will take, He who gave, who came and remained in me, who anointed me, who sanctified me, who led me into the wilderness, who returned me as victor, 'He will take from what is mine and declare it to you.' And to show that He did not mention the Holy Spirit but the gifts, He adds immediately after saying 'He will take from what is mine': 'All that the Father has is mine'; I received them from the Holy Spirit; therefore I said that He will take from what is mine. Since God sanctified the flesh with the Holy Spirit and the Father sent the gift of the Spirit into the flesh of Christ, and the grace, having come, placed all the gifts in Christ, He says, 'He will take from what is mine and declare it to you.'" This is what the theological tongue expounds. But if the Holy Spirit, taking from the Lord, takes back His own, and what He Himself had first provided, and declares it to us, how is it possible from these things to conclude that the Son is the cause of the Spirit? For rather the Spirit would be the cause of the Son having these things, if one considers the assumed nature.

5. But if when the Spirit is said to take from the Lord, it is to be understood as the human Lord and that holy temple, not God the Word, how is it not thoroughly blasphemous to consider our nature to be the cause of the Spirit? For it is quite the opposite, if indeed the Holy Spirit is the cause of the nature assumed by the Lord.

6. Furthermore, if what the teacher says is true, that "we receive partially," and that "we cannot contain all the gifts," and that "we draw from the reservoir," and that "the Lord is the fullness, but

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we have received from the fullness," and that "the Holy Spirit will take from what He provided to the human Lord and will declare it to us," how is it not evident that the expression "from something" here does not indicate the cause, but rather a part or anything from the whole?

7. Furthermore, the Spirit cannot be from the Son on account of the Spirit being about to take from Him and declare to us, because Scripture says that the Father is also about to take from the Spirit and give to others. For Moses says to God: "I am not able alone to bear the burden of this people; appoint for yourself another. God says to him: Choose seventy elders, and I will take from the Spirit that is upon you, and I will put it upon them." And if there it says "I will take away from the Spirit that is upon you," but here not this, but "I will take from the Spirit that is upon you," one should not be amazed. For the divine Chrysostom in his treatise On the Holy Spirit both received and gave out this saying, and unfolding it, he adds: "He did not say 'I will take yours,' but 'from the Spirit that is upon you.'" And what God says through Joel: "I will pour out from my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons will prophesy, and they will see visions, and they will dream dreams," means the same thing. Therefore, from these sayings, the Son is not the cause of the Spirit, since neither is the Spirit the cause of the Father on account of these things.

8. But if someone is troubled by the Lord saying "All that the Father has is mine," and should think because of this that the Son also has the dignity of the Father insofar as He is the principle of the Spirit, first, it has been shown that the Lord's declaration is also common to the Spirit, and surely because of this the Spirit will not have the dignity of the Father insofar as He is the principle of the Son; therefore, because of these things, neither would the dignity of the Father insofar as He is the cause of the Spirit belong to the Son. Next, among the things observed in the Trinity, some are personal and some are natural; that the discourse here is about the natural attributes is shown by the common teaching of the Church. And the divine Basil in his works against Eunomius, more clearly saying that what is common to the Father and the Son is also common to the Spirit, and as we began the chapter above, this became known to us through many statements. Thus, those who claim that the Son is the Sender-forth of the Holy Spirit because this belongs to the Father, and the Son has what belongs to the Father, should know that they are deceiving themselves! For since the attributes observed in the Father are of two kinds, personal and proper on the one hand, and natural and common on the other, the middle term is equivocal. If, then, you take "what belongs to the Father" in regard to the personal attributes, the minor premise is true—for it has been shown that sending forth is a personal attribute—but the major premise is false, for the Father and the Son are not the same in hypostasis. But if by saying "what belongs to the Father" you have in mind the common attributes of divinity, the minor premise is false—for sending forth is not among the things said of all divinity—but the major premise is true. But if by saying this very thing, in the minor premise you understand the discourse to be about personal attributes, and in the major premise about common attributes, the

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statements are true, but there is no syllogism anywhere; for the middle term is not the same, so that one cannot draw a conclusion. And apart from these things, as was shown in the third discourse, the divine Gregory, more precisely attending to the theological declaration that the Son has all that belongs to the Father, now adds "except unbegottenness," and now "except causality." And if explicitly by unbegottenness and causality the Father is distinguished from the Son, just as by no means could the Son be called unbegotten, so it is entirely necessary that He not be a cause either. And if He is not a cause, of necessity He would not be a Sender-forth.

REFUTATION IV.

FOURTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, from the giving of the Spirit to the disciples by the Lord, and this through breathing, it is evident that the Spirit also has its existence from Him; for it is written in the Gospel according to John: "He breathed on them and said to them, 'Receive the Holy Spirit.'"

Solution to the chapter, concerning the Lord's breathing

1. However, the breathing will be of no further use to the Latins for their purpose. For if they think that this breathing is the Holy Spirit itself, the argument is absurd; for breathing is fleshly and belongs to the flesh, and it is utterly absurd to consider the Holy Spirit a body. That the breathing is fleshly, the divine Cyril demonstrates in his "Address to the Empresses," for he says: "And why does He give the Spirit through fleshly breathing?"

2. If this seems absurd to them as well, but they make the fact that the Spirit is given through the Lord's breathing a proof of their belief that the Spirit is also from the Son, let it be noted first that one should not make inferences about faith; and furthermore, one should not be ignorant of what the Theologians think about this. For through this, they did not consider the Son to be the cause of the Spirit, but the great Basil in his treatise "On the Holy Spirit" says such things as: "Let him also remember the Lord, who breathed the Holy Spirit and showed through this breathing that the Spirit is of the divine essence, and not of created nature." The divine Cyril in his "Address to the Empresses" says: "And why does He give the Spirit through fleshly breathing? Because His flesh has not become alien to the Word, but uniquely His own." And in his "Explanation of the Divine Creed," he contemplated not the existence of the Spirit, but its bestowal and giving, when recalling this evangelical saying. For he says: "The Spirit is poured forth, that is, proceeds as from a fountain from God the Father, but is bestowed upon creation through the Son; for He breathed and said to the disciples, 'Receive the Holy Spirit.'" This is also what the divine John the Syrian says; for he, explicitly removing the existence of the Spirit from the Son, and saying "we do not say the Spirit is from the Son," states that this saying applies to

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the bestowal and manifestation of the Spirit; for he immediately adds: "We name it the Spirit of the Son and we confess that it is manifested and distributed to us through the Son; for He breathed and said to His disciples, 'Receive the Holy Spirit.'" If the bestowal of the Spirit, or its manifestation, were either identical to the procession of the Spirit, or if it were possible to deduce the latter from the former by necessity, he would not have denied the existence of the Spirit from the Son while attributing to Him its bestowal and manifestation; and this in the same chapter and so closely.

3. Furthermore, the Spirit is not given through breathing alone, but also through water to the faithful in the divine bath, and through the mantle of Elijah the Spirit descends upon Elisha, and indeed through the apostolic hands a multitude beyond counting were filled with the Spirit, and in earlier times when Moses laid on his hands, the Holy Spirit descended. If, therefore, they make the fact that it is given through breathing an indication that the procession of the Spirit is from the same source as the breathing, let them say concerning the water and the mantle and the hands, what should be inferred from these as well?

4. Moreover, if they think that the bestowal or giving of the Spirit by the Son is either identical to the procession from the Son, or if they deduce the latter from the former, their eagerness is in vain; for it is bestowed and given in time, and for a reason, and to certain persons; but what do these have to do with the procession of the Spirit before the ages?

5. Furthermore, the Spirit is not only given by the Father and the Son, but also gives itself; for just as the Son is not only given by the Father but also gives Himself as Lord. For the divine Paul says: "who gave Himself for us"; in the same manner also the Holy Spirit, it too gives itself for it visits as Lord whom it wishes, and when, and as much; and the phrase "when the Paraclete comes" means the same thing. If the giving of the Spirit is common to the Trinity, but the procession of the Spirit is not common, and the one is essential, while the other is personal, as has been shown, I wonder what mechanism could exist either to consider hypostatic properties the same as common properties or to argue about personal properties on the basis of common ones!

6. Furthermore, the divine Chrysostom, far from thinking that the Spirit proceeds from the Son because the Spirit was given through breathing, does not even deem it right to think that the Lord's saying "Receive the Holy Spirit" refers to the Paraclete Himself, but rather to a certain power and spiritual grace, which is common to the Trinity. For interpreting this evangelical statement, he says: "Some say that He did not give the Spirit, but through the breathing He made them suitable for receiving it. One would not err in saying that they then received a certain spiritual power and grace to forgive sins; therefore He added 'whose sins you forgive, they are forgiven,' showing what kind of activity He gives; for the grace of the Spirit is ineffable, and the gift is multifaceted. This happens so that you may learn that the gift and power of the Father and

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the Son and the Holy Spirit is one; for what seems to be peculiar to the Father appears also to be of the Son and of the Holy Spirit and we see that the distributions of gifts belong to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." If the Son, by giving the common gift of the Trinity, is for this reason also the cause of the Spirit, how would the Spirit not also be called the cause of the Son by the same reasoning, since the Spirit also bestows the same things? For "the one and the same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each one individually as He wills," as the inspired voice of Paul says; but neither would it be sound to think this, nor would anyone accept that, except in madness. Therefore, the Spirit would not proceed from the Son just because it was given through breathing.

7. If they should say that some of the Church's teachers say that the apostles then received the Holy Spirit itself, this is not a matter of disagreement. For even though the essence and hypostasis of the Spirit is incomprehensible, uncontainable, and imparticipable by any created nature, yet we say that those who have received the gifts of the Spirit are partakers of the Spirit itself. Why? Because this is how God wills to be participated in; because the energy of the Spirit is inseparable from the essence of the Spirit; because it is uncreated; because the Spirit has these eternally and not as acquired. For this reason, it is an ancient custom of the Theologians to say sometimes that believers receive the Holy Spirit, and other times the gift of the Holy Spirit. For the divine Paul, writing to the Corinthians, says, "You did not receive the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is from God." And the blessed Luke in Acts says, "And when Simon saw that through the laying on of the apostles' hands the Holy Spirit was given." Here we heard that the Holy Spirit is both given and received by the faithful; which the blessed Peter interprets, saying, "May your money perish with you, because you thought that the gift of God could be purchased with money," clearly showing that the Holy Spirit is both given and received according to the divine and supernatural gifts. And again Luke in Acts: "While Peter was still speaking these words, the Holy Spirit fell upon all those who heard the word." Here is the Holy Spirit. Then immediately: "And those of the circumcision who believed were astonished, as many as came with Peter, because the gift of the Holy Spirit had been poured out on the Gentiles also," persuading us of nothing else from these words than that the Spirit visits the worthy according to its gifts. And again a little further: "For they heard them speak with tongues and magnify God. Then Peter answered, 'Can anyone forbid water, that these should not be baptized who have received the Holy Spirit just as we have?'" So that once and for all you would see the Scripture being woven through such things, and making this its purpose, that God Himself is considered as the one who is participated in according to His natural and supernatural attributes. Just as if we should say either that the Holy Spirit and the Father are one, or that the Father and it are two, the discourse would not be about another and a different Spirit, but the former would be about its essence, and the latter of course about the hypostasis of the same, so also if someone should say

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about the faithful that they receive the Holy Spirit, the discourse is again about the Spirit itself, according to its inconceivable energies. Therefore, it is not a matter of disagreement to say sometimes that the Holy Spirit is given, and other times that a certain gift and grace of it is given, since we know this to be inseparable from the Spirit. If this grace is created and separate from the Spirit, then in vain has the opinion of the Church considered the one who puts a price on it to be suffering from a worse disease than Macedonius. For while the latter called the Holy Spirit a servant, at least it was of the Father and the Son; but this one considered it a servant of himself as well, having thus purchased its grace. For if the grace is a creature, how would the Spirit, being uncreated, share in the insult?

REFUTATION V.

FIFTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the Lord says in the tenth chapter of John: "I and the Father are one"; and those things which are identical are certainly also causes of the same things, so that if the Father is the cause of the Spirit, the Son certainly is as well.

Solution to the chapter, and concerning the identity of essence of Father and Son

1. But the fifth [argument] gives the Latins no necessity for their purpose; for the minor premise, which holds that the Father and the Son are identical, is true and very truthful indeed if the Lord's statement "I and the Father are one" is true; but [they are] identical in essence or in nature, or in form, or in species, or whatever one might prefer to call it; for [they are] certainly not [identical] numerically, for that would be entirely Sabellian. This being the case, let them know that they are committing a double fallacy; for the middle term is equivocal and not simple. So if they wish to preserve the form of a syllogism in any way, they speak the truth, as has been said, in asserting the minor premise, but they err in thinking that things identical in this way are also causes of the same things, which is the major premise. For things that are identical in species or nature are not [necessarily] causes of the same things; since neither are Andrew and Peter or Paul and anyone else necessarily causes of the same things despite certainly being the same in species and nature; but this axiom is appropriate to things identical in number, which if they acknowledge has place in this syllogism, they will speak the truth and correctly assert the major premise, but it follows that the minor premise is not only false, but also leads to impiety. For if Father and Son are numerically identical, we pursue Sabellius in vain. But if they blush at falsehood and draw both statements towards truth, thanks to them for speaking the truth, but not at all for syllogizing. For if the statements are true, "the same" is not taken in the same way, but the meaning of "the same" is one thing in one of the premises, and another in the other. This is to

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have two middle terms in reality, which is not the work of those who syllogize or deduce, but of those who commit fallacies and deceive themselves.

2. Furthermore, what prevents me, taking the same [principles], from reasoning with the Latins in this way: "O excellent ones, the Father and the Holy Spirit are certainly identical; for are not the Father and the Son one in essence? And are not the Father and the Holy Spirit one? And if they are identical, they are also causes of the same things; so that since the Father is the cause of the Word, the Spirit is certainly also its cause." But neither because of these arguments is the Spirit the cause of the Word, nor indeed the opposite.

3. However, if when the Lord says "I and the Father are one," which means "I and the Father are identical in essence," this were undermined by thinking that the Son does not project the Holy Spirit, it would be right, because of the sameness of essence, to think that the Son is also a projector of the Spirit. But if this [sameness of essence] is preserved, even if someone thinks it impossible for the Spirit to exist from the Son, he certainly says that any attempt against our view starting from such arguments is unnecessary. It has been shown at length in the first discourse that projection belongs to the personal properties; for natural properties are common to the Trinity, but this [projection] in no way [belongs] to the Spirit; for the Spirit does not project itself, nor indeed another Spirit; therefore it is not a natural property. And if not this, it is surely a personal property. This being the case, if someone says that only the Father is a projector, and in no way the Son, he will certainly assert a personal difference—and this is in no way absurd, as long as the Father is one person and the Son another—but not at all a natural difference, if indeed in the other personal properties in which the divine persons differ, there is not also introduced with these an otherness according to essence.

4. Furthermore, if because the Son does not project as the Father does, the Father and Son are different in essence and not one, this same thing will certainly apply to the Spirit as well, since it neither generates nor projects in any way. But if this [difference] does no harm to the Spirit, for its sameness of essence with the Father is preserved, as even the Latins would say, even if it has no share whatsoever in causality, why would we distinguish the Son from the Father's essence, if we consider that he neither generates nor projects? Therefore, we preserve, not destroy, the Lord's statement, in thinking that only the Father is the projector of the Spirit.

REFUTATION VI.

SIXTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Further, in the Gospel according to Luke, it is explicitly written: "power went out from him and healed all"; this would be the Holy Spirit; for what else could it be? "Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as well."

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Solution to the Chapter.

1. Perhaps I too would have feared this argument, if upon hearing "power" one had to understand nothing other than the Holy Spirit. But now, what the divine Chrysostom has said concerning power and the Son, we can also say concerning the Spirit. For he says in his commentaries on the blessed John the Evangelist in the fifth homily: "Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God; but not everywhere where God's power and God's wisdom are mentioned is the Son meant." Therefore, we too can say that the Holy Spirit is power, but not everywhere where power is mentioned must one understand it to be the Holy Spirit itself; consequently, the conclusion is not necessary.

2. Furthermore, among the many attributes pertaining to the divine essence—wisdom, goodness, greatness, will—power is one of them, a common property of the three; which the divine Scripture also calls "what is known of God," concerning which the blessed Paul, writing to the Romans, says: "For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his eternal power and divinity." And the divine Basil in the second book against Eunomius: "The works are indicative of power, wisdom, and skill, not of the essence itself." And in the writings to Amphilocheus: "We claim to know the greatness of God, and the power, and the wisdom, and the goodness; not the essence itself." And the blessed Athanasius, writing a confession of faith, says: "We theologize one in three hypostases, having one essence and one power and one energy and whatever else is contemplated around the essence, theologized and hymned." According to this power, we say that the Father and the Son are one, as the Lord says: "I and the Father are one," as the divine Chrysostom has interpreted this evangelical passage: "For he says that it was spoken concerning power; for all his discourse was about this." If the power is the same, it is evident that the essence is also the same. But if the Holy Spirit is not only power, but we also know a certain common power of the three, then the Latins' arguments do not lead to necessity.

3. Moreover, the name of power is common to the Trinity. For the Father is power, as the Lord says: "You will see the Son sitting at the right hand of power." And the Son likewise: "Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God," as the apostle says. But the Spirit is also power; for the Lord says to the apostles: "until you are clothed with power from on high," foretelling to them the indwelling of the Spirit. But this common name is derived from the power common to them. For the divine Dionysius says in the eighth chapter on Divine Names: "God is called power as producing everything according to power that is unwavering and unlimited," alluding to the common power of the three. And the divine Basil, making a general discourse about these things in his writings to Eustathius, knows God as nameless and beyond names in essence; but he wishes that the names concerning Him be gathered from the attributes concerning Him. For he

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says: "The divine nature in all names conceived remains unsignified as it is, according to our discourse." And again: "Essence is one thing, for which no revealing word has yet been found, but the significance of the names concerning it is different, being named from some energy or dignity." So also the divine Chrysostom in the second homily of his commentaries on the divine John the Evangelist: "Therefore this one, namely the blessed John, nowhere puts the name of essence; for it is not possible to say what God is in essence, but everywhere he reveals Him to us from His energies." And Gregory of Nyssa: "The divine nature either has no significant name, or does not have it for us; but whatever is said, whether by human custom or by divine Scripture, signifies something concerning it; but the divine nature itself remains ineffable and unutterable, transcending all signification through voice." And in his works against Eunomius, he says that the Son is called power, "as having the entire paternal power residing in him; whence whatever he sees the Father doing, these things he does likewise." But if it has been demonstrated that power is common to the three, and according to it each of the divine persons is also called power, how is it just either to think that there is no common power, or to consider the Latin conclusion necessary?

4. Furthermore, the divine Cyril, interpreting this evangelical saying, did not understand the Holy Spirit here as power, but rather the common property of the three, namely the divine strength. For he says concerning the Savior: "He became the performer of very many and admirable signs, rebuking demons, freeing those who came to him from incurable diseases, and manifesting his own power in a manner most befitting God." Here he says that the divine power is shown from the effects, namely the miracles. Certainly here one must not think of the Holy Spirit, but of the common power of the Trinity. Why? Because the Holy Spirit is essence and a distinct hypostasis, but the works are indicative of God's wisdom and power and skill, not of the essence itself, as the great Basil says. And again the divine Cyril: "Power went out from him and healed all; for Christ did not borrow strength from another, but being himself God by nature even though he became flesh, sending forth power upon the sick, he healed all."

5. Moreover, the divine Chrysostom in his interpretations of the Psalms understood power as the grace of the Spirit, and "from him" he took as from the flesh; for he plainly thought that this saying refers to the same thing as the one saying, "grace is poured out on your lips." For he says: "The discourse is about the economy; for God does not have lips, but this is a member of the flesh; and another interpreter said 'grace was poured out on your lips,' speaking more clearly, that is, it was manifested; as if one would say, that which was within gushed forth, it welled up. What is this grace through which he taught, through which he worked miracles? Here he speaks of the grace that came upon the flesh." And again the same: "For all grace was poured out into that temple." And again: "That temple received the whole grace, but we have received a small portion and a drop from that grace." And again from the same: "He who gave the earnest of the Spirit in

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our hearts, here speaks of the part of the energy; for the Paraclete is not divided." And if the teacher accepted power here as grace, for this is, he says, through which he taught, through which he worked miracles, and he understood "from him" as from the flesh. And grace is divided, but the Paraclete is not divided, and he is whole in the temple, but a drop and an earnest in us, therefore one should not consider the Paraclete as power here. If there is absolute necessity that the Spirit is not from the flesh.

6. Furthermore, the blessed teachers of the Church, expounding this passage, sometimes say that power comes from Christ, not passing locally, but being distributed to others and remaining undiminished in Christ, just as lessons both remain with the teachers and are imparted to the learners; sometimes they say that the prophets did not have powers going out from them, for they worked miracles by the grace of God, but Jesus, being the source of all good and all power, has powers going out from him. But if the Holy Spirit is one, and the Lord is the source of all power; and the Spirit is power, but the Lord has powers proceeding from him; and the Paraclete is not divided, but this power is also given to others, how can one think here of the Holy Spirit itself? And if someone is troubled by the attribution to the common power of the three persons that it heals all, one should not be amazed; for not only does this pertain to the divine power, but also the bringing forth of all things; and this has been a doctrine of the Church from ancient times. The divine Dionysius in the chapter on Being called the divine procession essence-creating; and the blessed Maximus, interpreting his expression, says: "The teacher said procession, meaning the divine energy, which brought forth all essence." And the divine Chrysostom in the fifth homily of his commentaries on the divine John teaches that all things were brought forth and made through the energy of the Only-Begotten. Thus also the divine Cyril in the Treasures, in the chapters concerning the Spirit, says: "The creatures are works and products of God's energy, having come into being through the Son in the Spirit." And the blessed Maximus in the chapters on love says: "God knows himself from his blessed essence, but the things that have come into being through him, from his wisdom and from his power, through which and in which he made all things." Therefore, it is reasonable for the Latins to draw any conclusion from this passage rather than that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

REFUTATION VII.

SEVENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of the Son; for it says in the eighth chapter of Romans: "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, that person does not belong to him." And so that no one might say that the Spirit proceeding from the Father is different from the Spirit of the Son, it is demonstrated from the words of the same apostle that the Spirit of the

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Father and the Spirit of the Son are the same; for to the passage just cited, "If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, that person does not belong to him," he adds: "But if the Spirit of God dwells in you." It is not possible to say that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ only in the sense that Christ possessed it as a human being, as stated in the fourth chapter of Luke: "Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan." For it says in the fourth chapter of Galatians: "Because you are sons of God, the Son has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying 'Abba, Father.'" Therefore, the Holy Spirit makes us sons of God insofar as it is the Spirit of the Son of God; we become sons of God through adoption because of our likeness to the natural Son of God, as the apostle says in the eighth chapter of Romans: "Those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers." Thus, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ insofar as Christ is by nature the Son of God; and it is impossible for the Holy Spirit to be called the Spirit of the Son of God according to any other relation, except by some causal relationship, for this is the only distinction found in divine matters. Therefore, it is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is of the Son as proceeding from him.

Solution to the Chapter, and How the Holy Spirit May Properly Be Called the Spirit of the Son

1. The seventh argument, which they consider significant and like a defensive wall, is actually a clear but fragile support. It is true that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son; we know this from the apostle's teaching. And we know that the Spirit of the Father is not different from the Spirit of the Son, and that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son not only because Christ possessed it as a human being, but also because as God the Son possesses it together with the Father. These things are true. "But that it is impossible for the Holy Spirit to be called the Spirit of the Son according to any other relation, except as proceeding from him as from a cause, and that this is the only distinction in divine matters, the one according to cause and effect"—these claims are clearly at war with the truth, as we shall see. But concerning distinction, we shall speak a little later. For now, we must say that it is not "impossible for the Holy Spirit to be called the Spirit of the Son according to any other relation, even if it does not proceed from him as from a cause."

2. For why should the fact that it is the Spirit of the Son necessarily mean that it is from the Son, and that it cannot be otherwise? If this is because whatever simply belongs to something must also be from that thing, this is false. Look, for example, at the double, which belongs to the half, and vice versa. Yet neither is from the other. The slave belongs to the master, and the master to the slave. And generally, most relative terms are said to belong to each other, but they are not

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from each other. Nor is God from Abraham or from mercies, even though he is called "God of Abraham" and "God of mercy and compassion."

3. If they insist on this for the Spirit, if they mean it to apply to every spirit, this too is false. For look, each person's soul is called that person's spirit; for Paul speaks of the spirits of the righteous and of the prophets, and the Lord says, "Into your hands I commit my spirit"—yet our soul is not from us. If they do not mean this to apply to spirit in general but only to this particular Holy Spirit, this is also not true. For the blessed Paul calls it "the Spirit of adoption" and "the Spirit of power and love and self-discipline," and no one with sense would say that the Holy Spirit is from adoption, or from power, or from love, or from self-discipline.

4. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is also called the Spirit of us believers, as it is written in Numbers: "The Lord said to Moses: I will take from your Spirit and give it to them"—for so the Latin version has it—and in the fourth book of Kings: "The spirit of Elijah rested upon Elisha." And the divine Luke in Acts, chapter forty: "While Paul was waiting for them in Athens, his spirit was provoked within him as he saw that the city was full of idols." And yet the Holy Spirit is certainly not from us. That the Spirit of Paul here is the Holy Spirit is shown by the divine Gregory of Nyssa in his first discourse on Abraham, where he says: "The narrative of the apostolic Acts has told us about Paul's stay in Athens, how, when the people there were mad for idols and devoted to the sacrificial smoke on the altars, the Holy Spirit was provoked in the blessed Paul, as if a flooding stream observed in the apostle's soul, seeking an outlet among the unworthy." This is also the view of the Latins, for Thomas in his present chapter wants the Holy Spirit to be the Spirit of Christ in that Christ possessed it also as a human being; but he would not claim that the human nature is from Christ, for he says: "It is not possible to say that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ only in the sense that Christ possessed it as a human being, as stated in the fourth chapter of Luke: 'Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan.'"

5. If they do not attribute this to the Holy Spirit in general when it is said to belong to someone—that it is also from that person—but apply this only to the Son, so that when the Spirit is said to belong to him, it is also from him, then they have taken what needs to be proven as if it were already agreed upon, with nothing to convince us.

6. Furthermore, if the name "Spirit" were necessarily one of the relational terms that indicate a relationship, so that it refers to the one who breathes, as the Latins say, just as Son refers to Father, offspring to parent, and creation to creator, then it would make sense to think that, when called Spirit of the Son, it is from the Son, as if the Son were breathing it forth. But if this is not so—for it is not classified among relative terms as a genus—how is it not reckless to take as necessary what could also be otherwise? This is clear: Moses says in his ode, "His Spirit will melt and waters will flow," referring to the wind; and in Genesis, "The Spirit of God was moving over the water"—here the divine Chrysostom understood the air. And surely such things do not

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proceed from God; for God does not breathe forth the wind or the air. The soul, too, is spirit; and the angel; and the spiritual gift is also called thus; and anger is called spirit; and a deep thought; and what is contrasted with the letter, as the divine Chrysostom says in his discourses on the incomprehensible. And no one with sense would refer these to a breather as their cause. And each of the saints is called spirit, as Gregory of Nyssa says in his discourse to Simplicius.

7. Furthermore, those names in the Trinity that are said in relation or reference or as correlatives to one another are not common to all three; but the name "Spirit" is common to all three persons, just like "holy" and "God" and "Lord." For not only the Paraclete has received the designation of Spirit, but also the Father and his Word. For the Lord says concerning the Holy Spirit: "God is Spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth." But the Son, too, is Spirit. For the great Basil says in the third book against Eunomius, taking from Jeremiah: "The Spirit of our face, Christ the Lord, of whom we said, 'In his shadow we will live among the nations.'" And again the same author in the same discourse: "The Lord is the Spirit." Therefore, Spirit is not among the relational names.

8. If they should say that the Father or the Son is called Spirit in one way, and the Paraclete in another, the statement is not true. For the great Basil says in the same discourse: "Not only is the name of holiness common to him with the Father and the Son, but also the very designation of Spirit." And a little later: "From these things it is clear to everyone that the commonality of names indicates not estrangement of nature, but an affinity with the Father and the Son."

9. Furthermore, if the name "Spirit" were relational and indicative of reference to its cause, it would not be called our Spirit; for the Son is not called our Son, nor is the Father called our Father, when we mean the one who begets by nature, nor is any other of the divine names that indicate the relation to one another. But the Spirit is called ours, as has been shown; therefore, it is not among the relational terms.

10. Furthermore, if Spirit were among the relational terms and referred to the one who breathes forth as to a cause, of whom breathing forth is the Father Spirit, and to whom does he refer as to a cause? Therefore, Spirit is not among the relational terms.

11. Furthermore, if "spirit" gives an understanding of relation, and it is equivalent to calling the Spirit "Spirit" and "Projection," just as the Word is called Son and Offspring, then the Holy Spirit would be called not only our spirit but also our projection! But this is utterly blasphemous. For if the Spirit were my projection, then I would certainly be the projector of the Spirit. Therefore, the term "Spirit" is not of this kind.

12. Furthermore, the name "spirit" denotes the incorporeal, the purely immaterial, and the indivisible. For the great Basil says in the ninth of his letters to Amphilochius: "Holy Spirit is his proper and distinctive title, which is especially the name of everything incorporeal, purely immaterial, and indivisible; therefore, the Lord, instructing the soul that believes God should be

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worshiped in a specific place, teaching that the incorporeal is uncircumscribed, says, 'God is Spirit.'" And in the fourth book against Eunomius, the same author says: "When God is called Spirit by the Lord, he indicated that the Father is incorporeal." If these things are as they are, and the incorporeal or immaterial or indivisible is not classified among relative terms, nor is it relational, it is evident that neither is "spirit" of such a kind. If those names by which something is called and from which things are derived are relational in the way described, and if it has been shown that the term "Spirit" is in no way relational, then we would not assign such a term to the relative terms by any means.

13. Therefore, it would not be sound to say that the Spirit is from the Son because it is called the Spirit of the Son. Consequently, the Latins have not used sound reasoning, nor as they ought to have, nor as the order of things demands. For if the Spirit were from the Son, they would necessarily conclude that it belongs to the Son, if this were not already established; for that which is from something as from a cause surely belongs to that thing. For the Son, being from the Father, is necessarily also the Son of the Father. And created things, being from God, are also called creations of God. And the Projection, being from the Projector, both is and is called the Projection of the Projector. For the order of things gives a kind of affinity to causes with the things that come from them, and because of this, things that come from causes necessarily belong to those causes. However, the fact that the Spirit belongs to the Son does not mean that it is therefore from the Son, just as our soul or our body is not from us, even though they are called ours. For this reason, the divine John the Syrian, not ignorant of such a reversal, and knowing very well that the Holy Spirit belongs to the Son, does not maintain that it is from the Son, for he says: "We do not say that the Spirit is from the Son, but we name it the Spirit of the Son."

14. It would be even more proper to consider that "Spirit of God," namely of the Father, and "Spirit from God" have the same meaning as "Spirit of the Son" and "Spirit from the Son," because the former is what is being investigated, while the latter is what is presupposed. But the divine Chrysostom in his discourse on the Holy Spirit did not interpret "Spirit of God" and "Spirit from God" in the same way. For he says, "And lest we, hearing 'Spirit of God,' might think it is called 'Spirit of God' due to relationship, Scripture introduces the Holy Spirit and adds to 'of God' the phrase 'from God'; for 'of God' is one thing and 'from God' is another." And again shortly after, "Just as it said 'Spirit of God' and Scripture added 'from God,' so again it is called 'Spirit of the Father'; and lest you think this is said according to relationship, the Savior confirms: 'when the Paraclete comes, the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father.'" If therefore, as the divine Chrysostom maintains, it is one thing for the Spirit to be "of God" and another to be "from God," then all the more is it different to say "Spirit of the Son" and "Spirit from the Son." But saying "Spirit from the Son" indicates causation, therefore saying "Spirit of the Son" indicates something different and not causation.

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15. Furthermore, while the Latins think it impossible for the Holy Spirit to be called the "Spirit of the Son" in any other way unless it is also "from the Son," this is not how the teachers of the Church understand it, but rather the opposite. For instance, the great Basil understood and received the apostolic phrase in such a way that the Spirit is the "Spirit of the Son" because the Son and the Spirit are of the same essence. For he says in the eighteenth of his discourses to Amphilochius: "But it is also called the 'Spirit of Christ,' as being naturally appropriated to him." The divine Cyril also agrees with this when writing to John of Antioch: "For the Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, according to the Savior's voice; but it is not foreign to the Son according to the principle of essence; for what the former [Basil] called 'naturally appropriated,' this one [Cyril] rendered as 'not foreign according to essence.'" And these statements are equivalent. For one can also reverse the argument: what is naturally appropriated to someone is certainly not foreign to them in essence; and what is not foreign to someone in essence is certainly naturally appropriated to them. In harmony with these statements, the divine Chrysostom also said in his discourse on the Holy Spirit: "It is the same to say 'Spirit of God' and 'Spirit of Christ'; but he [the Apostle] says 'Spirit of God' is spoken of through relationship. For it is thus, and lest we, hearing 'Spirit of God,' might think it is called 'Spirit of God' due to relationship, Scripture introduces the Holy Spirit and adds to 'of God' the phrase 'from God'; for 'of God' is one thing and 'from God' is another." And he also understood "Spirit of the Father" to be said according to relationship. Therefore, he also accepted that "Spirit of Christ" refers to the natural relationship; and it is clear that being naturally appropriated and being from something are not the same, for they are not convertible terms. If something is from another according to essence, it is necessarily naturally appropriated to that thing. But if this is so, the converse is not necessarily true: for the Father is naturally appropriated to the Son, but is not from the Son; and the Son is naturally appropriated to the Spirit, but is not from the Spirit. And the divine Chrysostom, attributing relationship to the one term and causation to "from God," and saying that "of God" is one thing and "from God" is another, clearly did not consider causation and natural appropriation to be the same. And the divine Cyril also makes this same distinction clear through his division of conjunctions: "For the Spirit," he says, "proceeds from God the Father according to the Savior's voice" — here he speaks of causation — "but it is not foreign to the Son according to the principle of essence" — here he speaks of natural appropriation. And in his interpretation of the Gospel according to Luke, in the thirty-ninth chapter, he more clearly sets out the difference between causation and natural appropriation. For he says: "Just as the finger is attached to the hand, not being foreign to it, but in it by nature, so also the Holy Spirit is connected to the Son in unity by the principle of consubstantiality, even though it proceeds from God the Father." Moreover, in the chapters where he defends himself against Theodoret, he interpreted the Spirit being of the Father and the Son as meaning the Spirit is not foreign to them.

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For he says in his defense of the ninth chapter: "We do not say that the Lord clearly used the power through the Spirit as something foreign, as indeed each of the saints did; for it was and is his, just as it is also the Father's." Here, having prefaced with the negative statement that "he did not use it as a foreign power," he added: "for the Spirit was and is his just as it is also the Father's." And if "foreign" is contrasted with "one's own," and now he has represented the contrast with "it is his," he certainly knows by necessity that the Spirit being "his" is the same as the Spirit being naturally his own. And not only the blessed Basil, Chrysostom, and Cyril received the apostle's words in this way, but also almost all the teachers of the Church share the same understanding. For the divine Maximus, in his explanation of what the golden lampstand and its lamp mean to the prophet Zechariah, says: "The Holy Spirit, just as it exists by nature according to essence of God the Father, so also it is of the Son according to essence, as proceeding ineffably from the Father, essentially through the Son who was begotten." And the divine Anastasius in his discourse entitled "Concerning the Orthodox Doctrines of Our Church" (for the Sixth Ecumenical Council also considered his voice to be a teacher's voice) says: "The Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of Christ, and the Spirit of Jesus, the discourse showing throughout the natural kinship of the divinity." Therefore, this does not necessarily indicate causation; for the one [natural kinship] is common, while causation is not such. And again from the same discourse: "It is always present with the holy apostles by participation, but with our Savior Christ and God as being consubstantial and equally divine; in this sense it is called Spirit of God and Spirit of Christ." And why do we speak of this or that teacher when the First Ecumenical Council itself proclaims such things? For that council also interpreted the apostolic expression this way, considering the Spirit's appropriation to the Son: for it says in a chapter of its acts: "Accept one divinity of the Father who ineffably begot the Son, and of the Son who was begotten from him, and of the Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father himself; but being the own [Spirit] of the Son, just as the divine apostle says: 'If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, this one is not his.'" They say here that the Spirit is the "own" of the Son, as naturally appropriated; not indeed as belonging to the Son alone, since it belongs to the Father as well, but by giving to the Father causation and to the Son appropriation, they make it entirely clear that they do not consider both to be the same. Therefore, the Latins do not rightly say that it is impossible for the Holy Spirit to be called the "Spirit of the Son" according to any other relationship, unless it were also from him.

16. If they should say, "Even if the Holy Spirit is called the 'Spirit of the Son' because of consubstantiality and natural appropriation, this must be convertible, so why do we not also call the Son 'of the Spirit'?" We will say this: The Latins are under every necessity to accept the aforementioned interpretations, as they are the common opinion of the Church; but we are under no necessity to resolve their difficulties, for these arguments are not directed at us, nor do they

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come to us as learners, but as debaters, not to say teachers. Indeed, what the divine Dionysius said to those who attempt to undermine theological principles, this we shall also say to them: "If there is anyone who altogether opposes the scriptures, he will be entirely far from our philosophy, and if he does not care about theological wisdom from the scriptures, how would we care about guiding him to theological knowledge?" But if he looks to the truth of the divine words, using this as our rule and aim, we will proceed steadfastly toward the defense as best we can, affirming that there is no necessity, because something is said to be of the Son according to natural appropriation, that the Son should also be called of that thing. For the Word of God, being God by nature and having become man by nature, would call his soul and his body his own, certainly according to natural appropriation, just as each human being calls his own soul or body his own. And the divine Cyril, in his discourses to the Third Council, says that the soul which he assumed and the body are the own of the Son, and there is no necessity for the statement to be convertible. So that one should think the Son is of the soul or of the body, but also the creative and foreknowing and good and indeed each of the divine properties is said to be of the Father and of the Son according to natural appropriation, and no argument compels us to convert the statement and say that the Father or the Son is of the previously enumerated properties. Moreover, we say both "Word of God" and "Spirit of God" according to natural appropriation, and the matter does not permit us to use conversion and say either "God of the Word" or "God of the Spirit."

17. Furthermore, one should not be unaware that if relative names are not properly attributed to that to which they refer, especially when the discussion concerns divine matters, it will bring no small harm to the argument. This is clear: for just as when the Holy Spirit is called "of the Father" due to appropriation, the Father is not also called "of the Spirit," for the Spirit would seem to be a Son of the Father, so also if one calls the Son "of the Spirit," the Spirit would be considered a Father, since the Son clearly requires a Father. This, then, would not reasonably be said. But what is greater than this for demonstrating consubstantiality, although it seems somewhat paradoxical, we strongly affirm. For the Son is called Christ. But Scripture has also given the appellation of Christ to the Holy Spirit, and it is also called Christ. For the blessed Paul, writing to the Romans, says: "But you are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you. Now if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not His. And if Christ is in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the Spirit is life because of righteousness." Interpreting this, the divine Cyril says in his Thesauri: "Receive from this correct notions about the Holy Spirit, so that you may learn that it is of the essence of the Father, and not foreign to the one divinity; for having called it 'the Spirit of God,' he immediately also calls it 'the Spirit of Christ,' showing that all things that are proper to the Father naturally pass to the Son who is begotten from him, and again he immediately calls the Spirit 'Christ,' saying 'if Christ is

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in you,' showing that it is not foreign to the nature of the Word." Here the blessed Cyril, having learned from the apostle, clearly called the Holy Spirit "Christ," and indeed having called it "Spirit of God" and "of Christ," he added the reason, that "all things that are proper to the Father naturally pass to him who is begotten from him," clearly showing that it is because of the natural appropriation which the Spirit has to the Father and the Son that it is called "Spirit of the Father" and "Spirit of Christ." And it is clear that the discourse gives us to understand that "proper" here means not the personal but the essential and natural attributes, for the other would be altogether blasphemous. But also the great Basil in the fourth of his discourses against Eunomius says that the Holy Spirit is Christ, showing through this its connatural unity with the Son. For he has it thus: "The Spirit is the property of God and of the Son, being and recognized in the divine glory; for your spirit is not Christ, nor is the spirit of the wind the Lord, nor is the unclean spirit (since some have dared to introduce this); but the Holy Spirit is named Christ and Lord."

18. If someone were to seek a reciprocal relation even with these things being so, the discourse of truth does not entirely reject this either. For while the Lord as Son would not be called "of the Spirit," as Jesus or Christ He certainly could be. For if Scripture calls the Holy Spirit "the Spirit of Jesus" because of their natural intimacy, what hindrance could there be to calling Jesus or Christ "of the Spirit"? For if He is called ours because of His assumption [of human nature], and the one who says "my Jesus" and "my Christ" bears witness to these words, how much more [could He be called] "of the Spirit" because of their ineffable identity of nature? Therefore, nothing prevents the Holy Spirit from being called "Spirit of the Son" because of their natural intimacy, nor from reversing the statement. For there is no necessity in the discourse, as has been shown, and because even if the Son cannot be reciprocally related to the Spirit due to their relation and the absurdity that would result, it is possible when speaking in other terms, as has been demonstrated.

19. Furthermore, the Holy Spirit was also manifested to the world through the Son, as is written in the revelation of the divine Gregory the Theologian. And for this reason, the Spirit could be called "of the Son," as the great Basil also believes. For he says in the fourth book against Eunomius: "For these reasons, the Apostle clearly proclaimed that the Spirit is from God, saying that we have received the Spirit from God, and he made it clear that the Spirit appeared through the Son, naming it 'Spirit of the Son' just as [he named it] 'of God.'" And one would not be acting justly by accepting "has come into being" as an interpretation of "has appeared," for it is not the custom of those who theologize about the superessential Trinity to say anything unless they have received the principles from the divine oracles. Nor would the divine Basil have said that the Spirit originally appeared through the Son if he had not heard from the Spirit that "the Holy Spirit has its existence from God and has appeared through the Son"—clearly to human beings. If there it is impossible to understand "has appeared" instead of "has come into being," it

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is absolutely necessary here also to interpret "has appeared through the Son" as referring to the manifestation of the Spirit.

20. If the Holy Spirit is also "our Spirit," as has been shown, and we have received and possess it from the Son, then if the gift belongs to the receiver, it would much more belong to the giver. And the Son is its giver and bestower. For the divine Cyril says in his Explanation of the Divine Creed: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from God the Father, but is bestowed upon creation through the Son; for He breathed and said: 'Receive the Holy Spirit.'" If they should say that the Spirit is of the Son before the ages, but is given in time, and that therefore it should not be called "Spirit of the Son" because it is given by Him, this argument is not necessary. For the Son has the ability to give the Holy Spirit; and what God has, He certainly has from eternity and not as something acquired, even if He gives it in time and recently to whomever He wishes out of love for humanity, since He also creates recently and whenever He wishes, yet possesses the ability to create from eternity.

21. Furthermore, the Son is the dispenser of the Spirit, as the divine Gregory says, and the Spirit makes its dwelling in the Son, as we have heard from the Gospels. And the blessed Andrew, the Lord's apostle, in his travels, teaches to believe also in "the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son." If these things are true, then the Holy Spirit would also in this way be the Spirit of the Son, as abiding and resting in Him, and relating to Him exactly as it relates to itself.

22. Moreover, Paul calls the Holy Spirit "the Spirit of adoption." How would it not be, for this reason also, the Spirit of the Son, both as conforming those born by grace to the Son by nature, and as adopting for itself—which is to say, for the Son—us who were estranged? With so many ways having been revealed according to which the Holy Spirit could be called Spirit of the Son, the Latins have not spoken soundly or truthfully when they say that "it is impossible for the Spirit to be called 'of the Son' in any other way unless it has also received from Him the cause of its existence."

REFUTATION VIII.

EIGHTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the Lord says: "But if I cast out demons by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you." This means that the Son works through the Spirit. But divine Scripture and many theologians also say that the Father works through the Son. Therefore, just as the Father is the cause of the Son because the Father works through Him, in the same manner the Son is also the cause of the Spirit, since He works through the Spirit.

Solution to the Chapter.

REFUTATION OF THE LATINS

1. Neither is the eighth chapter necessary for the Latins' conclusion. Rather, it is necessarily the case that the Spirit does not exist from the Son for this reason. For if the Spirit would necessarily be from the Son because the Son works through the Spirit, then the Son would necessarily be from the Spirit as well, since we know that the Spirit also works through the Son—but this is not the case. For the divine Chrysostom, in the twelfth homily of his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, taking his principles from the blessed Paul, says: "And what he [the divine Paul] always does—moving from the Son to the Spirit, and from the Spirit to the Son and the Father, and attributing all things among us to the Trinity—he does here as well. For having said, 'Who will deliver me from the body of this death?' he showed the Father doing this through the Son; then again also the Holy Spirit through the Son; for he says, 'The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free.'" So if the argument works in both directions, either the Son is not the cause of the Spirit, just as the Spirit is not the cause of the Son for this reason, or if the first is true, the second would necessarily follow as well. But the latter is absurd; therefore, the Spirit is not from the Son for this reason. Moreover, the divine Theodore, bearing the marks of martyrdom and himself being among the chorus of theologians, wants the Holy Spirit to work through the Father and the Son; for he sings concerning the Holy Spirit that "it preserves creation in the Father but through the Son." Therefore, according to this new theology, at least from these words, the Spirit would also be the cause of the Father and the Son! Reasonably, then, the divine Cyril said in his Treasures that these are proofs of their consubstantiality and essential unity. For his expression goes like this: "He has spoken as a human being although being God by nature, and giving the Spirit that proceeds from God the Father to those who are worthy, and using it as His own power, for it is consubstantial with Him, and whatever is said to come into being from God the Father" — this is certainly through the Son in the Spirit.

REFUTATION IX.

NINTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. The divine apostle in the second Epistle to the Thessalonians, says that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the mouth of the Son; for he says thus: "whom the Lord Jesus will destroy with the Spirit of His mouth." And the great Basil, in the fourth book against Eunomius, says thus: "For we would not have had any lesser knowledge of the Spirit's existence from God by hearing that it is the Spirit of the mouth of God; but this name is sufficient to show its existence from God." If, therefore, the Holy Spirit's being the Spirit of the mouth of God is sufficient to show its existence from God the Father, and the divine apostle, writing to the Thessalonians, says "the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the mouth of the Son," the necessary conclusion is clear, if one is not willing to be contentious.

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Solution to the Chapter.

1. This argument also does not contain any necessity within itself. For the apostle does not here call the Holy Spirit "Spirit," but the term "spirit" in the usage of Scripture is one of those terms with multiple meanings, and here he means the command of the Lord; for, as the Lord says, "My words are spirit and life." And the divine Chrysostom, explaining this apostolic saying in the third homily, says: "'Whom the Lord Jesus,' he says, 'will consume with the spirit of His mouth': for just as fire, when it simply comes upon small creatures, makes them numb and consumes them even when they are far away before its actual presence, so also Christ is sufficient to be present with His command alone and His presence, and all these things will perish; He will stop the deception simply by appearing." This being the case, what necessity befitting the argument would there be to think that the Spirit is from the Son, just because that bitter tyrant will be destroyed by the command of the God-Word alone?

2. If someone is troubled because "Spirit of the mouth of the Father" does not mean the same thing as "Spirit of the mouth of the Son"—for in the former case it is the Holy Spirit itself, according to "By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and by the Spirit of His mouth all their power"—but in the latter case it is the Lord's command, let him know that such a distinction is a long-standing custom in divine Scripture. The blessed Maximus has also handed this down as a rule in his contemplation on Zechariah concerning the seven lamps and the lampstand; for he says there: "Not always and not all things that have the same verbal expression will be understood in one and the same manner, but each of the things said should be understood with respect to the particular meaning present in that passage of Holy Scripture, if we are going to correctly hit upon the purpose of what is being said." And one might observe such a thing from the apostle's writings to the Corinthians: "All things are ours, and we are Christ's, and Christ is God's," but not in the same way even in reality; for we are Christ's as having been created by Him, but Christ is God's as His Son, and all things are ours as having been created for us. And again the same apostle: "The head of woman is man, and the head of man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God," but we would not attribute what is signified by these terms in the same way. This, therefore, must be reckoned in this case as well, and since the word "spirit" has a variety of meanings, one should not be surprised if it is interpreted one way with respect to the Father and another way with respect to the Son, according to the particular meaning present in that passage of Holy Scripture, as the theologians say.

REFUTATION X.

TENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

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0. Further, the blessed Paul, writing to the Romans, says concerning the Holy Spirit: "Those whom He foreknew and predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son." And in the revelation of the divine Gregory, the Holy Spirit is called the image of the Son, for it is written there concerning the Spirit: "perfect image of the perfect Son." And just as the Spirit is the image of the Son, so also is the Son the image of the Father. But if the Son, being called the image of the Father, is also from the Father, then in the same manner the Spirit would be from the Son, since it is called the image of the Son.

Solution to the Chapter, and Concerning the Image, What It Means

1. But the Spirit is not necessarily from the Son merely because the Spirit is the image of the Son. For in other cases, the name "image" suggests a certain similarity, as the term itself indicates. But in the case of the divine persons, it indicates not simply similarity, but unalterable similarity, since the Son, being called the image of the Father, possesses unalterability either as an attribute or as something implicit. This unalterability exists not because the Son is caused, nor because of other personal properties—for by these the Son is rather distinguished—but because of His essence. This is similarity without any variation. Therefore, since the Spirit is also the image of the Son, it would be an unalterable image—as the divine Cyril says in his Thesaurus: "How then shall the Holy Spirit be numbered among created things, if indeed it is the unalterable image of the Son of God?" Therefore, this would be indicative of identity of essence, not of procession from the Son.

2. Furthermore, Moses in Genesis says that Adam lived so many years "and begot according to his form and according to his image, and named him Seth." The divine Chrysostom, explaining this, says: "Was I not right when I said at the beginning that nothing in divine Scripture is written simply or without purpose? For behold, with what precision this blessed prophet has spoken: 'Adam begot according to his image and according to his form, and named him Seth.' But concerning the first-born, I mean Cain, he appears to have made no such observation, thus foretelling from above his inclination to evil, and rightly so. For he did not preserve his father's characteristics, but immediately deserted to evil. But here he says 'according to his form and according to his image,' that is, similar in character to his begetter, preserving the same marks of virtue, and able to rectify through his own virtue the transgression of the one who came before. For Scripture is not speaking to us here about bodily features when it says 'according to his form and according to his image,' but about the condition of the soul." And again the same writer: "For see with what generosity the Master displays His gifts; for He not only granted another son, but also foretells that he will be virtuous; for he begot, it says, according to his form and according to his image." Here indeed, both the divine Scripture and its interpreter clearly intend the name "image" to preserve similarity, and in no way, from these words at least, is this indicative of

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causation. For "concerning Cain," Moses "appears to have made no such observation," although if this indicated derivation from Adam, Cain would certainly have been said to be according to the image and form of Adam before Seth, since Adam produced him before the others. But this is not what Scripture intends: "For he did not preserve," it says, "his father's characteristics." And again, "according to his image, that is, similar in character to his begetter." And by saying "he begot" and then adding "and he begot such a one," which means according to his image and form, he clearly showed that being begotten is one thing, and becoming virtuous is another. Therefore, if this establishes that the concept of image signifies similarity, but does not consider Cain worthy of the same description, even though he was clearly begotten from Adam, then certainly from the fact that the Spirit is called the image of the Son, one can very much infer the commonality of essence, but not causation or procession from it—not even close.

3. Moreover, if one were to ask the Latins whether Abel was according to the image and form of the one who begot him, they would not deny it, for he too was greatly devoted to virtue. And "according to the image and form" is nothing other than this one being similar in character to that one. If, as with Seth, so also Abel was similar in character to his begetter, then they must necessarily be similar in character to each other as well, and images of each other. But it is utterly impossible for them to be from each other. Therefore, the Son is not the cause of the Spirit because of the image.

4. Again, the blessed Paul says in his letter to the Colossians, "Having put off the old man with his deeds, and having put on the new man who is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of the one who created him." The divine Chrysostom, explaining this, says: "Behold, creation is called the best way of life, according to the image of Christ; for this is what 'according to the image of the one who created him' means." But the old man did not have this; for this reason he was cast aside. If he did not have the image, but being from God belonged to the new man just as to the old, then the image does not necessarily signify causation.

5. Furthermore, if the Spirit is from the Son because it is the image of the Son, then fathers would also be from their sons, since they are clear images of their sons. But the second is absurd, so the first is also not true. That fathers are images of their sons is stated by the divine Athanasius in his writings against the Arians: "The fathers will answer them thus: what we beget is not of our will, but similar to us. We do not become parents by prior deliberation, but begetting is proper to nature; for we too are images of our children."

6. Moreover, if, when the Son is called the image of the Father, it were not possible to reverse the statement and call the Father the image of the Son, the Latin argument might have some basis. But since the Son is called the image of the Father, and the Father is also called the image of the Son, what necessity prevents the Son from being called the image of the Spirit? If this is so, either the Spirit is not from the Son despite being called His image, or the Son is from the

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Spirit, and indeed the Father is from the Word, being His image. But this is absurd. That the Father is also the image of the Son will be attested by the divine Cyril in his interpretation of the sacred Gospel according to John. For explaining the Lord's saying, "If you do not believe me because of the works themselves, I and the Father are one," he says: "For if the Father is one with the Son, how will He not share equality with the Father, being an unalterable image, having become an unalterable image of the Son?" Therefore, the Son is not necessarily the cause of the Spirit because of the image; however, through it He is certainly consubstantial. For this is what everyone with a sound mind would say the reciprocity implies.

7. If they should say that the divine Gregory in his second discourse on the Son calls the Son the image of the Father because He is from Him, and for this reason the Spirit would be from the Son, being His image, the argument is not conclusive. For the Holy Spirit is called the Breath of the Father's mouth in Scripture, but in the same Scripture it is also found as the Breath of the Son's mouth, as the Apostle says in writing to the Thessalonians. But there the discussion concerns the Paraclete, while in the Apostle's writing, the Breath of the Son's mouth signifies the command, as we have shown. Therefore, terms that have the same pronunciation will not, as the blessed Maximus says, necessarily be understood in one and the same way. Thus, there is no necessity here to understand the concept of image in the same way for Father and Son.

Furthermore, the explanation is not entirely accurate; for the teacher there gave the reason why the Son is the image of the Father: because He is from the Father and because He is the same in essence as the Father. For he says: "And image, because He is consubstantial, and because He is from that one, not the Father from Him." This being the case, the teacher's explanation is on our side. For it is not necessary, then, that the Spirit be from the Son on account of being an image, as long as the concept of image is preserved through the unalterability of essence, even if the Spirit is not from the Son, just as the Father is the image of the Son even though He is not from the Son.

8. Furthermore, even the teachers of the Latins bear witness to what we are saying. For Augustine in the seventh book on the Trinity says: "The Son alone is the image of the Father." And Thomas, in his discourse on the image, says: "The teachers of the Greeks commonly say that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Father and the Son; but the Latin teachers attribute the name of image to the Son alone, for nowhere in canonical Scripture is the term image found in reference to the Holy Spirit, but only in reference to the Son." And again the same writer a little later: "Damascene and the other teachers of the Greeks use the term image in place of perfect similarity." If the teachers of the Latins would not say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son because of being an image, since they have not even initially addressed the Holy Spirit with the name of image, and if the leaders of our Church use the term image in reference to the Holy Spirit in place of perfect similarity—which perfect similarity must necessarily be reciprocal in

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the case of the divine persons, and perfect similarity is unalterable similarity, which is identity of essence—then we have correctly and appropriately, and in keeping with our teachers, explained the concept of image which we are now examining.

9. Furthermore, how could the blessed Damascene or any other teacher of our Church have called the Spirit the image of the Son because it is from Him as cause, when he expressly says this: "We do not say that the Spirit is from the Son"? Therefore, this argument made on behalf of the Latins has not been properly and correctly presented.

REFUTATION XI.

ELEVENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, in the Revelation, the divine John the Evangelist says: "And he showed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb." Here, it is evident that he calls the Son the Lamb, and the water of life is clearly the Holy Spirit; for thus the same John has handed down in the Gospel concerning the living water, saying: "This he said concerning the Spirit, which those who believe in him were about to receive." This being so, it is shown irrefutably from this passage that the Holy Spirit proceeds from God and from the Lamb—that is, from the Father and the Son.

Solution to the Chapter

1. To the eleventh [argument] we say this: first, who does not know that this book of Revelation is full of enigmas and possesses much obscurity within itself, and that one ought not pursue the investigation of disputed matters through unclear passages? For this shows an obvious deficiency in those who attempt it.

2. Moreover, we observe that those deemed worthy of such visions do not remain at this level but require angelic teachers when they are about to enter into knowledge of what has been revealed. Daniel bears witness to these words, being instructed about the vision by Gabriel, concerning whom it is said, "Help him understand the vision." The divine Basil too, in his interpretation of Isaiah, considers that one who is about to undertake exegesis of prophetic words should not be devoid of the Spirit who speaks in the prophets, if he is not to be carried far from the intention of the prophets. And the gift that the Lord gave to the apostles after his resurrection—"for he opened their minds to understand the Scriptures"—leads to the same conclusion. How then shall we readily believe the Latins who set out from such passages concerning the matters under discussion, when these passages contain such obscurity within themselves? What precisely this theological passage intends [to convey] is not necessary to state in the present context; but that it does not intend what the Latins claim, and that there is no necessity arising from these

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words that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, will not require many words from us. For what does it say? "He showed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb."

3. Here, he clearly calls the Son the Lamb, on account of the flesh and the slaughter he underwent for us. But that he names the Father the throne of God, and that the river of living water is the Holy Spirit, and that the expression "to proceed" indicates the eternal procession of the Spirit—here there is much confusion, and no demonstration at all. For the Lord called heaven the throne of God, for it is written in the Gospel according to Matthew not to swear "by heaven, for it is God's throne." Furthermore, we know that the throne of God [can refer to] the angelic powers and pure and holy souls, as God rests in them. The great Basil in his first book against Eunomius maintains that the throne of God is a name of dignity. And the blessed John Chrysostom understood the throne as representing kingship when interpreting the prophetic utterance, "Your throne, O God, is forever and ever." Each of the statements regarding the throne of God refers to the common throne of the Trinity, and there is no one who is ignorant of this; for the Trinity shares the same throne, the same glory, and the same honor. But [the idea that] the throne of God [is] the Father, or the throne of the Son [is] the Son—until now we have heard no one—neither apostles nor teachers—say this. Nor is any plausibility present in the argument. Therefore, let the Latins first demonstrate this if they wish their argument to progress in any way whatsoever, or let them know that they have assumed what is being questioned, and not without violating the text.

4. Even if the term were among those frequently used, there would be no place for this argument here. For you would see the throne of God mentioned in many places in the Revelation, but also the one sitting on the throne. For the divine John says in the same work: "After this I was in the Spirit, and behold, a throne was set in heaven, and one sat on the throne, like in appearance to a jasper and sardius stone." And again: "And when the living creatures give glory and honor and thanks to him who sits on the throne, who lives forever and ever, the twenty-four elders will fall down before him who sits on the throne and worship him who lives forever and ever." And again: "And I saw in the right hand of him who sat on the throne a book written inside and outside." And again: "I heard all saying to him who sits on the throne and to the Lamb, 'Blessing and honor and glory and power forever and ever, Amen.'" Therefore, if he mentions not only the throne but also the one sitting on it, and there are certain things proper to the throne and others to the one sitting on it, what argument would be available to those who wish to mix everything together and understand the one sitting on the throne in place of the throne itself? For this is contrary to the common usage of language and is liable to many absurdities. For if God's throne is God, who would be the one sitting on the throne?

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5. Furthermore, the divine John says in the same book: "And from the throne proceed lightnings, voices, and thunders." If they understand the throne here to be the Father and consider the expression "to proceed" as simple and unambiguous, then not only does the Spirit proceed from the Father, but lightnings, voices, and thunders also proceed. But the second [interpretation] is absurd; therefore, the first would not necessarily be true. Thus, neither well nor soundly have the Latins rendered "throne of God" and "God" as meaning the same thing; therefore, they necessarily mean different things. This being so, if the river of the water of life here is not the Holy Spirit, then what is said does not concern us at all, since it is not related to the question. But if the Latins say it is the Holy Spirit itself, it remains that the Spirit does not proceed only from the Father and the Son, but also from something else—something other than the Father—if the text has shown the throne to be one thing and the one sitting on the throne to be another.

6. Moreover, Scripture calls not only the Holy Spirit the water of life, but many other things as well. For Moses also called the water of testing thus. And we call the grace of the Spirit thus; for the divine Cyril says in his interpretation of John, explaining "Everyone who drinks of this water will thirst again": "It should be known that in these words, the Savior calls the grace of the Holy Spirit water, of which if anyone becomes a partaker, he will have welling up within himself the provision of divine teachings." And the divine Chrysostom [says]: "Scripture," he says, "sometimes calls the grace of the Spirit fire, sometimes water, showing that these are not names of essence but of energy." So since this expression has such variety, it would not be clear from this passage that the apostle is speaking about the Spirit itself; for the Holy Spirit might be called water of life, but not everything that is called water of life must necessarily be thought to be the Holy Spirit itself. But here he would perhaps be speaking of the grace of the Spirit, or one must suppose something else; for the language of Revelation is symbolic, and one who speaks about it would not readily make definitive declarations. But if it is not absolutely necessary to think that the water of life here is the Holy Spirit, the statement from Revelation has in this way also betrayed the hopes of the Latins, and they must once again look elsewhere.

7. Indeed, although the expression "to proceed" is particularly assigned to the Holy Spirit, indicating its ineffable procession in an absolute, unqualified, and transcendent manner, we know that this is also common to others in Scripture. For the term also pertains to the generation of the Son; for the divine Fathers at Nicaea say: "The divine Scripture says concerning the Son, 'He will bend,' it says, 'upon them as a river of peace,' clearly proceeding from the true life of the Father's deity," just as the Lord himself proclaims in the Gospels: "I came forth from the Father." And "the crowds marveled at the words proceeding from the mouth of the Lord," as the divine Gospel says. And this sacred book of Revelation speaks of lightnings, voices, and thunders proceeding from the throne. So, since the expression is common, there is no necessity to consider the property of the Spirit here because of the word "proceed."

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8. Even if the existence of the Spirit, or emission, or procession, or however one might prefer to call it, just like the generation of the Son, is unrelated, absolute, and transcendent—not in relation to anything nor for any cause (for God's existence is uncaused)—the procession that the Lord's apostle intends in this passage is not unrelated, nor transcendent, nor absolute, but in relation to something, for a cause, and in relationship. There is every necessity not to consider in any way that what is proceeding here is the Holy Spirit, nor that ineffable procession; for it would be altogether blasphemous to think such things about the divine Spirit. This is clear: "For he showed me," he says, "a river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb, in the middle of its street"—that is, of the city—"and on either side of the river was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits, yielding each month its fruit, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations." By saying that the proceeding river flows in the middle of the street of the city, he showed that the procession is in relation to something. But [he showed] also certainly the cause; for it does not proceed to them vainly and purposelessly, to whomever it does proceed. And the tree of life, and the fruits, and the healing of the nations intend this same thing. Therefore, it is not appropriate to understand the existence of the Spirit from these passages.

9. Moreover, if the authority and the rule and the divinity of Father, Son, and Spirit are common, and the throne is also common, being evidence of their common dignity, and it is absurd and altogether leads to impiety to think that the throne of the Father is one thing and the throne of the Son another, why should we not by all necessity understand here that this proceeding river of life in the middle of the street of the city, which he himself calls Jerusalem above, whatever these things are, proceeds from the throne of the Father and the Son? For this is what it means to proceed from the throne of God and of the Lamb, which is also common to the Spirit. This is what both the common dogma of the Church and the usage of language require. But in addition to falling into many absurdities, we would further violate the text by considering the Father to be the throne of God. That we do not say these things by mere conjecture about the apostolic meaning, nor simply wishing to dispute, the book itself will bear witness to what is being said; for it too considers this throne to be common to the Father and the Son. For it says immediately—or rather, I will set out the entire sacred text: "And he showed me a river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb in the midst of its street, and on either side of the river was the tree of life bearing twelve fruits, yielding each month its fruit, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. And there shall be no more curse, and the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and His servants shall serve Him. They shall see His face, and His name shall be on their foreheads. There shall be no night there: They need no lamp nor light of the sun, for the Lord God gives them light. And they shall reign forever and ever." Therefore, if there is no discussion here at all about the procession of the

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Spirit, the Latin hopes rest on a weak foundation. But if they still force the argument, it would seem, as far as it depends on them, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father and the Son, but from the common throne of Father, Son, and Spirit! For the throne of God and of the Lamb is equally the throne of the Spirit as well. But this would seem absurd even to them.

10. Furthermore—for one who looks toward the truth must never forget the theological principle, especially in discussions about God, and this is to examine each thing in relation to the intention of the speaker, if we are not to wander completely from the truth—I am at a loss as to what could be common between this apostolic statement and the interpretation of the Latins! It is clear that this apostolic passage is simply a type and image of the future inheritance of the righteous, depicted by the angel to the apostle through symbols, each of which is full of contemplative meanings, which would be fitting both to the revealing Spirit, the initiating angel, and the initiated disciple. In this way, there is a city there called the bride of the Lamb, coming down from heaven, and the glory of that city is the glory of God. And there is an angel there examining the measurement of the city with a golden reed. And the shape of the city resembling a cube, it extends twelve thousand stadia in length, and the height and width are the same. And there are twelve gates there, and as many angels standing at the gates. The entire city is golden, and its foundations are equal in number to the gates. And the stones of the foundations are of the same number; and their names are jasper, sapphire, chalcedony, emerald, and all the other exceptional stones. The city having twelve entrances, each pearl suffices as a gate. And there was no temple there nor sun, nor any other light, but God and the Lamb are instead of a temple and light for the city, and there is no night or darkness there. And everything common and unclean has been banished from there. And he says that those whose names are written in the book of life of the Lamb will inhabit that city. Then, immediately preserving the sequence of the discourse, he discusses the river flowing through that city, adding the following: "And he showed me"—clearly the showing angel—"a river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding from the throne of God and of the Lamb in the midst of its street, and on either side of the river was the tree of life bearing twelve fruits, yielding each month its fruit, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. And there shall be no more curse, and the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it, and His servants shall serve Him. They shall see His face, and His name shall be on their foreheads. There shall be no night there: They need no lamp nor light of the sun, for the Lord God gives them light. And they shall reign forever and ever. And he said to me, 'These words are faithful and true,' and the Lord God of the spirits of the prophets sent His angel to show you the things which must shortly take place." These things being thus set forth and the purpose of the words being placed as if before our eyes, from where do the Latins derive the necessity of these words concerning the existence of the Spirit? That it is from the Father and the Son in the present case? For neither is the purpose of this passage theological, nor was the Lord's

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disciple, who was not ignorant of the procession of the Spirit and from whom it is, being taught this by the angel. For he had already been taught this most securely by the Word of truth, and by the Spirit of truth itself. And the sequence of the discourse, and the occasion of the Revelation, and the varied writing of the image, and the river of living water flowing through that city, and all those visions, are each clearly a symbol of the rest that awaits the righteous. These things, which have not yet attained their proper fulfillment, will certainly all occur at the time appointed by the Lord; for he adds, "and the Lord God of the spirits of the prophets sent His angel to show you the things which must shortly take place." Therefore, from these words there is no necessity for the Latins to accomplish their own purpose.

11. Furthermore, even if according to their interpretation we consider that the Father is enigmatically referred to here as the throne of God, nothing more will be established toward their conclusion, both from believing that the expression "proceeding" is also appropriate to others—especially when it is not spoken absolutely and without relation—and from the reference to "the water of life," which is also said concerning the grace of the Spirit. Indeed, this grace has been established as common to the Trinity. With these things established, nothing absurd will follow for us who believe that the common grace of the Trinity proceeds not only from the Father and the Son but also from the Spirit, for the felicity of those who are going to inherit that life. This indeed quite aligns with the purpose of the present discourse, if indeed the crown for the righteous is the grace of the Spirit, as the great Basil writes in his letters to Amphilochius: "then being provided more abundantly and completely."

12. Furthermore, in the second chapter of Revelation, the Spirit says the following: "And to the angel of the church in Philadelphia write: 'These things says the Holy One, the True One, who has the key of David, who opens and no one will shut, and who shuts and no one opens. I know your works. Behold, I have set before you an open door, which no one is able to shut, because you have little power, and have kept my word, and have not denied my name. Behold, I give some from the synagogue of Satan, who say they are Jews and are not, but lie. Behold, I will make them come and worship before your feet, and to know that I have loved you. Because you have kept the word of my patience, I also will keep you from the hour of trial which is about to come upon the whole world, to test those who dwell on the earth. I am coming quickly. Hold fast what you have, so that no one may take your crown.'" Here the discourse clearly neither introduces any innovation to the church of Philadelphia and bears witness to its many good qualities, the chief of which is faith; for he says, "you have kept my word and have not denied my name." This is no small praise regarding piety. And again, "I have loved you because you have kept my word of patience." This bears witness to both their piety and their endurance in terrible circumstances. And the discourse draws certainty from previous events, for no one is unaware either of the multitude of calamities or of the dangers of many days through which this

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city has endured with steadfastness, nor of the divine intervention through which it was paradoxically delivered, having encountered so many terrible things. "For I will keep you," he says, "from the hour of trial which is about to come upon the whole world, to test those who dwell on the earth." But everyone knows who the tempters are; who else would they be but the enemies of the cross of Christ who use Mohammed as their guide in impiety, who say they are Jews and are not? For circumcision is their distinguishing mark just as for the Jews, and monotheism is what they supposedly honor. And the brother marries the wife of the deceased, and the tasting of pork meat seems equally evil to both of them. And having plundered many things from the Jews, they glorify themselves, although they are also maniacally opposed to them. And that they "will come and worship before the feet" of that church—we know that this has happened and has been fulfilled according to prayer. And indeed, concerning future events, we cannot disbelieve based on what has already happened. For after that terrible and completely inappropriate siege and the famine that followed it, because of which the great city was reduced to the mere appearance of a city, God brought the head of the enemy and placed it under the city. And the bishop of the city was appointed to decide for him what should be done. And he brought gifts to him and provisions to the city. And when they attempted to steal the city, and this not just once, when they were caught, what pitiable cries did they not utter, being in danger of the worst. But also, "hold fast what you have," the Spirit says to the church of Philadelphia. This is an exhortation to remain in the things rightly determined from the beginning, and to make no innovation either concerning the faith or concerning other matters. If these things are as has been said, and God is the one bearing witness to us about these things, and we know that church considers the innovation of the Latins to be hostile to itself, and that its shepherds would most gladly accept death rather than agree to this, how is it not obvious even to a child that it stands with our church, and that the book of Revelation does not permit the Latins even to breathe briefly, and that those who war against us are plainly shooting arrows at heaven?

REFUTATION XII.

TWELFTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Further, the First Council of Nicaea, through Bishop Leontios, states the following: "One must also understand this, O friend and philosopher of truth: the Spirit is found proceeding from the Father, being proper to the Son and welling up from him." To say that the Spirit wells up from the Son is equivalent to saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, for the meaning of this expression permits nothing else. Therefore, since no pretext remains for those wishing to contradict, it is futile to wage war against such manifest truth.

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Solution to the Chapter, and Concerning the Two Processions of the Spirit

1. Before the solution to the chapter, we must speak concerning the procession of the Spirit, since this discourse is entirely pertinent to the present matter. We know this procession to be twofold and not simple, having taken our principles from the Scriptures of the Spirit. One procession is, just as it is inconceivable and ineffable, so also without beginning, while the other occurs in time. For the divine Joel says, and indeed the blessed Peter taking from him: "In the last days, I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh."

2. And the first procession, like the generation of the Son, is without cause, concerning which divine Gregory says: "In the beginning He was without cause; for what could be the cause of God?" And again concerning Him: "From the One who eternally exists beyond cause and reason; for there could not be a reason higher than the Word." But the other procession, the Scriptures say, is through a cause. For the Lord says in the Gospel according to John: "When He comes, He will guide you into all truth." And the great Basil in the fourth book against Eunomius: "The provider of the Holy Spirit for subsistence and formation of creation." And again the Lord: "When He comes," that is, the Paraclete, "He will convict the world concerning sin and righteousness and judgment."

3. And just as the first procession is not for a cause, so also it is not directed toward anyone, while the second is both for a cause and directed toward certain ones. For He says: "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh." And the divine Paul, writing to Titus: "He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, which He poured out on us richly through Jesus Christ our Savior." And the divine Peter: "Therefore being exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, He has poured out this that you yourselves see and hear."

4. Furthermore, the first procession is hypostatic and belongs to distinct theology, and it is impossible for it to be also of the Father, for the Father is not from anyone. But the second is essential and entirely common to the Trinity, for it belongs not only to the Son and the Spirit but also to the Father Himself. For the Lord says in the Gospels: "I and the Father will come and make Our dwelling with him." That such a thing is a procession, the expression "will come" also testifies. Moreover, the divine Dionysius, knowing a common procession of the Trinity for the benefit of our nature, in his discourse on theology calls "divine distinction" "the goodly befitting procession of the divine source." From the divine source, what else could one think but that the Trinity is the one God, according to which procession he also says the Trinity is united.

5. And for the first procession, it is entirely necessary to have a source from which, but impossible to have an end toward which; but for the other procession, conversely, while it is absolutely necessary that it tends toward something, it is not at all necessary that it has a source

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from something. For the Father visits those whom He wishes and when He wishes with lordly authority; and so also do the Son and the Spirit.

6. Further, although both this and that procession have with them the notion of being from something, to the first, the concept of being from something is assigned as being from a cause, and it is impossible for the procession to be said to be from elsewhere than from that whence the one proceeding exists; but to the second, in one way it is from that whence the one proceeding has its being, and in another way it is from another person. This opinion is held not only by us but also by the Latin Church. For Thomas, in the chapter concerning power, making a lengthy discourse on the procession of the Spirit, says the following concerning Augustine: "Augustine establishes that the person sent temporally, and from whom it does not proceed essentially, is sent; for since the sending of a divine person is understood in relation to some effect in creation, which is from the whole Trinity, in the sending, the cause of the sending is not understood in relation to the person sent, but in relation to the effect, according to which effect the person is said to be sent."

7. Furthermore, one of the processions of the Spirit is a work of the divine nature and not of will, which the Theologians also say concerning the generation of the Son; but the other proceeds from God willing through goodness to us, for such a thing is a gift, and this is not without the will of the giver. And the divine Paul, writing to the Hebrews, says: "God also bearing witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit according to His will."

8. And for the first procession, it is impossible also to be from the Spirit, for it is impossible for the Spirit to proceed from Himself; but the second is also from the Spirit: "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh," says the blessed Joel. That this discourse concerning this procession is addressed to the Lord's disciples and apostles, as the divine Joel also says, is evident both from the divine utterance of Peter, speaking thus in the Book of Acts concerning the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost: "This is what was spoken by the prophet Joel: 'And in the last days it shall be, God declares, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy.'" And again: "I will pour out my Spirit, and they shall prophesy, and I will show wonders in the heaven above and signs on the earth below." And again the same person, immediately in his speech, making discourse concerning the outpouring of the Spirit: "Being therefore exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, He has poured out this that you yourselves now see and hear." This is evident, as has been said, from the words of Peter, and it is also evident from the commentary on Acts by the divine Chrysostom. For he says in the sixth discourse of his explanations: "'Having received,' he says, 'the promise of the Holy Spirit': observe how at the beginning he did not say that He Himself sent Him down, but the Father." And again: "If He poured it out concerning Himself, the prophet said earlier: 'In the last days I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh. And on my male

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servants and female servants, and I will give wonders in the heaven." And the great Basil, knowing that such a procession of the Spirit is also from the Spirit, says in his writings against Eunomius: The Holy Spirit "does not seek increase, being most perfect; wherefore all things in Him are perfect: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, wisdom, understanding, counsel, security, piety, knowledge, sanctification, redemption, faith, workings of powers, gifts of healing, and whatever is similar to these, having nothing acquired in Himself, but eternally having all things, as the Spirit of God and having appeared from Him, having Himself as cause, as His own source, and flowing from there, but He Himself is also the source of the aforementioned good things: but that which flows from God is hypostatic, while those things which flow from Him are His energies."

9. If someone thinks that this procession is from the Spirit Himself, yet supposing that the things proceeding from Him are creatures, and says that the saints receive these, we will oppose this error with the utterances of the Lord's disciples. For among these, Peter says, "Having received the promise of the Holy Spirit," that is, the Lord from the Father, "has poured out this that you now see and hear." And Paul: "He saved us through the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, which He poured out on us richly." If the things poured out from the Spirit are creatures, then the Holy Spirit itself, which is poured out, would certainly not be these; but the apostles say that it is the Holy Spirit itself. And indeed the blessed Luke says "they were all filled with the Holy Spirit," making his discourse concerning this procession, which would not be the case if they were participating in creatures. Where shall we place again the utterance of Peter saying, "who have received the Holy Spirit just as we have"? And what does Paul mean when saying, "For you did not receive the spirit of slavery again to fear, but the Spirit which is from God"? Does the great Basil seem to you to be speaking nonsense when he says that these things proceeding from the Spirit are nowhere acquired, but co-exist with the Spirit from its own nature, and indeed are beyond the ages? Therefore, the procession from the Spirit is according to His essence, and that which proceeds is the Holy Spirit Himself—according to His supernatural energies, that is. And the Lord, making mention of both processions of the Spirit in the Gospel according to John, says: "But when the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth who proceeds from the Father, He will bear witness about me." In saying "when He comes," He showed both the lordship of the Spirit and indicated time; in saying "whom I will send to you," He showed that the Spirit is not opposed to God and that this procession is for our sake, for He is sent to us; and by adding "who proceeds from the Father," He divinely transmitted the eternal and uncaused [procession]. And in the revelation of the divine Gregory, the blessed John says: "The Holy Spirit having existence from God, and having appeared through the Son, that is, to men." The former refers to the eternal [procession], the latter to the other. And the divine Cyril in his Explanation of the Divine Creed says: "The Holy

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Spirit is poured forth, or proceeds, from God the Father"—this concerning the ineffable procession—"but is bestowed upon creation through the Son"—this concerning the [procession] toward us.

10. Therefore, since the procession of the Spirit is twofold, and the one for the sake of clarity might rightly be called both first and hypostatic and according to existence, while the other second and communicative and according to energy, the proper name for the first is "to be proceeded," and for the second "to be bestowed" or "to be given." Common to both are "to be poured forth," "to flow," "to shine forth," "to go forth," "to well up," and "to be poured out." That these are also appropriate to the communicative procession of the Spirit is clear from the following: for the divine Cyril says in his discourse to Emperor Theodosius: "Absolving the one attached to Him from sins, He at length anoints him with His own Spirit, which He indeed infuses as the Word from God the Father and causes to well up to us from His own nature." And Gregory of Nyssa in his writings against Eunomius says: "The Holy Spirit is apprehended conjointly through the Son, not coming into existence after the Son, so that the Only-begotten might at some point be conceived without the Spirit, but having from the God of all things Himself the cause of His being, whence also is the Only-begotten Light, but shining forth through the true Light." For here the division through the conjunctions assigns to the Father the procession of the Spirit according to existence, and to the Son the other; for the discourse does not permit thinking that this and that are one and the same thing, for it is not allowed. And again the same author in the same writings concerning the Holy Spirit: "shining forth through the Son, but having the cause of His hypostasis from the primordial Light"—here conversely, the former applies to the second [procession], the latter to the first. Concerning the expression "to go forth," that this is also one of the common names, the divine Cyril says in his interpretation of the Gospel according to John, unfolding the Lord's utterance where He says "and I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Paraclete": "How are those who participate in the Spirit sharers of the divine nature according to the sayings of the saints, if it is numbered among created things and does not rather proceed to us from the divine nature itself?" That "to be poured out" and "to well up" are also of this kind, concerning "to be poured out," the same author says in the same interpretation, interpreting the evangelical saying, "As you sent me into the world, so I have sent them": "But as I said just now, proceeding from the very essence of God the Father, and being poured out on those worthy to receive, through the Word who is consubstantial and has appeared from Him." Concerning "to well up," the First Council of Nicaea says: "One must also understand this, O friend and philosopher of truth: the Spirit is found proceeding from the Father, being proper to the Son and welling up from Him to us."

11. With these presuppositions established, the Theologians reasonably attribute to the Father all the enumerated terms, whether you speak of those common to both processions or those

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particular to each: for the Father is the cause of both processions. For the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and from Him is bestowed upon creation, and is poured forth and wells up, and goes forth from Him by whichever procession you wish. But concerning the Son, they removed the proper name of the hypostatic procession—for they did not know the Holy Spirit to be proceeding from Him—and they assigned to Him what is proper to the second procession, and indeed they also predicate of Him the common names, not being ignorant that these also belong to the communicative of the processions. For this reason, none of the teachers of our Church has ever said either that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, or that it has its existence from Him, or that the Holy Spirit is the Projection of the Son, or that the Son is the Projector of the Holy Spirit. And if they do know of the hypostatic procession of the Spirit from Him, let someone say why they assign to the Son the pouring forth, and springing forth, and welling up, and all other such common terms, and indeed also what is proper to the second procession, but this primary expression of the Spirit's particularity, I mean "to proceed," which is unique to the procession according to hypostasis, this alone they have concealed as if by common agreement?

12. If they should say that through the words "pouring forth" and "welling up" and "going forth" they are attributing to the Son the hypostatic procession of the Spirit, this argument is not necessary, so long as the procession of the Spirit is twofold, and these terms are common and homonymous, and it is not right to characterize particular properties from common and homonymous terms. That those who make such claims speak not only unnecessarily but impossibly is clear from this: since the procession is twofold, as has been shown, and since the Theologians now consider the Father to be distinguished from the Son by being "source," and that the Son is not a source, and that the Son has all things of the Father except causality, and that being "principal" is a property of the Father's hypostasis, just as is being "unoriginate," and that the Son does not have the causality of the Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and not from the Son, and other such things—that we might not speak of each individually—but now these same Theologians say that the Spirit pours forth from the Son, and wells up and springs forth and goes forth and shines forth: we understood those former statements to be about the hypostatic procession, since the discourse of the Theologians there was by all necessity about that; but these latter statements we say belong to the communicative and second procession. And no absurdity will follow if the truth is not found in both affirmation and negation concerning the same procession. But if we should accept these statements as referring to the first and hypostatic procession according to the new theology, where shall we place those previously enumerated statements? Will they say that those also refer to the first procession? They would certainly say so, for otherwise it is not possible. And would they say that those statements are also true? They would not deny this either. But this is nothing other than allowing contradiction to stand

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alongside truth, and conceding that the same thing both is and is not, which not even a madman would accept.

13. If they should say that these statements pertain to the first of the processions, and those to the second, the refutation is immediate: for the discourse there concerned personal properties, and at the same time the transgression in the expression is clear. Furthermore, there is a danger that all the Theologians are lying when they explicitly hymn the Son as the provider of the Spirit, and that the blessed Peter also lies when he says concerning the Lord: "Therefore being exalted at the right hand of God, and having received from the Father the promise of the Holy Spirit, He has poured out this which you now see and hear." If these conclusions are absurd, it is entirely necessary to attach the "pouring forth," and "springing forth," and "welling up," and "shining forth," when predicated of the Son, to the second of the processions, if indeed we wish to be very pious.

14. But concerning the processions of the Spirit, enough has been said. Regarding the statement of the First Council with which the Latins attack us, it should be said that this does not provide any necessity to those who maintain it, so long as there is a certain twofold procession of the Spirit, and the word "welling up" is among the common and homonymous terms, befitting both the first procession and the communicative one. Furthermore, from the fact that the blessed Council divided its discourse with conjunctions, and gave to the Father the procession according to existence, it appears to be assigning the other procession to the Son. And apart from these considerations, the passage is not entirely free from tampering, but this also appears to have been subject to Bekkos's abomination: for he has cut out the voice of the Theologians, not without malice, removing what most clearly shows that the second of the processions is being indicated here through the word "welling up." For it reads thus: "And the Holy Spirit also, because we all the faithful receive from Him, being of the same essence as the Father and the Son, proceeding from the Father, but being proper to the Son," as we have shown above; "and that it wells up to us from Him, the Lord Himself taught more clearly in the Gospels, saying 'If anyone thirsts, let him come to Me and drink.'"

REFUTATION XIII.

THIRTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. "Furthermore, in addition to these, quotations from the Greek teachers of the Church can be adduced. For Athanasius the Great says in his confession of faith: 'The Spirit is from the Father and from the Son, not made, not created, not begotten, but proceeding.'"

Solution to the Chapter:

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1. The thirteenth chapter pertains more to us than to the Latins against their Church, and we would be justified in exacting due penalty from them for this, not only because they have not left this theological passage free from tampering, but also because they hoped to speak and to represent our Church through such arguments. For that this saying of the blessed father has suffered the same fate as the Creed, his books will testify; for it is not written there, "The Spirit from the Father and the Son," but "The Spirit from the Father, not created, not begotten, but proceeding." And if they should present to us identical texts, first, these books of the teacher do not come to us from there, but the Latins, having received them from us, possess them, translated there from the Greek language, and it is not right that what is among us should follow what is among them, but rather what is among them should be judged by what is among us.

2. Furthermore, no one has ever accused us of such things; but for the Church of the Latins such behavior is frequent, in matters which they cannot even deny. Evidence of this argument is the common Symbol of faith itself, which they have made their own by additions of their own, against all justice, with canons protesting against it, with apostles legislating to the contrary, with all Christians, so to speak, lamenting the injustice and demanding what is rightfully theirs. And they, so manifestly employing force in the most essential matters, what would they have shown themselves to be in matters where they hoped to act in secret?

3. Nevertheless, that blessed one did not publish only this theological work, but having become the father of many excellent discourses, and in almost all of them mentioning his faith, he is never seen to have uttered any such thing, but agreeing in all things with the teaching of the Lord and the apostles and with himself, he says that the Holy Spirit proceeds only from the Father, nowhere mentioning the Son. And it is altogether ungracious not to consider his opinion from what he has said many times, not to say from what he always states, but from a single instance which possesses much that is spurious within itself, and which least agrees with the most ancient of the manuscripts.

4. Furthermore, as has been shown in the third discourse, just as this blessed one attributes unbegottenness to the Father alone, and it is impossible for this to be common to others, so also does he attribute the being a source of divinity. But if the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, then being a source of divinity pertains also to the Son, and thus not to the Father alone, according to him. But if holding contrary opinions about the same matters, especially in discourses concerning faith, is characteristic of people unsound in mind, and if this necessarily follows for the teacher of piety from what the Latins maintain, they would be right to blame themselves for being the cause of such evils for the Theologians. Therefore, such an utterance is not necessarily genuine to the soul of Athanasius, but is spurious and deceptive, and by no means befitting theological principles.

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(Seek also concerning this the testimony of Saint Augustine at the beginning of the first discourse, concerning our books, that is.)

REFUTATION XIV.

FOURTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the great Basil in the third book of his refutations against Eunomius explicitly states that the Holy Spirit has existence from the Son; for it reads thus: "What necessity is there, if the Spirit is third in dignity and order, that it should also be third in nature? For the doctrine of piety teaches that while in dignity the Spirit is secondary to the Son, having existence from him, receiving from him, and announcing to us, and being entirely dependent on that cause; yet in nature, we have neither been taught by the Holy Scriptures to regard it as third, nor is it possible to deduce this logically from what has been said. For just as the Son is second to the Father in order, because he is from him, and in dignity, because the Father is his origin and cause, and because through him is access and approach to God the Father, but is not second in nature, since the Godhead is one in each, so likewise the Holy Spirit, even if it is subordinate to the Son in order and dignity, would not reasonably be of a foreign nature."

Resolution of the Chapter

1. But what we have said regarding the thirteenth chapter would also aptly apply to the one immediately following it; for this one too has received much that is spurious. They have not only known how to do wrong through removing or adding, but through both. And the books themselves bearing these sayings are witnesses, being so ancient and so numerous and circulated throughout the entire world, that no one, not even the most contentious, could dispute these facts. For most copies, if not all, do not state anywhere that "the Spirit has existence from the Son, and receives from him, and announces to us." And although it does place "the Spirit being second to the Son in order and dignity," it does so not without qualification, and the very passage they present to us adds those things and deems the Spirit second to the Son, removing all ambiguity. These facts are sufficient to persuade even the most contentious person to be silent, and having clearly seen the weakness of his own opinion and the basis on which he attacks, to turn in the opposite direction and grasp sound doctrines. For when both we and they have equal access to the manuscripts, with some containing the passage as they claim and others as we maintain, they would not be justified in presenting such things as necessary when the statement could also be otherwise—especially when nearly all are on our side, with only one or two scarcely differing, they would not be making reasonable claims when arraying themselves with such arguments.

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2. If they should say that their copies contain the genuine voice of Basil, while ours bear what is counterfeit and spurious, first let them demonstrate this, for we too can say the same and justly reverse the argument. Then let them know that they are asserting the opposite of what is evident. For while it might perhaps be easy for someone to corrupt one book or a second or third—this being their practice—since the act is possible, and such examples abound in life, but to be able to alter a multitude of books distributed throughout the entire world according to one's own wishes is utterly impossible. If they accuse us of impossibilities, yet claim that both readings proceed from the same theological understanding, which is extremely difficult, it follows by necessity that theirs is coupled with falsehood.

3. What I said earlier would have been sufficient to prevent those who attack us from being overly confident in this passage. But in order to make the truth abundantly clear, I will set forth both the reading they prefer and the one we accept, and what follows from each discourse—though their version has already been presented, so what remains is ours. It reads as follows: "Eunomius says: 'It would be appropriate next to speak about the Paraclete, not following the unexamined opinions of the many, but preserving in all things the teaching of the holy ones, from whom, having learned that the Spirit is third in dignity and order, we have believed it to be third in nature also.' The Great Basil's response: 'That he does not think it necessary to abide by the simple and unaffected faith of the many, but by technical and sophisticated arguments to subvert the truth again according to his own opinion, he has sufficiently shown by what he said. For dishonoring the opinion of the many who glorify the Holy Spirit, he pretends to preserve the teaching of the holy ones, and he is silent now about those who have handed this down to him, just as he was shown to do in his discussions about the Only-Begotten. Then he says that he has learned from the holy ones that the Spirit is third in order and dignity, but that he has believed from himself that it is third in nature also. But he cannot say who these holy ones are and in what discourses they have made this teaching. Has anyone become so bold as to introduce innovations concerning divine doctrines? For what necessity is there, if the Spirit is third in dignity and order, that it should also be third in nature? For that it is secondary to the Son in dignity is perhaps taught by the doctrine of piety; but that it possesses a third nature, we have neither been taught by the Holy Scriptures, nor can it be deduced logically from what has been said. For just as the Son is second to the Father in order, because he is from him, and in dignity, because the Father is his beginning and cause and because through him is access and approach to God the Father, but is not second in nature, since the Godhead is one in each, so likewise the Holy Spirit, even if it is subordinate to the Son in order and dignity—that we might fully concede this—would not reasonably be called third in nature.'" This, as we maintain, is the teacher's voice and our own, against Eunomius's innovation. For in these words, he clearly first uses a stance of opposition, then resolves the argument; and in no way does he accept that the Holy Spirit is third in dignity

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and order, but rather clearly demonstrates that Eunomius is lying and vainly and pointlessly attributing his own ideas to the saints, and he is evidently unable to bear Eunomius's boldness concerning divine matters. Then, following the rules of rhetoric, he proceeds against him with a counter-position, saying that there is no necessity, even if the Spirit were third in order and dignity, that it would also be third in nature. We all know that a counter-position completes its argument hypothetically, not showing the actual intention of the speaker.

4. With these premises established, we can now examine from the present passage what the teacher believes about the procession of the Spirit. For he clearly wishes to confidently assert that the Son is second to the Father in dignity and order because he is from the Father, but in no way in nature. But if he knew that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, how could he assail Eunomius for saying that he had learned from the holy ones that the Holy Spirit is third in dignity and order, and lament Eunomius's madness concerning divine matters? For just as the Son is considered second to the Father in order and dignity because he is from him, as Basil himself says, it would necessarily follow that the same reasoning applies to the Son and the Spirit, and that the Spirit would likewise be considered second to the Son because it is from the Son, and third from the Father, since it would be second to the Son, who is from the Father. But this is not what he wishes. Therefore, he did not necessarily know that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For it stands thus: if, because the Son is from the Father, he is necessarily second to the Father in order and dignity, then what is not second to someone in dignity and order is necessarily not from that person. But he does not concede this about the Son and the Spirit. Therefore, he did not necessarily know the Son to be the cause of the Spirit. And what he did not know, he rejected emphatically at the beginning of his refutation, and he would not have allowed it to be written in his own words, making statements inconsistent with himself, with the truth, and with Christian theology. Therefore, the statement that the Spirit has existence from the Son and depends on his cause is necessarily not Basil's voice, but an addition of the Latins, containing much that is malicious and blasphemous, and much that is ignorant. Either they have not read or, having read, have not understood what the teacher intends in his objection. But such is wickedness and evil, harmful not only to truth but also to itself. For while they thought they were playing against us, they have drawn fire upon their own heads. For if from nowhere else, it is sufficiently clear from these words that the divine soul in no way considers the Son to be the producer of the Spirit.

5. Furthermore, if he considers it audacious and calls it an innovation and a falsehood to say that the Spirit is second to the Son in dignity and order, it follows that, remembering his counter-position, he would present the argument with doubt, which is precisely our position. And now he might say "perhaps," and then add "that we might fully concede this," so as not to appear to be openly warring against himself and the other saints. With these considerations established, let

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those who champion their opinion say who in all the ages has necessarily drawn from such expressions the idea that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and how is it not utterly ridiculous to think the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son when the passage says: "For that it is secondary to the Son in dignity is perhaps taught by the doctrine of piety"? And again: "even if it is subordinate to the Son in order and dignity—that we might fully concede this"?

6. If they should say that theological declarations are pure of qualifications, first let them know that in this too they are manifestly lying. For never yet has a manuscript been found among them free from ambiguities, but they say—though they themselves have not seen the passage in manuscripts without ambiguity—that it exists and is kept in darkness, yet they have never shown it. Furthermore, the great Basil would not be consistent with himself if one were to remove the ambiguities. And this would seem absurd even to them. Therefore, this too is a clear demonstration of Latin mischief, who have corrupted the theological voice not only with additions as those of old did, but also with removals.

7. Furthermore, even the Latins would testify that the voice of the great Basil is with us. For who is unaware of our Niketas? For he is ours, being a Bishop of Thessalonica, even if in his opinion concerning the Spirit he is very close to the Latins and hostile to us. In his second dialogue on the Holy Spirit, when recalling this passage of the great Basil, he presents it, and presents it soundly as we have presented it, and as he found it in all the manuscripts, and he thinks to deduce from this, because of the order in the Trinity, that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. Yet if he had found it explicitly stated in the passage that the Spirit has existence from the Son, how would he have passed this by, having the object of his inquiry right there, and attempted to deduce this not without effort? And if from that time two hundred and fifty years have passed, or rather even more—for he lived during the reign of the fourth of the Komnenoi—certainly our manuscripts that have been found to read thus predate these by far. And if time with respect to manuscripts seems to some a great ally of truth, this too testifies to the authenticity on the side of our enemies, showing that our books are the most ancient.

REFUTATION XV.

FIFTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, Cyril in the epistle which was accepted by the Council of Chalcedon says: "He is named the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the truth, and he is poured forth from him just as, indeed, also from the Father." It is ridiculous what some concede about the Holy Spirit, that he is from the Son or is poured forth from him, but not that he also proceeds from him; for the name of procession, when all things are traced back to a cause, belongs to what is common—for whatever something might be, and however it might be from something, we say that it also

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proceeds from it. Since divine matters are better signified through common rather than specific terms, this name of "ekporeusis" ["procession"] is especially appropriate to the procession of the divine persons. Therefore, if it is conceded that the Holy Spirit is from the Son or is poured forth from him, it follows that he also proceeds from him.

REFUTATION XVI.

SIXTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the same [Cyril] in the second book of the Thesaurus says: "When, therefore, the Holy Spirit, coming to be in us, makes us conform to God, and he proceeds from the Father and the Son, it is evident that he is of the divine essence, essentially proceeding in it and from it. Just as, indeed, also the breath that runs out from a human mouth, even if the example is small and unworthy of discussion; for God will surpass all things." If he proceeds from the Father and the Son, there is every necessity to say that he also proceeds from the Father and the Son. Or what is the reason for saying that from the Father he both proceeds and "ekporeuetai," but from the Son, he proceeds but does not "ekporeuetai"?

REFUTATION XVII.

SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the same [Cyril] in his discourse to Emperor Theodosius says: "Releasing from sins the one who is devoted to him, he anoints him with his own Spirit, which he himself sends forth as the Word from God the Father, and causes to spring up for us from his own nature."

REFUTATION XVIII.

EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, in many of their discourses, the teachers of the Church say that the Holy Spirit both shines forth and is poured out from the Son. And it is absurd and utterly inconceivable to accept such expressions as impious, and thereby believe that the Holy Spirit has its existence from the Son, while refusing to attribute procession to the Son—as if the term "to proceed" signified something different when one says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Solution to the Chapters Set Forth

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1. What we stated at the beginning of our solution to the twelfth chapter concerning the processions of the Spirit will suffice for these matters as well. For all these expressions and others similar to them, we will attribute to the second and communicative procession, for the reasons stated there. If the Latins should say that since the procession of the Spirit is twofold, when characteristics of the second procession are attached—namely, the cause, or the person, or the time—as when we might say that the Spirit wells up to us from the Son or proceeds to us, or "in the last days these things will be" and so forth, we will attribute these to the second procession. But when it is simply said that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, or is poured forth from the Son, what necessity compels us to rush toward the communicative and second procession, as if deliberately fleeing the first and existential one? Moreover, when theological statements say that "the Spirit is poured forth from the Son just as from the Father"—if indeed the Spirit is from the Father according to both processions—how is it just to deprive the Son of the other? For the phrase "just as" is not used idly or in vain. Furthermore, Cyril says that "the Spirit proceeds naturally from the Son"; but this adverb clearly testifies to the first procession for the Son as well; for in the second procession, there is no place for such modes by any means.

2. If they should say these things, their arguments are not reasonable. Let them first explain to us the necessity arising from these statements, for their arguments are directed against us. Why is it that, given the twofold procession of the Spirit, and the words "proceed" and "pour forth" and "well up" and the others having this twofold meaning, we are to understand here not the second procession, but the first and existential one? But they would not be able to explain this! And since they cannot, they would not be justified in demanding this of us, who are unwilling to accept any necessity; for even if we remain silent, time is on our side as long as what they assert contains much uncertainty. Moreover, it has been demonstrated in the same chapter that they introduce impossibilities if they attribute the first of the processions to the Son. Therefore, it necessarily follows that the discourse concerns the communicative and second procession. And we should not be surprised if the indicators of the second procession are not always attached when speaking of the Son. For even the generation of the Son from the blessed Virgin, which was arranged for us and for our salvation in the last days as the Apostle testifies, does not always carry such specifications with it. Sometimes Scripture says with addition, "a child has been born to us and given to us," and "a Savior Lord has been born to us in the city of David," and many other such statements. But at other times, the blessed Paul, speaking of the Lord as "born of a woman," does not state the cause of the lower generation, both because it has been mentioned many times and because it follows by absolute necessity.

3. That the addition of "as" or "just as" does not grant to the Son the first procession as well, which belongs very much to the Father, can be seen from this: Such adverbs, to which they may be attached, do not in all cases introduce complete identity regarding what they modify; rather,

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sometimes they indicate this completely, and at other times, as far as possible. This is evident from the images or examples or parables that we humans constantly use. For we do not seek complete identity in all respects, even though these adverbs are commonly employed there, as when we say, "Just as Paul is human, so also is Peter"; or as the Lord says, "Just as the Father raises the dead and gives life, so also the Son gives life to whom He wills"; or "As the Father knows me, I also know the Father." Certainly in all these cases, one can understand the complete identity. But if we say, "As a father has compassion on his children, so the Lord has compassion on those who fear Him," or "His face shone like the sun," where is the complete identity in these? And one of the sacred prophets says to God: "Your love came upon me like the love of women"! Here, it would be clearly blasphemous if one were to consider complete identity in all respects. And what shall we make of the Lord's saying, "Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful" or "Be wise as serpents and innocent as doves"? And the divine Chrysostom, interpreting the Lord's words in the eighty-second homily of his commentary on John, "that they all may be one, as you, Father, are in me and I in you," says: "Again, the 'as' does not indicate exact equality in their case; for that was not possible for them, but as far as is possible for humans; just as when He says 'Be merciful as your Father.'"

4. If they should say, "But here one must seek very precise equality, for the discourse concerns the Father and the Son," if they make such claims about personal properties, it is absurd. And it has been demonstrated that the existential procession of the Spirit is a personal property. But if the discourse is about other matters, we will indeed be very concerned with equality and identity. Observe that here, since the discourse requires the communicative procession of the Spirit, we will attribute this procession without distinction to the Son, just as we do to the Father. To make what we are saying clearer, the divine Cyril says in his Thesaurus: "Just as the Father is without beginning, so also the Word who proceeds from His essence is without beginning." If, then, simply because the discourse concerns the Father and the Son, we would not deny the complete identity and precision through all the signified meanings, as they might say these adverbs necessarily require, observe the consequence: since the Father possesses being without beginning in the sense of having no cause, the Son would also not be under causation. But this means that the Son would not be what He is! Such ideas, however, are not far from madness! Therefore, not even here, because of saying that the Spirit is poured forth from the Son just as from the Father, would it be necessary to attribute both meanings of the term "to pour forth" to the Son, as long as the statement of the Theologian can be preserved through the other mode.

5. If they try to frighten us by saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son and proceeds naturally, nothing additional will be gained for their purpose from this. For the Son is God and true God; and what God has, He has by nature and not by acquisition. Therefore, the Son does not have the ability to bestow the Spirit from outside, but while the apostles bestow it by

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participation, the Son bestows it not by participation but by having it naturally, just as the Father gives it. Furthermore, the divine Cyril himself, a worthy interpreter of his own words, said that the Holy Spirit proceeds naturally from the Son; but he himself understood the term "naturally" to mean "truly." For in his explicit defense against Theodoret, who accused him of using the phrase "hypostatic union," an unusual expression among theologians, he says: "I understood 'hypostatic' to mean 'truly,' following Scripture when it says, 'we were by nature children of wrath.'" Thus, while the apostles bestow the Holy Spirit, as the divine Chrysostom maintains in his interpretation of the Gospel of John, and indeed as blessed Luke does in the Acts, and while the Son Himself also bestows it, the Son would be a true and proper giver, not having received this from another, but giving what is naturally His own to whomever He wishes.

6. What Thomas says—that "it is ridiculous, as some say concerning the Holy Spirit, to concede that the Spirit is from the Son or is poured forth from Him, but not that He proceeds from Him"—this he spoke unworthily of his own learning. For he thinks that the term "to proceed," even in theology, is a generic term, just like "to go forth." But this is not the case; rather, the latter is a generic term applicable to both the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, whether you speak of the first or the second; while the former is specific to the Spirit. For one can hear theologians saying "the Son goes forth from the Father" and "the Holy Spirit goes forth to us from the Son"; and one can also signify the ineffable procession of the Spirit through this term. But no one has said that "the Holy Spirit proceeds to us"; for we know that such an expression is specifically established for the ineffable procession of the Spirit, just as "generation" is for the Son. And the divine Gregory, in his discourse on the Theophany, clearly considers "going forth" to be a generic term, which he divides in two ways—into "being generated" and "proceeding"—attributing the former specifically to the Son and the latter to the Spirit. If he had thought that "to proceed" was among the generic terms, he would not have contrasted it with the generation of the Son; for he says: "The Holy Spirit is truly Spirit, going forth from the Father, not in the manner of the Son, not by generation, but by procession." And "to be poured forth" is related to "to proceed" as a general category to a specific part; for the former is used both for the first and second processions of the Spirit, as we showed in the solution to the twelfth chapter, while "to proceed" is specifically assigned to the existence of the Spirit. Therefore, it is not the case that "pours forth" and "proceeds" are related as Thomas claims, but rather the opposite: if He proceeds, He also pours forth. And concerning the question of why, when saying that the Spirit both goes forth and proceeds and pours forth and shines forth and all the enumerated actions from the Father, we say that the Spirit goes forth and pours forth and shines forth and wells up from the Son, but in no way proceeds—and all the other difficulties raised in these matters—these have both been discussed and resolved to the best of our ability

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there. It would be superfluous to use the same arguments about the same topics many times; therefore, we should proceed to what follows.

REFUTATION XIX.

NINETEENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Yet this same divine Cyril, in many of his writings, says that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, and naturally from Him, and thus from the Son just as from the Father. For in his commentary on the prophet Joel, regarding "I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh," he says: "Insofar as the Son is God, and from God by nature—for He has been begotten from God the Father—the Spirit is His own and in Him and from Him, just as indeed He is understood to be in God the Father Himself." And in his discourse to Emperor Theodosius, he said, "Jesus baptizes in fire and the Holy Spirit, not infusing into the baptized an alien Spirit in a servile or ministerial manner, but as God by nature with supreme authority, [giving] that which is from Him and His own." And in the Thesaurus: "Therefore," he says, "when Christ gives the law, His Spirit, which exists in Him and naturally from Him, gives the law." But the aforementioned statements signify that [the Spirit] has existence from the Son; for this is no different from saying that He is from the Son, just as He is from the Father, or that He is naturally from the Son. If this differs from saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, that would be astonishing!

Solution to the Chapter, and the Various Meanings of "From Something"

1. Divine Cyril says, as does anyone else, that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, and naturally from the Son, and from Him just as from the Father. But that these statements necessarily mean that the Spirit has existence from the Son, which is the major premise of the argument, this has not been spoken truthfully. For if one statement had the same meaning as the others, then one could be predicated of the other and would be convertible. But this is not the case, nor does it follow; rather, the opposite is more likely. For it stands thus: if the Spirit has existence from the Son, or proceeds [from the Son]—which is not found [in the texts]—then those other statements would certainly be true. But if those other statements are true, these do not necessarily follow. It is clear that the phrase "to be from something" does not signify just one thing; for this is among the expressions that can be understood in multiple ways, whether you are investigating its meaning in relation to the superessential or to beings. For Aristotle, in the fourth book of his *Metaphysics*, holds that "from something" can be said in one way as from matter, as a statue is from bronze; in another way as from the first mover, as a battle [comes] from a quarrel, or a statue from the craftsman; in another way, as a part from the whole that is composed; in another way, the reverse, as the whole from the part of the form, as the definition of man from "biped";

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and in another way, as that which follows in time, as night from day, and winter from fair weather.

2. One who examines the divine Scripture when it speaks about God would find that it uses "being from something" in the following ways: In one way, according to causality, but in such a way according to causality as from energy; as creations are from God, as from His energy; for they are not from God as from His essence. For the great Basil says in his works against Eunomius: "What is made is not from the essence of the maker." And again, the same author in the same works: "God works with hands that are not corporeal; and He works not by producing creations from Himself, but by establishing them through His energy, as one who works with hands does not project the work out of himself." And the divine Damascene in his theological works: "Creation, even though it came into being afterward, is nevertheless not from the essence of God." That creation is from God as from His energy is clear; for the theologians say that products are works and products of energy; for the divine Chrysostom, explaining the phrase "all things were made through Him" in the fifth homily, says: "Thus also concerning the energy of the Only-Begotten, as many things as you believe to have been brought forth and made through it, it becomes in no way diminished"; and the divine Maximus in his commentaries on the divine Dionysius, in the chapter concerning being, says, "He calls the divine energy 'procession,' which brought forth every essence"; and the divine Cyril in the Thesaurus, in the chapters concerning the Holy Spirit, says, "We do not say, O excellent ones, that all things are from God in the same way as the Spirit is. For the Spirit exists naturally in Him and is essentially fixed in Him, so to speak, and proceeds from Him indivisibly; but [all other things] are works and products of energy, having come into being through the Son in the Spirit, and are thus understood to be from God." This, then, is one way.

3. Another way of [understanding] "from God" is according to causality, as from His nature. For we say that the divine energy is from God as from His nature. For the holy and ecumenical Sixth Council says in its proceedings concerning the two energies of the Savior: "We know each energy of each nature; I mean the essential and natural and fitting [energy], proceeding undividedly from each essence and nature." And again, from the same [council] concerning the Savior: "Projecting each energy undividedly and unconfusedly according to His natures, from Himself naturally, according to His divine nature, by which He was consubstantial with the Father, projecting the divine [energy], and according to His human [nature], by which He Himself remained consubstantial with us humans, [projecting] the human and earthly [energy]." And again, it says that each energy interprets its own nature, from which it wells forth undividedly and naturally.

4. In another way, we say [something is] "from God" according to causality, as from the hypostasis, and this in two ways: either according to ineffable generation, as the Son from the

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Father, or according to the ineffable procession, as the Spirit from the Father; for both are from the Father according to hypostasis. For the blessed John of Damascus says, "To be begotten is not of nature but of hypostasis," and the divine Gregory of Nyssa says, "The Spirit proceeding from the Father's hypostasis." But concerning these things, we have set forth more extensively in the first discourse.

5. In another way, we say [something is] "from God," not according to causality, but according to the principle of appropriation. For the Lord says in the Gospel according to John, "He who is from God hears the words of God." And yet if "being from God" here were according to causality and not according to appropriation, everyone would hear the words of God, even if he happened to be among the most wicked, for there is no one who is not from God as from a cause. Furthermore, if "being from God" necessarily means having one's cause from there and nothing else, then "not being from God" would mean not having one's being from there, and anyone who says of certain people that they are not from God would necessarily be speaking falsely; for "all things are from God," as the Apostle says. But the Lord is not saying this; for He says in the Gospel according to John: "For this reason you do not hear, because you are not from God." Therefore, "being from God" does not in every case denote drawing existence from there, but sometimes this, and sometimes not this; rather, the whole meaning concerns appropriation.

6. Furthermore, the blessed John the Evangelist in the third of his epistles says, "He who does good is from God"; and the opposite; and again the same [author]: "Everyone who does not practice righteousness is not from God, and he who does not love his brother." And again, "Not as Cain who was from the evil one, and slew his brother." And again the Lord: "You are from your father the devil." And yet if we should refer these statements to causality, it would follow that we would not believe God to be the one origin and cause of all things, but two: one, the origin of good things, a certain good principle, and the other, of evil things, a certain wicked origin and source! But he who says these things will lament with the Manicheans! Therefore, the premise is not true. Consequently, such statements have been spoken according to appropriation, not according to causality. For in this way, both the affirmation can be true, and indeed also the negation, though certainly not concerning the same subjects, for Scripture explicitly states both; for those who live piously and righteously are from God, that is, they bear a relation of appropriation to Him; and indeed, those who do not live this way, not having this relation of appropriation, could not be said to be from God in this sense. And writing to the Corinthians, the blessed Paul says: "God chose the foolish things of the world to shame the strong, and the ignoble things of the world and the despised God chose, and the things that are not to nullify the things that are, so that no flesh may boast before God, but you are from Him in Christ Jesus." The divine Chrysostom, explaining this in the fifth homily of his commentaries on this epistle, says that "from Him" here "I think he is speaking not about bringing into being, but about faith";

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and clarifying this, he says, "that is, 'you became children of God'"; and we become children of God by being appropriated to God. And what the same [apostle] says concerning the Lord, writing to the Ephesians, is of the same meaning; for it reads thus: "We are members of His body, from His heart, from His flesh, and from His bones." This, if you refer it to causality, is absurd. For the Lord's flesh is not the cause of anything in terms of existence, nor indeed are we parts from a whole; for we are not pieces of Christ, but here also one can understand appropriation and likeness; for the blessed Chrysostom also understood this apostolic passage in this way; for he says: "What does 'from His flesh' mean? That is, genuinely from Him. And how are we thus members of Christ? Because we have been begotten according to Him"; and again the same [author]: "How then are we from His flesh and from His bones? Some say the blood and the water; but it is not this; but just as He was begotten without intercourse from the Holy Spirit, so we also become in the washing [of baptism]." Being begotten according to Him, and just as He without intercourse, so we also in the washing [of baptism], these are all surely characteristic of likeness to the Lord.

7. Again, the Lord says in the Gospel according to John, "Not that anyone has seen the Father except He who is from God." The divine Chrysostom, explaining this in the forty-sixth homily, says the following: "He is not speaking here according to the principle of causality but according to the mode of essence." For if He were saying this [according to causality], we are all from God, but the mode of essence surely means that which is appropriated according to nature; for he explicitly rejected causality, and not without proof. What might seem paradoxical is that not only can we refer "from something" to the principle of appropriation, but also we are not always compelled to look to causality through the term "Son"; for it does not follow; but there are instances where we consider only appropriation, apart from causality; and there are many testimonies of this. For Scripture calls those who are being saved "sons of light," and "sons of the bridal chamber," and "sons of the kingdom," and it calls John and James "sons of thunder." And on the contrary: "sons of perdition" and "of Gehenna," and "offspring of vipers," and "sons of the devil"; and David speaks of a "son of lawlessness." These do not at all indicate causality; for neither are the apostles from thunder, nor are those who live wickedly from Gehenna or from perdition. But both those [positive appellations] and these [negative ones] require the principle of appropriation from judges who have sound minds.

8. If these things are as has been said, and [if] Scripture is full of such a meaning for those who wish to pay attention, then the phrase "the Son is from God" does not always present causality, but sometimes this, [and] sometimes the equality and identity of essence, as has been shown. Therefore, those who say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son do not speak necessarily, [just] because it has been said that [the Spirit is] from the Son, and that [the Spirit is] naturally from Him, and that [the Spirit is] from the Son just as from the Father. For these [phrases] do not

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necessarily carry causality with them, so long as the principle of appropriation is abundant in usage, as has been shown through many examples. Let no one be disturbed hearing such adverbs; for we have spoken about these matters at length in the solution to the eighteenth [chapter].

9. Further, since the leaders of the Church hold that "all things of the Father are common also to the Son except the cause," and that "the Son does not have the cause of the Spirit," and that "just as being unbegotten is the property of the Father, so also is being the cause," and that "the Father is distinguished from the Son as source," and that "the Father alone is the source of divinity and alone is cause," and that "the Spirit is not from the Son," and other such statements, that we might not mention all of them; and again, since some say that the Holy Spirit is from the Son and "naturally from Him," and "from the Son just as from the Father," we, believing that all the divine declarations are true, and referring each to the intention of those who speak, attribute those statements to causality—since there the discussion is explicitly about divine distinction—and we consider these statements to pertain to appropriation according to nature; and no absurdity will follow, since the meanings of "from something" are different, as has been shown, with negation occurring there and affirmation here, both being true. But if we consider both these and those statements to pertain to causality, if the first are true, the second are necessarily false. But if these [latter ones] are true, all those [former ones] will be destroyed. But if they say that both these and those are true—and as Aristotle says, those who demand impossibilities need blows along with their blasphemy—they stir up an implacable war against the theologians. Therefore, such statements necessarily show what is appropriate according to nature, connatural, and consubstantial, and in no way the cause and what is from it.

10. Furthermore, if the aforementioned statements, as the Latins would assert, demonstrate that the Spirit's cause is from the Son, it follows that the divine Cyril contradicts himself. For it has been shown in the fourth discourse, both in what he said collectively and individually, and in his reconciliation with those from the East, that he considered it blasphemous for the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Son. But this is absurd. Therefore, it is not the action of those who act justly to consider these statements equivalent to those claiming that the Holy Spirit has its existence from the Son.

11. Moreover, above all else, the divine Cyril customarily uses this meaning of "from someone" in reference to natural kinship. This is evident in many places, but especially in the Thesaurus, where he also states: "Therefore, if the Spirit, while no one else knows the divine counsel, searches and examines it, and knows the depths of God, and reveals and makes manifest to the saints what is hidden in Him, how could it reasonably be separated from likeness to God? And how is it not entirely from Him, naturally existing in Him, as His Spirit and knowing all things in Him?" Yet if the phrase "from Him" here indicated causality, he would not have made this part of his conclusion. For no one is compelled to conclude what they have already received

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from Scripture directly and beyond demonstration. Nor did any of the heretics deny that the Spirit is from God, or that the Spirit proceeds from Him, for they did not dare to contradict what is explicitly stated in the Scriptures. Furthermore, this was not the intention of Cyril's words; for his entire effort there is to show that the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son, as this was the point of contention with the heretics. And this is clear from his conclusion when he says "the Holy Spirit could not reasonably be separated from likeness to God." Therefore, here too, the phrase "from God" indicates consubstantiality and natural kinship, not that someone is the cause of the Spirit.

12. Furthermore, this is evidence that the aforementioned theological passages do not indicate causality. For the divine Cyril's statement is as follows: "Inasmuch as the Son is God, and begotten from God according to nature, the Spirit is from Him." But if the phrase "from Him" indicated that the Son is the cause of the Spirit, it would necessarily follow that the statement is not free from blasphemy. For how would it not be absurd to say that because the Son is God, the Spirit proceeds from Him? For neither does the First Cause beget insofar as He is God—otherwise this would be true of the Son and the Spirit as well—nor does the Son, insofar as He is God, have the Spirit proceeding from Him—for this attribute would also belong to the Paraclete, since He too is God in the same manner as the Son. Nor would it be sound to say that the Lord, because He is Son, has the Spirit proceeding from Him; for it is not procession but being begotten that pertains to Him through sonship, just as begetting pertains to the Father through fatherhood. And indeed, procession belongs to Him not because He is God—nor because He is Father, for then the Spirit would be Son—but because He is not only begetter but also projector. Therefore, the phrase "from Him" here does not indicate causality, but if one were to say it indicates consubstantiality, I think they would speak correctly and in accordance with the purpose of the discourse. For inasmuch as the Son is God, He is entirely consubstantial with the Spirit, and this attribute also belongs to the Father. And the Spirit, inasmuch as He is God, is consubstantial with the Father and the Word. Furthermore, since the term "Son" signifies not only that He is from a cause, as the Theologians say, but also the unchangeableness of essence, it is possible to conclude from this, and it would seem to be rightly said, that because "the Son is begotten from God according to nature," we should consider the Spirit to be consubstantial with Him and naturally akin, and that this is what is indicated by the phrase "from Him."

13. Furthermore, if one wishes to interpret this expression "from someone" metaphorically and apply it in another manner, this also would be entirely appropriate to the divine Cyril's purpose. There is no fault in doing so; rather, it serves as a clear refutation of those accustomed to innovate and who stray far from theological understanding. For it is thus: the Scriptures clearly call the Son the hand of God and the Holy Spirit the finger of God. For the Lord says: "But if I cast out demons by the finger of God," which another of the evangelists interpreted by saying:

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"But if I cast out demons by the Spirit of God." As therefore the hand, being connected to the body, might be said to be from the body, not as from a cause—for the body is not the cause of the hand—but as from that to which it is connected, so too the finger is from the hand, being a part of it; for neither is the hand entirely the cause of the fingers. The divine Cyril, having taken this image from the divinely inspired Scripture, frequently says the Spirit is from the Son, as being united to Him, just as the finger is certainly from the hand—not because there is part and whole there, but only to demonstrate their consubstantiality, since the whole is identical in essence with the part. In this way also the Scripture says: "From the womb, before the morning star, I have begotten you"; and the Theologians call the Son and the Spirit "the inward lights of goodness"; and again the Scripture says: "I am from above"; and it says that the Lord descended "from heaven," in order to represent the genuineness of the Son's generation. And that these things are true and that we are not merely conjecturing about the teacher's meaning, the divine Cyril himself will testify in his words. For he says in the Thesaurus: "Here he calls the Holy Spirit the finger, as in some way naturally growing from the divine essence and naturally suspended from it, just as the finger is from the human hand. For the divine Scriptures call the Son the arm and the right hand of God, according to the text: 'His right hand saved him' and 'His holy arm.' Therefore, just as the arm is naturally connected to the whole body, performing all that the mind decides, and customarily anoints using the finger for this purpose, so we consider the Word of God to be from Him and naturally connected in Him, so to speak, and naturally implanted, and in the Son, the Spirit naturally and essentially permeates from the Father, through whom He anoints and sanctifies all things. Therefore, the Holy Spirit appears not as foreign nor alienated from the divine nature, but from it and naturally in it. Just as the finger of the body, being in the hand, is consubstantial with it, and the hand again in the body, not being of a different essence in relation to it." And again from the same work concerning the Holy Spirit: "How would it not be God in essence, being united to the Father, being from Him and in Him, just as the hand of the human body is not separated, but rather is bound in it, and is naturally rooted." But if here the phrase "from Him" indicated causality, what place would the example of the hand and the body have? How would he have said that the Spirit grows from the divine essence and is naturally suspended from it, just as the finger is from the human hand? That these things were said to demonstrate consubstantiality, the divine Gregory also showed in his discourse On the Holy Spirit: "The Holy Spirit," he says, "is called 'finger' for the manifestation of consubstantiality." Thus, for this innovation in these statements, we would find an adequate cause in homonymy, as the Latins were either unable or unwilling to assign the appropriate place to each of the meanings of "from someone," as the purpose of the discourse would require.

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REFUTATION XX.

TWENTIETH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Further, the same divine Cyril in his Thesaurus, in the chapters concerning the Holy Spirit, says that the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Son. For he states: "Since the Son is life by nature, and the Spirit that is supplied by him gives life, it necessarily follows that he exists from the substance of the Son and God, possessing all his power and activity, just as, if vapor rises from water, by those means through which it acts, cooling those around whom it might come, it signifies the nature of that which sends it forth." And again from the same work: "In the Gospels, the Savior says somewhere concerning himself: 'I am the truth.' And the blessed John, showing that the Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son, says in the Gospels, 'the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father,' and in the Epistle, 'the Spirit is the truth.' How then could the Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and is the Spirit of the truth, existing according to likeness and identity of substance, such that he is called truth, also be created and made?" In another of these chapters, he places a heading that reads thus: "That the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son." Now if the Holy Spirit's being from the substance of the Father means that he proceeds from the Father and nothing else, why, when it is said that he is from the substance of the Son, would this not demonstrate that the Son is a sender-forth of the Holy Spirit?

Resolution of the Chapter

1. From what has already been said concerning this matter, we will not need lengthy arguments. For deception has crept in here too through homonymy and has caused much damage, and it has rendered an invalid conversion that is neither sound nor consistent with the realities. For if the Spirit is from the substance of the Son, it does not necessarily follow that he also proceeds from him; for this neither follows nor will it convert. But quite the opposite: if he proceeded from him, then by necessity he would also be from his substance. This is clear from what has been said. For just as we have shown that "from God" or "from the Son" are phrases said in multiple ways, so too in this way "from the substance" has not been used by theologians in one and the same way. For this can also be among the things referred to causality, as the divine Chrysostom says when discoursing about God: "The substance is not from wisdom, but wisdom is from the substance." It can also be as from a composite, as a part from a whole, that is, when the statement is understood tropologically; for such expressions about God are not properly used for the concept of consubstantiality. For the divine Athanasius says in the discourse entitled "On the Incarnate Economy of the Word of God": "For having taken the firstfruits from the substance of mankind, that is, from the seed of Abraham, which is the form of a servant, and having come

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to be in the likeness of man, he gave us from the substance of the Father, the firstfruits of the Holy Spirit, so that we all might become one son of God, in the likeness of the Son of God." For here "firstfruits" clearly shows a part. Furthermore, "from the substance" is most clearly used interchangeably with "consubstantial," especially by the divine Cyril, whose previously cited statements we are now examining. For he explicitly states, being the interpreter of his own words, in the fifth discourse of the Acts of the Third Council, whose title is "On the Incarnation of the Word of God," and the preface of the discourse runs thus verbatim: "It is profound, great, and worthy of admiration, and thus it will henceforth be true, that the holy Virgin has become the God-bearer, having marvelously given birth to one Christ who has partaken of flesh and blood like us, and is consubstantial with both her and us according to his humanity, so that the flesh is from Mary the God-bearer; for not similar in substance, as some heretics thought, but consubstantial, that is, from our substance." Now if he had said "from the substance" and then added "consubstantial," one might have accepted the latter as following from the former, but now he has said "consubstantial" and added "that is, from our substance," in order to draw his statement toward greater clarity, he has made his meaning clear to all, that "consubstantial" and "from the substance" have the same force. Therefore, since this expression has a varied usage, those who say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son make no necessary inference from the divine Cyril's statement that the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Son. For the mode of consubstantiality remains, well-known to the Church of God from antiquity, and this expression accompanies it, being used by theologians.

2. Further, if the Holy Spirit's "being from the substance" of the Son necessarily demonstrates that the Son's substance is the cause of the Spirit, and for this reason also the Son himself, then "not being from the substance" necessarily introduces a negation of causality and shows that the substance is not a cause. But theologians say that created things are not from the substance of God. And it would be absurd to say that God's substance is not the cause of created works. Therefore, neither does "from the substance" necessarily involve causality.

3. Further, if we necessarily consider the Latin hypothesis to be true, there will be two substances in the Son and the Spirit: the substance of the Son as cause, and the substance of the Spirit as caused. But this is absurd. Therefore, not even the first premise is valid; for God is one and undifferentiated with respect to substance. And the one and undifferentiated cannot be both cause and caused, lest it break into plurality. But with respect to hypostases, [God is] three, in which both cause and caused and number have place.

4. Further, if the Spirit's "being from the substance of the Son" is the same as "proceeding from the Son," and he proceeds immediately and directly from the Son, then he would be directly from his substance. But also, being one who proceeds from the Father, not directly or immediately, as the Latins say, since this is the same as being from the substance of the Father, he would be from

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his substance not immediately or directly. But if the substance of the Father and the Son is one and the same, then from this one substance [the Spirit would be] both directly and not directly—but this is the speech of one who utters nonsense and clearly falls into contradiction. Thus, it is not the same to say "to proceed from the Father and the Son" and "to be from the substance of the Father and the Son."

5. Further, if saying that the Spirit is from the substance of the Son means the same as proceeding from the Son, and [if saying that the Spirit is] from the substance of the Father [means the same as] proceeding from him, and moreover, if saying from the substance of the Father is the same as saying from the substance of the Son, just as it is indifferent to speak of the substance of the Father or the substance of the Son, then it would not be different to say that the Spirit proceeds from the Son or from the Father. But these have the same force as saying from the hypostasis of the Father and from the hypostasis of the Son, for it has been shown that begetting and proceeding are "not of the nature but of the hypostasis." And Gregory of Nyssa says that the Spirit proceeds from the paternal hypostasis. But if these have the form mentioned, it follows by absolute necessity that "being from the hypostasis of the Father" and "being from the hypostasis of the Son" are the same thing—but this is extremely Sabellian! Therefore, not even the first premise is valid.

6. Moreover, if "the Spirit proceeds from the Son" has the same force as "he is from his substance," then "the Son is begotten from the Father" will be the same as "he is from the substance of the Father." But the divine Cyril always assumes the former as agreed upon, having this explicitly from the Scriptures, and indeed no heretic has caused trouble for the Church on this account. But that the Son is from the substance of the Father, this he certainly aims to show in the book of Thesaurus, and he demonstrates this with countless refutations and just as many proofs from the Scriptures; for on this point the God-fighters wage war. But if the second is not true, then neither is the first.

7. Further, the divine Dionysius says: "It is characteristic of those who are unwilling to think divine thoughts not to attend to the force of the purpose but to the words." And the divine Cyril in the first discourse of the Acts of the Third Council says: "One who encounters divine words must examine the persons and the time, and consider the reason for which each thing is said; for in this way one will be able, by the grace of the Spirit, to apply the proper interpretation to each text." And Chrysostom in the interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans in the fifteenth homily intends the same. Since these things are so, it would be necessary for us to seek the purpose in these words of the divine Cyril. Now the statements are from the chapters in the Thesaurus concerning the Holy Spirit, but the purpose of the discourses there is in no way to show from where the Spirit has the cause of his existence, but rather that the Spirit is of the same substance as the Father and the Son—for on these matters the heretics are also at war. And the purpose is

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known from the conclusions, both there and everywhere. If these things are true, and it cannot be otherwise, it is absolutely necessary that here too "from the substance of the Son" does not mean causality but equality and identity of substance. For the divine Cyril sets this as a conclusion, if someone is not determined to fight against what is evident.

8. Further, from the cause by which the conclusion is shown, it would become clear that the divine Cyril is not here considering the cause of the Spirit, but rather the natural kinship of the divine persons. For the statement of the teacher runs thus from beginning to end: "Since the Son is life by nature, and the Spirit that is supplied by him gives life, it necessarily follows that he exists from the substance of the Son and God, possessing all his power and activity, just as, if vapor rises from water, by those means through which it acts, cooling those around whom it might come, it signifies the nature of that which sends it forth." Now it is clear that "from the substance" is the conclusion of the argument, and the reason for the conclusion is that the Son is life by nature, and the Spirit also gives life. If this concludes consubstantiality, then it has a place and can be converted, and it is necessary that the argument apply to the Spirit as well, and no absurdity will follow. But if one wishes to deduce causality from these premises, since the middle term equally applies to the Spirit, the Son would also be from the Spirit! But this is not far from madness! For consider: Since the Spirit is life by nature, and the Son gives life by dwelling in us through the Spirit, it necessarily follows that the Son exists from the substance of the Spirit. In this case, if we understand "from the substance" in place of "equal and same in substance," both the premises are according to the teacher's intention, and the conclusion is exceedingly true, following from such premises. But if we refer "from the substance" to causality, while the premises have truth, by absolute necessity the conclusion is absolutely impossible. This would seem absurd even to them. Therefore, here "from the substance" cannot indicate causality, but rather natural kinship; this is required both by the purpose of the speaker and by the premises, for one who makes statements according to truth. And that the Son is in us through the Spirit, just as the Spirit is supplied to us through the Son, the divine Cyril himself will testify. For he says in the same chapters: "When the Word of God dwells in us through the Spirit and comes to be in us, we ascend to the dignity of adoption." And if someone should ask why we do not also say that the Son is from the substance of the Spirit, since "from the substance" indicates consubstantiality, first, it is [indeed] said, since consubstantiality is predicated of both. For we will not engage in a battle over words, which some have already suffered, as long as the syllables lead to the same concept, as some have rightly stated. Next, those who warred against the Spirit, I mean the followers of Macedonius and others who were thought to hold the proper opinion concerning the Father and the Son, would likely, according to their opinion, want to elevate the Spirit to the dignity of the Father and Son rather than deem the

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Father and Son equal to the Spirit, which they thought was lowly. Thus, as necessity called for it, the one has been explicitly stated, and the other follows, with nothing preventing it.

9. Further, sending forth the Holy Spirit is not among the common [attributes] of the Trinity—for this has been shown to belong to the personal [attributes]—but life and giving life are not among the personal [attributes], for this is common to the Trinity. How then could the non-common be soundly demonstrated from the common? Rather, how could someone who seeks the differentiated from the united seem to hunt for these without madness? Therefore, it could not be the same for the Spirit to be "from the substance of the Son" and to "proceed from him."

10. Further, if the Spirit proceeds from the Son directly and immediately, as the Latins might say, and there is no syllogism of immediate things, then the argument here does not intend the cause of the Spirit when it concludes that the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Son.

11. Furthermore, one might appeal to the title of the chapters as worthy of credence. For it says, "That the Holy Spirit is from the substance of the Father and the Son." And no one is ignorant of the purpose of the book of Thesaurus, that the discourse there concerns the equality and identity of substance of Father, Son, and Spirit, nor indeed that a title better manifests the intention of a discourse than any herald. Therefore, here "from the substance" necessarily equates to consubstantiality, if one is not determined to wage war against the truth.

I'll translate this 14th-century Greek theological text by St. Neilos Kabasilas into modern academic English, keeping each numbered paragraph distinct and preserving the theological precision of the original.

12. Furthermore, as the Latins also wish, the divine Cyril explicitly states the following: "The blessed John, demonstrating that the Spirit is from the essence of the Father and the Son, says in the Gospels, 'the Spirit of truth who proceeds from the Father,' and in his epistle, 'the Spirit is truth.' If he demonstrates that the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Father, and the means by which this is demonstrated is the Lord's statement that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and if that which is demonstrated and that by which it is demonstrated are not necessarily identical, then neither are these things identical to each other, in the judgment of those who are of sound mind and who discern these matters."

13. Moreover, if according to the divine Cyril, "the Spirit being from the essence of the Father" and "the Spirit proceeding from Him" were identical, he would not have set out to demonstrate such a thing in the first place, since no person of even moderate intelligence would labor with sweat and various circumlocutions to demonstrate what can be directly apprehended and is better understood without demonstration. But since the second proposition is not the case, neither is the first. Therefore, similarly, it is one thing to say "the Spirit is from the essence of the Son" and another to say "the Spirit proceeds from the Son," which is not found [in Scripture]. And the usage of the Theologians has accepted the former to mean equality and identity of essence, as the

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divine Isaac says in his discourse on renunciation: "So-and-so is your brother and is from your nature." But the latter would reasonably indicate the cause of the Spirit's existence, if it were possible to derive this from the Scriptures.

14. Furthermore, in the same chapters of the Thesaurus in which the divine Cyril discusses the Holy Spirit, he states, as if in opposition to heretics: "And how is it not absurd and extremely difficult to understand to say that the Spirit is from the essence of God, when it is so imperfect and has nothing from itself, but exists as what it is by participation?" The Savior speaks most clearly about this in the Gospels: "For He will not speak on His own, but whatever He hears He will speak." If none of the heretics from all time has dared to say that the Spirit is not from God—that is, not to trace the cause of His existence to Him, which is to say that He does not proceed from Him—but many heretics have ventured to say that the Spirit is not from the essence of God, as is clear from what has been set forth, then "from God" and "from His essence" are entirely different concepts. And for these reasons, it is one thing to say that the Spirit "proceeds from the Son" and another to say that He is "from His essence."

15. Furthermore, in the conclusions of the chapters concerning the Holy Spirit, the same divine Cyril sometimes infers that "the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Son," sometimes that "the Spirit is therefore of the divine nature," sometimes that "the Spirit is therefore not foreign to the divine essence," sometimes that "the Spirit is not separated from the divine essence," sometimes that He is "consubstantial itself," and sometimes that "the Spirit is not created." If "from the essence of the Son" is equivalent to the other statements—for the purpose of all the chapters is one, and they clearly demonstrate the consubstantiality and unity of nature of the Trinity and in no way [address] whence the Spirit has His cause—then "from the essence of the Son" will, like the other statements, indicate this very thing and nothing else.

16. Furthermore, since in the previous chapter we have shown that the Theologians explicitly state that "being from God" does not always indicate causality, there is no necessity here for "from the essence of the Son" to imply causality. It is necessary for everyone, but especially for one who is about to discourse about God, to construct arguments from necessary and unchanging premises, not from those that could be otherwise, for it is not possible to believe in a contingent manner.

REFUTATION XXI.

TWENTY-FIRST CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, Gregory of Nyssa in his Exposition on the Lord's Prayer says the following: "The Only-Begotten Son is named by Holy Scripture as being from the Father, and the discourse establishes His property up to this point. But the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father and is

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also attested to be from the Son. For it says, 'If anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Him.' Therefore, the Spirit who is from God is also the Spirit of Christ; but the Son, being from God, is neither from the Spirit, nor is He said to be, nor does this relational sequence reverse itself." These are the words of the teacher of the Church, removing every pretext of those wishing to innovate and who think that the cause of the Spirit belongs only to the Father and not also to the Son, for he says that the Son is from the Father, and the Spirit is from the Father and the Son. And one who loves truth must either exclude from the choir of teachers the one who theologizes in this way, or, as long as he considers him his teacher, he must necessarily agree with himself and with the teacher, accepting the teaching and offering obedience.

Resolution of the Chapter

1. What we said above when examining the statements of the blessed Athanasius and Basil is sufficient for this as well. For here too there is much that is spurious, and to rely simply on such texts is no small cause for deception. Indeed, in the most ancient and reputable copies, no such thing is found, and this is clear to those who consult the books.

2. And if such statements are seen somewhere, even in these one cannot rest assured. For some say "the Spirit is attested to be from the Son" with the preposition; while others do not have the preposition with them, but say "the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father and is attested to be of the Son." It is evident that we recognize no necessity arising from such texts. This is the first point.

3. Next, let it be granted that all copies support the preposition of the Latins, and that the statement is genuine to Gregory's thought; even so, those who speak on behalf of the Latins will gain nothing for their purpose. For even if one were to concede everything, one could not attribute the preposition "from" to Gregory and his opinion. Why? Because to claim these things is equivalent to setting the teacher in opposition both to the truth and to himself. This is clear: he says, "the Holy Spirit is said to be from the Father and is attested to be from the Son." But that it is said to be from the Father can indeed be traced back to Scripture; for the Lord says, "the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father," and the Apostle says, "For you did not receive a spirit of slavery leading to fear, but the Spirit who is from God." So it is true that it is said to be from the Father. But that it is attested to be from the Son—who is so audacious as to wish to take Scripture as a witness for these words? For nowhere in Scripture can this be seen. So if the teacher calls Scripture a witness to the doctrine, but Scripture has completely denied the preposition, it is necessarily false to say that "the Spirit is attested to be from the Son." Thus the teacher simply contradicts the truth!

4. And he contradicts himself because, having said "it is attested to be from the Son" with the preposition, he brings us testimony from the Apostle that does not say "from the Son," but that

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"the Spirit of the Son." This is certainly one thing, as we have shown through many arguments, and "being from him" is another. For the Spirit, as the theologians say, "we call of the Son, but we do not say from the Son." And the divine Chrysostom explicitly says "it is one thing to say the Spirit of God, and another to say the Spirit from God." So if it is not absurd for the teacher to present such things, let them say so. But if even the Latins would not find this acceptable, then it is not part of Gregory's statement to say "the Spirit is attested to be from the Son" with the preposition.

5. And from the conclusions, it is clear that the teacher in no way accepts the preposition with respect to the Son. For he says: "Therefore, the Spirit who is from God is also the Spirit of Christ." If the purpose of his discourse from the beginning was to show that the Spirit is from the Son just as He is from the Father, he would not have concluded by saying that the Holy Spirit is of Christ. Therefore, the preposition "from" and the thought of Gregory have nothing in common.

6. If any of the Theologians thinks to infer "from the Son" because the Apostle writes "the Spirit of the Son," let him know that he is not examining everything with precision. For to say "the Spirit is attested to be from the Son" is to show that these very words, with the preposition "from," are found in Scripture stating that the Spirit is from the Son, just as He is from the Father. This is clear also in that he did not say "is attested" but "is additionally attested."

7. And apart from these considerations, if we do not necessarily refer "from the Son" to causality, as we have shown, just as we do not always do with "from God," then even if the preposition is present, at least from these words, the Holy Spirit would not be proceeding from the Son.

REFUTATION XXII.

TWENTY-SECOND CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. All the teachers of the Church collectively declare in many of their writings that the Holy Spirit "is through the Son" and "proceeds through the Son." But does this attribute to the Son the property of projection [of the Spirit], or what else? The great Athanasius, in his discourse entitled "Refutation of the Hypocrisy of Those Around Melitius and Eusebius," says: "It was impossible for the Spirit to be glorified in the glory of the Trinity unless He exists processionally from God through the Son." And in the "Dialogue of an Orthodox and a Macedonian," he says concerning the Holy Spirit: "That which is poured out from the Father Himself through the Son." Furthermore, the great Basil, in the fourth book against Eunomius, when addressing why the Spirit is not called the Son of the Son, says: "Not because He is not from God through the Son, but so that the Trinity would not be considered an infinite multitude, suspected of having sons

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from sons as among humans." This is also what John of Damascus says in the thirteenth chapter of his Theological Works. At one point he states: "He is an abyss of word, a begetter of word, and through word a projector of the revealing Spirit." And again in the same chapter: "The Holy Spirit, the revealing power of the hidden divinity of the Father, proceeding from the Father through the Son." And again in the fourteenth chapter of his Theological Works, the same author writes: "The Holy Spirit is God, existing between the unbegotten and the begotten, and through the Son joined to the Father." This is also what the divine Tarasius confesses in his Confession of Faith, with which the holy and ecumenical Seventh Council agreed, for he says: "I believe in the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father through the Son, and is recognized as God." Moreover, the divine Maximus also says: "The Holy Spirit, just as He exists by nature according to essence from God the Father, so also He is of the Son according to essence, as proceeding ineffably from the Father through the Son who is begotten." If the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Son, and this is considered the common opinion of the entire Church, then [it follows that] He is also from the Son. For "through" has the same meaning as "from," as the great Basil shows in the fifth chapter of his work to Amphilochius, saying: "The preposition 'through' is often interchanged with 'from,' when one takes the significance of the other, as in 'I acquired a man through God,' meaning the same as 'from God.' And elsewhere: 'Whatever Moses commanded Israel through the commandment of the Lord' and again: 'Is not the interpretation of them through God?' Instead of saying 'from God,' he said 'through God.'"

Solution to the Chapter

1. But this would not be a windfall for the Latins regarding their intention. For if the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, it does not necessarily follow that the Son is also the cause of the Spirit's existence. Why? Because, first, those who say these things are Athanasius, Basil, Maximus, and the blessed John, and those who follow them. Athanasius attributes to the Father alone both the property of being unbegotten and that of being the source of divinity. Basil, on one hand, says that the Spirit is from the Father and not from another, and on the other hand, he proves Eunomius liable to serious accusations for saying that the Holy Spirit is third from the Father. He considers the Son second from the Father because He is from Him, but he does not dare to call the Spirit second from the Son. Maximus has demonstrated very clearly that he shares the opinion of those who believe the Son does not possess causality regarding the Spirit. If all the aforementioned statements clearly remove causality of the Spirit from the Son, then saying "the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son" is not intended to mean that the Son is the cause of the Spirit. It would be utterly characteristic of Eurybatus and Euripus, not of theological men, to hold contradictory opinions about the Holy Spirit themselves and to attempt to persuade others of them. Moreover, what could one say more clearly about the divine soul of

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John than that he acknowledges only the Father as the cause of divinity, and does not wish to say that the Spirit is from the Son, nor that He has His existence from Him? If, therefore, as if in reconsideration, by saying that the Spirit is from the Father through the Son, he considers the Son as a cause of the Spirit, he would leave no excess of misfortune unconquered. And the most terrible thing is that in the same chapter, he says at one point: "Whatever pertains to cause, source, and begetter must be attributed to the Father alone," and at another point that the Spirit of the Son is "not as being from Him, but as proceeding from the Father through Him; for the Father alone is cause."

2. And this is the gracious point: if the phrase "through Him" here gives causality of the Spirit to the Son, why in the same passage does he not concede that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, but rather establishes one as sound, considering it correct to say "He proceeds from the Father through the Son," while removing the idea that He proceeds from the Son? This is certainly contrary to common usage. For when "through" has the meaning of causality of existence, it always becomes equivalent to "from." But it is clear that the Theologian does not intend this here. Therefore, in this context, "through" does not signify causality.

3. Moreover, it is evident that he has from afar suspected the Latins' interpretation, which is why after saying "He proceeds from the Father through the Son," he sets up thorns for the Latins on both sides of this statement. On one side, saying "not as being from Him," and concluding by adding "for the Father alone is cause," so that it would be in no way possible for anyone to believe, by saying "from the Father through the Son," that the Son is the cause of the procession of the Spirit. For if the Son is also a cause of the Spirit because of the aforementioned statement, then the Father is not the only cause of this very thing, but the Theologian says "the Father alone is cause." Therefore, the one who wrote this statement did not issue it as the Latins wish. And this is a completely wretched method of interpretation, to arrive at the opposite of what the interpreters themselves intended; first, regarding these matters.

4. Next, if the Theologians had said that "the Spirit proceeds from the Son," perhaps "through" would have the meaning of causality, and we would have taken it in place of "from," and it would have been equal in meaning to saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. But now, just as it is nowhere said that the Spirit has His existence from the Son, or proceeds from Him, so also it is not said that He proceeds through the Son, but rather "proceeds from the Father through the Son," and this is said in many places. This clearly shows the Father as cause, and strongly so, but not the Son in any way. For when "from" precedes, indicating the cause of existence with itself, and "through" follows, it is not necessary to also attribute causality to "through." It is clear: when "through" characterizes this causality, we know it is used in place of "from." But when one preposition is used in place of another, there is no harm to the meaning if we remove one and substitute the other that has the same meaning. But here this is not possible by any means. For

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you would not say that the Spirit proceeds from the Father from the Son, for such expressions are far from the Greek language. Therefore, from the aforementioned statements, we will not necessarily consider the Son to be the cause of the Spirit.

5. Furthermore, when the Father creates, and the Son creates in the same manner, and when the Fathers' statement says that all things came into existence from the Father through the Son, it would be more justifiable, given these premises, to understand the statement "through the Son" as meaning that the Son is creator, rather than understanding the statement "the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son" as meaning that the Son is the projector of the Spirit. But the first is not necessary, for this is not what the teachers of the Church intend; therefore, the second is much less likely to be the case. And that the former is true, the great Basil says in the eighth book to Amphilochius: "The Father creating through the Son indicates neither that the Father's creation is incomplete nor that the Son's energy is weak, but rather it presents the unity of will. Thus, the phrase 'through the Son' contains a confession of the primary cause; it is not employed as an accusation against the efficient cause." If through the phrase "through the Son" we learn about the unity of will and the Son's agreement in will with the Father, then at least from the present passage we do not understand the Son to be creator—even though the Son possesses this attribute no less than the Father.

6. Furthermore, the Latins, from hearing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, have considered the Son to be the cause of the Spirit, and have accused us of ignorance, claiming we could not understand even our own expressions. For Thomas says in the chapter on Power that "the Greeks, while agreeing that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, but not from the Son, are ignorant of their own expression, just as Aristotle says about Anaxagoras: 'Wishing to be teachers of the law, they understand neither what they say nor the things about which they make assertions.'" This is what they say, but the teachers of the Church think the complete opposite. Concerning Damascus, it has already been said that he believes the Spirit is of the Son "not as being from Him, but as proceeding from the Father through Him; for the Father alone is cause"—and one could not say that he too was ignorant of his own expression. The divine Maximus, in the letter to Marinus—whose purpose, as has been said, is the same as ours now—explicitly removed the causality of the Spirit from the Son and gave it to the Father alone, and he accepted "the Spirit proceeds from the Son" as meaning "proceeds through the Son," which he interpreted as indicating the equality and identity of essence. Most importantly, he does not say these things primarily himself, but rather it is the Romans who are defending themselves, while he is the one asking and giving authority to their responses. For when members of our Church accused the Romans of saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, the blessed Maximus questioned them about this innovation in doctrine. And they, as he says, "brought forward harmonious quotations from the Roman Fathers, and moreover from

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Cyril of Alexandria's sacred treatise on the holy evangelist John, from which they proved that they do not make the Son the cause of the Spirit—for they know one cause of the Son and the Spirit: the Father, of one by generation, of the other by procession—but in order to show that He proceeds through Him, and thereby to indicate the connection and immutability of the essence." It is worth noting! The Latins and Thomas maintain that "the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son" means "from the Son," and for this reason they also consider the Son to be a principle of the Spirit, and they criticize us as being ignorant of our own expression. But Maximus and the Romans of that time interpreted "proceeds from the Son" rather as "proceeds through the Son." And they did this not to show the Son as cause, but to clearly present to us the equality and identity of essence. These are clear contradictions. So who are the ones ignorant of their own expression—we and the Romans of earlier times, together with the divine Maximus, the divine Cyril, and the other Roman Fathers, or Thomas himself and the Latins, who take the opposite view to the Roman Fathers? Therefore, it is not we who wish to be teachers of the law, but rather such things are more fitting for the Latins, who have waged an undeclared war against the paternal traditions. So it is evident from what has been said that "from the Father through the Son," if we say that creation has come into being, represents the unity of will of Father and Son, as the divine Basil says—for creation came into being from God by the will of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. But if this same phrase is used in the context of theology, as in "the Spirit from the Father through the Son," it does not indicate a common will, but rather "the equality and immutability of essence," as the divine Maximus understood it. For both the Son from the Father and the Spirit from the Father exist not by will, but by nature. So the Latins are deceived, considering necessary and immovable what is not so. For in some cases, when something is said to be from one through another, one might perhaps accept that it refers to a cause and that through which it comes; but to demand this universally in all cases, and especially in the case of the Father and Son, is not necessary.

7. Moreover, it is not even possible to consider the Son as the cause of the Spirit because of the statement "the Father is the projector through the Word of the revealing Spirit." For it is similar to saying that the Father is the projector of the revealing Spirit through the Word, for the Holy Spirit was revealed to us through the Word, which amounts to the same thing as what the divine Gregory says: "The Holy Spirit, having its existence from God, and having appeared through the Son, clearly to humans."

8. If we were to interpret differently both the statement of the divine Maximus that "the Holy Spirit proceeds ineffably from the Father through the Son who is begotten" and all similar statements, while preserving simultaneously the wording, the dogmas of the Church, and the agreement of the teachers with each other, we would not be at fault. For this demonstrates that the Latins do not approach these sayings with necessity. For the statement of the divine Maximus

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could mean the same as those saying "the Spirit, from the Father together with the begotten Son, proceeds ineffably from Him." For both the Son and the Holy Spirit shone forth timelessly from the Father. If to someone it seems paradoxical and contrary to common usage to understand "through the Son" as meaning "together with the Son," let him know that such usage is found in the divine Scripture, of which the teachers of the Church are genuine hearers. For the blessed Paul, writing to the Ephesians, says: "That now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known through the church the manifold wisdom of God." The divine Chrysostom interpreted "through the church" as meaning "with us," that is, with the Church and together with it. For he says in the seventh homily of the interpretation of the First Epistle to the Corinthians: "'That now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known through the church the manifold wisdom of God.' God did this to honor us, so that they might hear the mysteries with us; for we also, when we make friends, say that this is a proof of friendship toward them, to tell secrets to no one before them." Thus, since the aforementioned theological statements also admit of such an interpretation, the Latins are clearly not compelled to rush to their own interpretation.

REFUTATION XXIII.

TWENTY-THIRD CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the divine Gregory of Nyssa, in his discourse "To Ablabius," explicitly states that the divine persons are distinguished only by cause and that which comes from the cause; so if the Spirit were not from the Son, It would not be distinguished from Him. He says that the Son exists directly from the Father, while the Spirit is from the Father, though not directly, but through the Son; and this constitutes another form of distinction. For he writes: "While acknowledging the unchangeable nature, we do not deny the distinction according to cause and that which is caused, in which alone we discern one from the other, believing that one is the cause and the other is from the cause. And concerning that which is from a cause, we perceive yet another distinction: one proceeds directly from the First Cause, while the other proceeds through that which comes directly from the First Cause. Thus, the 'only-begotten' status remains unquestionable for the Son, and there is no doubt that the Spirit is from the Father, since the mediation of the Son both preserves for Himself the 'only-begotten' status and does not exclude the Spirit from a natural relationship with the Father."

Solution to the Chapter:

1. But let us now turn to this much-discussed matter. For the Latins clearly claim that the blessed Gregory teaches that the Son has His existence directly and immediately from the Father,

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while the Spirit has existence from the Father not in the same way, but through the mediation of the Son, and that in this way the divine processions of the Son and the Spirit differ, and because of this the Son is necessarily also an immediate principle and cause of the Spirit, just as the Father is of the Son. But first, as in the preceding arguments, let it be said now also: If the Son is the originator of the Spirit for these reasons, and the Father is also the originator, if there are two originators as Thomas also says, then there are certainly two causes, and the blasphemy is obvious, requiring no further discussion. But if the Father and the Son are one originator, while the Father alone is one begetter, and the one begetter is not the same as the one originator (for they are not interchangeable), and each is a principle and source of divinity, then even in this way there are two principles and two causes of divinity, and the misfortune is evident to all. But this is absurd! Therefore, it is clear that the Latins have not properly and fittingly interpreted the Theologian's meaning.

2. Moreover, if the Father is the cause of the Spirit through the mediation of the Son, then the Father approached the existence of the Spirit through an intermediary divinity. But the Theologians attribute such a thing to created beings, for it says... Therefore, the Father is not the cause of the Spirit through the mediation of the Son, for the Holy Spirit is not a created being.

3. Furthermore, Justin Martyr and philosopher, an ancient man who lived during the time of the successors of the apostles, says in his "Exposition of the Christian Faith": "As the Son is from the Father alone, so also is the Spirit from the Father, differing only in the mode of existence." Therefore, maintaining the distinction in the mode of processions, if the Son is immediately from the Father, then the Spirit must necessarily be immediately from the Father as well, if the Lord's martyr holds the truth with himself. And if this is true, then the Spirit does not have its existence from the Father through the mediation of the Son.

4. And indeed, if the Son is from the Father immediately, but the Spirit is not from the Father in this way but through the Son, from what oracles of the Spirit, from which apostles, from which prophets, from which gospels proclaiming such a distinction have we learned this? For concerning the Trinity, it is not permissible even to conceive anything unless it is granted by Scripture. For let it be according to their interpretation that when Scripture says "Spirit of the Son" or that "He is sent by the Son," they have concluded that the Spirit is also from the Son. But from what scriptural expression have they been taught to say that the Spirit is immediately from the Son and mediately from the Father? But there is none! Therefore, they have not deliberated about the Spirit with the Spirit! For the divine Gregory himself says in his writings against Eunomius: "The Christian faith, which was proclaimed to all nations according to the Lord's command by the disciples, is neither from men nor through men, but through our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. For He appeared on earth and dwelt among men, so that people might no longer form opinions about the divine Being according to their own judgments, making doctrines out of

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conjectures arising from certain speculations, but being persuaded that God truly appeared in the flesh, we might believe that the only true mystery of piety is that which was delivered to us by the Word and God Himself who spoke to the apostles in person." This being the case, let them either show this distinction in the Scriptures, or let them seek the meaning of the statement from those who know.

5. Moreover, since the divine Dionysius, as demonstrated in the second discourse, preserved what is in the Scriptures concerning divine union and distinction, which as he himself says are not to be multiplied or diminished, and since he passed over in silence this distinction between mediate and immediate—to the point that it became incredible (if such a thing ever infiltrated the traditional theology)—it is entirely necessary that the Latins are approaching their own interpretation contrary to both the teacher's understanding and the intention of Scripture.

6. And indeed, if the discourse here by the teacher concerns the distinction of the divine persons, and he attributed causality to the Father as a property, and nothing else, how could this become common also to the Word? Therefore, if causality is a property of the Father here, the Son would not necessarily also be a cause. And if he is not a cause, it is wholly necessary not to call him an originator either. But if they claim that the Son is also a cause, then causality is not a property of the Father. So either let them show in this passage what property he assigned to the Father, or let them say that the Theologian forgot himself and also forgot the purpose of his discourse. But that is absurd!

7. Furthermore, to interpret the Theologians' statements in this way is contrary to the Theologians' own interpretation. For we have shown that John the Syrian and indeed the divine Maximus, who are Theologians, understood such matters differently, and not as the Latins desire. For John, having read all these texts, whether you mention those of Gregory or those of the divine Cyril or others, and having examined them all as a Theologian should, uttered a common statement befitting all theologians: "We say the Spirit is of the Son, but we do not say the Spirit is from the Son"; and "Spirit of the Son, not as from the Son"; and "the Father alone is cause." And the divine Maximus praised the Romans of those times for saying things that agreed with the divine Cyril and the teachers of their Church, according to whom they did not consider the Son to be the cause of the Holy Spirit. Certainly the blessed Maximus, knowing not only Cyril's writings, was not ignorant of the teachings of the other teachers—Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory. For of these, he clarifies the statements of some, becoming their interpreter; and others he calls upon repeatedly as witnesses to his own words, using them as teachers. But to attempt to interpret theological matters contrary to the understanding of the Theologians is both presumptuous and leads to utter ignorance; just as if someone wanting to be a teacher of geometry would deem it appropriate to understand such matters in a manner contrary to geometers.

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Translation of St. Neilos Kabasilas's Theological Text

8. Furthermore, what is most terrible is that this divine Gregory would not even be consistent with himself if we were to say that the Latin interpretation is entirely true. For if, as they claim regarding him, the Spirit does not proceed directly from the Father, yet this same Gregory most clearly maintains that just as the Son, so also the Spirit proceeds directly from the Father, and if this were not so, monarchy—the distinguishing mark of the faith—would be lost to us; how then would the teacher of the Church not be at war with himself? But this is absurd! Therefore, the Latins have not understood Gregory's meaning in Gregory's words. That this blessed one understands the Spirit to proceed directly from the Father, just as the Son does, and that he not only simply states this but also attempts to demonstrate it, and because of this he regards the Trinity as one God, would become evident as follows. For he says in the discourse entitled "How in speaking of three persons in the Godhead we do not speak of three Gods": "All human persons do not have their being from the same person in terms of immediate causation, but some from this one, and others from that one, such that there are many and various causes in addition to those caused. But in the case of the Holy Trinity, it is not so; for one and the same person of the Father, from whom the Son is begotten and the Holy Spirit proceeds. Therefore, we firmly say that the one cause, together with His effects, is properly one God." If the pinnacle of the most holy Christian religion is monarchy and the belief that the Trinity is one God, and this good accrues to us because both the Son and the Spirit are directly from the Father, then Gregory cannot intend that the Spirit has its being from the Father through the mediation of the Son, lest he lose his piety. Moreover, if the Son is directly from the Father, but the Spirit is directly from the Son yet only indirectly from the Father, as the Latins would say, then not only are there many effects in the Godhead, but also many causes as the teacher states. Therefore, as long as the Latins have not yet condemned their own interpretation, let them neither deny that they speak of many and different causes of the Spirit, nor, most wretchedly, that the Trinity is not one Lord and God.

9. If they were to say that there is nothing absurd in calling the Spirit both directly and indirectly from the Father—directly insofar as it is from the Father, and indirectly insofar as it is from the Son, just as Abel proceeds directly from Adam insofar as Adam was his father, and indirectly, insofar as Eve was his mother, who came from Adam—if they say these things, they are not speaking with logical necessity. First of all, proofs from analogies are completely worthless everywhere, but in matters concerning God, by as much as the divine transcends all things, I do not even know what to say! For it is similar to someone speaking about God and leading the argument to absurdity that the Son would be later in time than the Father, and would not know as much as the Father knows, and would not conform to all the Father's attributes; and if another were to say that none of these are serious problems because Abel was born from Adam

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and was later than him in time, and did not know everything that Adam knew, and many things that seemed good to Adam did not seem good to the son. Furthermore, one should not be ignorant that the one who supplies this solution is Thomas, who has condemned its uselessness even before us, so that it has no place in discussions about faith. For he says directly: "Just as Abel proceeds directly from Adam, insofar as Adam was his father, and indirectly insofar as Eve was his mother, who came from Adam, even though this image, being of material procession, seems unsuitable for signifying the immaterial procession of the divine persons." Moreover, if one considers Abel and his mother and Adam, there is nothing absurd in thinking of many causes of Abel and regarding them as many human persons. But in theology, to speak of many causes of the Spirit, or to say that the three persons of the Godhead are a plurality of gods, this is intolerable either for Gregory, or for the Latins, or for us. So while many absurdities follow in this case due to the concept of mediation, but none in the case of the analogy, Thomas's argument would not be true if the Spirit were both indirectly and directly from the Father. And apart from these considerations, how is Abel both directly and indirectly from Adam? For he would be a composite, with part of him from Eve and part from Adam. Therefore, he might reasonably be considered to proceed directly from each of them. But how can one be both directly and indirectly from the same source, if one is not wholly from each source? Besides, he does not come from both simultaneously, but first from Adam, and then from Eve. And when the father is gone, sometimes the child comes from the mother at a later time! Moreover, the teacher's intention has attributed to the Spirit the quality of being directly from the Father, just as to the Son, and the Son would not tolerate any kind of mediation for the sake of receiving being from the Father, nor indeed would the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the solution does not properly address the matter, nor does it have anything in common with Gregory's words.

10. Furthermore, returning to the purpose of the argument, the first distinction has its difference according to cause and that which is from the cause, and the second distinction explicitly announces another difference, and yet the Latins are forcing both of these to be stated according to effect and cause, and in this way they claim the Son to be the cause of the Spirit—is this not clear shamelessness, both in terms of dogma and the common usage of language, and many other things? Therefore, to interpret theological statements in this way would not be characteristic of a person who is very sound in theological matters. Thus, these arguments are sufficient to show that the Latins have incorrectly received Gregory's statement, and that their interpretation is deceptive and spurious and would be implicated in many absurdities.

11. But if they should ask what the Theologian means by saying "one directly from the first, the other through that which is directly from the first," the inquiry is not entirely just. For even if we were to remain silent about the true and just interpretation, the hope of the Latins clearly vanishes, since it has been demonstrated that their interpretation manifestly contains absurdity.

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So as long as they insist that their understanding is sound, they deserve to hear nothing else from us except the swarm of absurdities that quite justly follows from their interpretation. But if they acknowledge that they do not understand the Theologian's meaning, it is not permissible for us to remain silent about what has occurred to us and to those before us to say concerning the matters at hand. For it stands thus: The teacher, being about to discourse on divine union and distinction, first interpreted union through the invariability and identity of essence; but seeing cause and effect in relation to the essence, which is one, he proceeded to divine distinction, addressing the Father as cause, and placing under the category of effect both the Son and the Spirit together. This is clear from his statement that the one is distinguished from the other by cause and that which is from it—and "the one" and "the other" are certainly applicable to two, not to more—and from the fact that he is evidently subdividing the category of effect (for he also divided it, but not at all into cause and effect) but indeed into some other distinction that we understand. If our first distinction is according to cause and that which is from cause, then the second, requiring another difference, would not be according to the first; it remains, therefore, that the other distinction is according to different processions, according to which one of the divine persons is offspring, the other is projection. For this is what he means by saying "one directly from the first, the other through that which is directly from the first." For it is not possible to conceive of another distinction. Since theology calls the first cause Father, certainly the concept of Father immediately requires its own relation, which made known the Son immediately after the Father, not the Spirit. For the Spirit is not Son, but projection; but this would not be referred directly to the Father, for the Spirit does not have a Father, as the divine Maximus taught in his theology, but a projector. If it is said to be from the Father, this is because the projector is also the begetter. If, then, the term Father immediately requires the Son, then with the Son being preconceived and mediating, the Spirit would be referred to the Father; therefore, in this manner, we connect the Father to the Spirit through the Son; just as the Son might be said to be from the projector through the projection, with the projector being directly attributed to the projection, just as the Father is to the Son. So just as the Son is directly from the begetter, but not directly from the projector but through the projection, so also the Spirit is directly from the projector, but through the Son from the begetter.

12. If someone should say that we are legislating against the usage of language, saying "through the Son" rather than "because of the Son," let him know that both are in use. For we say both that all things were established through God, and also that in syllogisms, the third exists in the first because of God; and we say both "because of the middle" and "through the middle." If it is simply stated that the Son is the middle between the Father and the Spirit, and because of this he is necessarily the cause of the Spirit, they should not be ignorant that the Father is also said to be the middle between the Son and the Spirit; and indeed the Spirit is also the middle between

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the Father and the Son according to different concepts. And the Theologian Gregory demonstrates this when he says in his Farewell Discourse concerning the Spirit: "The nature of the three is one; the union is the Father, from whom and to whom the subsequent are referred, not so as to be confounded, but so as to be united"—and everyone would say that union is between the things being united. And in the discourse "On the Holy Spirit" he says: "The Holy Spirit who proceeds from the Father, who insofar as He proceeds from there is not a creature; insofar as He is not begotten, not a Son; and insofar as He is the middle between the unbegotten and the begotten, God." And the divine Damascene says: "The Holy Spirit is God, the middle between the unbegotten and the begotten." And indeed the Latins also say that the Son is the middle between the Father and the Spirit. So since the mediation is common, the Son would not be considered the cause of the Spirit because of this.

13. In general, we say the following: since the first distinction has been made by the teacher of the Church according to cause and that which is from cause, if, just as the cause would not be from a cause, so also that which is from a cause would not be a cause, it is entirely necessary that neither the Son projects nor the Spirit begets; and with these assumptions, the purpose of the discourse is clearly preserved, as is the order of things, and the intention of the teacher, and the usefulness of the distinction, since he has attributed causality as a property to the Father, and to the Son and Spirit the property of being from a cause. But if that which is from a cause could also become a cause, then the Theologian is shown to have used the distinction poorly, both contrary to the order of beings and contrary to his own intention. For what benefit is there for the sake of distinction if one is a cause and the other is from a cause, if that which is from a cause is also a cause? How could the argument be reasonable, calling this a distinction at all, if the things distinguished are sharing in that by which they are distinguished? For just as no one in his right mind would tolerate dividing the animate into animal and human, or the plant into olive tree and tree, because a human is also an animal, and an olive tree is a tree—for division is into things that are unshared in themselves—so no one wishing to be pious would distinguish the divine according to cause and that which is from it, as long as that which is from the cause is also a cause. But it is completely difficult even to imagine such things concerning the divine Gregory. Therefore, that which is from the cause would not be called a cause of divinity; but the Son is from the cause, just as the Spirit is. So even if not from other considerations, from what has been said we have sufficiently demonstrated that the Son is not the projector of the Holy Spirit.

REFUTATION XXIV.

TWENTY-FOURTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

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0. The great Athanasius also says in his discourse on the Incarnate Economy: "For he knows that the Son, who is with the Father, is the source of the Holy Spirit." And Gregory the Theologian, in his discourse on the Holy Spirit, calls the Father "the eye," the Son "the source," and the Holy Spirit "the river." If, therefore, they explicitly call the Son the source of the Holy Spirit, and the source clearly represents causality, how could it be right to object if someone thinks that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son?

Solution to the Chapter

1. We have already demonstrated that the procession of the Spirit is twofold, and that the term "source" is predicated of both processions, and that the Son is also cause and source of the second procession of the Spirit. Indeed, the great Basil in the eighth book of his work addressed to Amphilochius, enumerating the names attributed to the Son, also assigned to him the name of "source," not without clearly showing how he calls him a source. For he says: "Again, because of the manifold nature of the grace which, through the richness of his goodness according to his multifaceted wisdom, he provides to those in need, Scripture designates him by various other appellations, calling him sometimes a shepherd, sometimes a king, and again a physician, and also a bridegroom, and a way, and a door, and a source, and bread, and an axe, and a rock. For these do not represent his nature, but the diverse manner of his activity, which out of compassion for his own creation, he provides to those in need according to the particularity of their needs." If the name "source" is a name of activity when applied to the Son, just like each of the enumerated names, and it is because of a reason—for he says "because of the richness of his goodness and the manifold nature of his grace which he provides to those in need"—then we are not compelled to consider the Son as the emitter of the Spirit, especially when it is possible to think of the Son as the source of the Holy Spirit in another way.

2. That the name "source" and "cause" is also frequently used by the Theologians with reference to the bestowal of the Spirit is clear from the following. For the blessed Joseph calls the Mother of the Lord a source, and a source of the Holy Spirit, not as if the Spirit exists from her, but as the one through whom the Spirit visits us. For in his hymns, piously praising her, he says: "Rejoice, inexhaustible source of living water, O Lady." And we know that the Holy Spirit is the living water; for surely it is not appropriate to think of the Son in this context, for he called her an "inexhaustible source," which means ever-flowing, perpetually flowing forth; but she gave birth to the Son of God only once. And the divine John the Syrian in his own hymns to the blessed Virgin says, "Rejoice, source of ever-living streams," speaking about the Holy Spirit, and "Rejoice, fountain of grace," and again, "You who are the source of compassion." And they call her "the cause of the deification of all and the source of our re-creation." And the tomb of the Lord is addressed by them as "the source of our resurrection." And the great Basil, addressing

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God, asks that the sanctified water over which he prays may become "a source of incorruption." That in these instances, the terms "source" and "cause" are used in relation to transmission and bestowal, cannot be disputed. Therefore, since the concept of "source of the Spirit" is understood by the Theologians in this way, sometimes referring to the hypostatic procession of the Spirit and sometimes to the communicative procession, it is not necessary, because the Son is called the source of the Holy Spirit, to immediately think that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. For he is a source also as the bestower of the Spirit that is naturally united to him, and let no one attack us on this point. For we certainly do not call the Son the source of the Holy Spirit in the same way as the blessed Virgin or any of the saints; for they, partaking of the Spirit in measure, thus impart it to others, but the Son, being God by nature and not partaking, but having the Spirit naturally united and joined with himself, causes it to flow forth to whomever he wishes according to his inexhaustible activities.

3. Moreover, since those things naturally and supernaturally proper to the divine Spirit are the common activities of the Trinity, which have the divine essence as their cause, as previously stated, the Son would also be a source of the Spirit in this sense, according to the activities of the Spirit, just as the Spirit itself is a source, as has been shown, according to its essence, of those things eternally proper to it, as the great Basil says.

4. Furthermore, since the concept of "source" is twofold, if according to the first meaning, the Son would never be the source of divinity, for in this respect he is distinguished from the Father, it remains that when he is called the source of the Spirit itself, this must necessarily be understood in the second sense. Thus, those who start from these premises and think that the Son is the emitter of the Spirit are demanding things that are not only unnecessary but impossible.

5. Apart from these considerations, the blessed Athanasius himself, as has been shown, has assigned to the Father as a unique property the sourcing of divinity, just as he assigned to him being unbegotten. If being unbegotten could by no means belong to the Son, then neither could the sourcing of divinity, namely, according to the hypostatic procession. For according to the communicative procession, being a source and a cause is common to the Trinity, as the divine Dionysius says when he theologizes about divine union and distinction. For there, enumerating the common attributes of the Trinity, he also adds the "source-like and inexhaustible cause and distribution of good-fitting gifts." Therefore, the Latins have not accepted the words of the divine Athanasius as he would have interpreted himself.

6. Moreover, taking up again this blessed man's statement, we will show that he is making his argument with a view to the second of the processions of the Spirit. For he says concerning the Son: "For taking the first-fruits from the essence of men, that is, from the seed of Abraham, which is the form of a servant, and having been made in the likeness of man, he gave us from the essence of the Father the first-fruits of the Holy Spirit." If it were the Spirit itself given in

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hypostasis, he would not have said "the first-fruits of the Holy Spirit." For the Holy Spirit, of what Holy Spirit would it be the first-fruits? And again, in the same statement, he introduces Joel saying, "I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh." We have shown that this belongs to the second of the processions. For if it were itself in hypostasis, how would it be "of the Spirit"? For the Spirit is not the cause of itself. And again, in the same statement, he says: "For in us dwells a pledge and first-fruits of divinity, but in Christ, the whole fullness of divinity." A pledge and first-fruits would certainly be a part; but the Spirit is not divided according to essence, nor according to hypostasis. And the divine Chrysostom understood the phrase "of his fullness we have all received" as referring to the gift and grace. Then again, in the same statement, remembering the evangelical words, he adds: "Everyone who drinks of this water will thirst again; but whoever drinks of the water that I will give him will never thirst, but the water that I will give him will become in him a spring of water welling up to eternal life." The divine Chrysostom considered these things to refer to the gift and grace of the Spirit. Then he immediately says: "This is why David, singing to God, says, 'For with you is the fountain of life; in your light we shall see light.' For he knows that the Son, who is with the Father, is the source of the Holy Spirit." Therefore, it is evident that the Latins have not given the appropriate interpretation to this theological passage.

7. Concerning the divine Gregory, how is it not burdensome to infer from the eye, the source, and the river, which he accepted as an image of the Trinity to show its natural unity, oneness, and inseparability—for the eye, source, and river are inseparable from each other—from these to suppose that the Son is the cause of the Spirit? That the divine Gregory took this as an example, and that we take from the example what is appropriate and let the rest go, and that he knows the images and examples to be shadows and deceptive, falling far short of the truth, and therefore completely banishes them from theology, the divine Gregory himself will testify. For he says in his discourse on the Holy Spirit, speaking about the image of which we are now speaking, and indeed about every image in general: "I thought of an eye, a source, and a river—for others have thought of these too—where the Father corresponds to the eye, the Son to the source, and the Holy Spirit to the river, for these are not separated in time nor disconnected from each other in continuity, and they seem somehow to be divided by three properties." Then, after mentioning some other images, he adds: "And in general, there is nothing that steadies my mind in the examples when I contemplate what is being imagined, except if one takes just one element of the image and, out of good sense, discards the rest. Finally, it seemed best to me to bid farewell to the images and shadows, as they are deceptive and fall far short of the truth, and to hold to the more pious conception, standing by a few words, using the Spirit as my guide, preserving to the end the illumination I received from it." Here it is accurately shown that the teacher accepted the eye, the source, and the river, which seem to be three in their properties, for the sake of their

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natural unity, and because the divine persons are not disconnected and separated from each other, since he also took the other images in the same way, because the purpose of the discourse and those against whom the battle is waged require such things, not to show from whom the Spirit has its cause—and this is clear from his own testimony. For this alone is possible to take from the example: that the eye, the source, and the river are neither separated from each other in time nor disconnected in continuity, but the properties of the persons—how can one infer these from the example, when the discourse is not about these and the example is not sufficient, since he did not even accept to call the aforementioned things three in their properties? And if he knows these to be deceptive and falling far short of the truth—for this reason the teacher bids them farewell—I do not know what benefit there is in deception. And apart from this, it is a clear battle against the truth to think that that blessed man held such opinions, who not only, as has been shown, distinguished the Father and the Son according to the causality of divinity, but also assigned to the Father as a unique property the principle of divinity and the act of projecting, just as the act of begetting. Therefore, the Latins have discharged this arrow against us in vain and to no purpose. For such things are not appropriate to those who are struggling, but rather to those who are dancing!

REFUTATION XXV.

TWENTY-FIFTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, Divine Gregory of Nyssa in the first book against Eunomius says that the Son is the cause of the Spirit, and he says that the Son is conceptually prior to the Spirit in terms of causality. This clearly amounts to saying that the Spirit proceeds from the Son. For he says thus: "For just as the Son is conjoined to the Father, and having His being from Him, is not subsequent in existence, so again the Holy Spirit is joined to the Only-Begotten, with only the notion of causality distinguishing the Son as conceptually prior to the hypostasis of the Spirit." But if these things are so, who would deny that the Son is also a cause of the Spirit's hypostasis, just as the Father is of the Son?

Solution of the Chapter

1. From what has been said in response to the twenty-second and twenty-third chapters, the solution to this objection is not difficult. So that we may not fall into the same errors, when the Son and Spirit are both said to be from the Father, according to different accounts of causality, it is not right to think that the Son is conceptually prior to the hypostasis of the Spirit according to the notion of causality which he supposedly has over the Spirit—for this is the source of blasphemies—but rather according to that causality by which he himself is referred back to the

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Father, namely his own cause, being the Son. For it has been shown in the twenty-third chapter that when we call the first cause "Father," the Son always mediates because of the concept of fatherhood, and thus the Spirit is referred to the Father, so that we might not consider the Paraclete to be an offspring, as divine Maximus says. Therefore, for this reason the Son might be conceptually prior to the Spirit, just as the Spirit might be conceptually prior to the hypostasis of the Son according to the notion of its own causality, if we were to call the first person "Projector," according to which the Spirit is directly referred to the Projector as a projection. In this way also, divine Gregory the Theologian says in his discourse on Baptism: "I would prefer the Son to the Spirit, as Son." He did not say "as cause," but "as Son," because of the necessary coexistence with the concept of the Father. If this were not the case, how else could he, as Son, be preferred to the Spirit? And if he knew that the Spirit proceeded from the Son as well, he would not have omitted the greater aspect concerning causality and attributed this preference merely to generation.

2. If some should say, "But even if he establishes this, he takes it away again by saying 'I would prefer the Son to the Spirit, as Son, but Baptism does not permit me,'" they speak unnecessarily. For he seems to do the same thing regarding the Father and the Son, yet this does not prevent the Father from being greater than the Son in terms of causality. For he says: "I would like to call the Father greater, from whom the equals have both their equality and their being. For this will be granted by all, but I fear lest I make Him the origin of inferiors, and thus insult Him by this preference." If from the Latin interpretation many absurdities result with no justification from anywhere, while from our interpretation no harm is inflicted upon the Church—and indeed, we show the Theologian to be consistent with himself and with others and with the apostolic traditions—we will certainly consider our interpretation appropriate for the teacher of the Church, lest we suffer what one of the ancients was accused of: constructing his own rule in a crooked manner.

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TWENTY-SIXTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the great Athanasius in his first discourse against the Arians says: "To the disciples the Lord, showing his divinity and greatness, signifying that he is not less than the Spirit but greater and equal, gave the Spirit and said, 'I send him,' and 'He will glorify me,' and 'Whatever he hears, he will speak.'" If the Lord is greater than the Spirit, and this "greater" cannot be understood according to essence, it remains to interpret it according to causality, so that the Lord is not greater than the Spirit in nature—for this would be intolerable—but in causality, just as the Father is greater than the Son.

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Solution of the Chapter

1. To this, it would be fitting to say the following: If the Son is the source and cause of the Spirit, clearly as a provider according to the second meaning, I mean the communicative procession of the Spirit—for as God He provides to whomever He wishes what naturally belongs to Him—in this sense He would be greater than the Spirit; since the provider of a gift is conceptually prior to the gift itself. Furthermore, as has been shown, if the Son is given preference over the Spirit as "Son," then in this sense too He would be greater than the Spirit, neither of which shows the Son to be the originator of the Spirit. However, the argument can also be reversed. For if the "greater," as divine Athanasius says here, is signified by the fact that the Son sends the Spirit, and it has been demonstrated that the Son is also sent by the Spirit, then the Spirit would likewise have this type of "greater" in relation to the Word. So if, because of this "greater," the Son is necessarily the originator of the Spirit, then for the same reason the Spirit would be the Father of the Word; but the second proposition is absurd, therefore the first is as well. Moreover, when the Lord says in the Gospel according to John, "My Father is greater than I," the "greater" is not necessarily to be understood by the fact that the Son is from the Father. And yet it would be much more reasonable to hold such things necessarily about the Father and Son than about the Son and Spirit, but even there it is not necessary; therefore much less is it necessary in this case. That this is true, divine Cyril says in his Thesaurus: "The Lord speaks of the Father as greater than Himself in an economic sense, either insofar as He became human, conceding to the nature of divinity the superiority over created beings." And again: "For the Son, being equal to the Father, ascribes the lesser to Himself economically, as has been shown." If these things are true, neither would we seem to act unreasonably if we were to say that the "greater" concerning the Son and Spirit is spoken economically. Therefore, it is not by looking at necessity that the Latins conclude that the Son is the originator of the Spirit. Furthermore, so far is it from being the case that the Spirit proceeds from the Son because the Son is said to be greater than the Spirit, that the great Basil expressly in his works against Eunomius in no way allows that the Father is called greater than the Son because of causality and because the Son is from Him, even though this seems right to some teachers. Therefore, much less would he accept this regarding the Son and Spirit. For he says: "The 'greater' is said to be greater either in size, or in time, or in dignity, or in power, or as cause. But the Father could not be called greater than the Son in size, for He is incorporeal. Nor in time, for the Son is their creator. Nor in dignity, for He never became what He once was not. Nor indeed in power, for 'whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise.' Nor as cause, since in the same way He would be greater than both the Son and us, if He is the cause of both the Son and us."

REFUTATION XXVII.

TWENTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, divine Athanasius says that "the Spirit, having received from the Word, has everything that it has." Moreover, the great Basil says, "The Spirit is called Lord, having received this designation from the Lord." But if the Son is not the cause of the Spirit's existence, how else could this be said? Thus, it is clearly a war against the Theologians to say that the Son does not project the Holy Spirit.

Solution of the Chapter

1. First, I cannot say where in his writings the Theologian has said this; neither can the one who presents these arguments to us—perhaps through ignorance, or deliberately concealing it, so that the intent of the statement would not refute the argument itself. For as the Theologians say, one must attend to the power of the purpose, not to phrases randomly and in vain. Moreover, even with this statement, the argument is not conclusive for the Latins. For the Father and the Son have received from the Spirit the designation that each of them is called "the Spirit" of the other, just as is the Spirit itself. Indeed, the Father also received the designation "Lord" from the Son—these things serve to make known the equality and identity of essence, which is entirely right—but causality and procession from a cause cannot readily be fabricated when statements are thus reversible. That this is true, the great Basil says in the fourth book against Eunomius: "Since there is one Lord, the Son, the Father is called Lord by the name of the image, as being His prototype and generator; so also the Spirit is Lord, having received this designation from the Lord, from whom the Spirit is imparted, and the Lord [receives the designation] 'Spirit' from the image [i.e., the Son], since God is also called 'Spirit' from Him; yet we should not on this account make three Gods, or three Lords, or three Spirits, but recognize the unity of the Trinity in the communion of names." But if the Spirit is called Lord because it is from the Lord, and for this reason the Spirit is also from Him, then the reverse would also be true, and the Son would be from the Spirit; for he says that the Son is also called "Spirit" from the Spirit; and indeed God the Father would be from the Spirit since He is called "Spirit" from it—but this is absurd. If the divine persons impart to one another [their names] as the Theologians hold, and this shows the unity of the Trinity, how shall we reckon causality and procession from cause from these statements as if they were necessary, when no reciprocity or common property at all is introduced regarding causality, as the apostolic tradition maintains? Apart from these considerations, as in the chapter where we explained to the best of our ability the evangelical statement saying that "the Spirit receives from the Son and announces to us," it has been shown that causality has no place there, as far as this theological passage is concerned, but rather the

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unified and connatural relationship of the Son and Spirit, and from that one can infer unity. Therefore, the Latins have discharged this arrow against us in vain.

REFUTATION XXVIII.

TWENTY-EIGHT CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, if the Son is consubstantial with the Spirit, it is necessary either that the Spirit is from the Son, or that the Son is from the Spirit, just as the Father is consubstantial with the Son and the Spirit, and each of them is from the Father. But it is utterly blasphemous to say that the Son is from the Spirit—for the Spirit would then be the Father—so the first alternative remains. That the premise is true, the great Basil says in his letter to the canonesses, which begins "How greatly a distressing rumor echoing in our ears first grieved us," as follows: "Since, then, the Father is unoriginate Light and the Son is begotten Light, and each is Light and Light, they would rightly be called consubstantial, to demonstrate the equality of nature. For things that are brothers to each other are not called consubstantial, as some have supposed, but when both the cause and that which has its existence from the cause are of the same nature, they are called consubstantial." If, therefore, in consubstantial things it is necessary that there be a presupposition, and that one of them be the cause and the other from the cause, it is absolutely necessary to confess that the Spirit is from the Son as from a cause, lest by rejecting this, we also deny the unity and connatural character of the Son and Spirit.

Solution of the Chapter

1. I do not know if saying these things leaves any excess of madness for anyone else! For how is it not madness to pounce with such shamelessness on theological statements, and when the teachers intend one thing, to confront them openly and readily, without even blushing, contrary to their wording, contrary to their intent, and contrary to all likelihood, and hope to convince us with such arguments? For if we were to grant this, that in consubstantial things it is necessary that one be the cause and the other from the cause, then neither would soul be consubstantial with soul, nor angel with angel, nor indeed brother with brother. And the ridiculous thing is that each of them would be consubstantial with their father, but not consubstantial with each other! So according to them, things consubstantial with the same thing would not be consubstantial with each other!

2. Furthermore, where in his writings did divine Basil say this? For here he appears to have said nothing of the sort, but rather the opposite. It reads as follows: Those who were attacking the unity and natural affinity of the Father and Son were proceeding against the consubstantial and saying, "If the Father is consubstantial with the Son and each is of the same essence, then instead

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of Father and Son, they would be two brothers, being from one superordinate essence." Divine Basil, refuting such an evil notion, says: "We call the Father unbegotten Light, and the Son begotten Light; and since each of the persons is Light, the term 'consubstantial' will suffice for both, to demonstrate the equality of nature; for things that are brothers to one another are not called consubstantial, as some have supposed, but also when, there being two things, one is the cause and the other from the cause, and each exists from the same nature, we also apply the term 'consubstantial' to them. For not necessarily does cause and that which is from the cause also have consubstantiality along with them." That the great Basil was looking toward such a notion when he said these things is evident from what he himself testifies more clearly about these matters in the discourse entitled "Against Sabellians, Arius, and Anomoians." For he says thus: "When I say one essence, do not think of two divided from one, but the Son subsisting from the principle of the Father; not Father and Son from one superordinate essence—for we do not say they are brothers—but we confess Father and Son; and the sameness of essence, since the Son is from the Father, not made by command but begotten from nature." Consider the extent of the deception! For we will say the same things again, not to babble, but so that it may be clear to us how terrible is a person who has given up on himself. For those against whom Basil was arguing thought that the consubstantial applies only to those things that have one and the same principle. For this reason, not wanting to say that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, they reduced the argument to absurdity, saying: "If the Father is consubstantial with the Son, and consubstantial things are brothers to one another, then the Son is a brother to the Father," lying in the major premise. Divine Basil, solving their argument, does not confine the term "consubstantial" only to brothers, as they did, but when there are two things of the same nature, of which one is the cause and the other from it, he thinks the term "consubstantial" is appropriate for them too. This was the position of the heretics, and this was the teacher's solution. But from these words, the Latins say that the great Basil claims that nothing can be consubstantial with anything unless one of them is the cause and the other is caused, as if they are willfully ignorant of both the context of the discussion and what the expression itself means. Therefore, this argument also did not turn out as they had hoped.

REFUTATION XXIX.

TWENTY-NINTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Further, the great Basil states in his writings against Eunomius: "As the Son has the Father as Father, so the Spirit relates to the Son; therefore, the Son is the Word of God, and the Spirit is the utterance of the Son." Now if the Son relates to the Father as effect to cause, then surely this must also be the relationship of the Spirit to the Son.

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Resolution of the Chapter

1. Upon this passage also, Bekkos, who dares all things, has poured much deformity, not only regarding its meaning but indeed also regarding its wording, adding from himself at the beginning of the statement, and deliberately concealing parts at its conclusion, so as to obscure the Theologian's intention for which he theologizes such things. For where in this statement does it say "as the Son relates to the Father, so the Spirit relates to the Son"? Let us grant it nonetheless—what does this contribute to proving that the Spirit necessarily proceeds from the Son? For if it allows no difference in the relationship of the Son to the Father and the Spirit to the Son, that would be another matter, and thus the Spirit would be the son of the Son. But since even they themselves acknowledge that the terms "as" and "so" do not preserve complete identity in all respects, what necessity compels us to turn the discussion toward cause and that which proceeds from the cause, when the similarity can extend to other aspects? For behold, as the Son is consubstantial with the Father, so is the Spirit with the Son; and as the Son speaks in harmony with the Spirit, so does the Father with the Son. The Father acts through the Son, and the Son through the Spirit. And as image, the Spirit is of the Son, and the Son of the Father. And there would be many other respects in which similarity exists between Father and Son and Son and Spirit, none of which attests to the Son being the cause of the Spirit. "Therefore, even if the great Basil had said such a thing, there would be no necessity from this that the Son be the projector of the Spirit; for it has been demonstrated above that such statements are indicative of equality and sameness of essence, not of causality.

2. Concerning the statement that the Son is the Word of the Father, and the Spirit the utterance of the Son, the father of the discourse himself would be a credible interpreter of his own words. For clarity's sake, I will present the Theologian's statement from beginning to end, so that not only the teacher's meaning, but also the addition, the subtraction, and the malice of the Latins may become completely evident. For he says in the fourth book against Eunomius: "That the Trinity is glorified in the same divine works is a testimony to the one Godhead, because neither does the Father act without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit; therefore the Son is the Word of God, and the Spirit is the utterance of the Son; for 'He upholds all things,' it says, 'by the word of His power.' And since the Spirit is the utterance of the Son, therefore He is of God; 'the sword of the Spirit,' it says, 'which is the word of God.' The Word of God is living and active. For do not fall down to human similitudes, but everywhere comprehend what is greater concerning God, taking the example of the word for the demonstration of the one operation; because your mind also accomplishes all things through the word." Here, he says that neither the Father acting without the Son, nor the Son without the Spirit, is a testimony to the one Godhead, not to causality and what proceeds from it, and in this sense the Father would relate to the Son as the

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Son to the Spirit. But also, that the Spirit is called the utterance of the Son, and the Son the Word of the Father, he wants the example to be understood as demonstrating the one operation, because the human mind also accomplishes all things through the word. If, then, the teachers of the Church, looking toward the unity of the Trinity, accepted such things, but the Latins considered such things to be fitting not for unity but for distinction, how are they not clearly enemies of the theology of the Fathers, going in the opposite direction to them? And this not without malice, as we have shown.

REFUTATION XXX.

THIRTIETH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Again, the divine Cyril, in one of the chapters of his first book of Treasuries, says: "The Son is the living and essential energy and power and wisdom of the Father." And the divine Paul [states]: "Christ [is] the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor 1:24). The great Athanasius, in his letter to Serapion, calls "the Spirit the energy of the Son," and again, the Son is the person of the Father, as the divine Cyril says in his fifth book Against Hermias: "That the Son is, as it were, the person of God and the Father, the Psalmist would easily instruct us—at one time saying, 'Where shall I go from Your Spirit? Or where shall I flee from Your presence?' (Ps 139:7), and at another, speaking as if from the perspective of those who believe in Him, 'The light of Your face has been marked upon us, O Lord' (Ps 4:6)." But the same [Cyril] also calls the Holy Spirit the person of the Son. For he says in his commentary on St. John the Evangelist, expounding the verse "Believe Me because of the works themselves" (Jn 14:11): "If His person—that is, the Spirit (for the Spirit is called the person of the Son)—fills all things, how could He Himself be contained within limits?" If these things are sound, and the Son is the energy of the Father while the Spirit is [the energy] of the Son, and likewise the person [of one is the other], along with many other similar [relations], who could deny that there is an order within the Trinity—such that one person is first, another middle, and another third? And according to what [principle] would this be, if not that one is the cause, and the other is from the cause? It is not, therefore, absurd if one should consider the Spirit to be from the Son, just as the Son is from the Father—provided the distinction of modes [of procession] is preserved.

Resolution of the Chapter

1. The Son is called the wisdom and power of the Father in Scripture to show that He is above created things. For the wisdom and power of God are uncreated. And using this very method, the great Basil, in Against Eunomius, demonstrated that the Son is uncreated, saying: "If Christ is the wisdom and power of God, and these are uncreated, then Christ certainly is [uncreated]." This

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also applies to the Spirit, for He too may rightly be called the wisdom and power of the Father and the Son.

2. Moreover, the Son is called the wisdom and power of the Father in this sense: that the entirety of the Father's power resides in Him. As the divine Basil also says in *Against Eunomius*: "This [logic] applies wholly to the Spirit as well, in relation to both the Father and the Son."

3. Further, the divine Gregory [of Nyssa] says of the Son that He is called the Word of the Father because "He relates to the Father as word does to intellect, due to their inseparability"—for intellect and word are indivisible. Thus, in this manner, the Son may also be called the wisdom, power, and energy of the Father because of their indivisibility. For wisdom is inseparable from the wise, power from the powerful, and energy from the one who acts. And if the Spirit is inseparable from the Father and the Son, then the Spirit may likewise be called the wisdom and power of the Father and the Son.

4. Again, the Son is called wisdom (as the theologians affirm) as the knowledge of divine and human realities—for it is not fitting for the Creator to be ignorant of the principles of His own works. He is called power as the preserver of created things, supplying the power by which they cohere. Yet God is not only wisdom and power but also wise and powerful. This is said, first, so that when we hear God called wisdom, power, or energy, we do not imagine Him as some unsubstantial reality lacking independent subsistence (for such is the nature of energy); and second, so that we do not suppose He is called such by participation, as if receiving these attributes from another. But if, in the manner described, each of the Three may rightly be called wisdom, power, and energy—the Son as the unvarying image of the Father's wisdom, power, and energy, and the Spirit similarly [of the Son]—then the Latins, in their haste to reach their conclusion, have done so without necessity. For these terms demonstrate the consubstantiality of the persons emphatically but in no way their distinction—much less [do they prove] the relation of cause and that which is from the cause.

5. If, as has often been said, it is most just to discern the meaning of these statements from their purpose, you will observe that the leaders of the Church theologize in this way while looking to the equal and identical essence of the divine persons. For their aim—and indeed their struggle against heretics—concerns this very point, not at all the question of cause and that which is from it.

6. That the Son is called the person of the Father, and the Spirit the person of the Son, is first evident from the intent of the Theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus]: he did not speak these words wishing to divide the Son from the Father or the Spirit from the Son, nor while theologizing about the distinction of persons. Rather, the entire thrust of his argument is the unity of the Trinity. Second, it is absurd and borders on impiety to suppose these terms are

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meant hypostatically. For if the Son is the person of the Father because He is begotten from Him, then the Father would not be a distinct person apart from the Son—and the Trinity, the hallmark of our piety, vanishes. For this reason, the doctrine of the Church acknowledges two persons, the Father and the Son, while also recognizing their distinction—not because one is cause and the other from the cause. If, as the Latins claim, the Son is called the person of the Father for this reason [i.e., causality], it follows only that the Father and Son are two persons (and not two, yet also not one). The same applies to the Son and the Spirit. Such reasoning is neither sober nor logical. Rather, the Son is called the person of the Father, and the Spirit [the person] of the Son, just as they are called image or power—with the theologians skillfully using these terms to signify the consubstantiality of the persons. Thus, the notions of first, middle, and third collapse here: for if the foundational premises are removed, the conclusions necessarily fail.

7. Apart from this, if you call the Spirit third in terms of enumeration, you speak in harmony with truth and the theologians. For each of the persons is counted first, counted after, and counted together, as they themselves say. Indeed, we have shown that each of the Three may be taken as middle in different conceptual frameworks—but this provides no basis for [asserting] cause and that which is from it. But if you consider the Spirit third in the natural order (as the Son is second from the Father because He is from Him), your reasoning is unsound. For the Spirit is not second from the Son—indeed, as has been shown, the great Basil did not accept this at all. Further, just as the Son, though called second from the Father, is not third from Him in the natural order, so too the Spirit, likewise called from the Father (for He is proclaimed second from Him, just as the Son is), cannot be third from Him in the natural order. That this is true, the divine Gregory [of Nazianzus] will testify: in his Poems, he calls the Spirit second, just as he does the Son. Thus, the Latins have pointlessly weaponized this argument against us.

REFUTATION XXXI.

THIRTY-FIRST CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Again, the divine Cyril consistently distinguishes the Spirit as proper to the Son in order to deny that it is from Him. For he says: "When Jesus baptizes with fire and the Holy Spirit, He does not impart a Spirit foreign to those being baptized—as if in servile or ministerial fashion—but as God, by nature and with authority, [He gives] what is from Him and proper to Him." And elsewhere: "He did not receive a Spirit alien to Him or substantially separate from Him, but what is from Him, in Him, and proper to Him." And again: "For proceeding through Him as His own." And in another place: "It is clearly shown that the Holy Spirit is not alien to the Son but is in Him and from Him, as His energy." This same [Cyril] also says of the Son that He is proper to

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the Father, since He is from Him. Therefore, if the Spirit were not from the Son, it would necessarily be alien to Him—neither proper to Him nor consubstantial—and this plainly leads to impiety. How, then, could one avoid confessing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son?

Resolution of the Chapter

1. That the Holy Spirit is called proper to the Son by the theologians is true. But the claim that whatever is proper to something must necessarily derive its existence from it (which is the second premise the Latins use to draw their conclusions) is false, contrary to reality, and intolerable. For if the Spirit proceeded from the Son, it would certainly be proper to Him; but the converse does not hold. This is evident from Scripture: in the Gospel of John, it is written, "He found his own brother Simon" (Jn 1:41); again, "He calls His own sheep by name" (Jn 10:3); and in Matthew: "They went away, one to his own field" (Mt 22:5); and elsewhere, "Like a man traveling, who called his own servants" (Mt 25:14). Yet no one would say that brothers, disciples, sheep, fields, or servants derive their existence from us.

2. If they argue that this premise is not universally true but applies only to the divine persons, so that when something is called proper to another, it must also be from it (as with the Father and Son—for theologians call the Son proper to the Father, and the Son is from the Father)—even this reasoning fails. The Son is from the Father because He is the Son of the Father, not because He is proper to Him. Indeed, the reverse is also true: as the Gospel of John states, "He not only broke the Sabbath but also called God His own Father" (Jn 5:18)—yet no one would say the Father is from the Son. If they claim this logic applies only to the Spirit (that when He is called proper, He must also be from the Son), such a demonstration is utterly laughable, for it assumes the very point in question.

3. Further, how have they interpreted Cyril's statement that the Spirit is proper to the Son? How do they understand the term proper? If they take it in the sense of a defining characteristic (like human laughter, the Father's unbegottenness, or the Son's begottenness), then their reasoning is absurd. For the Spirit would not be a distinct hypostasis but a property of the Son's hypostasis—and even so, this would not prove He is from the Son, since hypostatic properties do not derive from the hypostasis itself. Nor is the Spirit proper to the Son as a possession (a notion better suited to the madness of Arius!). But if by proper they mean consubstantial and naturally akin (as opposed to alien), we fully agree—this is the genuine sense used by the theologians. Yet to infer from this the division of divine persons into cause and that which is from the cause is crude and wholly untheological. Such terms signify unity and consubstantiality, not distinction.

4. They trace their assertion (that the Spirit is from the Son) to three grounds: the term Spirit, the term proper, or both. But this is unjustified: Not by Spirit, for we have shown that the Spirit

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is not from the Son merely because He is called Spirit of the Son. Not by proper or both terms, as we have just demonstrated. Thus, their claim shares no common ground with the Fathers' intent. Moreover, the Latins distort the theologians' meaning. They do not say the Spirit is proper to the Son because it is from Him but because it is consubstantial with Him. For the divine Cyril, interpreting "All that the Father has is Mine" (Jn 16:15), says: "For this Spirit is proper to the Only-Begotten, since He is consubstantial with the Father." And again, explaining "When the Paraclete comes" (Jn 15:26), he states: "If the Spirit were not proper to the Son, He would have sanctification as something created—like the rest of creation—and could potentially fall away." Likewise: "We affirm that the Paraclete—the Holy Spirit—is proper to the Son: not externally appended, nor acquired by Him as is the case with those capable of receiving holiness." The Council of Nicaea, too, calling the Spirit proper to the Son, confirms this from the title Spirit of the Son—which denotes consubstantiality and unity, not procession from the Son. Theodoret and Cyril explicitly reject the Latins' interpretation: the former says, "If one calls the Spirit proper to the Son as consubstantial, we accept this pious language; but if as from the Son, we reject it as blasphemous"; the latter agrees, as we have shown.

5. If the divine Cyril says "what is from Him and proper to Him" or "what is from Him, in Him, and proper to Him", this is no cause for alarm. We have shown that "from Him" sometimes refers to causality and other times to natural affinity. Thus, it is unnecessary to ascribe causal origin of the Spirit to the Son based on this phrase. Moreover, since we have proven that "from Him" here cannot mean cause, it must refer to natural consubstantiality—which is Cyril's actual intent. Interpretations must align with the author's purpose. If the Latins object that this reading is unlikely (since, by their logic, the Son could then be called proper to the Spirit), their argument is irrelevant: First, we appeal not to our own views but to the Church's teachers; their quarrel is with the Fathers, not us. Second, we have already explained, to the best of our ability, why the Spirit is called Spirit of the Son. Thus, the Latins' objection is groundless and misses their own mark.

REFUTATION XXXII.

THIRTY-SECOND CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Furthermore, the divine Cyril states in his Treasuries: "Just as a plant imparts to the fruit that proceeds from it the quality naturally inherent in it, so too the Son is understood to have received from the Father all that belongs to Him, being all that the Father is, except only being the Father." The divine Chrysostom also says this in his commentary on St. John the Evangelist. And again in his second book Against Hermias, the divine Cyril states: "We believe the Son to be coeternal with the Father, having everything equal in measure, except only begetting—for this

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belongs to the Father alone." It is worth noting! The theologians did not simply say without qualification that the Son is all that the Father is, lest one think this refers only to natural properties, but they add "except only being the Father" and "except begetting." Therefore, by absolute necessity, the Son possesses procession, since the Father has it—if the declaration of the theologians holds truth within it.

Resolution of the Chapter

1. The title "Father" is used in multiple ways, and the usage of what it signifies bears witness. For God is called Father as Creator—we speak of God as Father of this universe. And indeed as Provider—Scripture calls Him Father of the fatherless. Moreover, we know Him as Father by nature and by grace in begetting—for the Lord says, "I go to My Father and your Father"—His Father by nature, and the disciples' by grace. And Scripture has also called Him Father as Cause simply, for the blessed Paul writes to the Corinthians: "the Father of mercies and God of all comfort." In theology too, Scripture uses this meaning, for the divine James says: "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights," that is, from the Son and the Spirit. For here one must not understand the Begetter, since He did not beget the Spirit, but simply the Cause. If someone insists that "lights" means something else and not the Son and Spirit, first even so the apostle used the name "Father" simply in place of "Cause." Then let such a person be instructed by the blessed Fathers. For the divine Cyril in *Against Hermias* says: "For whatever is 'from above'—that is, from the Father of lights—is thereby God; but only the Son and Holy Spirit are 'from above,' while what is understood as 'below' is creation." The divine Dionysius in *On the Divine Names*, aligning his theology with the apostle's words, calls the Father "the fountainhead of divinity," and the Son and Spirit "offshoots of the divinity that begets God—if one may so speak—God-grown blooms and, as it were, supraessential lights." That this is so is clear where the divine Maximus explains such things, saying: "Note the sacred and awe-inspiring names for the undefiled Trinity: the Father is fountainhead of divinity, while the Son and Holy Spirit are offshoots of the divinity that begets God—that is, God-grown from the Father, blooms and supraessential lights. Rather, Scripture speaks of 'offshoots' in Zechariah the prophet's eleventh vision of olive branches—where the Seventy say 'olive branches,' other translators say 'ears of grain' and 'offshoots'; and 'lights' where it says 'Father of lights' and 'Light from Light.'"

2. Furthermore, we call the Father "unbegotten" and this property His own, not merely because He alone was not begotten—for this is true of the Spirit too—but because He is without cause. If "unbegotten" means "without cause," then "begotten" would necessarily mean "caused," and "begetting" would mean "cause." Therefore, as shown, the blessed Dionysius refers "God-engendering" to both Son and Spirit. But "begetting" and "Father" are the same—so "Father" and

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"cause" have equal force. If this is so, and the title "Father" is used in multiple ways while Scripture in theology accepts the name "Father" in place of "cause," then the declaration of the Church's teachers Cyril and John—that "the Son has all that the Father has, except only being the Father"—stands in our favor. For this is what the divine Gregory meant, as we showed: "the Son has all that the Father has, except causality," and that "the Father alone is cause and sole fountainhead of divinity." That the divine Cyril says "the Son has all that the Father has except only begetting" imposes no necessity for our dispute. For if it has been shown that "Father," "cause," and "begetter" have the same force, and "begetting" and "bearing" must ultimately equate to "being cause," then this is settled. Besides, the usage of the theologians has not wholly rejected the term of equal force for this meaning by the Church's teachers Dionysius, Cyril, and Maximus. For the blessed Anastasius says in his discourse *On the Orthodox Doctrines of Our Church*: "The difference between generation and procession does not indicate a difference of essence. For the difference in mode of existence does not signify 'to be' but 'how to be,' while the same existence remains for both Him from whom and those who are from Him, according to different modes." By "those who are from Him," he means according to different processions—taking the term "beget" not partially but as something common understood in different ways.

3. But even if we understand "Father" here specifically as "begetter" and likewise "bearing," still the Latins gain no advantage, so long as no syllogism can prevail against what has been clearly and expressly stated—and because one who loves truth should try, as far as possible, to show that conclusions agree with what has been plainly declared, and yield precedence to such authorities, not arm oneself with inferences against them. For it is just to consider: The theologians say "the Son has all that the Father has except unbegottenness." Now the syllogism, insofar as it follows from this statement, grants begetting to the Son. For if all except unbegottenness—but "begetting" and "unbegotten" are different (the former being positive and relational, the latter neither)—then begetting must also belong to the Son. This is the syllogism, if one carelessly attends to it, but it is by no means sound. Why? Because it is expressly forbidden to say the Son has begetting, as even the Latins would admit. And they claim this very statement means either that the Son is all that the Father is except being Father (in which case no syllogism starting from this premise holds), or—most absurdly—that the Son is unbegotten or cause of the Spirit's divinity. But we hold it true only until both are expressly denied to the Son by the theologians. For we showed the blessed Gregory saying "the Son has all that the Father has except causality," and the divine Maximus insisting "the Son does not have causality of the Spirit," and the divine John of Damascus stating "the Spirit is not from the Son" and "the Father alone is cause and sole fountainhead of divinity." If you seek the reason why, since neither causality nor unbegottenness belong to the Son, the statement says "except only being Father," it

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is not for us to explain so long as the Latins wish to dispute. For it is not we but those from Rome who rely on such arguments. Thus this argument too does not turn out as the Latins hoped.

REFUTATION XXXIII.

THIRTY-THIRD CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Moreover, this is also included in the definition of the Fifth Council: "We follow in all things the holy fathers and teachers of the Church - Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril, Leo, Proclus - and we accept all that they set forth concerning right faith and the refutation of heretics." Now it is clear from many passages of Augustine, especially in his book *On the Trinity* and in his work against John, that the Holy Spirit truly is from the Son just as from the Father. Therefore it must be conceded that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

Resolution of the Chapter

1. But even the statements made by Augustine, as the Latins would claim, are not sufficient to attribute the procession of the Spirit to the Son. For while it cannot be denied that Augustine is a teacher of the Church (as the fathers testify concerning him), I am not entirely convinced that these statements are genuine products of his mind and tongue. For they do not agree with what has been shown from the apostles and the ecumenical councils. Nor is it surprising if these too have received spurious additions, since even many works of the theologians have suffered similarly. Indeed, the divine Cyril in the acts of the third council, concerning the writings of Athanasius of blessed memory in his letter to Acacius the bishop, says: "They inquired of me whether I agreed with the writings attributed to Athanasius of thrice-blessed memory, our father, to Epictetus bishop of Corinth. I replied that if the document is preserved among you unadulterated (for many parts have been falsified by enemies of the truth), I would agree wholly and entirely." And again concerning them: "Taking copies I provided from ancient books and comparing them, he found these to be falsified and urged that they be corrected from our books and sent to the church of Antioch, which was done." The same applies to blessed Xystus, who was bishop of the Roman church during the third council, for he says: "If some bring forward a letter supposedly written by the most devout presbyter Philip of the Roman church, as if from the most holy bishop Xystus expressing displeasure at Nestorius' deposition, let your holiness give no credence to this. For he wrote in agreement with the holy council and confirmed all its acts, being of one mind with us." Concerning his own writings he says: "If any should circulate a letter supposedly from me expressing regret for what we did at Ephesus, let this be ridiculed, for by the Savior's grace we remain sound in mind and have not been overcome by unreasonable

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thoughts." The Sixth Council too shows many such interpolations in the writings of the saints. Why speak only of this or that writer's works? Even the Apostolic Constitutions written by blessed Clement (who was their disciple), though containing many great goods, suffered similar damage, for which the Fathers excluded them from the Church, as the Sixth Ecumenical Council states in its second canon: "Since in these canons (namely the Apostolic ones) we are instructed to receive the Apostolic Constitutions through Clement, into which certain heterodox have introduced spurious and alien elements to the Church's harm, obscuring for us the fair beauty of divine doctrines, we have properly rejected such constitutions for the edification and safety of Christ's flock." If this corruption has reached not only the Church's teachers but even the Apostolic Constitutions themselves, we should not be troubled nor think it incredible if similar suspicions attach to Augustine's writings.

2. Apart from this, concerning the Roman Fathers including blessed Augustine and the Spirit's procession, such matters must be greatly suspected, as the divine Maximus says in writing to Marinus. He asked the Romans, as has been shown, what they meant by saying the Spirit proceeds from the Son. They replied that they did not make the Son cause of the Spirit, supporting this with quotations from Roman Fathers and Cyril of Alexandria. If the Romans of that time and the divine Maximus so regarded their church's teachers (since their statements agreed with blessed Cyril's), but now the opposite is found, is it not just to view such things with great suspicion? Therefore we should not be troubled if we must doubt statements about the Spirit's procession attributed to Augustine and some Roman Fathers, when those with firm authority support us.

3. But suppose these are indeed his genuine thoughts. Still the Latins cannot prevail against us! For not everything said in the Church by theologians is said dogmatically. Some things are said dogmatically, others parabolically, others economically, and yet others polemically. For example, when Scripture calls God a panther or a bear in distress, it names Him thus parabolically, just as when it calls Him a man. Thus the divine Chrysostom, interpreting the parable "A certain man had two sons," says: "God is called 'man,' and here the Lord speaks parabolically, not dogmatically." That Scripture also says many things with economy, the divine Basil testifies in his fourth book Against Eunomius: "If the Son truly said 'Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me,' He would not only accuse Himself of cowardice but suppose something impossible for the Father. For 'if it be possible' implies doubt whether the Father could save Him, and that He died unwillingly, no longer humbling Himself nor being obedient unto death to the Father, nor giving Himself as the apostle says 'who gave Himself a ransom for our sins.'" After some discussion he adds: "We must not therefore take what is said economically as simply stated." The divine Cyril too in his Treasury chapters on the Son says: "If the Son is God by nature as the Father is, and good by nature, and creator by nature, and king by nature, what

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greater thing will be in the Father, when the Son possesses these perfectly too? But if He does not possess them perfectly, how is He God, still lacking what is good? For what has not yet attained the perfection proper to God would not be God by nature. But the Son is God by nature, therefore perfect as the Father is. Since He is perfect, He is not inferior. Economically He calls the Father greater than Himself, in that He became man, yielding to the divine nature its superiority over creatures." And again from the same: "Though equal to the Father, the Son economically attributes inferiority to Himself, as has been shown." Concerning the disciples' question about "that day and hour" and the Lord's reply "no one knows, not even the Son," the divine Chrysostom in his seventy-seventh homily interprets this as the Lord speaking to stop the apostles' idle curiosity - the Savior fulfilling an economic need that they not labor over foolish questions. The divine Paul too in writing to the Romans often speaks economically, saying: "If their trespass means riches for the world, and their failure riches for the Gentiles, how much more will their fullness mean?" Blessed Chrysostom in his eighteenth homily interprets: "Here he speaks to please them, for even if they fell countless times, the Gentiles would not have been saved had they not shown faith." Almost this entire apostolic passage the Church's teacher thus understands, saying: "See how throughout this passage he proves he wishes to comfort them? If you remove this intention, many difficulties remain." Again in his twenty-fourth homily on this epistle he says: "Unless we again observe Paul's purpose - wishing not to rebuke them too severely before the proper time - these words would be unworthy of Christian pastoral care. But as I always say, we must examine the intention behind what is said, the subject being discussed, and what he aims to accomplish by saying it." That some things are said polemically, the divine Basil explains in his *Asceticon*; indeed, writing to the Neocaesareans in defense of Gregory, he says: "They circulated a test by letter to our like-minded Anthimus of Tyana, claiming Gregory said in a statement of faith that Father and Son are two in thought but one in hypostasis. That this was said not dogmatically but polemically, they who pride themselves on subtlety could not see in the dialogue with Gelian." Therefore, since not all statements in the Church about God are made dogmatically or in truth, but some this way (namely dogmatically), others parabolically, economically or polemically, we may say the same about Augustine's statements on the Holy Spirit - that he set them forth not dogmatically but either polemically or to meet some economic need of that time. This is not far from what the Latins themselves say. Defending the addition to the Creed, they shift the reason to those times when heretics claimed the Son was inferior to the Father because He could not send the Spirit.

4. But even if we were to suppose that the blessed Augustine expounded these matters dogmatically and in truth, still the Latins would not thereby be compelled to accept his reasoning. For did he derive the Spirit's procession from the Son by his own authority, or did he take this from Scripture? That he did so by his own authority, not even the Latins would claim.

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Therefore he must have learned this from the divine oracles and taught it to others. But deriving something from Scripture is twofold: either directly and explicitly stated, as when it is said of the Father that "the Spirit proceeds from Him," or necessarily inferred, as many Church doctrines have received their certainty from Scripture. The first is impossible—where is this stated in Scripture? Nor does the second hold, for this is not necessarily inferred from Scripture. All scriptural teachings remain intact even if the Spirit does not proceed from the Son. This we have demonstrated by setting forth both the theological passages and their proper interpretations from the Church's teachers, none of whom ascribe to the Son the role of projecting the Spirit. Even the Latins cannot dispute these interpretations, for they preserve both the letter of Scripture and its necessary conclusions—which the Latins wholly accept—and those offering such interpretations could rival angels themselves. Therefore, even if the Spirit did not proceed from the Son, none of the Church's confessed doctrines—whether teachings or dogmas—would be overthrown. Those inferring this from Scripture do so only as a possibility, not a necessity. But how could it be just to believe such a possibility—let alone die for it? Moreover, there exists an apostolic tradition forbidding us to say or even think anything about the supreme divinity beyond what is stated in Scripture.

5. The Latins object: "What of 'consubstantial'? Or the three hypostases in God? Or the hypostatic union in one of the Trinity? Or the two natures of the Word? Or the two wills? These too are nowhere explicitly stated in Scripture, yet we believe them as if written, following the theologians who deduced them from Scripture." We do not oppose what is necessarily inferred from Scripture. Indeed, we believe these doctrines no less than what is explicitly stated. That these are necessarily drawn from Scripture, even the Latins would not deny. Take "consubstantial"—an ancient term contemporary with the apostles' successors, as the divine Athanasius and Dionysius attest (the latter having studied under the apostles, using "of same divinity" and "of same goodness" for "consubstantial"). The very passages from which these doctrines—whether consubstantiality, hypostatic union, or the rest—are inferred demand this interpretation by absolute necessity. Denied this, they collapse. The unanimous agreement of theologians confirms these teachings, as do the ecumenical councils that sanctioned them, and the miracles and revelations that established them. Without these, many Church doctrines would be overthrown—which is not the case with the Latin dogma. If they claim the distinction between Son and Spirit would be erased unless we accept the Spirit's procession from the Son, this is untrue—as will shortly be shown, the distinction remains perfectly clear even without making the Son the Spirit's projector.

6. They insist: "The Church's teachers have thus interpreted these passages, and we must absolutely obey them." Blessed one, I would not deny these were teachers, nor that they sought to draw Scripture to their own meaning. But since the passages admit other interpretations, it is

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unclear whether they mean what the Latins claim. The interpretations we give—following the supreme theologians—even the Latins would approve. The uncertainty remains whether their interpretation holds. Therefore the Latin interpretations lack necessity. If they reply that the teachers' intent is unambiguous, we repeat that the Latins' dogma is not necessarily credible from Scripture alone—only possibly so. Its necessity comes solely from the opinion of teachers like Augustine and Jerome. But how perilous to believe men concerning divinity when we do not deem their writings divine! Especially when, as noted, an apostolic man counsels us not to speak or even think about the Trinity beyond Scripture.

7. They say: "Your interpretations do not contradict ours. Why not believe both?" We do not claim these interpretations are mutually exclusive. Yet with many interpretations possible, we deem it uncertain whether the Holy Spirit accepts the Latin reading. For though not contradictory (if we must concede this), they are certainly different. That they are contradictory and conflicting is clear: the Latins and their teachers insist the Son projects the Spirit based on their interpretations, while the apostles' successors, the ecumenical councils, and the supreme theologians—who knew these passages thoroughly—would never accept the Latin interpretation but would expel it from the Church, knowing the Father alone is "fount of divinity," distinguishing Father from Son by "fount and cause," and considering "without beginning" the Father's unique property. Furthermore, the Latin interpretations deduce the distinction of Son and Spirit from Scripture, whereas our Church's teachers emphasize their union. These are not far from opposition.

8. If anyone thinks this insults the teacher or deems it impossible for a teacher of truth to err, they speak unnecessarily. One may be a teacher yet not speak all things in truth. Why else did the Fathers need ecumenical councils if none could ever stray from truth? Let them consider the great Dionysius of Alexandria and Gregory the Miracle-worker—the first headed the Church and won the martyr's crown; the second's name alone suffices for praise. Concerning Dionysius, the great Basil writes to Maximus the Philosopher: "You inquire about Dionysius' works. Many have reached us, but the books are not at hand, so we have not sent them. Our judgment is this: we do not admire everything in the man. Some things we wholly reject. He was, as far as we know, the first to sow the seeds of that impiety now widely spread—I mean the 'Unlike in essence' heresy. Not from wickedness, I think, but from overzealous opposition to Sabellius." Later he adds: "We find this man, while vehemently resisting the Libyan's impiety, inadvertently fell into the opposite evil through excessive zeal. It would have sufficed to show Father and Son are not identical in subsistence, thus defeating the blasphemer. But to win overwhelming victory, he posited not only hypostatic difference but essence, power, and glory—thus exchanging one evil for another while missing truth." So clearly does the divine Basil speak of Dionysius—matters well known. Concerning Gregory, Basil writes to his brother: "When persuading Greeks, he did

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not think verbal precision necessary, sometimes conceding to their customs to avoid obstructing essentials. Thus you will find many phrases there now giving heretics great advantage —'creature,' 'product,' and the like." Again, when the Pepuzeni baptized converts in the name of Father, Son, Montanus, and Priscilla, Dionysius accepted their baptism after they renounced their teachers' error. But Basil says in his canons: "The Pepuzeni baptism seems to me invalid. I marvel how canonical Dionysius overlooked this, for the ancients judged only baptism preserving the faith acceptable." He adds: "What defense has their baptism in Father, Son, Montanus, and Priscilla? They were not baptized into our tradition. Though the great Dionysius overlooked this, we must not imitate his error—its absurdity is obvious to all with minimal reasoning." Even Damasus of Rome regretted not speaking with full precision in his doctrinal writings. The divine Gregory says to Cledonius: "Why wonder if some take Jovinian's writings more devoutly while others rage at their plain meaning? Damasus himself, later instructed, recalled and corrected his doctrinal statement, condemning their deception which had misled his simplicity." Why cite individual teachers when whole councils of holy Fathers—like that against Paul of Samosata led by Gregory the Wonder-worker, Athenodorus the martyr, and Dionysius of Alexandria (also a martyr)—though acting nobly, later caused the Church much trouble? For they did not handle the term "consubstantial" precisely. The divine Athanasius explains: "Since Samosata taught the Son did not exist before Mary but began from her, the council deposed him as heretic. But concerning the Son's divinity, writing simply, they neglected 'consubstantial's' precision." The Neocaesarea council, led by Basil of Amasea the martyr, unknowingly contradicted an apostolic saying when formulating its canon. The Sixth Council, noting this canon's idleness, states: "Since Acts records seven deacons appointed by apostles, while the Neocaesarea canon insists on seven even for large cities, we find the Fathers meant not ministers of mysteries but servers of tables." If not only teachers but whole councils—some dealing with faith, others with Church order—sometimes erred, we must neither be troubled nor cry blasphemy if one accepts Augustine and Jerome as teachers yet does not submit to all their doctrines—especially when, as shown, they inferred certain dogmas from Scripture not by necessity.

9. Furthermore, not only does the divine Basil and ancient Church custom regard the same men as both teachers and yet reject some of their statements, but even Augustine himself holds this view. Writing to Jerome, he says: "I have learned to give such honor only to the canonical books of Scripture that I firmly believe none of their authors erred. Other writings I read so that, however outstanding their holiness or learning, I do not therefore accept as true whatever they may have written or thought"—calling "canonical" those books of Old and New Testament enumerated in the councils, as he explicitly states with the Council of Carthage in its twenty-fourth canon. If only the divinely inspired Scriptures—where neither explicitly nor by necessary

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inference is the Spirit's procession from the Son found—are free from error, while other writings must be read in such a way that we do not automatically accept their contents as true simply because their authors were holy or wise, then we do no wrong in refusing to believe the Spirit proceeds from the Son merely because Augustine or Jerome thought so. If some object that Augustine did not speak these things in his doctrinal treatises (since teachers cannot err in matters of faith), first, the facts themselves clearly refute this. The examples we cited earlier include doctrinal statements by teachers who erred in precision. Moreover, if they could err in lesser matters, how much more in greater? Since divine teaching is divided into doctrines of faith and moral instruction, if teachers cannot err at all in faith, and are seen to have spoken all moral truths perfectly (with none ever faulted in this—not even the most serious pagan philosophers), then Augustine's words to Jerome about Scripture and teachers would be meaningless.

10. Beyond this, that Augustine intended his statement to include doctrinal matters is attested by Thomas Aquinas himself in the eighth chapter of the first part of his second book. There he clearly uses this very phrase while examining matters of faith, meaning that our faith rests necessarily on the apostles' and prophets' writings, while using the teachers' works as reputable but non-necessary authorities. This aligns with Augustine's statement to Jerome cited earlier. Thus the Latins have not read Augustine's words rightly—nor as Thomas himself would interpret them.

11. If they consider the Fifth Ecumenical Council's testimony sufficient to forbid opposition to anything Augustine said, this argument still lacks necessity—even if we granted the Latins' premise. For if we must obey Augustine completely, then we must accept that only the inspired Scriptures are error-free and that other writings deserve little attention (as he demands). But since the Latins themselves do not accept everything Augustine taught (which they would not admit), then neither must we accept his statements about the Spirit. Why should they be free to pick and choose from his teachings while we must submit unquestioningly? Therefore, we are not bound to believe all Augustine taught.

12. Indeed, the Seventh Ecumenical Council praised blessed John of Damascus with great honor, yet Thomas fiercely opposes John's teachings on the Spirit, accusing him of Nestorian error. Thus we do no wrong in not accepting all Augustine's teachings.

13. Moreover, since they use the Fifth Council's approval of Augustine as their bulwark, let them know Gregory of Nyssa—who shares equal honor in the same council's records—yet we do not accept his statements on universal restoration. If we must trust all Augustine's teachings because of the council, why not Gregory's as well? And if not all Gregory's teachings, then not necessarily all Augustine's either. Furthermore, the great Barsanuphius—a man adorned with apostolic gifts—when asked about Gregory's problematic statements, gave not his own opinion but a direct revelation from God, applicable not only to Gregory but to all Church teachers:

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"Hear the assurance God gave me three days before your inquiry: Some received unsound teachings from their instructors. Later advancing and becoming spiritual teachers themselves, they did not ask God whether their teachers spoke by the Holy Spirit. Considering themselves wise, they failed to discern their teachers' words. Thus their teachings became mixed—sometimes speaking what they learned from their teachers, sometimes their own thoughts—and so their writings bear their teachers' names." If not all their words are Spirit-inspired, but sometimes reflect other influences, who granted Augustine immunity from error—that he spoke nothing deceptive but only pure truth?

14. Indeed, regarding what the Latins assert about Augustine, drawing from the Fifth Council, they reach this conclusion through inference. But what we maintain, saying that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, we have explicitly shown that the Third Council both heard this and arranged it among the sound doctrines. One ought not to bend explicit statements toward inferred conclusions, but rather to harmonize the latter with the former and strive and pray for this.

15. If the Latins should claim that we are subject to the same criticisms—for one can also consider as spurious what we say, and that the Theologians set these things forth not dogmatically but as part of a debate, and moreover that they likely were ignorant—this argument is not compelling, nor is the censure comparable. For when we look to the traditions of the apostles, to the ecumenical councils, and to the other teachers who follow them very closely, no one could justly bring such charges against us. For there is no suspicion in the works of divine Dionysius, nor in the books of the acts of the councils. And the Latins themselves would testify to this, showing their copies of the books preserved in the same manner among both us and them. And the great Maximus and the Damascene, who became interpreters of those words and who affirm the authenticity of the successors of the apostles, stand with us. Even Thomas attests to the authenticity of what was said about the Spirit by the blessed Damascene. But that these things are consistent with what was said by divine Dionysius and the teachers before him cannot even be shown. Most importantly, regarding the procession of the Spirit, no one who speaks so readily about everything could show the works of divine Dionysius to be suspect in the way we have shown the works of Augustine and other Roman Fathers to be. Furthermore, the successors of the apostles did not write these things for the sake of debates; for there was not yet a time for debates against heretics while the apostles were living, and their successors also, and at the same time they were writing to Titus and Timothy, who were apostles and disciples of the Lord. This is to converse among themselves. And no one, paying attention to himself, speaks agonistically rather than truthfully. And regarding the ecumenical councils, nothing of the sort can be said; for the fathers who sit in general assemblies are legislators and determiners of what is proper to consider regarding the faith. And no legislator debates, having his own will as sufficient. To say

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that the successors of the apostles and their teachers, and the ecumenical councils, were ignorant of something—wouldn't this be exceedingly blasphemous? For the sayings of Hierotheus and divine Dionysius have been shown to be secondary; that is, they are the utterances of the Holy Spirit. And the Church has received the pronouncements of the ecumenical councils as it has the Gospels. So how is it possible for one who looks to those to be deceived? Those are the canons for all things in the Church—whether concerning faith or other matters—but Augustine and anyone with sense would pray to harmonize his views with theirs. And no one of sound mind would charge them with distortion of doctrine; but someone's private views are sometimes poorly received. Or why would they make much account of general councils, if they had little concern for mutual alliance? Moreover, if it is necessary to call upon their own testimony, Augustine attributes all truth to the sacred texts, but does not greatly trust others, even if they have reached the height of wisdom or holiness. And concerning his own theology, praying to God, he clearly does not completely trust himself; for he does not speak by the Spirit, nor does he have everything received from God, for he says: "O Lord, the one God, the Trinity God, whatever in these books is recognized as being from You, may Your people also recognize. But if there is anything from me, both You and Your people forgive." Such are Augustine's words. But the theological sayings of Hierotheus and Dionysius are secondary, and Dionysius is so confident in his own theology as to say: "We hasten to unite and distinguish divine things in our discourse just as the divine things themselves are united and distinguished." So how can what is said by us and by the Latins come to the same thing?

16. Apart from these considerations, even if there were nowhere the theology of Dionysius and Hierotheus, nor the pronouncements from the ecumenical councils, nor those from the Theologians, it would be absolutely necessary for us to conclude from Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, while for the Latins it would be wholly impossible that the Spirit is from the Son. For it is thus: explicitly from Scripture we find the Father begetting; for it says, "From the womb before the morning star I have begotten you" and "before all the hills he begets me." But that begetting belongs to the Father alone, how can this be deduced from Scripture, except that it nowhere says either the Son or the Spirit begets? Again, that being begotten belongs to the Son, we know from Scripture because it calls him Son and because it says, "Everyone who loves the one who begot also loves the one who has been begotten of him." But that being begotten belongs to the Son alone, this comes to us from nowhere else than that neither about the Father nor about the Spirit has anything of the sort been said in Scripture, either explicitly or otherwise. The same can be said about the Spirit, that the Paraclete alone is processional, because such a term is not predicated of either the Father or the Son. In the same way, we also speak about the sending forth; for this too has been shown to be personal, and is equivalent to the aforementioned terms. For from Scripture we have heard that the Holy Spirit

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proceeds from the Father; but that it is from the Father alone, we have grounds to believe from the fact that this cannot be gathered either from the Son, or explicitly from the sacred texts, or even through syllogistic reasoning. That this is true, and that it is not possible to deduce this from the sacred texts, has been shown above, and going through each of the points from which the Latins think they deduce their position, we have set forth at length. So how can these things be the same for the Latins and for us, when we have the upper hand in all respects, even if none of the teachers had explicitly been with us, while they are weak, as has been demonstrated, even if they might array themselves with others? Therefore, it would not be necessarily the case that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son because of Augustine or anyone else. So even from what the Latins say in their own defense, we can gain additional advantage, when we consider their weakness.

[And these things are from the author: The following, being from St. Augustine and found later, were added.]

Florilegia: Quotations from Augustine

1. From blessed Augustine, in the preface of the third book on the Trinity concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. Since in all my writings I desire not only that the reader be pious, but also that the critic be free, much more so in these matters where the greatness of the question itself is at stake; would that it could have as many discoverers as it has opponents. However, just as I do not wish my reader to favor me, so I do not wish the critic to favor himself. For the former should not love me more than the catholic faith; and the latter should not cherish himself more than the catholic truth. And just as I say to the former, "Do not wish to be enslaved to my writings as if they were canonical Scriptures, but in those Scriptures, even what you did not believe, once you find it there, believe it without hesitation; in my writings, however, what you did not hold with certainty, unless you understand it with certainty, do not wish to hold it firmly." So I say to the latter, "Do not wish to correct my writings according to your own speculation or contentiousness, but from sacred readings or irrefutable reasoning. And if you grasp something true in them, its existence is not due to me, but in understanding and loving it, let it be both yours and mine."

2. From the same. Do not wish to be enslaved to my writings as if they were canonical Scriptures; but in those Scriptures, even what you did not believe, once you find it without ambiguity, believe it; whereas in my writings, if you do not find with certainty what you firmly believed, do not wish to hold it firmly. (This quotation fits with chapter 13.)

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3. From the same. Just as the authenticity of the old books is tested by comparison with Hebrew codices, so the credibility of the new ones seeks the standard of the Greek books.

4. From the same, in the second book addressed to the victor of victors. I cannot deny, nor should I, that just as in those extensive writings of mine, so too in the smaller ones, there are very many things that one might justly criticize with fair judgment and no derangement.

5. From the same, in the eighth epistle to Jerome. I have learned to render this fear and this honor only to those writers who are now called canonical, so that I dare not believe that any of them erred in writing. And if I should encounter anything in their writings that seems to be contrary to truth, I would suppose nothing else than either that the book is pseudepigraphical, or that the translator has not followed what was said, or that I have not understood it at all. As for other writers, I read them in such a way that, however much they may shine with holiness and learning, I do not therefore consider something true because they thought so, but because they have been able to convince me that it does not contradict the truth, either through other writers or through canonical and demonstrative reasoning.

6. From the same, in the epistle to the victor of victors. Brother, do not wish to gather slanders against the divine testimonies—which are so numerous, so clear, and so indisputable—from the writings of bishops or from our writings, such as those of Hilary or Cyprian and Agrippinus before the heresy of Donatus. First, because this type of writing is distinguished from the veneration due to the canonical Scriptures. For they are not read in such a way that testimonies are offered from them, and that it is not permitted to think contrary to them wherever perhaps they think differently than what the truth demands. For in this category we bishops belong, so that the apostolic saying should not disdain to be applied to us also: "And if in anything you think otherwise, God will reveal even this to you."

7. From the same author, in his epistle to Fortunatus. We should not regard the discourses of any individuals, even if they are catholic men of renown, as we do the canonical Scriptures, as if we are not permitted—while preserving the honor due to them—to reject and refute anything in their writings if we should ever discover something they have thought differently from the truth, which has been understood either by others or by ourselves with God's help. Indeed, I am such a person when reading the writings of others as I wish those who study my own works to be.

8. From the same author, in the second book concerning singular baptism. Who has not seen that the canonical Holy Scripture, consisting of both the Old Testament and the New, stands firmly within its own boundaries, and is set before all writings composed afterward by bishops in such a way that, concerning Scripture, no one can in any way doubt or dispute whether what is written in it is true or correct? But regarding the writings that have been or will be written by bishops after the established canon, it is permitted that criticisms be made, even through the discourse of someone perhaps wiser, who is more experienced in such matters, or through the

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weightier judgment of bishops, or through more instructive wisdom, or through the decisions of councils.

9. From the same author. Concerning the varied judgment of readers and their different understandings, from the first book on the Trinity, chapter three. From here, whoever examines these things, where he is equally assured, let him proceed with me; where he is equally uncertain in opinion, let him seek with me; and where he recognizes his own error, let him return to me; where he recognizes mine, let him call me back. And thus together let us enter upon the path of love, striving toward Him of whom it is said, "Seek His face continually." For this I set as pleasing, pious, and secure before the Lord our God, along with all those who will read these things that I write, in all my writings, but especially in these where the unity of the Trinity is being sought. For there is nothing more perilous to err in elsewhere, nor is anything else sought with greater difficulty, nor is anything else discovered with greater profit.

REFUTATION XXXIV.

THIRTY-FOURTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS

0. Moreover, in a certain council that the Greeks rely upon, the following is written: "Anathema to those who reject the utterances of the holy fathers—Athanasius, Cyril, Ambrose, Amphilochius the God-inspired, Leo the most holy archbishop of elder Rome, and the rest—spoken for the establishment of right doctrines in God's Church, and who do not embrace the acts of the Fourth and Sixth Ecumenical Councils." Now one may clearly find Ambrose and Leo explicitly stating that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Thus one must either grant the Son's projection of the Spirit or, by not accepting this, submit to anathema's condemnation.

Resolution of the Chapter

1. First, what was said about Augustine suffices here as well. Even if not as numerous, far more teachers speak against this doctrine. For it is absolutely necessary to preserve immovably the apostolic traditions that distinguish the divine persons by "fount" and "cause," and to maintain unshaken what the ecumenical councils decreed. Furthermore, doctrines about the Trinity have no validity unless deduced from the Spirit's own oracles—none of which the Latins have ever demonstrated, neither from Scripture nor from the teachers they cite.

2. Next, the statements about Ambrose and Leo are not entirely above suspicion as genuinely teaching the Spirit's procession from the Son. Nowhere does Thomas Aquinas mention them as holding this view, despite writing many volumes against us about the Spirit's procession. While constantly citing Augustine, he never once references these fathers.

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3. If the Latins resent this argument, we remain unconcerned. For the council's pronouncement cannot apply universally to all Ambrose and Leo's writings, but only to those passages actually read in certain ecumenical councils—very few indeed—and not without interpreters' clarification. This is evident because the councils issued their decrees in Greek, understanding Latin poorly if at all. Yet Leo, Ambrose and Augustine wrote entirely in Latin. None would rashly pronounce judgment on writings they never read or could scarcely comprehend.

4. If the Latins, while approving these statements, acknowledge the council's decree as partial, they would escape difficulty. But if they insist it universally covers all these fathers' writings, then they slander Leo and Ambrose by attributing to them the Son's procession of the Spirit. Why? Because this council neither ignored Photius (as the Latins claim) nor his arguments, nor the conflict between the churches over what Photius and our Church believed. It knew all Rome's accusations against Photius and his counterarguments about the Spirit's procession. Yet still it venerated Photius as most holy, anathematizing everything said and done against him by the Romans—which it would never do if it knew Leo and Ambrose taught the Spirit's procession from the Son. For only fools would both condemn as impious and admire as holy the same doctrine—now anathematizing those who deny the Son's procession (Ambrose and Leo's alleged view), now anathematizing all accusations against Photius, whose chief "error" was denying that procession! Therefore, if the council necessarily knew both Photius' case and all Ambrose and Leo's writings (as the Latins claim), and if it wished to remain self-consistent—as is most reasonable—then the Latin teachers must be cleared of innovating about the Spirit. They should join us in outrage against those who suffered slander and ecclesiastical injustice, whom the Latins refuse to reconsider with sacred intent, having condemned them prematurely. That these things are true, the council itself testifies by its severe condemnations of anyone speaking against Photius: "Eternal memory to Ignatius, Photius, Stephen, Anthony and Nicholas, most holy and orthodox patriarchs." And again: "Anathema to all things written or said against the holy patriarchs Germanus, Tarasius, Nicephorus, Methodius, Ignatius, Photius, Stephen, Anthony and Nicholas."

**PART 3: THAT THE LATINS CANNOT DEMONSTRATE THE PROCESSION OF THE
HOLY SPIRIT FROM THE SON WITH SYLLOGISMS**

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PROLOUGE:

1. There remain only syllogistic arguments, which possess as much strength for demonstrating divine matters as blind men would have if they attempted to judge colors. But before we examine each argument individually, we must first consider in general whether the present problem of ours admits of demonstration.

2. First, therefore, the ancient and apostolic tradition holds that in matters of God, the aid of human reasoning must be avoided, since it is weak and leads to falsehood, accomplishing nothing other than undermining the efficacy of the Cross. For the divine Paul, writing to the Corinthians, says: "Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the Gospel—not in the wisdom of words, lest the Cross of Christ be emptied of its power." Moreover, when a theological question is proposed, the apostolic command is that it must be resolved by the oracles of the Spirit, not by human wisdom. For the same Apostle says: "We speak not in words taught by human wisdom, but in those taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual things to those who are spiritual."

3. Furthermore, if we envelop matters of faith in syllogisms, our faith collapses, the crowns due to the merit of faith are lost, and we will no longer believe in God but in men. For He Himself says: "And my speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of human wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power, so that your faith might not rest in the wisdom of men but in the power of God." The great Basil also says in his books against Eunomius: "For if we attempt to measure all things by our understanding, and if we judge that whatever cannot be grasped by the mind simply does not exist, the reward of faith will perish, the reward of hope will perish."

4. Moreover, to rely on syllogisms in matters of faith is the same as declaring that the Holy Spirit was given to Christians in vain. For the same Apostle says: "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things freely given to us by God. These things we also speak, not in words taught by human wisdom, but in those taught by the [Holy] Spirit."

5. Again, in the Gospel according to John, the Lord says: "It is written in the Prophets: 'And they shall all be taught by God,' alluding to His own teaching. Now, if we believe that this divine promise extends to all, yet it is impossible for all to rely on demonstration, what then should we think of demonstrations? Are they not contrary to the divine promises? Are they not found to be hostile to Christian theology? Therefore, we shall not employ the enemy as a counselor, nor shall he sit as a judge to decide matters about which doubts may arise; rather, we shall drive him away, anointed with ointment and crowned with wool, from the precinct of divine things."

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6. Moreover, since the syllogism is an instrument of human wisdom—and the Lord has declared this wisdom to be foolish—how can a sound-minded man rashly trust in something foolish and insane? For the divine Paul says: "Has not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" Such, then, is the opinion of the Lord's Apostles concerning syllogisms. Let us now consider what those who immediately succeeded them thought of the same. For example, the blessed Dionysius, at the very outset of his theological work, diverts those who encounter it from the common utility of syllogisms, as if from an axiomatic principle, himself also employing the words of the Master and writing as follows: "Let the sacred law of the oracles now also be set before us, so that we may demonstrate the truth of what is said about God not in persuasive words of human wisdom but in the manifestation of the power which the Spirit has inspired in theologians." And again: "Therefore, we must not dare to say or even think anything concerning the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity beyond what has been divinely indicated to us in the sacred oracles."

7. The divine Dionysius further adds: "Even the most luminous of all things said about God—namely, the divine formation of Jesus Himself from our nature—is ineffable to all speech and unknown to any understanding, even that of the most ancient chief angels." Now then, if what is most manifest in theology not only surpasses human intellect and reason but also transcends the comprehension of the most ancient chief angels, by what right, tell me, shall that which is most hidden and ineffable—I mean the procession of the Spirit—be subjected to arguments drawn from demonstration, when such reasoning revolves around human understanding and is known to be inferior to our own minds?

8. But the great Basil does not consider it fitting for faith and demonstration to coincide; rather, one must exclude the other. "Faith," he says, "must precede the words spoken about God—faith, not demonstration. Therefore, lest we succumb to the disgrace of unbelief, it is necessary that whoever looks to Christ flee from syllogisms as from fire."

9. The divine Chrysostom also serves as an example—indeed, Gregory the Theologus as well, who cites that Scripture: "Let us not seek the living among the dead." The blessed John, moreover, does not even wish to heed those who apply faith through syllogisms in matters pertaining to God. For he speaks thus about syllogisms in his books *On the Incomprehensible*: "We promised you that we would say nothing drawn from reasonings. For our weapons are not carnal but spiritual, destroying arguments and every lofty opinion raised up against the knowledge of God. We are commanded to demolish these, not to construct them; we are ordered to dissolve them, not to arm them. For the reasonings of mortals are timid. What does 'timid' mean? Even if a timid man walks in a safe place, he does not dare but fears and trembles. Likewise, what is demonstrated by syllogisms, even if true, does not yet bring to the soul firm

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arguments or worthy faith. Therefore, since the weakness of reason is so great, come, let us fight against adversaries with the Scriptures."

10. The great Basil also says in his Expositions on the Psalms: "It is necessary that the first principles of any discipline be delivered to learners without any debate." And again: "It is impossible for those who dispute the first principles to proceed methodically and orderly to the end. You may learn this even from secular disciplines. For if you do not grant the first principles to geometers, they cannot deduce what follows. And whoever opposes the principles and elements of arithmetic blocks the path to further knowledge. Similarly, not even physicians can demonstrate the first principles of medicine. In short, in every discipline that proceeds methodically and orderly to its end, demonstrations of the primary propositions cannot be sought." Then, shortly after: "Thus, indeed, the mystery of theology also requires a sense of faith free from proof."

11. Since this is so, those things which in Christian theology are most ancient and fundamental—such as that God is One and Triune, that the first Person is unbegotten, the second begotten, and the third proceeding—these, I say, must necessarily be presupposed as the first principles of primary propositions, without inquiry. But since it is impossible to seek a demonstration of primary propositions, as the theologian affirms, how can one who places his hope in syllogisms to investigate the matters presently under discussion not meditate absurdities?

12. Furthermore, not only Damascene but also Thomas, the teacher of Latin theology, states in the third chapter of the first book of *Contra Gentiles*: "Some truths about God are such that they exceed all capacity of human reason—for example, that God is Triune and One. Others, however, are such that natural reason can attain to them—for example, that God exists, that God is One, and similar truths—which even philosophers have demonstrated about God, led by the natural light of reason." Concerning these, the Apostle also says: "What is known of God is manifest in them." And again, Thomas says: "Therefore, some intelligible truths about the divine are accessible to human reason, while others entirely exceed the power of human reason."

13. Therefore, if the truth that God is Triune surpasses all human reason, then by the same logic (since it is the same truth), that one of the divine Persons is the cause while the others derive their existence from it according to a distinct mode of procession must also do so. Indeed, Thomas himself writes in another book: "It is known to Him alone concerning Himself, and communicated to others through revelation." Therefore, if these things are true, how could the same truths become knowable through reasoning? For it would be a contradiction if the same thing is held to be both above demonstration and within the limits of demonstration—or, what is the same, if it can be known both by God alone and not by God alone. Thus, revelation would be unnecessary if its object could be attained through reasoning.

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14. Moreover, since the things said about God are of two kinds (as stated)—some known in a better way than through demonstration, others not impervious to human reason—no small harm is also inflicted on the latter by demonstration. For even in these cases, the conclusive argument is provided by faith alone. Thomas himself adds the reasons for this in the fourth chapter of Book I of *Contra Gentiles*, where he recounts the absurdities that follow if one insists on contending against this truth—chiefly, that faith is rendered pointless where demonstration has conclusive force. Furthermore, very few are able to arrive at religion [in this way], and only after a long period of time.

15. But the greatest issue is that not even these few can pass their lives without the taint of error, since human demonstration either contains much admixture of falsehood or mere probability—which certainly does not deserve the name of demonstration. Thus, according to his reasoning, it would seem that all men, in relation to religion and God Himself, have been punished as if by a penalty. Indeed, what blessed Paul writes to the Ephesians—"That you no longer walk as the Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their minds, having their understanding darkened by shadows"—and what Isaiah says—"And I will make all your children taught by the Lord"—he asserts to amount to the same thing.

16. But if, in those truths concerning God to which human reasoning can scarcely even lightly attain, demonstration must be avoided as harmful—since religion could hardly stand on such a foundation—then we too would seem to err in our minds, "having our understanding darkened," like the other Gentiles. Nor could the divine promise—that "all shall be taught by God"—be fulfilled, since faith would then be useless and void. How, then, will it not be judged the clearest madness, a war against God, and the overthrow of the Christian religion, if those truths which plainly surpass human reasoning and are delivered to men by God only through divine revelation are held in such contempt—as if they were trivial—that they may be entangled in human syllogisms?

17. Consequently, it follows that our hope of salvation would no longer rest in God but in our demonstrations and reasonings, which, according to Scripture, are weak and uncertain, utterly unfit to stand on their own. Indeed, this leads to the absurdity of earlier arguments: for those who think this way either—ignorant of man's limits and fostering diabolical thoughts—compare their own wisdom to the divine and infinite wisdom, or, knowing their own lowly rank, ignorance, and the shadows surrounding them, are blinded to higher lights. Like the Manichaean atheists, they rave, imagining nothing less than that we ourselves are God.

18. Furthermore, although what the Doctors of the Church have said about religion provides probable (not compelling) arguments—as Thomas also holds—yet they retain arguments proper to themselves; for we would not consider their teachings alien. But whatever arguments are brought from without or discovered through human and natural reasoning, even Thomas

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acknowledges these as merely probable and foreign. Only those drawn from Scripture does he call proper and necessary. For he says in the eighth chapter of his second book: "Sacred doctrine uses the authorities of philosophers where they could know the truth by natural reason—as Paul, in Acts 17, cites the words of Aratus: 'For we are also His offspring.' Yet sacred doctrine employs such authorities as extraneous and probable arguments. But it uses the authorities of canonical Scripture properly, arguing from necessity. The authorities of other Doctors of the Church it uses as proper arguments, yet only probably. For our faith rests on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets."

19. Come now, if the arguments of the Doctors—even those who reached the highest summit of holiness or wisdom—cannot furnish necessary proofs for matters of faith (as Augustine affirms in his letter to Jerome, admitting that even they can err, since only Scripture escapes this charge of error), and yet we call their arguments proper, how shall we permit arguments of another kind—which are neither necessary nor proper but wholly alien, deriving from sensible things (for Thomas himself declares that what is not subject to the senses cannot be grasped by the human mind)—how, I say, shall we allow such arguments a place in discussions of faith, especially in those matters where human reason is not even permitted to approach?

20. Moreover, concerning our present question: if we examine syllogisms, since all are either demonstrative or dialectical (for sophistic ones have nothing in common with truth), they are found to contribute nothing to questions about God. But that the present inquiry does not admit of demonstrative syllogisms is clear from this: for Aristotle teaches in the Posterior Analytics that a demonstrative syllogism must proceed from prior, causal, primary, and better-known principles. Thus he says: "The principles will also be proper to what is demonstrated." This is evident in mathematical syllogisms and indeed in all sciences where demonstrative syllogisms apply, since they employ hypotheses, postulates, axioms, and definitions (as Aristotle states), all of which are prior, causal, and better known than what is demonstrated by them. But in arguments about God—the present question—what, pray, will be the hypotheses, definitions, axioms, or prior causes by which the Spirit's procession from the Son could be demonstrated? If such existed, God would no longer properly be called the Principle or the Cause, since He would have as principles things that are the principles and causes of the very arguments concerning Him—for there is a proportion: as arguments to arguments, so also things to things.

21. Further, if we sought to conclude by apodictic demonstration that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, the major premise would necessarily have to be predicated of the middle term universally and univocally—not only in respect to the minor premise but also to other majors of the same genus. But what, in truth, could be of the same genus as the Godhead, when this smacks of blasphemy? Nothing, surely—nor is there anything predicated univocally of God and anything else, for this is impious. When something is predicated univocally of many, each subject

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participates in it (for a species participates in its genus, and an individual in its species). But nothing is predicated of God by participation, for it is utterly absurd that God should participate in anything, since that thing would more rightly be called god. Therefore, it is entirely impermissible to use demonstrative syllogisms in discussions about God.

22. Again, the principles of demonstrative syllogisms are certain general notions derived from sensible things. Hence, even Thomas holds that what does not fall under the senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect. And he says in the thirty-first chapter of Book I of *Contra Gentiles*: "Our intellect, taking its beginning of knowledge from sensibles, does not transcend the mode found in sensible things." But the principles of Christian theology—the dogmas of the Trinity and all things pertaining to the Economy of the Savior—do not take their origin from sensibles, nor are they subject to human reasoning according to its native power, since they come to us from heaven through divine revelation. What, then, do these have in common with those reasonings? Thus, our question lies entirely beyond the scope of demonstrative syllogisms.

23. Add this: to demonstrate something is an operation of the logical intellect, which works through the mind (in intelligible things). But the divine realities we now discuss surpass not only the mind but even the intellect (I mean not only the human intellect but that of the highest angels). They are not merely superior to what understanding can grasp but transcend the very substance of things, standing far above demonstrative syllogisms.

24. Moreover, demonstrations concern things whose principles are presupposed. But the principles of demonstration are definitions, as Aristotle affirms in the *Posterior Analytics*: "We call not only demonstration but also the principle of demonstration that by which we know definitions." Yet to investigate a definition of God is impious, for the divine is found in no genus—otherwise, it would participate in a genus and be posterior to it. Indeed, it would share something common with many others according to generic essence. But where there is no genus, there is plainly no differential either (since differentials are found in genera). Furthermore, if substantial differentials were ascribed to God, He would belong to a species, and that species would more rightly be called god. But these are absurdities. Now, if there is neither genus nor differential, then neither is there a definition—and thus no principle of demonstration, and consequently, no demonstration at all.

25. Again, where there is demonstration, there is also knowledge and cognition; but the infinite cannot be known. The divine, however, is such—for "of His greatness there is no end"—and thus cannot be subject to demonstration. Add also that only what carries potentiality within it can be circumscribed by limits and definitions. But where potentiality is absent, there can be no limit, boundary, or circumscription. Yet in God, potentiality is nowhere found, for nothing imperfect exists in Him. If we conceded this, something would be superior to God (since act, as Aristotle says, is superior to potency), and He would be drawn from potency to act by another actual

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being. For the imperfect is never the cause of its own perfection; rather, what is potential may either be led to perfection or not. But if these cannot apply to God, the Godhead is wholly beyond limitation and every boundary—the infinite Godhead. But we cannot attain knowledge or demonstration of the infinite.

26. Likewise, a demonstrative syllogism shows that something belongs to another by means of a third thing, which is the cause of the predicate's inherence in the subject. No demonstrative syllogism can reach its conclusion without a middle term. But if the Spirit's procession from the Son is supposed, would it not be wholly indecorous to think that He does not proceed from Him immediately but that some other medium and cause exists for why the Son is the Producer of the Spirit?

27. Further, in a demonstrative syllogism, the premises must be causes of the conclusion—not only syllogistically but in reality. Yet in the conclusion stating that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, which premise could be called its cause?

28. Another point: in a demonstrative syllogism, the premises must yield certainty, not mere probability. Certain knowledge arises when both subject and predicate are attained through a middle term that naturally allows both to be known. But to say that the premises of a syllogism demonstrating the Spirit's procession from the Son possess this certainty is impious. We, who are of human nature, lack the faculty to judge such things, so that not even the premises themselves become certain to us. How, then, could such a syllogism be demonstrative?

29. That the syllogistic demonstration of our present question eludes both us and the Latins has now been sufficiently shown. That this question cannot even be resolved dialectically, we have long since demonstrated on multiple grounds—citing the opinions of the Apostles and Doctors of the Church, some of whom hold that syllogisms destroy the mysteries, others that they pervert faith. We have even shown Thomas himself agreeing with them, as he heaps up absurdities resulting from approaching theology armed with syllogisms. In his writings to the Cantor of Antioch on matters of faith, he says: "Thus, our faith cannot be proved by necessary reasons, because it surpasses the human mind."

30. [Missing from the digital scan]

31. [Missing from the digital scan]

32. [First part of paragraph 32 is missing from the digital scan] ... [The argument] draws one premise from Scripture, the other from human reasoning. But apostolic tradition forbids us to dare think anything about the supersubstantial Godhead beyond what has come down to us from Scripture. Moreover, not all truths known in nature necessarily apply to supernatural realities.

33. But the greatest consideration is this: we tremble to hear that Christ wills "not that the mystery of faith be preached in the wisdom of words." And whoever acknowledges—as Thomas says—that the weakness of syllogisms tends rather to distrust in the mystery than to its

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confirmation, and thus does not regard the Latins' human reasonings as true, such a one is not far from our own position.

34. Now, if a dialectical syllogism is constructed from premises admitted by the interlocutor—since the premises the Latins assume as true in their syllogisms (particularly the major premise) are neither proven to us nor, as established above, can ever be proven—does it not follow that even dialectical reasoning is inadmissible in the present question? But it has also been shown that demonstrative reasoning is equally inapplicable. Therefore, since no other form of syllogism is suitable for resolving this matter, whatever syllogistic arguments the Latins employ in these discussions must plainly be dismissed as sophistical absurdities and splendid errors.

35. In short, if the Latins arrived at Christianity through human reasoning and, trusting in it, assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, let them first declare this openly. Let them show that the blessed Peter, to whom the matters pertaining to their Church are traced, likewise structured his sermons in this way, and then let them try to drag us into similar arguments. But if even they do not admit this—knowing full well that human reasonings (from which syllogisms are constructed) are uncertain and weak, and that the human intellect is entirely surpassed by the questions we debate—if they too refuse to "walk, as the Apostle says, like the Gentiles in the vanity of their minds, having their understanding darkened," and instead rely on the oracles of the Spirit to approach faith, recognizing the utter inadequacy of syllogisms and turning their eyes to the Fishermen—then it would be unjust for us to confront divine truth with syllogisms, seeking to grasp it not through those means by which, though obscure, it becomes most clear, but through those by which it is rightly hidden, even if it might sometimes appear lucid and manifest.

36. For this reason, we too—to the best of our ability—have not relied on reasonings to prove that the Father alone is the Producer of the Spirit. Nor have we rashly and ignorantly applied arguments from sensible things to the theology of the Spirit, "anointing our heads with the oil of sinners," as some before us have done. On the contrary, either we have assumed the adversaries' conclusion and investigated what necessarily follows from it (as the divine Basil says in *Against Eunomius I*), or, since apostolic traditions and the decrees of the Councils provided what we sought—and in a manner superior to demonstration—we have advanced further, simultaneously refuting all the arguments devised by our opponents in their interpretation of Scripture, showing their exegesis to be erroneous. If we have occasionally composed syllogistic arguments, this was for clarity—either presenting reason for reason to make the matter more vivid or employing the axiom of contradiction so that even those most inclined to dispute could raise no objection. Thus far, we have set forth all that might generally be said against the Latins' syllogisms. But what is their response to these points?

37. First, they say it is not right to reject demonstrations in theology, for this would amount to removing truth altogether. Second, they claim a demonstration is valid if both premises are

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drawn from Scripture, or if one is from Scripture and the other from necessary and natural principles—and that this conforms to Aristotle's view, since he acknowledges in the Posterior Analytics that in some cases the principles of demonstration may descend from higher truths. Third, they argue that since demonstration sometimes proceeds from posterior and caused things (as Aristotle holds), it would be irrational in divine matters to insist on demonstration from prior and causal principles, rejecting what is valid and demanding what is weak. Fourth, they assert that syllogisms found in theological discourse—particularly those expounded by the Church's teachers—must necessarily be called either demonstrative, dialectical, or sophistical. Yet it is absurd to call them sophistical (for the Doctors' words are not fallacious), nor can they be dialectical (since dialectical syllogisms concern only persuasive and probable matters, which could be otherwise—things wholly alien to the divine). Thus, they conclude, these syllogisms must be demonstrative. Fifth, they add that it should not surprise us if they call syllogisms about God "demonstrative," even though there is no univocal predication common to God and other things (as demonstrative syllogisms require), for they reason about Him as they do about other singulars, like the sun, moon, or heaven. Sixth, they concede that God in His essence is beyond knowledge and demonstration but insist they are demonstrating not His essence but what surrounds it. Seventh, they find it utterly absurd that, while the Church's Doctors constantly use syllogisms in discussing God—and terms like "demonstration" abound in their works (e.g., "this has been demonstrated," or "we will demonstrate below")—we Greeks, as if deliberately opposing them, would strip demonstration from divine matters.

38. Such are the Latins' claims. But let us examine whether their arguments align with truth. Regarding their first point: truth is not abolished by rejecting demonstration; rather, the opposite occurs—where truth is exiled, no place remains for demonstration. Truth extends far beyond demonstration. A syllogism (if confined to its proper limits) may contain truth, but not all truth is reducible to syllogism. The principles and immediate propositions from which syllogisms are constructed are indeed true, but they are not themselves syllogisms. Otherwise, we would have to say that the blessed Paul—who disregarded syllogisms and did not speak "in persuasive words of human wisdom"—failed to express truth in all things. But this is absurd. Those who think this way, elevating demonstrations infinitely, fail to see that by their very love of demonstration, they deprive themselves of it—for there can be no certain science of the infinite.

39. Their second response is partly correct but mostly—or rather, entirely—incorrect. If it were possible to demonstrate the Spirit's procession from the Son by deriving both premises from Scripture, any rational person (myself included) would highly esteem such a syllogism and believe it sufficient to restore the lost peace of the Churches. But since there is no hope of such a syllogism being produced, proclaiming it is useless and leads to error. As for their claim that one premise may be drawn from sacred oracles and the other from natural principles, and that this

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constitutes a demonstration—this is wholly unworthy of those who reverence truth. Aristotle himself in the *Posterior Analytics* clarifies the matter:

40. When one science is subordinated to another (e.g., medicine to physics or optics to geometry), if the subordinate science uses the conclusions of the higher science as its own principles, it proceeds methodically, and no inconsistency arises from borrowing principles (since they are proper and of the same genus), nor from deriving truth from prior truths. Even without such subordination, no harm follows if both sciences use common axioms or symptoms for demonstration, though each receives them in its own way. But if there are no shared axioms, nor any subordination of sciences, the rules of demonstration are entirely violated, and a paralogue (not a demonstration) results when we attempt to prove what belongs to one science by the principles of another. As Aristotle states in the same work: "It is not permissible to demonstrate by descending from one genus to another." And again: "Demonstrations do not pass from one genus to another." Further: "The extremes and the middle must belong to the same genus." And: "Each thing can only be demonstrated from its own principles." And: "We know each thing non-accidentally only when we know it through its proper principles." Again: "Since it is clear that nothing can be demonstrated except from its own principles, if the thing to be demonstrated belongs qua itself, we cannot know it without these [principles], even if the demonstration proceeds from true, indemonstrable, and immediate premises. For such arguments demonstrate universally what may also belong to another thing; hence, they apply to other genera. Thus, the demonstrator does not know the thing qua itself but only accidentally—otherwise, the demonstration would apply to another genus." Finally: "Nothing can be demonstrated absolutely except from its proper principles."

41. If this is so, then we know that Christian theology is a science subordinate to no other. All other sciences, rather, serve it in a ministerial capacity—as Thomas himself admits. The divine Chrysostom not only affirms this but adds that whoever disregards theology's proper principles and seeks to grasp divine truths by mixing human and divine principles strays far from truth, falling into futile and foolish hopes—like "weaving ropes of sand" or building on a foundation of air. Indeed, one might say there is no principle of demonstration common to theology and other sciences. For its theses are received immediately from divine revelation (as Thomas also asserts), whereas the principles of other sciences derive from sensibles and do not transcend the human mind. But as shown earlier, the Godhead is found in no genus, shares no homogeneity with anything, has no predicates, and nothing is predicated univocally of it and anything else.

42. Furthermore—and by God!—if any syllogism were to take one of its premises from Scripture and the other, though true, from natural topical reasoning, for what reason, I ask, should it be rightly and justly granted admission into the Church of God? Perhaps some will assert that this is due to the truth of the premises, since, being true, they necessarily attest to the

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truth of the conclusion. Yet this is not absolutely necessary, most wise sirs! For consider, if someone were to say: “The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three hypostases; but in natural philosophy, three hypostases are always and everywhere three partial essences,” would you declare the conclusion thereby entailed to be true? Indeed, you would, yet this conclusion would be scarcely distinguishable from the ravings of Arius. Similarly, if one were to argue: “The Father and the Son are two hypostases, the one generating, the other generated; but wherever in nature two such hypostases are found, their generation occurs not without passion or corruption, nor apart from a body,” the conclusion that follows would certainly be deemed intolerable to Christian ears. Why then, are not the premises of both syllogisms—one derived from Scripture (namely, the minor), the other from natural topics (the major)—each true, and so much so that none would contest them?

43. Still, they might say—should they wish to appear pious—that it is not necessary for all truths found in nature to hold also in the realm of the supernatural, since in these domains things must rightly be said to function differently. But indeed, since we ourselves affirm the same, it is not fitting that they should be annoyed with us; for if they admit the one, they must also admit the other. If, on the contrary, they reject the latter, how can they maintain the former? Truly, if a conclusion follows entirely from a premise of inferior quality, what then shall be said of those arguments which conclude that the Spirit is from the Son, by deriving their minor premises from the Spirit, but taking their major premises from human reasoning? Clearly, the only thing that can be drawn from such premises is human reasoning itself—weak, uncertain, and insufficient in itself to establish faith. Therefore, if we rely on such teachers in the most exalted matters, we shall seem to be madmen in theological discourse. Hence, as is evident, Aristotle rightly declared: “Demonstration must not only proceed from prior truths, but from first principles, that is, from those proper to the matter at hand; and we cannot have knowledge of what is demonstrated unless it derives from principles proper and of the same genus.” Again he says: “Nothing can be demonstrated except from its own proper principles.” A demonstration of the sort under consideration, he terms “demonstration per accidens,” and he asserts it to be far removed from truth. What then? How shall we be permitted to trust in such syllogisms, regarding the very questions now under dispute, when it is evident that they prove false and misleading even in domains where they are commonly admitted?

44. If they now assert that the major premises of their syllogisms are proper even to theological science—not only true in natural matters but also when speaking of divine realities—they must then first either show that this is explicitly taught or that it can be deduced with necessary consequence from Scripture, or else show what, among the tenets of theology, must be forfeited if one were to deny it. But they will not be able to do so. On the contrary, it is altogether absurd, since the problems under current consideration are, as we have shown, beyond any

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human mind and so vastly superior to it that they cannot be attained by demonstration; it is absurd, I say, to then adopt some syllogisms and reject others, as if the one sort were fit to resolve the absurdities, and the other were not.

45. Nonetheless, nothing in divine matters is such that it could not receive one of its premises from the oracles of the Spirit, and the other from natural principles. But if this is allowed—which in fact must necessarily be allowed—then there would be nothing in divine matters that could not be known by science. And those are plainly mistaken who imagine that divine things are partly proportioned to the human mind (so that they may, to some extent, be possessed and known scientifically), and partly exceed human understanding, as we demonstrated above. Moreover, it has also been shown that even in those matters to which human reason may, in some limited fashion, be applied, necessity does not follow from demonstration, because of the error which, as an inevitable shame, surrounds the very genus of syllogism itself.

46. They might respond that certain commonalities exist between divine things—things superior to us—and natural things (though such commonalities exist only by analogy, not by univocation), and that on the basis of these, one may rightly advance a demonstration toward supernatural matters. Yet first of all, it is the same thing to say that predication does not proceed univocally and to say that demonstration is entirely precluded, since univocal predication is required by the very nature of demonstration. Secondly, even if certain analogical commonalities are found between God and natural things, we clearly observe that even in these, dissimilarity greatly prevails, while the similarity that exists is obscure, tenuous, and such as to be grasped only by conjecture. On these grounds, whoever attempts to argue from such similarity would scarcely give credence even to himself, seeing that because of the overwhelming dissimilarity, he finds himself driven to a conclusion contrary to the one he intended to investigate.

47. For this reason, even Thomas—who had a more thorough grasp of such syllogistic reasoning than anyone—grants that it may be used for the sake of intellectual exercise; but since he deems it weak, infirm, and hardly reliable, he advises that little confidence should be placed in it, nor does he believe that science or demonstration can be attained by such reasoning. For he says in Chapter 8 of Book I of the *Contra Gentiles*: “Sensible things, from which human reason takes its starting point for knowing, retain some trace of divine imitation, yet this trace is so imperfect that it is found entirely insufficient to declare the substance of God.” And again, in the same chapter: “Nonetheless, it is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such arguments, however feeble they may be, provided there is no presumption of comprehending or demonstrating.” Furthermore, even where such arguments are permitted, they are not allowed in all divine matters indiscriminately and without limitation, but only in those where it is permitted to the human intellect—making use of phantasms—to attain something pertaining to God; not, however, in those things that even surpass angelic understanding. Otherwise, what prevents us, if

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these things be granted, from asserting that nothing in divine matters surpasses human reason? Such a position would render the Latins internally inconsistent.

48. Consider further: Geometry and arithmetic seem in many ways to agree; both, after all, are concerned with being and quantity, as genus or subject, though not with the same immediacy. Both also originate from principles of a kind that are not more certain than those grasped by the human mind; and they are found to make use of the same axioms and, so to speak, perceptions. Nevertheless, despite these many commonalities, Aristotle held that it is impermissible to apply arithmetical demonstration to matters pertaining to magnitude, due to the distinct nature of each. If this is true, then how could natural things ever be adapted to those that are established beyond all nature? How could things subject to the intellect be applied to what transcends understanding? Or, to say it simply, how could what is perishable be applied to what is supernatural, or what is not divine to what is divine? These things, clearly, are not comprehended under one genus; to imagine otherwise is impermissible, and if one reflects, it is evident that such things ought not be mingled.

49. Regarding the third point: we certainly do see in some cases that demonstration proceeds from what is posterior to what is prior, as when Aristotle, in his books *On the Heavens*, demonstrated the shape of the moon from its illuminated parts. Indeed, some mathematicians have followed Aristotle in applying the same demonstration, and he stated that there is nothing to prevent, in those things which are predicated of each other, that what is not the cause may nonetheless be more well known. Therefore, that demonstration may proceed in this way should not surprise us; for such syllogisms are employed by those who engage in demonstration. Yet Aristotle himself called the middle term in such reasoning, both in the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, a *tekmérion* (sign), not the middle term of a *dioti*-type syllogism (demonstrating the cause), but of the *hoti* type (demonstrating the fact). Truly, however, when speaking of God, we must never employ this form of reasoning; for in such demonstrations, the things demonstrated are supposed to be proper, of the same genus, and univocal with their principles, and to behave likewise under transposition of terms—none of which, it is said, applies in the case of God and the things of nature.

50. As to the fourth objection: that dialectical syllogisms operate only in the realm of probabilities, ambiguities, and contingencies, even this is not entirely in conformity with the truth. For humans dispute not only about what is probable or can be interpreted in diverse ways, but also about things that are necessary. One example of this lies in the questions of faith which we now discuss; this widespread disputation has made the aid of syllogisms necessary to us, since they must be employed both to argue against adversaries and to preserve the position of the syllogism. Thus, if the matter in question appears not only probable but also necessary, primary, immediate, and proper to the thing demonstrated, so much the better. But even if it appears only

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probable, without those other qualities, provided it is grounded in truth, it still suffices for the purposes of argumentation; for it achieves that which was its intended aim from the beginning. Therefore, it is permissible to dispute syllogistically concerning God—even if not demonstratively—provided that the things assumed can be shown to be probable to one's opponents.

51. However, it is not permitted to extend demonstration to God in the same way as to singular things—such as the sun, the moon, and others of that kind. For what is singular does not pertain to those things that can be spoken of in only one manner; and although the divine is in the highest degree such a singular thing, it is not singular in the same way as created things are. For each of these singular things is something and is said to be a subject; but God is not called something and a subject. For the divine Dionysius, in his treatise *On the One*, says: “That One which is the cause of all things is not one thing composed from many; and although each of these other things is one, they are not infinite; but God is no less all things than He is one—or rather, let me say, He is beyond this oneness and is placed above all multiplicity whatsoever.”

52. In truth, the sun or any other singular entity, even if not directly classified under a highly specific species (since there are no other suns or heavens), nevertheless certainly falls under a more common and universal category of body—whether you call it spherical, light-giving, or uniformly moving—all of which are more general classifications than “sun.” For we demonstrate that those properties which exist per se belong to each of these things, either as a spherical body, or as illuminating, or as moving uniformly; and every thing always shares in some common nature. But to conceive of anything, whether proximately or remotely, as more common or superior to God—would this not seem utterly improper?

53. Moreover, we do not establish demonstrations as though we were discussing this particular sun or this particular heaven, but rather in a simple, universal manner, concerning sun and heaven in general, since what is said of them applies to all such entities, even if an infinite number of suns and heavens were to be counted. However, when dealing with God Himself, it would certainly not be safe to fabricate in our imagination some concept of God upon which to build demonstrations. Furthermore, what inheres in God belongs to God alone; whereas what pertains to any singular entity does not belong exclusively to it, however singular it may be. Let us clarify our meaning with an example: the fact that the equinoctial circle bisects the Zodiac results from the principle that in a sphere, great circles bisect each other. Now, this principle resides in the divine creative mind in a simple, absolute manner; whereas we grasp it only partially, through many discursive steps, with the aid of reasoning, and, I might almost say, as though in an image. When we activate this [principle] and through it examine celestial phenomena, we claim to have derived knowledge from cause, though we have only attained an

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image of the true cause. But since these modes could never be applicable to God, neither by this method can divine matters be subject to demonstration.

54. Nevertheless, let us now proceed to the sixth [point], which asserts that not the essence itself is demonstrable or knowable, but rather that which surrounds it. Against this we must say that this is not peculiar to God alone, but is also most common to all other things. For no essence admits of demonstration; rather, demonstrations concern those attributes that inhere in essences per se. We do not grasp essence itself nor do we know it, since we cannot know with scientific certainty even those properties that belong to it per se. Indeed, those essences that we can apprehend, whether through the senses (as with singular and entirely sensible things) or through judgment and intellect (as with universals and mathematical theorems), of these we can grasp by means of demonstration only their proper accidents, not the essences themselves. For the definition of the essence in question becomes the starting point of demonstration; but that which entirely eludes definition, such that one cannot even glimpse its surface, how could it be possible to know its properties through demonstration? Indeed, what properties per se are to other essences, this is what statements made about the superessential essence are in relation to it; so that divine Dionysius rightly said that God is not knowable insofar as He is One and Triune, and that no mind, even one capable of the deepest insight, can attain a proper concept of His Unity or Trinity. If, then, we are properly incapable of grasping these divine realities about which we now speak, and such statements remain unintelligible and incomprehensible to us, how could things that do not even fall under scientific knowledge be demonstrated, or in what way could they be rendered knowable, when they do not present a tangible surface? Therefore, God, with everything pertaining to Him, must be placed in a higher order than that which is subject to the constraints of demonstration.

55. That certain Doctors of the Church have employed syllogisms in discussing God, and have called these demonstrations, is not surprising; for it is necessary not only to examine the matter itself, but also to consider when or against whom they wrote, or what conception they had of these things. For they did not use syllogisms without lamentation; nor did they use them always, but in times of conflict, when they had to be prepared against heretics who greatly magnified syllogisms and subjected the [Fathers'] arguments to the scrutiny of judgment.

56. This is evident from the following: for when they directed their discourse to their own followers, they declared that they were conducting their discussions in the manner of fishermen, not of Aristotle, as Gregory the Theologian affirms in the second of his orations on peace; indeed, he himself, in his encomium of divine Athanasius, seems to explicitly deplore all these things, calling the crowd of syllogisms in discourses about God mere trifling; he considers the time of their appearance in the Church of God as an era of subversion, just as conversely he hopes for a most blessed day for the height of piety and exaltation of the faith, when even any

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approach to the divine courts will be denied to them. He considers the violence of heretics to be the cause of these [syllogisms], and he seems to long for Jeremiah, so that together with him he might concordantly lament the calamity befalling the Church.

57. Thus he says: "There was a time when our affairs were prosperous and in good order, when namely this superfluous method of treating theology, adorned with the charm and artifice of words, did not even have access to the divine courts; but it was the same thing to play with pebbles that deceive the eye by the quickness of their movement, or to beguile spectators with all manner of lascivious bodily gestures, as it was to say or hear something new or curious about God; simple and ingenuous speech and doctrine, on the contrary, was considered piety. But after the Sexti and Pyrrhonists and the tongue excited by the lust of contradiction, like some grievous or malignant disease, crept into our Churches to our great misfortune; and trifling gained the reputation of erudite doctrine, and, as the Book of Acts relates concerning the Athenians, we are occupied with nothing else than saying or hearing something new. Oh! Which Jeremiah will bewail our confusion and darkness! For he alone knows how to match calamities with lamentations."

58. Now then, if when the affairs of the Church were in a good state and faith was flourishing, simple and ingenuous speech was considered piety, I do not know how one could call that method of treating theology which is adorned with the charm and artifice of words [as truly theological]. But if this has the flavor of novelty and is consonant with heresies, was it not the duty of the Fathers of piety to expel it from the word of faith from the beginning? Indeed, who would use trifles for something necessary? Who of sound mind, on the contrary, would not condemn those things through which that Athenian disease crept into the Christian commonwealth, by which the beauty of the Church has been changed into the ugliness of theaters and stages?

59. He also explicitly shows the same thing in his book on the Holy Spirit: namely, how syllogisms were introduced into the Church by the force of heretics (who were stealing the faith). For he says against them: "Since God is one and one supreme nature, from where shall I represent a likeness to you? Do you again demand that I draw it from earthly and human things? It is indeed very shameful, and not only shameful but also very foolish and vain, to take a simulacrum of superior and heavenly things from humble matters, and [to take] from fluid and fragile nature [an image] of things certain and constant, and, as Isaiah says, to seek the living among the dead. And yet I shall endeavor, since you so wish, to bring some assistance to our discourse from this source as well."

60. Therefore, it would not be just for the Latins to wield arguments drawn from syllogisms against us in the discourses with which they attack us, since we neither ever seek such things, and moreover reject them as dishonorable, useless, and laden with innumerable errors. As we

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have shown, the blessed Chrysostom, recalling the apostolic precept: "Destroying counsels and every height that exalts itself against the knowledge of God," understood this passage of the Apostle as directed against syllogisms. Therefore, no one is deceived when, equipped with the aid of syllogisms, he approaches the investigation of ecclesiastical matters. And lest anyone think that the Doctor's threats are not directed simply against syllogisms, but against those who use syllogisms to lead to falsehood; he says that one should not trust even correct syllogisms. Indeed, as we have declared, they [syllogisms] are charged with impiety by the Great Basil, inasmuch as they deprive Christians of the merits of hope and faith.

61. Now then, if those who more than others employ them in combating heretics have such an opinion of them, and attribute our precarious state, full of calamities and dangers, to their unbridled freedom in the Church; how would it be just to cast to the healthy the food by which the weak are nourished, and to pretend to use the arguments of the doctors, but in reality to apply them in a manner contrary to what the doctors intended? But if we believe that Christ speaks in Paul, and Paul confesses that he was sent by the Lord to preach the Gospel, as we have explained above, not in wisdom of words, lest the weakness of syllogisms should ever bring impotence to Christ's cross (for this is what the 'emptying of the cross' means); and therefore if the Apostle's preaching, as he himself narrates, did not [consist] in persuasive words of human wisdom, so that our faith might not be in the wisdom of men but in the power of God; it is absolutely necessary to fear and draw back and seek justification [for this fact]: by what reasoning did it happen that, with such threats proposed, the doctors still looked to syllogisms?

62. In a word, if they consider the Gospel of Christ and the Apostles to be their own Gospel, what do they have in common with syllogisms? For He who sent the Apostles commanded them the exact opposite. But if they attack us with the weapons of syllogisms, then they do not come bearing the Gospel of Christ. Nevertheless, one should not be disturbed if, although this business of syllogisms is so forbidden where the question concerns the Deity, occasions arise where the Fathers mix it religiously into their works; but either the opportuneness of the economy, or against whom they are composing their orations, or even their own intention must be investigated. For from a long time ago the apostolic custom has been in force, according to which in the difficulties of the times all things must be met with a suitable economy.

63. But what is most important is that one who is prepared to judge rightly must not only look at what has been said, nor at the things themselves, but rather it is necessary to consider the purpose of these things. For who dissolved circumcision or Jewish sacrifices, or called disciples away from legal precepts, more powerfully than Paul, who even dared to resist Peter to his face? Nevertheless, the same man, after the heavenly calling to the apostolic office, circumcised Timothy, and we do not marvel at the deed; nor did he only circumcise, but also shaved his head and offered an oblation, yet we never draw such things into an example, so as to declare from

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this that the Apostle of the Lord was a Jew in faith, but we seek the reason why those things were done, and we investigate the purpose of the action. In this way, all things will become clear to us; and one who turns to the exegesis of blessed John [Chrysostom] will obtain accurate knowledge of this fact, where, in the fifteenth homily, he interprets Paul's epistle to the Romans. For there he will learn from him how far the rule extends by which a matter should be judged. Moreover, the book of Acts of the Apostles is full of many such things, which would be very lengthy to adduce now as examples. Therefore, the Doctors of the Church should not be accused of wrongdoing when they use those things which were in the customs of the Apostles; nor because certain things that appear to have been done by economy in those circumstances should they certainly be judged as contrary to the laws. Nor should one fear that through these the apostolic affirmation is dissolved, which says that our faith is not placed in the wisdom of words, but in the power of God; or even that another divine promise falls, namely, that which says that all will be taught by God.

64. But why do I speak of the Doctors of the Church, as if they necessarily struggled against syllogisms? Even Thomas himself, who breathed syllogisms more than anyone, and whose demonstrative arguments concerning the question now proposed to us we are about to examine, he himself, I say, acknowledges (as we have seen) the great weakness of syllogisms in divine questions. If anyone inquires about the reason why he nevertheless uses them, it will be fair to hear him himself offering the cause. Thus, in the so-called second book, in the question concerning sacred doctrine, in the eighth chapter, he says: "Nevertheless, sacred doctrine also uses human reason: not indeed to prove faith, because this would take away the merit of faith, but to make manifest some other things that are handed down in this doctrine."

65. But in the first book against the Gentiles, in the ninth chapter, he says: "The manner of convincing the adversary... is from the authority of Scripture divinely confirmed by miracles: for those things which are above human reason, we do not believe except by God's revelation. Nevertheless, some probable reasons are to be adduced to manifest such truth, for the exercise and comfort of the faithful, but not to convince adversaries: because the very insufficiency of the reasons would confirm them more in their error, while they would think that we consent to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasons."

66. He added another cause in this passage; for when he had first said about Scripture that although it uses human reasons, it does not do so to demonstrate faith, but to make it manifest, he himself added something else with these words: "for the exercise and comfort of the faithful." And again he says in the eighth chapter of the same book: "...sensible things, from which human reason takes the principle of knowledge, retain in themselves some vestige of divine imitation, yet so imperfect that it is found to be entirely insufficient for declaring the substance of God Himself." And again in the same chapter: "It is useful, however, for the human mind to exercise

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itself in such reasons, however weak they may be, provided there be no presumption of comprehending or demonstrating."

67. Now, if demonstration primarily seeks how to make credible that which is demonstrated, but here exactly the opposite happens, for we are rather led to distrust; if we rebuke those who use demonstration for showing themselves too facile in handling mysteries, how could it be that one who wishes to insert discourses about such things would not flee from it?

68. Therefore, O wise Thomas! if, in attacking your syllogisms by which you strive to demonstrate that the Spirit is from the Son, we call them weak and infirm, and say they are insufficient to induce persuasion in you, who are their father, and not only do they fail to demonstrate the proposition or contribute anything to achieving victory over us, but, because of their poverty and lack of truth, we assert that they rather persuade the contrary of what their conclusion considers true; certainly you ought not to take it badly, either for yourself or for anyone else who speaks on your behalf, since clearly your words, not ours, are being brought forward. And indeed, if someone with a mind not sluggish but rather industrious were to inquire into such matters, he will perceive that the Doctors of the Church, when they establish discussions for their own followers, look to Scripture; but when the discourse is against opponents, since they mostly use demonstration by absurdity, they are accustomed to show that many things are removed from approved foundations if what seems true to the adversaries is supposed; indeed, they strive to dissolve their syllogisms against the truth by demonstrating that there is nothing sound in them. We know that this method is useful not only to theologians and necessary for the investigation of truth, but also for every art and philosophy, as the Great Basil asserts in the first book against Eunomius.

69. That these things are based on truth will be demonstrated by treatises concerning the Son or the Holy Spirit, which, whether you read divine Gregory or Chrysostom, will bear witness to being in conformity with our arguments. With these Thomas also seems to agree in the ninth chapter of the first book against the Gentiles; for he says: "But because such reasons cannot be had for the second truth, the intention should not be to convince the adversary by reasons; but to solve by the truth, which is from faith, his reasons which he has against the truth."

70. But if [the Fathers] also employed categorical syllogisms, this happened rarely, and, as they themselves say, under the provocation of [their adversaries'] force; perhaps also for some exercise and comfort, admitting that which was approved among the disputants, and looking to this one thing, namely, how through them it might happen that someone would be rescued from the waves. Such syllogisms, however, we will in no way call demonstrative, but dialectical, as long as we have our wits about us; for they lack many of those things from which the demonstrative syllogism claims its proper character.

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71. That they themselves are adorned with the name of demonstration by theologians, and that this appellation of demonstration is much used by them, is not surprising. For there is a twofold demonstration: one properly so called, the other common; which usage indeed occurs in writers and orators, and is in use among all those who are engaged in disputations, since they use the expressions "it has been demonstrated" or "it will be demonstrated." But demonstrations which receive necessary force from testimonies and approved arguments, Aristotle in his books on Rhetoric calls simple. Nevertheless, this name has been taken by us in its proper meaning, to distinguish it thus from the other species of demonstration. Rightly, therefore, what is abstracted from all things, we judge to be placed also outside the orbit of demonstration. Nonetheless, it has also been shown that the investigation of the matter we are presently inquiring into should not be subjected even to dialectical syllogisms. Therefore, if it is not lawful for the Latins to draw their conclusion either in a demonstrative manner or a dialectical one, then they ought not to make mention of syllogisms in any way to attack us.

72. Nevertheless, what had to be said in general against the syllogisms of the Latins has been said. I believe the time has now come to insert hands and fight at close quarters, that is, that we should gird ourselves against each of the syllogisms and examine the force of each one. May it happen, with God's help, that both some might attain salvation through us, and that we might have compassion on those who willingly remain ill. Moreover, their errors will be an omen of our happiness, if indeed from the weakness of their faith we shall behold the strength of our religion. Now therefore, the first of the syllogisms that is posed by them, and which they consider to contain so much knowledge that we cannot oppose even a word to it, is of this kind.

REFUTATION XXXV.

THIRTY-FIFTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - FIRST SYLLOGISM

73. This also appears by evident reasons. For in things, once material distinction is removed (which cannot have place in the divine Persons), some things are found to be distinguished only by some opposition. For those things that have no opposition to one another can exist simultaneously in the same thing, and therefore distinction cannot be caused by them; for "white" and "triangular," although they are different, nevertheless, because they are not opposed, they happen to exist in the same subject. But according to the teachings of the Catholic Faith, we must suppose that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son; otherwise there would not be a Trinity, but a duality of Persons. Therefore, this distinction must be made by some opposition. Not by opposition of affirmation and negation, for thus beings are distinguished from non-beings. Nor by opposition of privation and possession, for thus perfect things are distinguished from imperfect ones. Nor by opposition of contrariety, for thus things are distinguished which

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differ according to form: for contrariety, as philosophers teach, is difference according to form. And such difference is not fitting for the divine Persons, since they have one form, just as one essence: according to that saying of the Apostle (Philip. II, 6), speaking of the Son: "Who being in the form of God," that is, of the Father. It remains, therefore, that one divine Person is distinguished from another only by opposition of relation: thus the Son is distinguished from the Father according to the relative opposition of Father and Son. For in the divine Persons there can be no other relative opposition except according to origin. For relatively opposed things are either founded upon quantity, like double and half; or upon action and passion, like master and servant, mover and moved, father and son. Again, of the relatives that are founded upon quantity, some are founded upon diverse quantity, like double and half, greater and lesser; some upon unity itself, like "the same," which signifies one in substance; and "equal," which signifies one in quantity; and "similar," which signifies one in quality. Therefore, the divine Persons cannot be distinguished by relations founded upon diversity of quantity, because this would remove the equality of the three Persons. Nor again by relations that are founded upon unity: because such relations do not cause distinction, but rather are found to pertain to agreement, even if perhaps some of them presuppose distinction. But in all relations founded upon action or passion, one is always as subject and unequal according to power, except only in relations of origin, in which no diminution is designated, because something is found to produce what is like and equal to itself according to nature and power. It remains, therefore, that the divine Persons cannot be distinguished except by relative opposition according to origin. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son, it must be that He is from Him: for it is not possible to say that the Son is from the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit is rather said to be of the Son, and is given by the Son."

SOLUTION TO THE SYLLOGISM, WHERE ALSO CONCERNING DIVINE DISTINCTION

74. This indeed is the argument which, like the others that will follow it, rightly falls under all the accusations already mentioned, since it is entirely contrary both to the Lord's and to the apostolic tradition, inasmuch as it is forbidden to preach the Gospel in the wisdom of words. For it deprives one of the rewards of faith and hope, and moreover it boils a stone, and casts missiles into heaven, and strikes a blow against fire, since what is sought is placed above the human mind and all demonstration.

75. Besides the fact that [this syllogism] is truly not demonstrative, since it is not derived from prior causes, nor are its extremes and middle term of the same genus, but it seems to be some composite monster, since one of the premises is taken from superessential things that transcend intellect, while the other is taken from sensible things. But indeed, according to what was

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explained earlier, it is not even dialectical. By what suitable name, then, shall we call it? We shall certainly relegate it to the sophistical and fallacious, to be reserved for the shadows and for those who conceived it. But if this reasoning could be considered true, if not about superessential things, at least about natural things! But now the obstinacy of error has invaded even these natural things.

76. However, in order that the matter might be placed before our eyes, so to speak, we shall explain the entire syllogism, and in this way we shall detect its fallacy. Thus, the Son and the Spirit are distinguished. And things that are distinguished, if not by material distinction, are certainly diversified by some kind of opposition. The conclusion is evident. Of the foundations of the syllogism, one, namely the minor premise, is drawn from Scripture and has the force of necessity; but the other, which constitutes the major, Thomas, who is the author of such things, neither took from the doctrine of the Spirit, nor did he ever hear it from Ecumenical Councils or from any Doctors. But, clearly, what he found drawn from sensible things, as simply true concerning natural things, he very boldly, not to say unwisely, adapted to theological matters.

77. Consider therefore. Those things that are distinguished, he says, are distinguished by some opposition. This indeed (unless it is affirmed concerning all things) is certainly true; but since the thesis is particular, we have wasted time and effort: for with reasoning proceeding thus, neither will anything necessary be obtained, nor will there be any kind of syllogism. But if it is said universally, what if perhaps anyone would say the contrary concerning souls and angels who, being devoid of matter, are certainly distinguished, but do not admit of material distinction! For if soul is not discerned from soul, or angel from angel, there is no plurality of souls or angels. But these things are absurd: for concerning angels, Scripture says: "Thousands of thousands... and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him." And a similar multitude of souls is counted. But if it is also absolutely necessary that distinction exists in these, we must investigate what kind it is.

78. But certainly in these there is neither any opposition of affirmation and negation by which they are distinguished, for in this way beings are separated from non-beings, as Thomas considers; nor is there an opposition of privation and possession, because thus perfect things are distinguished from imperfect ones, but each of souls, like angels, is counted among perfect things. But neither is there certainly a difference of contrariety, for by this rationale things that are diverse according to form are distinguished from one another, but soul is of the same species as soul, and likewise angel with angel. Moreover, neither is there present that difference which is relative to something, which he calls relative. Not indeed by reason of cause and caused, since angel does not proceed from angel nor soul from soul. Nor does there appear any other reason of relation, which would be placed in action and passion; for in these, as Thomas himself teaches, one is always as subject and unequal according to power, which certainly does not obtain a place

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in the celestial orders or in souls. Certainly, neither is there here another kind of distinction from those which are relative, either of quantity or quality, because angels and souls are of the same form and of the same order to one another, although not all angels are the same. In a word, finally, what kind of relative differences, not accidentally but per se, could be made in angels and souls, is not easily imagined.

79. Moreover, also according to species, ram and goat, and horse and ox are distinguished; but what kind of contrariety, I ask, is given in these, by which species differs from species, as Thomas supposes? For if there is a distinction of contrariety, as in man and horse, which are discerned by rationality and irrationality, there is clearly a distinction according to species; but it is not necessary that where the latter is given, the former is also given. Besides, both white and dark are certainly discriminated, but they would not easily be subjected to the rules of distinctions handed down by Thomas. Therefore, it is necessary either that the aforementioned things are not distinguished, or that the proposed canon is false, which diversifies all things either by material distinction or by one of the modes of opposition. But since those things are distinguished, it remains absolutely to think that this reasoning is not supported by truth in every respect, nor is it a trustworthy judge of things. Thus, not all things that the Latins wish to conclude from these are found to actually have truth.

80. But if they themselves were to respond to these things, saying that angels are not of the same species, nor do they have identity of essence, and therefore they would say that they too are distinguished; and likewise souls, even those separated from bodies, by reason of their propensity toward matter, retain the difference of their proper bodies, insofar as they will take them up again at the time of reintegration; [even then] the argument does not bring force. For, first, let it be conceded to them that it is true that angels differ according to species, but let them tell us, then, what are the contraries by which angel is distinguished from angel; for thus Thomas thinks that those things which are diverse according to species are discriminated, the cause of which he states by adding: "for contrariety, as philosophers teach, is difference according to form." Secondly, there is not even a distinction according to species of those powers; for the laws of the Church do not allow this, as the Great Basil writes in the third book against Eunomius: "All angels, as they have one name, so also they have entirely the same nature in themselves." And divine Cyril in his commentary on the Holy Evangelist John, where he explains that saying of the Baptist: "Because I saw the Spirit descending like a dove from heaven," says thus: "Nor, I think, would one angel differ from another angel by reason of angelic substance, all being collected into one nature from the fact that they are of the same species."

81. Let these things, indeed, be said concerning angels; but with regard to souls, it would be a ridiculous reason to wish to reduce to the same thing both a demonstration arising from natural principles and the dogma of resurrection, which is supernatural, by jumping from one thing to

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another. For the resurrection of bodies, which is proposed by the Church to be believed, is not viewed according to physical reason; but what is contained under it is something alien and very new, and the Holy Spirit has been our teacher in this matter, by whose aid we especially hope both for incorrupt resurrection and for that wonderful transformation.

82. Moreover, Aristotle also says in his treatises on the Soul: "If some operation of the soul is separable from the subject, it is necessary that its substance is also separable." But as the discourse proceeds, he affirms that the intellect is separable, and that it alone is immortal and eternal. And thus indeed, having posited both these arguments, he most clearly concludes that the substance of the soul is separable from the body. This being the case, what then do the offspring of the Latins think about Aristotle? Do they believe that souls separated from bodies are united to one another, and one is made from all, or that all are changed into another species? But both are fraught with absurdity. Therefore, he [Aristotle] judged that souls are immortal and of the same species, and discriminated from one another; but he did not know that there would be a resurrection of the dead, or even that it would happen in the future. Hence, neither do those who think that beings are distinguished as Thomas taught affirm what was approved by Aristotle.

83. Furthermore, in what way do the Latins understand the difference of contradiction, which they exclude from Divinity, but also exclude from things, since they think that by it alone beings are discerned from non-beings? For this would not be conceded by those who think that, both in beings and in non-beings, the true is separated from the false by contradiction. Then, what would they judge about point and line, which are both beings, and are distinguished only by the mode of contradiction? For one is continuous with no interval, but the other is disjoined into one; and a point indeed is a part, but not one [whole], while a line is a magnitude having length, but deprived of breadth.

84. But also those who assert that the Son has all things whatsoever the Father has, except the cause, or even that He possesses all the same things, except only that He is not unbegotten, how then do they diversify Father and Son? Is it not by contrariety? What then? And others affirming that the Father is the only source of superessential Divinity, or that the Son alone is begotten, or that the Paraclete alone proceeds, do they not find contrariety in all these things? But when we say either that man alone is capable of laughter, or that the triangle alone among the remaining figures has three angles equal to two right angles, shall we not seem to talk nonsense if we either believe that things are not discerned, or that they are discerned, but not in the right way?

85. Moreover, the divine Dionysius, when in his treatise on divine union and distinction he discerns the Son from the Father and the Spirit, because the former indeed has assumed a complete and true substance from us, while the Father and the Spirit have not come into our nature in this manner, clearly appears to admit distinction of contrariety even in divine things. For he says: "Furthermore, in the beneficent restoration of us, this task is distinct from the Deity,

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that for us the Word, which is above substance, has assumed from us a complete and true substance of ours, and has done and borne those things which are principal and singular to his human action. These things are in no way common to the Father and the Spirit, unless perhaps one might say by the community of benign and human counsel." Therefore, not all things that the Latins have said about distinction are true.

86. Again, if they were to say that their rule is certainly not true in natural things in every respect, but that when the question concerns superessential things, as in those matters which are now being discussed, it proceeds most correctly; first, it has been demonstrated that this does not hold; secondly, let them produce arguments from which it occurs to them to think such things about the Deity, when natural things so clearly raise their voice against them. Therefore, it remains that they suppose as proven the very things which are being sought; but it seems entirely ridiculous to beg as a principle the very things which lie before us to be demonstrated.

87. Still more: let it be conceded that the argument itself is valid indeed concerning natural things. But when they say in their syllogism that those things which are distinguished are discriminated in this way, do they assert that both divine and natural things are commonly distinguished in this way, or natural things only? Indeed, if only these, their reasoning no longer has any value for the distinction of the Son and the Spirit; but if both these and those are distinguished in this way, let them tell us by what passion they were led (like those who deliberately work evil) to conceal in their rule the diverse processions of the Son and the Spirit from the Father, when no theologian of any age has existed who, desiring to discern the divine Persons according to truth, has thought that the distinction of the Son from the Spirit could exist in any other way than this. Therefore, since the discourse concerns the distinction of the divine Persons, and in the enumeration of the modes by which it is made, the most proper distinction (which was least becoming) is omitted, the major premise is clothed with neither strength nor truth, and therefore the conclusion cannot be effectively drawn.

88. That these things are true, and that their different procession shows us the distinction of the Spirit and the Son, many testimonies are brought forward. To adduce some, Scripture has adorned the Lord with the appellation of Son: "From the womb before the daystar I begot you," it says, and: "Before the hills I was brought forth." But concerning the Holy Spirit, the Lord says: "The Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father." When the first of the Universal Synods heard this: "The Holy Spirit," it says, "not begotten from the Father, but proceeding."

89. But the divine Justin, Martyr and Philosopher, who was very close to the successors of the Apostles, wrote thus: "As the Son is from the Father, so also is the Spirit, except that he differs in mode of existence." And the divine Gregory the Theologian in his oration on the appointment of bishops says: "Whatever the Son has, the same also is the Holy Spirit's, except sonship." And in his oration on Pentecost: "All things whatsoever the Son [has], are the Holy Spirit's, if you

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except generation." But in his sermon on the sacred Theophany: "The Holy Spirit," he says, "is truly Spirit, proceeding indeed from the Father, but not in the manner of sonship, for he is not begotten, but by procession." Lastly, in his oration on Hero [the Philosopher] he writes: "This is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit, that each of them is from the Father. However, the property... of the Son is that he is begotten; of the Holy Spirit, that he proceeds." And the divine John [Damascene], assuming these same things, says: "For although the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, nevertheless not by way of generation, but of procession. This is another mode of existence, equally incomprehensible and unknown." And again: "We have been taught that there is indeed a distinction between generation and procession: but what the mode of this distinction is, we do not know at all."

90. These things being established, if [the Latins] assert that in these passages the Son and the Spirit are not distinguished by the theologians, we shall pity them as insane; but if they say that this was especially intended by the Fathers, then the distinction of the Son and the Spirit must be established, which is supported by sacred tradition; nor does anything compel them either to remain without division, or to be distinguished according to some mode of opposition.

91. Finally, if it is the opinion of the Latins that generation and procession are one and the same thing, there will no longer be anything to contend with those who think either that the Spirit is a son, or that the Son is spirated, who also introduce two Sons and two Fathers in the Trinity, confusing all things. But if generation and procession, just as they are two names, so also seem to them to be two realities, in what way could it be that they speak the truth when they affirm that the Son is distinguished from the Spirit in no other way than that the relation of cause belongs to the former, and the relation of caused to the latter? For "to be generated" and "to proceed" are both mutually diverse, and it is in no way permitted to bring them to any kind of opposition. And yet by such names the diverse modes of existence have been called by those blessed [Fathers]. For Father and Son and Spirit in no way differ by reason of being, or existing, or essence, or however anyone may please to say this thing, for indeed for this reason the Trinity is one God; but as to the mode of existence and in what way each Person has its being, very much so. For just as "the Son is from the Father," Justin exclaims, "so also is the Spirit, except that he differs in mode of existence." And Damascene: "...nevertheless not by way of generation, but of procession. This is another mode of existence, equally incomprehensible and unknown." If these things are most true, who will believe himself to have found another distinction of the Son and the Spirit, who dismisses their different mode of existence?

92. But if perhaps they were to say that even for them generation and procession do not have the same meaning; but that this distinction is insufficient, and not at all adequate to establish a proper difference of the divine Persons; if, I say, they were to say these things, I would doubt whether I should accuse them of madness or of impiety. For did any of the Apostles or their

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successors or Doctors of the Church, did any of the Ecumenical Synods ever utter a word of this kind? For what imperfect or weak thing is it right to find there, whence for others both being and being perfect have emanated?

93. Next, it occurs to the Latins to call that distinction imperfect, I know not why; but according to the apostolic tradition the very same distinction is considered quite sufficient. For the divine Dionysius, establishing the distinction of the divine Persons, says: "The superessential name and reality of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit are discrete, with no reciprocation made in these, nor any community introduced at all." In this place the Father is discriminated both from the Son and from the Spirit, and the Son also from the Spirit. But the Father is discerned from the Son by reason of opposition, namely, that which is according to relation to something; but the Father from the Spirit, or even the Son from the Spirit, are certainly distinguished, but in no way by any opposition: for the Father is not the father of the Spirit, since neither is the Spirit a son. Now, if the Son is one thing, and the Spirit another, and from this the Apostles most clearly derive the difference, where in these is cause and caused found? But if the Son is indeed called Son because he flows forth by way of generation, and the third Person is called not son, but Spirit, because of that ineffable procession, and precisely by these names the divine Persons are discerned by the Apostles, who will be so audacious and so expert in theological matters as to think that their theology is imperfect and not at all sufficient?

94. Furthermore, if to the successors of the Apostles the Son seems to be distinguished from the Spirit by diversity of procession, and in no other way; if, as they note in advance, so by them both the union and the distinction of Persons in the divine are established, namely as they are in themselves either united or distinct, I truly do not know against whom the Latins wage war. For either they say that the doctrine of those men is not safe or apt in all respects (by which reproach the Apostles themselves are also punished, and through them the word of the Lord also comes into judgment, who promised that the Holy Spirit would teach them all truth, or what is the same, perfect theology); or, if they deny this, it is absolutely necessary that the war be laid aside. Otherwise their reproach will also run to divine things, as being distinct by another reason, which would have been necessary, and which moreover would not be able to be consistent with themselves.

95. But indeed when the Lord delivered the mystery of baptism to the Apostles, and announced that it was to be administered in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, he seems most clearly to have distinguished himself from the Spirit through generation and procession, since he who is the Son is [constituted] by generation, but he who is not the Son, by procession. Therefore, while we are in our right minds, we ought not to think that this distinction is imperfect.

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96. Still more. Why does this difference appear imperfect to the Church of the Latins, but that which is according to cause and caused is perfect? For the complete opposite occurs. And certainly when in Christian theology two things must necessarily be presupposed, namely that there are not two Sons, and that the Son is distinguished from the Spirit, we find that the diverse mode of their existence is sufficient for both matters. For if the Son exists by generation, but the Spirit not in this way, it clearly comes about that both there are not two Sons in the Trinity, and the generated Person is separated from the non-generated. On the contrary, if the Spirit were from the Son, distinction would necessarily follow, since one would be the cause, the other from the cause; but whence, I ask, would it be clear that the Spirit is not a Son, unless the mode of procession were added, since certainly the Spirit would receive existence from the Son, and would receive it in that way, by which the Son draws it from the Father? Therefore, the distinction which is taken from the different modes of procession is sufficient for preserving both foundations; but that which is asserted from cause and caused cannot be considered sufficient except by failing one or the other. Why, therefore, shall we not exchange the terms, and consider our distinction to be perfect, needing nothing, and alone accommodated to Christian theology; but concerning the other of cause and caused we shall think precisely the contrary, and therefore that it is not worthy of obtaining any entrance to the Church of God?

97. Furthermore, it is as proper to the Son that he is begotten, as it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten or to beget, and of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds. But the Father in relation to the Spirit and to the Son, and likewise the Spirit in relation to the Son and to the Father, are perfectly distinguished by their properties. Indeed, also each of natural things is similarly separated from others by attributes proper to itself, and nothing at all can be adduced that would be removed from this rationale, provided that what is said to be proper to each one continues to be truly proper to the same. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that this be verified also concerning the Son, since we assert that ineffable generation belongs to him alone. Now, if the Son according to the property inherent in him were indeed distinguished from the Father, but in no way from the Spirit, or at least not completely; then certainly not even that by which he is Son, as insufficient for distinction, would truly be called proper to him. But if this does not hold, then neither is the Son truly a hypostasis, since he certainly has that which is common to divinity, but lacks especially that in which his property consists. For thus the Fathers, by joining what is common with what is proper, defined the divine hypostasis, so that, if "to be begotten" is a property of some divine Person (and the properties of the Persons are sufficient for distinction, namely, of each from the other two), certainly "to be begotten" is also a most sufficient property, by which the Son is distinguished both from the Father and from the Spirit. Therefore, "to be begotten" and "to proceed" in no way constitute an imperfect difference, but a most sufficient one, however differently it may seem to the Latins.

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98. But the (I know not what name to call it) discrepancy, or contention, or perversity of the Latins toward the faith of the Church must be placed in a clearer light. For Thomas in the seventh chapter said: "The Holy Spirit cannot be called the Spirit of the Son of God according to any other relation except according to some origin: because this is the only distinction found in divine things." And in the present chapter he says: "It remains, therefore, that the divine Persons cannot be distinguished, except by relative opposition according to origin." But these things indeed are his; but to the Doctors of the Church, if one takes the beginnings of inquiry from the Apostles, such things in no way seem to conform to the truth. For to them the diversity of the modes of existence of the three divine Persons was so sufficient for their difference that, although in these modes that relative opposition is in no way present, nothing more was to be required.

99. But the matter is manifest. For just as, as has been demonstrated, "to be begotten" and "to proceed" are diverse modes of existence for the Son and the Spirit, so also the Great Basil attributes to the Father, as a mode of existence, that he is unbegotten. For he says in the first book against Eunomius: "Moreover, he who says that to be without beginning is essence, does not differently than if someone, when asked what was the essence of Adam and what his nature, were to respond that he was formed not from the intercourse of man and woman, but by the divine hand. But, someone will say, I do not inquire about the mode by which he subsists, but the material subject itself of man: which I am far from learning from the response. This also happens to us, when from the word Unbegotten we are taught more how God is, than what his nature is." Thus, therefore, through the property of Unbegotten, the mode by which the Father exists is demonstrated.

100. These things being established, then, let us see what theologians have taught concerning the distinction of the divine Persons. Let us consult the divine Gregory, who in his orations on the Son, defining our theology, says: "Therefore, containing ourselves within our own limits, we introduce the Unbegotten and the Begotten, and the One proceeding from the Father, as somewhere God himself and the Word pronounced." And again, the same in his oration on the [Holy] Spirit: "Rather, from these words: that he is not begotten and that he is begotten and that he proceeds, this is effected that one is called Father, another Son, another Holy Spirit, and thus the unmixed distinction of the three Persons... is preserved."

101. But the blessed John the Syrian, as if demonstrating the incommunicable difference of the divine Persons, speaks in this manner in the eighth chapter of his theological works: "Again, it is because of the Father that the Son has whatever he has, and the Spirit; that is, because the Father has these: except, however, the properties of unbegotten, begotten, and procession. For in these properties only are the three Persons of the Holy Trinity distinguished from one another." These, therefore, are the leaders of our faith, when they intend to discriminate the divine hypostases; nor

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is that difference of relative opposition found anywhere in these places. For neither is the unbegotten separated from the begotten relatively, nor certainly in this way from the proceeding in any mode; but neither is the latter distinguished from the begotten in this way. But the Latins fabricate the complete opposite, since they say that the divine Persons can be discriminated in no other way, except according to some cause: "because this is the only distinction found in divine things." Now when the opposition is evident, whom shall we judge to be superior? I indeed would cast my vote for the Doctors. Therefore, we shall not distinguish the divine Persons by relative opposition alone; but we say that for some, distinction which imports relation, and indeed necessarily, is fitting, as are Father and Son, spirator and spirated; but to introduce this for all, we consider unlawful.

102. Nevertheless, the Latins would perhaps say that it is one thing for the Son to be Son, and another for him to be Spirator (if indeed the Spirit is from him); for as he is Spirator, he is [related] to the Spirit, as he is Son, to the Father; but he is distinguished from the Spirit as to both. But then, one of the distinctions would be relative, because the Spirit is spirated: but insofar as here the Son, and there indeed the spirated is posited, relative distinction would no longer be had; and therefore we would be compelled in no way to place any distinction, according to their hypothesis, under the order of relative opposition.

103. Again. The Latins indeed assert that for the discrimination of the divine Persons it is not sufficient that the modes of existence are diverse; but to the successors of the Apostles those seemed plainly apt. For the divine Justin says in the third chapter on faith: "Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding do not declare essence, but signify hypostases. For they are enough for us to discern the Persons; and they particularly indicate the hypostasis of each, of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." How, therefore, can such a great discrepancy from the apostolic traditions be tolerated?

104. And again the same [Justin] in the third chapter on faith: "Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding," he says, "are not names of essence, but modes of existence, and by these names the mode of existence is denoted; but the notion of essence is signified by the appellation of God, so that the Father indeed has a difference from the Son and from the Spirit according to the mode of existence, but an identity according to the reason of essence. As he indeed has being unbegottenly, but this one begottenly, and the Spirit by proceeding, difference is wont to be observed in these." Where in these is relative opposition? Where cause and that which flows from cause? But Thomas says: "The divine Persons cannot be distinguished, except by relative opposition according to origin." Therefore, it is just that we, while turning our eyes to the Apostles, should not receive those words.

105. Add, I beg, this: since in the Deity not all distinctions can be reduced to relative ones, as we have shown, we assert that all those are equal for distinguishing, and we neither blame nor

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will blame any of them, while we continue to be in our right minds, since in them nothing imperfect or ineffective is found, nothing at all that would deservedly merit reproof. But the Latins, who indeed reject some as imperfect, but introduce others through their herald, namely those which are according to cause and caused, would perhaps be believed to have erred less, if they were to say that with superior right those are apt for distinction, but not so much these, which are repeated from cause and caused. For what reason? Because these indeed, although they are able to discern, are nevertheless suitable also to lead to union; but those which are not according to cause, discern only, they do not unite at all; which certainly is more apt than the former for establishing distinctions.

106. From this the matter will be clear: for Father and Son are both distinguished and certainly united according to the same thing. For what will bear closer to the rationale of unity and communion in nature, than that the former indeed has begotten, and the latter exists as begotten? For the divine Gregory says in his oration on the Son: "Therefore he seems to me to be called Son, because he is the same in essence with the Father; and not only that, but also because he is from him." In this place indeed the notes of both union and distinction appear: for when the Doctor had stated that he is the same in essence with the Father, he added: "and not only that, but also because he is from him"; which certainly contributes to distinction. But in his oration on the Holy Spirit: "For it is not because, according to some higher relation, the Son is Son (which, clearly, we could not indicate otherwise than in this way, that which is from God, and the same in essence with him), that we should therefore think that all earthly names of our relationship must necessarily be transferred to God." In this passage, on the contrary, he first indicated the distinction, by using those words "from God"; but he added what infers union with the expression "and the same in essence with him." It is right to say the same also concerning the spirator and the spirated. But "Unbegotten," "Begotten," and "Proceeding," each in relation to another, show only diversity, not indeed any identity; so that, if it were permitted to the Latins in general to adduce distinctions superior to distinctions and to pronounce judgment concerning them, it would be more opportune rather to select those which present the difference of modes of existence, as apt only for distinguishing; while others have not only this, but also aptitude for union with themselves.

107. Finally, the divine Dionysius, as was demonstrated in the second treatise, when he had announced that he was about to institute a discourse concerning all divine unions and distinctions, and had promised that he would preserve unmultiplied and unchanged those things which exist in Scripture concerning these matters, appears nowhere to have discriminated the Son from the Spirit by reason of cause and caused; therefore, he did not find this distinction in the Scriptures. Therefore, in general he might quite rightly say that one should not dare either to say or to think anything about the mystery of the Trinity, beyond what has been declared by the

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[Holy] Spirit. But if it is wrong to think that distinction of cause and caused concerning the Son and the Spirit, because it is not found in the Scriptures, but the other, which is derived from the difference of processions, is considered by the Latins and by Thomas as imperfect and insufficient, therefore the Son and the Spirit are not distinguished at all, nor is God a Trinity. But indeed this produces absurdity. And indeed since not only have "to be begotten" and "to proceed" been demonstrated to be apt for distinction, but also we have been taught this one distinction by the divinely inspired Scriptures; but the Latins utter something entirely contrary to these, what then could be done about such a great anomaly? Wherefore, the divine Gregory explicitly suggesting this very thing, namely that the Son is not distinguished from the Spirit except according to the diversity of emanation, now indeed says: "Whatever the Son has, the same also is the Holy Spirit's, except sonship," and now: "All things whatsoever the Son [has], are the Holy Spirit's, if you except generation." Come now, if the Son is also the author of the [Holy] Spirit, that reasoning does not proceed at all truly: all things that are the Son's are also the Spirit's, except generation, since it is very dangerous for the Spirit also to be a cause. But concerning the distinction of the divine Persons, let these things suffice.

Here is my translation of St. Neilos Kabasilas's Latin text into modern academic English:

108. Now, to encompass the entire matter in a few words, even if everything that has been said by the Latins and by Thomas on this subject were supported by truth, and if all things both divine and human were in agreement with his opinions; even if there were nothing that could be set against his reasonings, still these arguments that he constructs would not possess compelling force. For if someone, based on those suppositions, were to concede all those points, it would necessarily follow that the distinction between the Son and the Spirit would have to be placed in the relationship of cause and effect. However, the assertion that the Son is the cause and that the Spirit proceeds from this cause is no more valid than its opposite; since even we, under their position, could just as readily demonstrate that the Spirit is the cause from which the Son might be said to flow.

109. But if they should respond thus: "But this cannot be admitted, because the Spirit is indeed said to be of the Son and is given by him, but the opposite does not hold true"—this argument will not carry force, for it has been demonstrated that the Holy Spirit is neither named as belonging to the Son nor given by him by reason of causality. If, however, they should counter again that it is expressly forbidden to say that the Son is from the Spirit, we will likewise respond that it is explicitly prohibited to affirm that the Spirit is from the Son, and that the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit.

110. Yet if they should still argue: "But the faculty of generation belongs to the Father alone, and therefore would in no way be fitting for the Spirit as well, such that the Son would proceed from him; therefore the opposite must be true: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son." But

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neither does this attain necessary force among them. For just as it is explicitly stated that generation belongs to the Father alone, so it is also written that the Father alone is the fountain of divinity, and that the Son possesses all things that are the Father's except causality, and that the Father alone is cause. Therefore, since all these are stated similarly, if we believe that being the fountain and cause of divinity is common to the Son, why would we not think that the power of generation is also common to the Holy Spirit? But truly if this is impermissible, so plainly is that; for each of these has been shown to constitute properties of the Person of the Father, by which he is distinguished from the Son. Therefore, there is nothing sound, not even minimally, in this syllogism; hence the Latins must look to another argument, since their proposition is not supported by the arguments pursued in the first place.

REFUTATION XXXVI.

THIRTY-SIXTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - SECOND SYLLOGISM

111. Similarly. As the one who spirates relates to what proceeds and spiration relates to procession, so too does the one who generates relate to what is begotten and generation relate to being begotten. When four terms maintain a proportion, this proportion can be given reciprocally [between the terms]. Therefore, it can be held: as the one who spirates relates to the one who generates, so does what is begotten relate to what proceeds. Thus, whatever difference exists between the one who spirates and the one who generates, precisely the same difference will exist between what is begotten and what is spirated. But the one who spirates and the one who generates, although they are distinguished, are by no means sufficient for distinguishing Persons, since they are observed in one and the same Person, namely that of the Father. Therefore, their opposites—I mean being begotten and proceeding—will in no way be adequate for distinguishing Persons, even if they are distinct from each other. Thus, either some relation must necessarily exist between the Son and the Spirit that separates the Persons, or there will be no other extreme, and the Son could in no way be distinguished from the Spirit. But if this appears utterly blasphemous, it remains that the other must be conceded, namely, that relation; which is nothing other than the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER: AND FURTHER CONCERNING DIVINE DISTINCTIONS

112. This argument too, drawn from worldly wisdom, has been introduced into Christian theology for reasons unknown to me, and strives to displace divine tradition, as if the latter were inadequate and imperfect for declaring the distinction between the Son and the Spirit. Indeed, it attempts to impose its own deformity upon the faith. However, it is found to be fallacious not

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only in supernatural matters but also in natural things themselves. It is evident: for I plainly acknowledge that this reciprocal relation is true in certain cases, as it is shown to be so regarding the terms of magnitudes and numbers, whether one seeks arithmetic or geometric means.

113. But just because this correlation is found to be true concerning some things, it should not therefore be generalized; for if four terms are given in mutual relation such that: as the first is to the second, so the third is to the fourth; it does not follow from this that the proportion must similarly exist when the terms are interchanged, so that one could also say: as the first is to the third, so also is the second to the fourth. For this is untenable, and no one of sound mind would say it involves necessity. Indeed, if this reciprocation were simply true of all things, it would have to be verified in particular cases as well; but even if it is necessary regarding some, it will not yet be indicated that this argument is true regarding all things. Since this is not demonstrated in any way, nor can it lead to scientific certainty, a dubious argument will thus be obtained even concerning natural things, and conclusions drawn from such reasoning will in no way be necessary. But to say that because the reciprocation holds true for magnitudes and numbers, it must also be true for the terms we are now examining, namely, generating and being begotten, spirating and proceeding, is an absurd line of reasoning. For these are neither numbers nor any kind of magnitude, nor does their relation consist in numerical ratios or differences. It remains, therefore, that these arguments request indulgence from their hearers, to whom this method of demonstration appears quite ridiculous.

114. That it is not necessary for this reciprocation to be verified simply in all cases will be clearly evident from the following. For these concepts are opposed: as the uncreated relates to the created, so also does the incorruptible relate to that which suffers corruption; but a similar relation would not be preserved by interchanging the terms. For this does not hold: as the uncreated relates to the incorruptible, so does the created relate to the corruptible; since what is uncreated will also be incorruptible, but what is created is not necessarily also corruptible, as angels or souls could attest. Again, let these terms be posited: as the first and second, animal and non-animal; as the third and fourth, animate and inanimate. Indeed, these cannot be interchanged in any way. For this is not valid: as animal relates to animate, so does non-animal relate to inanimate; since animate necessarily follows from animal, but what is inanimate does not in the same way follow from non-animal, for plants are not animals, yet they are certainly called animate. Similarly, an astronomer relates to astronomical science just as a general relates to military affairs; but the correlation is destroyed if we say: as an astronomer is to a general, so is astronomy to military science. For an astronomer and a general can be one and the same person, but strategy and astronomy are recognized as entirely different disciplines.

115. Moreover, to avoid saying too much, this conversion does not even exist regarding proportions, such that it is not simply true unless the magnitudes are assumed to be

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homogeneous. Indeed, if someone wished to compare a straight [line] and a circle, they would establish this proportion: as a straight line relates to a part of itself, so also does a circle relate to what is proper to it. But if the terms were interchanged, the proportion would not be preserved; for how could this find a place where it is not even possible to establish a ratio? Since those magnitudes are said to have a [mathematical] ratio to each other which, when multiplied, can be mutually superimposed: which indeed cannot occur in any way between a straight line and a circle.

116. But there is more. For if, according to their reasoning, we were to say: as the creator relates to creation and creating relates to being created, so do the one who generates relate to what is begotten and generating relate to being begotten; what would they respond? Would the proportion be preserved even with the terms interchanged? Certainly if they respond negatively, seeing the falsity, they are caught; but if they affirm it absolutely, then according to their thinking there is no distinction between something generated and a house, one of which comes about through generation and the other through production, because it is possible to contemplate both together in one and the same being—I mean generating and creating the world. But these notions are absurd. And if they are considered true, they will contain an obvious blasphemy, for it would be the same as affirming that the Son and creation are not distinguished at all (although the former is begotten and the latter is produced), because it is necessary that God [Creator] and Father are one and the same.

117. But if someone says that a material distinction intervenes here, the argument is inappropriate. For it follows that the Son and creation, if matter were not present, would not be distinguished. But what could they say concerning the Son and creation conceived only in the mind, where matter is not present? Thus, it will be necessary that, if the reciprocation of terms is preserved, the Son would not be discerned from creation as mentally conceived; which indeed could never have been said even by the devil. In fact, it happens that a geometer and a mathematician are the same; but matters pertaining to geometry should not be adapted to arithmetic ratios, as Aristotle instructs. Now, if these are full of absurdity and positioned contrary to the consequence of things; if they lead to impiety, it is altogether necessary, according to divine traditions, to say that the Son and the Spirit are diverse because of their diverse modes of existence, even though generating and spirating are understood to be in the same Person of the Father; since both the Apostles and their successors, and simply the teachers of our theology, indeed even the Lord himself, as we have shown, distinguished the Son and the Spirit through generation and procession, even though they well knew that the faculties of generating and spirating are contemplated together in the one Person of the Father.

118. Furthermore, it is false that those things which are conceived in one and the same person are insufficient for distinction; for concerning most men, I might almost say, both being begotten

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and begetting are verified. Therefore, if this reasoning were valid, we would in no way distinguish man from man through cause and effect; but the loss will extend to the Deity, and we will not distinguish the Father and the Son, or the Father and the Spirit, relationally, since Thomas and the Latins know how to take topical premises for their syllogisms from natural things and matters that concern us.

119. And certainly, if generating and proceeding diversify the Father and the Spirit, and therefore those cannot concur together, why, someone might say, O Thomas, best of men, do the opposite properties, that is, spirating and being begotten, not also distinguish the Father and the Son (according to your hypothesis)? Here too it is impossible for these to be united into one.

120. But indeed, if Thomas considers his reasoning immovable, and that the Son and the Spirit cannot be discerned through generation and procession because the opposite properties of generating and spirating do not at all divide Persons, insofar as both are said of the one Father, let him then follow his own laws: and if indeed he believes that both being begotten and spirating are found in the one Son, and it is impossible for Persons to be distinguished from these, then neither should he contradistinguish the Father from the Spirit by the opposites, I mean generating and proceeding; as if it were possible for these to coalesce into one, namely: either for the Father not only to generate but also to proceed, or for the Spirit not only to proceed but also to be able to generate.

121. But if this also seems absurd to them, as it is a very clear overthrow of Christian theology; if they also believe that such properties cannot stand together, then they should in no way believe that those which are opposed to these, that is, being begotten and spirating, are both predicated of the Son. And yet to strip the Son of the property by which he is begotten is the same as asserting that the Son is not the Son. Therefore, it is altogether necessary that spiration is in no way attributed to him. But if in general the argument from correlation has been found to be false, and it is improper for the Latins to demonstrate their point from other premises, namely, that proportion: as generating relates to spirating, so also being begotten relates to proceeding; since moreover nothing is concluded except from some universal principle, then the Latins have arrived at these conclusions not at all by the force of reasoning, but solely by their own volition.

122. Furthermore, even if we were to concede that correlation is mutual and true in all natural things, not even then would the Latins justly compel us to embrace their conclusion; for the premises are not proper and of the kind that is accommodated to theology, as was said in what precedes, where we demonstrated that the necessity of the argument is frustrated especially on this account. Besides the fact that if we fully trust syllogisms formed in such a way that one premise is taken from the Scriptures and another from common intelligible concepts, an extreme danger is run, as has been both affirmed and demonstrated.

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123. Nevertheless, the emptiness of this arrogant correlation could be seen here too, and most clearly. For it seems to take upon itself what is said of the wicked, namely that he is wicked even to himself. For if someone, applying proportion in turn, were to say: as the begotten relates to the one who generates, so also does the one who proceeds relate to the one who spirates, it will not be permitted to interchange the terms so that the result is: as the begotten relates to the one who proceeds, so also does the one who generates relate to the one who spirates; for he who is begotten cannot be proceeding, but the one who generates must also be the one who spirates.

124. Moreover, what was said in the preceding chapter, we will also affirm now, asserting that this argument has probability in almost every one of the syllogisms about which a question is raised: for if someone were to concede that this correlation exists everywhere, and indeed that it also holds a place in supra-essential matters, and were to say that nothing absurd flows from these arguments, and that no theological affirmation is supported, it would indeed be concluded from these syllogisms that different modes of existence are not fully sufficient for the distinction of the Son and the Spirit, but whether the Spirit proceeds from the Son would, even under these suppositions, be investigated in the same way as if someone were to ask whether the Son also comes from the Spirit. Hence, even if we had nothing else to say about these syllogisms, it would certainly suffice to persuade the Latins both to be silent and to trust in anything rather than in those arguments. Therefore, their goal could not be obtained by this syllogism.

REFUTATION XXXVII.

THIRTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - THIRD SYLLOGISM

125. Similarly. The Son and the Holy Spirit are from the Father. Therefore, the Father must be related both to the Son and to the Holy Spirit as a principle to that which is from the principle. He is related to the Son by reason of paternity; but not to the Holy Spirit, because then the Holy Spirit would be a son: for paternity is not predicated except in relation to a son. Therefore, there must be another relation in the Father, by which he is related to the Holy Spirit, and this is called spiration. Similarly, since there is a certain relation in the Son, by which he is related to the Father, which is called filiation, there must also be another relation in the Holy Spirit, by which he is related to the Father, and this is called procession. And thus according to the origin of the Son from the Father there are two relations, one in the originator, the other in what is originated, namely, paternity and filiation; and two others from the aspect of the origin of the Holy Spirit, namely, spiration and procession. Paternity and spiration, therefore, do not constitute two Persons, but pertain to the one Person of the Father, because they do not have opposition to each other. Neither, therefore, would filiation and procession constitute two Persons, but would pertain to one, unless they had opposition to each other. But there can be no opposition given

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except according to origin. Therefore, there must be an opposition of origin between the Son and the Holy Spirit, such that one is from the other.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

126. This reasoning is somewhat similar to the preceding one; therefore, to refute it, those things that were said against the former will also suffice. The difference, however, is in this: that the former at least wore the appearance of argumentation, namely, by reason of that axiom of reciprocation; but now not even this is granted. For it is thought that it cannot likewise be concluded that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by filiation and procession, since not even through paternity and spiration, that is, through the act of generating and spirating, are two Persons constituted. But that is as if someone were to think that theological science cannot be distinguished from mathematical science because Hierotheus or Dionysius might both be called mathematician and theologian. For this is how the reasoning stands.

127. That something can be produced in diverse ways can certainly happen, as is evident not only in God, who produces those things that exist from himself in diverse ways, but also in creatures; but that those things which are variously produced constitute one entity, because they are judged to be from one source, is improbable and contrary to reality. For God both creates and begets; but what does the Son have in common with creatures? By similar reasoning, one and the same man both cultivates the land and builds a house; but the fruits [of the earth] and the house differ in every respect. Fire also heats and illuminates and softens and dries; but are those things suited to light and those things that liquefy and are hot and dry identical!

128. Similarly. That which is changed in diverse ways is plainly said to be one according to accident, and not per se; for the same thing can receive both heat and whiteness, because that affection is not of the essence, but concerns what is around the essence. Thus, for example, Aristotle in his books of Analytics states that the musical and the white are one because they pertain to one and the same thing, but by no means per se, inasmuch as whiteness and heat are diverse in species, just as sight and touch do not have identity. Now, if those things which are brought about in diverse ways in accidental matters cannot constitute one thing per se, in vain would we concede this very thing when dealing with the Son and the Spirit, on the grounds that they receive existence from the Father in various ways; for that which is one cannot have diverse modes of existence, since to those having a single unity there belongs entirely and in every respect one existence.

129. Moreover, Thomas himself said that the mode of divine generation and the mode of procession are diverse. For he says this when he posits paternity and spiration, in no way conceding that the Father is related to the Spirit by reason of paternity, lest the Spirit also become

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a son. But indeed, the diversity of modes must undoubtedly be believed to be entirely sufficient for distinction without any doubt.

130. But if they were to say that not all things that are diverse are apt for distinction, for the white and the hot and the musical, even if they are diverse, are nevertheless not equal for distinguishing, since the same thing can be both white and hot and musical. But, first of all, we did not affirm this simply about things that are diverse, but about those in which there is a diversity of existence. Then, that the white and the hot and the musical are one is by accident, and not per se. But where nothing accidental whatsoever occurs, it is not permitted in any way or by any reasoning to imagine either that the Son is spirated or that the Spirit is a son. Thus, this reasoning of the Latins does not seem to conform to the truth, since even in natural things one and the same thing can be produced in diverse ways, without it being necessary that those things which are derived from it come together into one.

REFUTATION XXXVIII.

THIRTY-EIGHT CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - FOURTH SYLLOGISM

131. Furthermore. Whatever things share something in common, if they are distinguished from each other, must be distinguished according to certain differences that pertain to that common element essentially, not accidentally. For example, humans and horses share in being animals, and they are distinguished from each other not by white and black, which are accidental to animal nature, but by rational and irrational, which pertain essentially to animal nature. Since an animal is that which has a soul, the distinction must be based on having a particular kind of soul, namely rational or irrational. It is manifest that the Son and the Holy Spirit share in common the fact of being from another, since both are from the Father; and accordingly, the Father appropriately differs from both insofar as He is unbegotten. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is to be distinguished from the Son, this must be through differences that essentially divide this common element of "being from another." These differences can only be differences of the same genus, namely, pertaining to origin, such that one of them is from the other. It follows, therefore, that for the Holy Spirit to be distinguished from the Son, it is necessary that He be from the Son.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

132. This argument also comes from the same arena, as they say. Indeed, the Son and the Spirit share in common that they are from another, namely from the Father, since both are from the Father. The Spirit and the Son are also distinguished from each other. But as for the claim that whatever things share something in common, if they are distinguished from each other, must be distinguished according to certain differences that pertain to that common element essentially

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and not accidentally; and that, with respect to the Son and the Spirit, these differences can only be of the same genus, that is, those that refer to causality—this claim, I ask, from where is it derived? From what source? From Scripture or from human reason?

133. Yet even the Latins themselves would not deny that such matters are in no way drawn from the Scriptures. It remains, therefore, that we exercise reason by examining each point. Now, this holds true when speaking of humans and horses, since they share in common their animality and are divided by certain differences, namely rationality and irrationality, which pertain essentially and not accidentally to that common element, which is animal nature.

134. Indeed, this reasoning can be said to hold true for other things as well. But whether it is possible to apply the same reasoning in all cases is certainly questionable. To use examples, rams and goats, and horses and donkeys, both share something in common, which is animal nature, yet they are not distinguished by any differences according to which that common element would be divided essentially and not accidentally. For each of these is irrational, and therefore it is not necessary that they be distinguished by having a soul of one kind or another, and by the difference that Thomas called "essential." Therefore, it would be proper for him to identify such differences, because otherwise, according to his reasoning, neither would a ram be distinguished from a goat, nor a horse from a donkey.

135. Let the Latins likewise produce the differences between Peter and Andrew, who are distinct individuals, according to which their common element—human nature, or Jonah from whom they were begotten—is essentially and not accidentally distinguished. Dark and light are both divided and share something in common, which is color; however, we would not easily demonstrate the differences by which these are distinguished, which could be said to belong to color essentially rather than accidentally. Indeed, begetting and spirating and creating the world are rationally distinct from each other, and together they coincide in a common element, namely the Father; yet to this day we have never heard anyone put forth the differences according to which that common element, that is, the Father, is distinguished essentially and not accidentally.

136. Moreover, if we were to judge this reasoning to be true in all respects, we could not help but support the insanity of Arius. For if the Son, who shares with the Father and the Spirit the common element of being God, were to be distinguished from each of them by a difference that pertained essentially to that common element, namely Divinity, then the divinity of the Father would be one thing, that of the Son another, and that of the Holy Spirit yet another. Therefore, the syllogism is by no means true in all respects, neither in natural matters nor in those that transcend nature. Now, if no force of Sacred Scripture supports the proposed argument, and if it is not possible to derive it even from human reasoning, what then should be said about the conclusion?

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137. Nevertheless, even if this reasoning were proven to contain truth in all respects, the Latins would still not justly reproach us if we were to reject it, since the examples provided above are in no way proportionate to be admitted in common with superessential realities. Therefore, since the arguments that are presented both suffer from falsity and are entirely disproportionate; and since other arguments that would maintain proportion neither exist nor are hoped to exist, from where do they derive the necessity for their conclusion? It remains, therefore, that they should neither construct syllogisms nor append a conclusion, since nothing at all underlies them as a foundation.

138. Furthermore. Generation and procession are different modes of existing, which certainly cannot be said to inhere accidentally in those in whom they inhere; indeed, there is no place for accidents in superessential realities. Hence, these are diverse and not differentiated accidentally. Now, if the Latins recognize this distinction as a proper difference, they do not proceed correctly in seeking another, since they can grasp the proper one with both hands. Besides this, since those things that are diversified from something common by essential rather than accidental differences differ in species and essence, it would be utter ruin to seek such a difference in the Son and the Spirit, according to which the Father, who is common to them, would be essentially differentiated; for this is both very difficult to understand and, as we ought to think, a clear occasion for perdition. And so these matters stand thus; but what of those that follow?

REFUTATION XXXIX.

THIRTY-NINTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - FIFTH SYLLOGISM

139. Furthermore. If someone should say that the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Son not because He is from the Son, but because of their different origins from the Father, this must in reality amount to the same thing. For if the Holy Spirit is other than the Son, their origin or procession must be different. But two origins cannot be distinguished except by their term, or principle, or subject. Just as the origin of a horse differs from the origin of an ox with respect to the term: inasmuch as the two origins terminate in natures that are specifically diverse. With respect to the principle: as if we suppose that within the same species of animal, some are generated by the active power of the sun alone, while others are generated by this power together with the active power of seed. With respect to the subject, the generation of this horse differs from that horse according to how the nature of the species is received in different matter. This distinction, which pertains to the subject, cannot have a place in the Divine Persons, since they are entirely immaterial. Similarly, with respect to the term, if it is permissible to speak this way, there cannot be a distinction of processions, because the Holy Spirit receives by procession the same divine nature that the Son receives by being born. It remains, therefore, that the distinction

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between the two origins can only be on the part of the principle. It is manifest that the principle of the Son's origin is the Father alone. Therefore, if the principle of the Holy Spirit's procession were the Father alone, the procession of the Holy Spirit would not be different from the generation of the Son; thus, neither would the Holy Spirit be distinct from the Son. For there to be different processions and different proceeding Persons, it is necessary to say that the Holy Spirit is not from the Father alone, but from the Father and the Son. But if someone should say again that the processions differ according to the principle, insofar as the Father produces the Son by way of intellect, as the Word, but the Holy Spirit by way of will, as Love: according to this, it will be necessary to say that the two processions and the two proceeding Persons are distinguished according to the difference between will and intellect in God the Father. But will and intellect in God the Father are not distinguished according to reality, but only according to reason, as was shown in the first book. It follows, therefore, that the two processions and the two proceeding Persons differ only in reason. But those things that differ only in reason can be predicated of each other: for it will be true to say that the divine will is His intellect, and conversely. Therefore, it will be true to say that the Holy Spirit is the Son, and conversely: which belongs to the impiety of Sabellius. It is not sufficient, therefore, for the distinction of the Holy Spirit and the Son to say that the Son proceeds by way of intellect and the Holy Spirit by way of will, unless with this it is said that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER; WHERE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF DIVINE DISTINCTIONS OCCURS

140. These are the arguments of the Latins; but we shall first summarize this syllogism, in order to clearly perceive its strength. It proceeds as follows: The generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit are different modes of proceeding. Different modes of proceeding are distinguished either by principle, or by term, or by subject. The conclusion, therefore, is manifest. But to distinguish divine modes of proceeding on the part of the term or on the part of the subject is highly dangerous, and, as it seems to them, leads to absurd consequences; therefore it remains that they are distinguished on the part of the principle, and thus it is evident that the procession of the Son is from the Father alone, while the procession of the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son together.

141. However, such is their syllogism; but what shall we say to these things, first, then subsequently, and finally? This, namely: we too could, using the same line of argument, conclude that the Son is generated from the Father and from the Spirit, if we first suppose from what has been demonstrated beforehand that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone; so that whatever arguments they could use to dissolve our conclusion, we could use the same to dissolve

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theirs. Anyone, I believe, would say this is fair. Therefore, if our conclusion contains absurdity, why not theirs as well? And if their proposition is granted to be true, surely ours will also be true.

142. Nevertheless, let us set this aside. Again, in this syllogism, Thomas drew the minor premise from the source of Scripture, namely, from divine revelation confirmed by signs and wonders, as the sacred Gospel says; but the major premise he could neither derive from the teaching of the Spirit, nor did he hear it from the Doctors of the Church speaking of such things. But indulging the Latins and his own opinion, Thomas—having apprehended it from sensible things, or even from certain inventions, or (if it is permissible to speak thus) from visions of dreams (for genera and species, as Aristotle also says, are subject to certain concepts, not to things)—attempted to adapt that premise to the teaching of the Spirit, while placing divine and incomprehensible and supernatural things together with sensible and material things, and stripping them of their proper freedom, subjected them to the necessity of perishable things and, mixing everything together, did not at all separate the profane from the sacred (as the proverb goes). Which we have demonstrated to be contrary to divine and spiritual traditions, and contrary to the opinions of the Doctors and the nature of things, and contrary to the method of logic, which Aristotle proposed in conjunction with truth.

143. Still more: if our syllogism proceeds from these sources that we mentioned, and if from such arguments it seems that nothing necessary can be concluded even to the Latins themselves, we will not continue to bring forth more, being content with their candor. But if, against these things, they should happen to object, nothing will be at hand to support them, since these arguments conflict with themselves, being rejected by all, and even poorly treated by their masters. For Thomas, the very one who expounded the syllogism, fights on our side regarding this matter: for we have shown that he holds this opinion concerning these things, that he considers any argument whatsoever from such reasoning to be hardly conclusive. For thus he writes: "Nevertheless, for the manifestation of this truth, certain probable reasons are to be introduced, for the exercise and consolation of the faithful." And immediately he adds the reason: "Because the very insufficiency of these reasons would further confirm them [that is, the adversaries] in their error." And in another place: "Sensible things, from which human reason takes the beginning of knowledge, retain in themselves some kind of trace of divine imitation, yet so imperfect that it is found entirely insufficient for declaring the substance of God Himself." And again in the same chapter: "Nevertheless, it is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such reasons, however weak they may be, provided there is no presumption of comprehending or demonstrating."

144. Furthermore, that the Son and the Spirit are distinguished by the different mode of existing by which they proceed [from the Father] is strongly affirmed by theologians, none of whom has thought to distinguish the Son from the Spirit in any other way. But in what precisely

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this diversity of processions consists, we find not a single person who has ever described it, since on the contrary they all with one voice confess their ignorance, and deter us from the desire to inquire too curiously into things, the knowledge of which they concede to God alone.

145. For the divine Gregory says thus: "You hear of generation? Do not inquire too curiously into the manner. You hear that the Spirit proceeds from the Father? Do not anxiously investigate how this occurs." And Damascene in the chapter on the Trinity says: "Indeed, we have been taught that there is a difference between divine generation and procession: but what the mode of this distinction is, we do not know at all." And again he says in the same chapter: "For although the Holy Spirit also proceeds from the Father, He does not do so by way of generation, but by way of procession. This is another mode of existence, equally incomprehensible and unknown." And again the divine Gregory in his oration on the praises of Hero says: "But if you seek the manner, what will you leave to those whom Scripture testifies to know one another mutually, and to be known by one another mutually?" And the Sixth Synod writes in its Acts: "It is characteristic of heretics to investigate the manner in which the processions of the Son and the Spirit occur."

146. This is the faith of the Church; but the Latins, when they explicitly seek the differences in divine processions, and immediately establish the problem of how the procession of the Son differs from the procession of the Spirit, are altogether guilty of the aforementioned accusations, for they prescribe absurdities and things that are not handed down by Scripture; indeed, they are not far from the opinions of heretics. And certainly, if what is being sought is whether the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, and they intend to demonstrate that by first laying absurd foundations, how can it be that one who undertakes to demonstrate in this way is not ridiculed?

147. Moreover, if on the one hand the manner in which the processions are diverse has in no way come to the understanding of theologians, since it is known to God alone, and is altogether unintelligible to human minds and inexplicable in words; and if on the other hand the manner of diversity of processions that Thomas has discovered—namely, that the distinction consists in the principle, insofar as the origin of the Son is from the Father alone, while the procession of the Spirit is from the Father and the Son together—can not only be known by men but even expressed in words; how can it not be necessary that this is not the true manner by which supernatural processions are distinguished, but on the contrary is somewhat monstrous and laden with errors and apt to keep men who trust in it far from God and from the truth?

148. Furthermore, when the Latins say that processions are distinguished either by reason of term, or principle, or subject, of which processions do they speak? Whether of those that can come to human knowledge, inasmuch as arguments about them are drawn from particular instances, or of the incomprehensible ones, concerning which neither science, nor thought, nor sensation, nor any investigation can be had, which also leave behind the understanding of

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angels? For if the discussion is about these latter ones, how could they be both unintelligible and superior to either science or experience, when they have even reached the point of being stated in a disjunctive mode? But if it is about the others, then the question is in no way about the processions of the Son and the Spirit. Therefore, if such is the necessity of this syllogism, if its minor premise is true, the major will appear false; for incomprehensible processions, while truly adorned with this name, will also have incomprehensible differences, and will not easily allow anyone to approach their investigation. Conversely, if the major premise contains truth, since it deals with processions that are in the nature of things, the minor is mistaken: for the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, although they are processions and indeed different ones, are certainly superessential, and such that they cannot come under scientific knowledge. Therefore, the conclusion will involve no necessity.

149. Nevertheless, the [Latins'] syllogism must be examined more closely. For to derive their conclusion, they employ a conditional syllogism, which flows not from consequence but from disjunction, inasmuch as with two members rejected, the third is necessarily inferred. But it errs, so that it does not compel assent: for syllogisms that are constructed in this way either take place in immediate opposites, or in those that are mediated, but whose middle is limited; for in these, with others excluded, what remains is necessarily induced. But our syllogism, like a proud tyrant, wrapping everything according to its pleasure, did not at all take up what would remain from opposites: for what opposition can be assigned between term and principle and subject?

150. Nevertheless, let these stand. Then we also add that the division of the consequent is not entirely good: for when Thomas enumerated three modes of proceeding, he produced them disjunctively, as if it were necessary that any procession be contained under the aforementioned ones, and that none could exist so prevalent that it would be possible for it to avoid the division established by him. But this requires much sweat, much labor, and many demonstrations, for us to believe that there is no procession in the nature of things that does not bypass the aforementioned division, or certainly that all cannot be reduced to fewer. That it is possible to establish still more causes by which processions are distinguished is clear from this: for the origins of two souls or two angels from their own principle are both somehow constituted diversely, and yet do not differ by reason of principle, since they come from the same one. Nor by reason of term, for a soul does not differ from a soul in species, or an angel from an angel. Nor by reason of subject, since there is nothing material in these. The same could also be seen concerning numbers, if one were to examine the progressions of the seventh and fifth and third from unity or number; namely, that they differ neither by principle, nor by term, since the seventh, fifth, and third are not distinguished in species: for each is both a number, and odd, and prime, and simple; nor indeed does the difference come to them through the subject, for there is no material distinction between them.

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151. But this must be said most emphatically, whereby Thomas's syllogism will be deprived of all assent whatsoever. For the generation of this and that man, as for instance two brothers from one father, is not at all diverse in terms of existence, since there is no difference between generation and generation, insofar as both are generation; but since the nature of the species (to use Thomas's own words) is received in different matter, certainly we will affirm that according to this they differ entirely. Likewise, the progressions of proper species from a genus, for example, of horse and ox from animal (if indeed it is necessary to reason about such things, which are subject only to concepts, not to things), would be distinguished by reason of the term of those proceeding, insofar as those two progressions terminate in different species of nature, as Thomas thinks; but they would in no way be said to differ from each other mutually, for by equal reason each proceeds from the principle, and animal is predicated as genus of both species in the same way, since both horse and ox flow from animal as a twofold species.

152. But truly these matters stand thus. Yet the generation of the Son and likewise the procession of the Spirit are not at all the same in terms of existence; but the manner in which both receive their being is entirely different, in the way that, for instance, generation and teaching undoubtedly differ. Therefore, the first cause, for example, is not the father of the Holy Spirit or the producer of the Son, nor is the Spirit the son, nor is the Son spirated. That we may contemplate all these things as if in an example, both Eve and Seth derive their origin from Adam, yet not in the same way; for while the latter flows from him through generation, the former likewise comes from him, but in a different way; so that the emanation of each can rightly be said to be diverse in terms of existence, inasmuch as we find Adam to be the begetter of Seth, but in no way of Eve. This difference, which is found in progressions according to modes of being, although it is great and worthy of attention, and alone fit for distinguishing superessential processions—this difference, I say, Thomas, I know not why, seems to have knowingly and willingly omitted in the division of the consequent. For if these things could be held simultaneously—both to affirm that the Son is from the Father, and the Spirit from the Father and the Son, and to inquire nothing further—then indeed generation and procession would rightfully be distinguished according to this consideration. But if, even with these things posited, a different mode of existing is still greatly sought in Christian theology, such that, namely, it is presupposed that the Son proceeds from the Father through generation, and the Paraclete not by way of generation, but by way of procession; it is nothing but a manifest crime to omit all these things in the division of the consequent. That what we are saying may be made clearer: just as when we state that the Son and the Spirit are from the Father, our faith does not stop here alone, but it must be added that the former comes through generation, and the Spirit not in this way, but in another mode, which we call procession, lest perhaps the Spirit be considered a son, or it be considered that the Son is indeed the Son, but not the Only-Begotten; in the same way, if we

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assert that the Spirit is from the Father and the Son, it is not any kind of fault if the mode of His existence is still not added. For otherwise it is possible to think that the Spirit is indeed from both, but in the same way that the Son is from the Father. Therefore, if the Latins improperly derived the division of the consequent, and omitted many necessary things, what remains but that the necessity of the consequence is not present?

153. But let these be granted. Then we also add that the division of the consequent has not proceeded entirely well: for when Thomas enumerated three modes of proceeding, he produced them disjunctively, as if it were necessary that any procession be contained under the aforementioned ones, and that none could exist so prevalent that it would be possible for it to avoid the division established by him. But this requires much sweat, much labor, and many demonstrations, for us to believe that there is no procession in the nature of things that does not bypass the aforementioned division, or certainly that all cannot be reduced to fewer. That it is possible to establish still more causes by which processions are distinguished is clear from this: for the origins of two souls or two angels from their own principle are both somehow constituted diversely, and yet do not differ by reason of principle, since they come from the same one. Nor by reason of term, for a soul does not differ from a soul in species, or an angel from an angel. Nor by reason of subject, since there is nothing material in these. The same could also be seen concerning numbers, if one were to examine the progressions of the seventh and fifth and third from unity or number; namely, that they differ neither by principle, nor by term, since the seventh, fifth, and third are not distinguished in species: for each is both a number, and odd, and prime, and simple; nor indeed does the difference come to them through the subject, for there is no material distinction between them.

154. And indeed, even if we were to say that divine generation and supernatural procession differ by reason of principle, but not in the way the Latins say—that is, that the former flows from the Father alone, and the latter from both—but insofar as the first cause, as Father, is the principle of the Son; as Producer, of the Spirit; what absurdity, I ask, will flow from this for us? For indeed we need not fear that, from the fact that Father and Producer are not really distinguished, the same would be thought concerning the Son and the Spirit. For it has been demonstrated that it is not at all necessary that being generated and proceeding be of the same nature in all respects, just as spirating and begetting. Moreover, it is false that things that can come together in one are not distinguished; for accidents with respect to substances differ as much as possible, yet indeed they are also united with them to such an extent that they cannot subsist in any other way, if perchance they are separated from substances. Likewise, if we follow the Latins, shall we in no way distinguish mothers from virgins, because we venerate both in the Most Blessed Virgin? Nor shall we distinguish the divine and ineffable substance from this perishable and flowing substance of ours, because the one and the same Christ must necessarily

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be considered both God and Man? Therefore, not even this has profited our adversaries for their purpose. This too is bitter and unripe for the Latins.

REFUTATION XXXX.

FORTIETH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - SIXTH SYLLOGISM

155. Furthermore. From the very fact that it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds in the manner of will, and the Son in the manner of intellect, it follows that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. For love proceeds from the word: since we cannot love anything unless we first conceive it through the word of the heart.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

156. In this syllogism, [Thomas] affirms that the generation of the Son indeed occurs through the intellect, while the procession of the Spirit occurs through love or will. This he had already expressed even more clearly in the preceding chapter, in this manner: The Father produces the Son in the manner of intellect, as the Word, but the Holy Spirit in the manner of will, as Love. Having established these premises, he believes it can be concluded that the Spirit proceeds from the Son, and openly asserts that the force of the proof is derived from human and familiar matters, when he adds, indeed as if providing the reason: "since we cannot love anything unless we first conceive it through the word of the heart."

157. However, first, the Latins should be asked from where they learned to call the generation of the Son "intellect" and the procession of the Holy Spirit "love" or "will." For it is by no means permissible to assert about the superessential Deity, or even to think, things that are not stated in the Scriptures. And they will never be able to demonstrate this, as is abundantly clear: for they are caught in falsehood, appear audacious to the point of absurdity, and wage open war against all theologians. Indeed, these theologians, as if with one voice, assert that even the comprehension of the most sublime angels transcends not only the eternal generation of the Son from the Father, but also the other generation which, through the economy in these last times, occurred in the Virgin's womb through the Father's benevolence and the Holy Spirit's power for our sake; yet the Latins claim they have clear insight into that first generation, and define it as occurring through intellect. Again, the Fathers proclaim that the procession of the Spirit is ineffable and inexplicable, that it surpasses human knowledge, and they believe that questions about it should not even be permitted, because a response would be impossible; but the Latins claim to know it, and call it love or will. By this reasoning they clearly betray themselves as having condemned the great wisdom of the blessed Fathers.

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158. Nevertheless, since these Fathers are confirmed by truth in every respect, and know that they cannot scrutinize the ineffable divine generation and the supernatural procession of the Holy Spirit, they could never by any reasoning be dissuaded from inveighing against absurdities. That the aforementioned statements are true has been appropriately stated thus far, and will be stated further, when we transcribe certain passages from what the Fathers, inspired by divine power, have proclaimed.

159. First, let us consider divine Dionysius, who in the preface of his theological treatise says: "We have received from the Sacred Scriptures that the Father is indeed the fountain in the divine realm, while the Son and the Holy Spirit exist as God's offspring, or, if it is permissible to say, as divine shoots, or flowers, or supersubstantial lights; but how they relate to each other, we can neither express nor understand." But the Latins say that they both understand and attempt to express in words not only that the modes of existence are diverse—namely, generation and divine procession—but also in what respect their diversity consists.

160. Also, divine Gregory, when the Macedonians questioned him about the processions of the Son and the Spirit, asking what was the mode of existence of each, and how it happens that those who are said to proceed in dissimilar ways are then reported to be consubstantial, says: "Tell me what the unbegottenness of the Father is, and I will undertake to explain the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, whereby it will happen that we both become delirious, casting our eyes upon the mysteries of God; and who are we to do this—namely those who cannot accurately know even the things that are before their feet?" And again, in his oration on the Holy Spirit, he writes: "Give me another God and another divine nature, and I will give you the same Trinity with the same names and realities. But since there is one God and one supreme nature, from where shall I represent a similarity to you? Or do you again demand that I derive it from earthly and human things? It is certainly very shameful, and not only shameful but also very foolish and vain, to take from humble things an image of superior and heavenly things, and to seek, as Isaiah says, the living among the dead—that is, to seek a likeness of certain and constant realities from a fluid and fragile nature."

161. Now then, if similarity is not preserved between natural and superessential things; if it is very shameful, not to mention very foolish, to seek such similarity, since to scrutinize this more curiously is the same as seeking capacity in privation, like seeking light in darkness, or, what is the same, the living among the dead, what then should be judged about the syllogisms of the Latins? From where did their major premises emerge? How does the entire syllogism hold together when it does not present a middle term common to the two extremes? And by what reasoning can these extremes, deprived of similarity, be connected? Therefore, they should not even be called syllogisms.

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162. Indeed, blessed Dionysius again wants discourses about the divine nature to be introduced in the manner that the nature itself has spoken about itself in the divine Scriptures. But he passes over in deep silence how divine generation and supernatural procession are distinguished. With this also agrees divine Damascene, who says thus in the chapter on the Holy Trinity: "We have been taught that there is indeed a distinction between generation and procession; but what the nature of this distinction might be, we simply do not know." The Latins, on the contrary, claim that even those things which the Holy Spirit has concealed and reserved knowledge of for Himself alone—these things, I say, they both claim to understand clearly and brand us with the mark of impiety because we do not persuade ourselves of this matter. For at times they assert that generation differs from procession in that the former flows from the Father alone, while the latter is from both the Father and the Son; at other times they call the procession of the Spirit "love" or "will," and the generation of the Son "intellect"; indeed, they affirm that the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, while the Son proceeds as Word. What, therefore, could be done against so great a conflict?

163. But besides what has already been said, if when the Father thinks of the Son, the Son in turn would not think of the Father, nor of himself, nor of the Spirit; and similarly the Spirit would think neither of the Father, nor of the Son, nor even of himself—perhaps we could agree with the Latins when they conceive generation in the divine realm as occurring through the mode of intellect. But if when the Father understands the Son, the Son likewise understands the Father, according to the statement, "As the Father knows me, so I know the Father," this must necessarily happen: either generating and understanding are not the same thing, and therefore generation is not intellect (and the foundation of the Latins' conclusion collapses), or, due to the complete similarity when the terms of intellection are reversed, it would have to be said that the Father is generated by the Son in exactly the same way as the Son is generated by the Father. Moreover, the Spirit will be generated by both the Father and the Son, and he will himself beget both the Father and the Son, since the manner of understanding is the same for each person with respect to the others, just as when the Father understands the Son. But truly, who could enumerate the mass of absurdities that would arise from this? And I will omit the point that from this it would also follow that the Father begets himself, since he understands himself just as he understands the Son, because generation and intellection are taken to be the same thing.

164. These things have been said concerning divine generation, considered absolutely in itself, beyond any comparison. Nevertheless, as the Father and the Son love the Holy Spirit, similarly the Spirit loves the Father and the Son; but if he proceeded from both, as the Latins would say, he would by no means communicate existence to them. May this be utterly rejected. How, therefore, can being loved and proceeding be one and the same thing? Indeed, even regarding will: if only the Father and the Son possessed will, but the Spirit did not, perhaps one might

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tolerate what has been said about will and procession. But if the Father wills, and the Son likewise wills, and the Spirit equally wills, and indeed wills exactly the same things (for there is one will of the Father and of the Son and of the Spirit), for what reason, I ask, does the Spirit flow from the will of the Father and the Son, but not from his own will? Or why does one Person, I mean the Spirit, shine forth from the will of the Father and the Son, but another person does not arise from the will of the whole Trinity, which is the very same will? [These are absurdities], but whoever judges the premises to be correct must necessarily either willingly embrace the consequent conclusions that flow from them, or, if he avoids them as inappropriate, he should consider himself to be the cause of the shame he feels.

165. Yet even if generation and intellect, procession and will, were to mean the same thing, from where would the foundation of the inference be taken, so that, as the remarkable syllogism claims, the Spirit proceeds from the Son? "We cannot love anything unless we first conceive it through the word of the heart." Therefore, because this is observed to happen in us, the same must be found in God. But it would be more fitting to say: because human affairs are disposed in this way, therefore the very same thing does not occur in divine matters. For the argument is not compelling. The difference between humans and God extends to infinity; similarity is either non-existent or confined within limits and of such a nature that it can only be conjectured.

166. Therefore, divine Gregory would say to these matters, and very aptly: "From where shall I represent a similarity to you? Or do you again demand that I derive it from earthly and human things? It is certainly very shameful, and not only shameful but also very foolish and vain, to take from humble things an image of superior and heavenly things, and to seek, as Isaiah says, the living among the dead—that is, to seek a likeness of certain and constant realities from a fluid and fragile nature."

167. But if they [the Latins] were to say at last that the modes of existence of the divine Persons are incomprehensible, feeling ashamed because they proceed against both apostolic and patristic tradition; and if they were to admit the differences in the modes, but take intellect and will as certain images and similitudes, so that those who are weaker in faith might be induced to believe it possible for divine generation to be compared to intellect according to a thin image—not only because it occurs without passion (for the exit of intellection from the mind is also without passion), but also by reason of indivisibility (since neither is the Son separated from the Father, nor is intellect from its intellection)—if, I say, they were to say these things, would we praise them for such a thought? For these concepts are far removed from the practice of theologians, who at times recall divine shoots or flowers, at times the sun and light and ray, or even an eye, a river, and a fountain. We would approve of these as they were meant [by the Fathers]; but we would in no way admit them if they were assumed as a demonstration to conclude that the Spirit is from the Son. For we accept images and comparisons not for

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demonstration, but for the sake of clarity, presupposing that the matters themselves are beyond all ambiguity. But when the matters themselves have obscurity and for this very reason are subject to question, if we try to demonstrate them from comparisons, it would be nothing other than to assume as proven what needs to be investigated.

168. Besides, when dealing with divine matters, we must use comparisons and images in such a way that we derive what is useful from the similarity, but suffer no detriment from the disparity. Therefore, divine Chrysostom says in the fifteenth homily on the Epistle to the Romans: "This should be observed everywhere: examples must not be taken in their entirety, but what serves the purpose for which the example was chosen should be selected, and the rest entirely set aside." Similarly, divine Gregory in his oration on the Holy Spirit recognized the great dissimilarity between comparisons and divine realities, and therefore applied such great care in investigating these matters that he said: "Indeed, having considered with great mental curiosity for a long time, and having explored the matter from every side, seeking some image of so great a reality, I could not find to what inferior things that divine nature should be compared. For although I found some slight similarity, the greater part escapes me, leaving me on the ground with my example." And shortly afterward: "In sum, there is nothing on which my mind can firmly rest, while I consider what I imagine in examples, unless perhaps someone has such equanimity that, having accepted one aspect from the proposed image, he rejects the rest."

169. Finally, having diligently examined this matter of comparisons, it is clear that he placed confidence in not even one of them, but since the conjectures of comparisons, due to apparent similarity, lead minds into error not a little, he took care to completely expel them from the portico of theology, being content only with what has been revealed by the Holy Spirit, even if they are few in number. For he adds: "Finally, therefore, this seemed most advisable to me: to set aside those images and shadows as fallacious and very far removed from the truth, to retain more tenaciously my pious thought and faith, and, standing firm in few words and using the Holy Spirit as my guide, to endeavor with all my strength to traverse this age, preserving to the end the splendor I have received here, as a faithful companion and comrade."

170. With these matters thus explained, to briefly encompass everything: if they continue to affirm that divine generation and ineffable procession are nothing other than intellect and will, they will be counted among the deranged, whose task it is to pierce the air with arrows. But if they believe these take on the character of an image or comparison, either let them investigate the reason why those, having been previously assumed as proven, were taken up, and there will be no further discussion of other matters; or, if this is not the case, let them also be completely willing to bid farewell to images and shadows, as fallacious and devoid of truth, and let them prepare to seek with the Holy Spirit those things that are of the Spirit from the divinely transmitted Scriptures, and use them, as far as possible, to persuade both themselves and others.

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For in this way, all things seem to proceed well in divine matters for those skilled in theological knowledge.

171. But if, because the Son is called the Word, this disturbs those who think that divine generation is intellection, the objection is without force: first, because there is no necessity, as soon as He is called Word, to immediately think of generation; for it is not because He is Word that He is Son, since not only the Son is Word, but also the Father and the Spirit, neither of whom certainly exists by generation. Even the Trinity itself, which is one God, just as it is predicated as light and God and life, so also it is predicated as Word, and no one would call the Trinity the Son. A witness to this is blessed Dionysius, who [in the book] on Divine Names, explaining the appellation 'Word,' says thus: "God is called Word, who is the cause of all things, and contains and anticipates all their principles in Himself because of the excellence of simplicity alone, and exists as the origin of knowledge and reason for all things that have reason." And again: "If we name the superessential darkness itself life or substance, or God or Word." That he considers all these predicates to be common to the whole Deity is clear from what he writes at the beginning of the book on Divine Names: "Whatever divine name we find predicated of one of the three Persons, we will accept it as said without distinction also of the entire Deity."

172. But if they were to object that both appellations belong to Christ, who is called both Word and Son, indeed even the Word of the Lord; not even thus would it be necessary that, because of this, divine generation should be called intellect, nor would the very mode by which the Son obtains existence be knowable because these terms are used. For that He is named Son is proper to Him; but that He is called Word becomes common to the other Persons as well. But how could that which is common be the same as that which is proper? Moreover, even if we particularly attribute the name of Word to the Son, it does not follow from this that generation occurs through the mode of intellect, since it is permissible to adorn Him with the appellation of Word because He has announced to us all that belongs to the Father, as the divine voice of the Savior says: "For all things whatsoever he has heard from the Father, he has announced to us," just as blessed Chrysostom understood the significance of the term "Word."

173. But if some also approve other reasons—namely, that He proceeds from the Father without passion, and that He is not separated from Him (for thus a word proceeds from the speaker)—the interpretation is indeed correct, but by no means peculiar to the Son, since it is common to the Spirit also, for He too is Word, and flows without passion from the Father, and does not exist as separable from Him. Therefore, for this reason too, procession, just as generation, will occur through intellect. However, it seems absurd that there should be identity between generation and procession.

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174. Furthermore, how could the ineffable mode of generation become knowable from the very fact that He is called Word? For the speaker and the word are not the same as the Father and the Son. The Father and the Son, namely, are two most perfect Persons, but by no means are the word and the one who utters the word the same. Similarly, the Father is consubstantial with the Son; but how could the word and the one who speaks be the same thing? Furthermore: the word is a faculty that perfects the one who pronounces the word; but the Son could in no way be this with respect to the Father. Finally, even setting these considerations aside, the blessed Fathers, who knew the Son most excellently, although they knew that He is celebrated in the sacred Scriptures under the appellation of Word, did not cease to testify that His divine generation is inexplicable and completely unknown. Therefore, from this name "Word," what His generation is like cannot be demonstrated.

175. And indeed, Scripture also praises Him as "the brightness of glory and the exact representation of [the Father's] substance"; but not only Him, but also the Holy Spirit is called "light from light." Now, if because of the word of the mind, generation is intellect, then because of brightness, and glory, and character, and substance, [the Latins] would say that supernatural generation is yet something else. Therefore, if we wish to preserve piety, images should by no means be trusted in every respect.

REFUTATION XXXXI.

FOURTY-FIRST CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - SEVENTH SYLLOGISM

176. Likewise. If one considers the different species of things, a certain order is evident among them: insofar as living things are above non-living things, and animals above plants, and humans above other animals, and within each of these various grades are found according to different species; hence Plato said that the species of things are numbers, which vary in form by the addition or subtraction of unity. Therefore, in immaterial substances there cannot be distinction except according to order. But in the divine Persons, who are entirely immaterial, there cannot be any order except that of origin. Therefore, there cannot be two Persons proceeding from one unless one of them proceeds from the other. And thus it is necessary that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

177. It cannot be denied that order is both preserved in divine matters and, conversely, not preserved. Indeed, we acknowledge that this latter occurs by reason of supreme excellence; for we do not say that order is not present there because anything is disordered, but because that other order surpasses the order of things. And the former, because order is undoubtedly

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considered to be some good, while God is the fullness of all good. Indeed, since all things that are under God are endowed with goodness, so that in them the definition of good is fulfilled, which are said to be very good in the Scriptures; since the entire universe is also called good, and would not be beautiful unless order shone forth in it; moreover, since those things that are considered in effects are also present eminently in causes, as divine Dionysius says, it happens, I say, that order is believed to be entirely present in divine matters, according to an ineffable mode and in the way that God Himself deigns to declare about Himself, not in the way that we ourselves might wish to attribute to Him. For disorder is evident if, when instituting an investigation about that order, we do not seek its constitution from the Divine sources, but we ourselves wish to determine in what manner, after all, those things that are in God stand in order. Nevertheless, we must not forget the apostolic tradition, which strictly forbids us from daring to say, or even to think, anything about the superessential Deity, beyond what has been divinely revealed in the sacred Scriptures.

178. We therefore say and affirm that God is both One and Three: one indeed by reason of the common nature and of those things that belong to Him supernaturally; but three because of the manifestation of three Persons in superessential fecundity. But indeed, how could any order be found in the divine essence, since it is one and the same, while order requires a succession of prior and posterior? For the same Persons in Sacred Scripture are enumerated sometimes in one order and sometimes in another, because of the equality of nature, as we well know. Consider, I ask you: the Lord now indeed says: "Baptize them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit," but now: "I and the Father are one." At other times He says: "My Father works until now, and I work," but at other times: "I and the Father will come to him, and make our dwelling with him." Similarly, blessed John in the Apocalypse says: "Grace to you and peace from God the Father, and from the seven spirits, and from the Lord Jesus Christ," taking the operations of the Holy Spirit in the enumeration of the Trinity.

179. Thus, in respect to essence, we would by no means say that order is given in divine matters; but in respect to the Persons, since three are enumerated, we plainly assert that a certain order is fitting, which is nothing other than that each of the divine Persons preserves its own property unconfused and incommunicable with the others. For divine Gregory says [in his oration] on the Holy Spirit: "It is necessary to preserve the properties of the Father, Son, and Spirit, lest there be confusion in the Deity, which brings all other things into order." And divine Dionysius says: "It is not right to separate what is united, nor to confuse what is distinct."

180. Now then, if order in divine matters consists in preserving the unchangeable properties, and conversely, disorder and confusion are called the opposite; if elsewhere the properties of the Father are, as the greatest of theologians says, to be without beginning and to be a beginning, or what is the same, that the Father alone is named the source of superessential divinity, so that all

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things that belong to the Father belong also to the Son, except causality; finally, if attributing causality to the Son, and affirming that He is the principle of divinity and the Producer of the Spirit, does not help maintain order, but conversely dissolves order; then it is not true to say that in the divine Persons an order of cause and effect is sought from one to another.

181. Nevertheless, if, supposing the Father as the sole Producer, the Son were not at all distinguished from the Spirit, the Latins would rightly maintain their opinion; but if that distinction is preserved, as we have already shown at length, although the Son in no way produces the Spirit (and to preserve this distinction belongs to one who guards the order, such as the teaching of the Spirit imparts), it is certainly useless to take pains to spurn existing order, but seek what is exiled, in such a way that one might seem unwilling to unite and separate the divine Persons in the manner in which they are in reality both united and distinct, which is contained in the tradition of the Apostles.

182. Furthermore, since from what has been demonstrated in the previous arguments, a multitude of absurdities grows, and many things that are acknowledged must be removed if the Son is said to produce the Spirit; since also all the Ecumenical Councils are in agreement with us on this point, how could anyone call that an order which would exist between the Son and the Spirit by reason of cause and effect, when from this hardly any of the Christian dogmas seems to be preserved intact? Nevertheless, if we too were to say that it is necessary for order to be preserved with respect to the Son and Spirit, indeed that order which is from cause and effect, but in reverse manner, so that the Son flows from the Spirit, what then would the Latins have to say? Perhaps they would loudly object that the property of the Father would be destroyed, and would call such a thing disordered, and would not spare us at all. But these same things they can rightfully hear from us, as long as they continue to say that cause and principle and fountain, in exactly the same way as being without beginning, are paternal properties. Therefore, the order of the Son and Spirit will not be that which is derived from principle and what proceeds from a principle; for this is indeed perfectly conceived of the Father with respect to the Son or the Spirit, but concerning the Son in relation to the Spirit, it is not even permissible to think; lest, without our knowing it, everything be mixed up under the appearance of order. But if we will be content with the properties of the Son and Spirit, which the Holy Spirit Himself has taught us through tradition, content also with the complete equality [of these] (since some have also rightly thought that there is order and principle of order), if, I say, we will seek nothing more; we believe that we both perceive and preserve the order that exists between them, since it is necessary for us not to deviate in any way from the straight path of truth.

REFUTATION XXXXII.

FOURTY-SECOND CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - EIGHTH SYLLOGISM

183. Furthermore. The Father and the Son, with respect to the unity of essence, differ only in this: that one is the Father and the other is the Son. Whatever, therefore, is beyond this distinction is common to both the Father and the Son. Now, being the principle of the Holy Spirit is beyond the notion of paternity and filiation: for the relation by which the Father is Father differs from the relation by which the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit, as stated above. Therefore, being the principle of the Holy Spirit is common to both the Father and the Son.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

184. In this syllogism, what is stated—that the Father and the Son do not differ with respect to the unity of essence, and that being the principle of the Holy Spirit is beyond the notion of paternity and filiation—is found to be entirely in accordance with the truth. However, all the rest is proven false: for example, the claim that the Father and Son are distinguished in no other way except that one is the Father and the other is the Son. For where would you place the cause, and source, and principle by which the Father is distinguished from the Son? For all things that the Father has belong also to the Son, except that the Son is not the cause, as you have heard. You have also heard that the Father alone is the font of the superessential divinity, and that this is the distinguishing feature of the divine Persons; and finally, that being without principle and being a principle constitute the paternal property.

185. That something other than the property of paternity is included under the names of principle, font, and cause has been declared many times and will be declared again. For these terms are not convertible. Indeed, if there is a single font of Deity, then necessarily there is one Father; but the opposite does not hold, such that if there is one Father, one would simply assign a single font of Deity. The Latins themselves are evidence of this: for they admit that the Father alone generates; but they become troubled if they hear that He alone is the cause of Deity or the sole font. Add to this that being without principle, or being unbegotten, or without cause, or however else we might want to express this same reality, is both distinct from the notion of paternity and constitutes the property of the Father, and is characteristic of the mode by which the Father exists. From all sources, therefore, you will hear that this is that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son and from the Spirit: for all things whatsoever that the Father has are also proper to the Son, except for unbegottenness.

186. We have already cited Justin, that Martyr and Philosopher, the successor of the Apostles and, as befits an apostolic man, a leader of the Church of that time; we have called upon him, I say, as a witness of theological discourses, when we showed that in his chapters on Faith, he distinguished the divine Persons by their diverse modes of existence, where the term "Unbegotten" also appears. Yet why do I cite this one or that one? Thomas himself, in the

REFUTATION OF THE LATINS PART 2

twenty-sixth chapter of the fourth book against the Gentiles, says: "The Father is distinguished from the Son by the relation of paternity and by unbegottenness." Therefore, that statement which does not distinguish the Father and the Son, except insofar as one is the Father and the other is the Son, is not founded on truth. Thus, what follows from this must be entirely of the same fabrication, namely: that whatever is established beyond paternity and filiation is common to both the Father and the Son.

187. But even setting these points aside, it has been demonstrated elsewhere that nothing whatsoever is common to the Father and the Son that is not equally fitting for the Spirit. Therefore, the tradition of both the apostles and the theologians maintains that whatever is common to the Father and the Son is also common to the Spirit. But even if we were to concede that this is so, it would still be false that whatever can be adduced beyond paternity and filiation would necessarily be common to the Father and the Son. For since it has been demonstrated that there are many things by which the Father is distinguished from the Son, it is impossible that these same things be attributed to the Son in any way. Now then, if the premises of the syllogism are built upon such a mobile foundation, how will its conclusion attain the force of necessity? Rather, what will happen is that, since the Father is distinguished from the Son by being the font of divinity, as we have shown, the conclusion necessarily turns out to be absurd and subject to the objections enumerated above.

REFUTATION XXXXIII.

FOURTY-THIRD CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - NINTH SYLLOGISM

188. Moreover. Whatever is not contrary to the nature of something is not impossible for it to possess, except perhaps accidentally. Now, being the principle of the Holy Spirit is not contrary to the nature of the Son. Not insofar as He is God: because the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit. Nor insofar as He is the Son: because the procession of the Holy Spirit and of the Son are different; and it is not repugnant that that which proceeds from a principle according to one procession be itself the principle of another procession. It remains, therefore, that it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. But what is not impossible can be. And in divine matters, being and being able do not differ. Therefore, the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

189. This syllogism, too, is not fully consonant with the nature of things in every respect. For what would be said about the Father and the Son? Is having paternity contrary to the nature of the Son, or not? But if it is not contrary to it and is not repugnant, it follows according to his

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[Thomas's] thesis that it is not impossible for the Son to become the Father. And what is not impossible can be. But in divine matters, to use his words, being and being able do not differ. Therefore, the Son is also the Father. But even if paternity is contrary to the nature of the Son, not even then can the Latins' reasoning be sustained: for it could happen that both this is repugnant and the Son truly becomes the Father. The matter is clear in natural things, on which Thomas bases the force of his arguments for his theology: for nearly every man is both a father and a son.

190. Furthermore, it would follow that the distinction whereby one generates and another is begotten would be considered insufficient for distinction; if indeed this or that person could exist simultaneously as father and as son, should it happen that both generating and being begotten coincide in one and the same person, as this portentous theology asserts. Moreover, God, before He called all things into existence, had the power to produce all these things; nevertheless, although He was fully able to do so, He did not produce them. Therefore, that reasoning is not valid, according to which being and being able are said to be no different in divine matters.

191. What more? The divine Dionysius says: "God is said to be Power... and that He can produce innumerable infinite other powers from above, and that powers infinite in infinite number could never dull the more-than-infinite effectiveness of His power-producing power." But though He could do so in the aforementioned way, He did not bring them into existence. Therefore, we believe that the statement "in divine matters, being and being able do not differ" is not supported by truth in every respect.

192. And indeed, if we, using the same reasoning, were to say: Whatever is not contrary to the nature of something is not impossible for it to possess; being the principle of the Son is not contrary to the nature of the Holy Spirit. Not insofar as He is God: since the Father is both God and the principle of the Son. Nor insofar as He is the Spirit: because the progression of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are different; and it is not repugnant that that which proceeds from a principle according to one progression be itself the principle of another progression. It remains, therefore, that it is not impossible for the Holy Spirit to be the principle of the Son. But what is not impossible can be. And in divine matters, being and being able do not differ. If, I say, we were to say these things just as they do (and immediately the conclusion of the reasoning would raise its head: therefore, the Holy Spirit is the principle of the Son), what would they respond? For the premises they employ are either necessary, or probable, or absurd. But how shall we judge them to contain necessity or even probability? Do not absurdities flow from such foundations? But it also seems absurd to them to call the Holy Spirit the principle of the Son. Therefore, it remains most certain that these premises proceed full of absurdity.

193. Thus, if what has now been said leads to the impiety of blasphemy, clearly those things by which the Latins were accustomed to demonstrate that the Spirit is from the Son proceed along

REFUTATION OF THE LATINS PART 2

the same path. But if they add that those things are quite correctly advanced by them, surely these arguments of ours will also be correct. For by whatever means either our arguments will be solved or theirs will be praised, we, using the same means, will demonstrate both these and those. Nevertheless, if they should say that it is presupposed in their arguments that the Son can be generated from the Father alone, we will respond that no less is it presupposed by us—what is explicitly proclaimed by the theologians—when they either say that we do not say the Spirit is from the Son, or that the Son is not the cause of the Holy Spirit, or that the Father alone is the font of Deity. Therefore, what was said by us at the beginning of the contest about syllogisms can be said both here and regarding almost every one of the syllogisms, namely: that these, if nothing else, certainly contain disgrace, but everything flows consistently from them. And indeed, the fact that nothing less can be demonstrated by syllogisms than that the Holy Spirit is from the Son will be a sufficient reason for anyone to deny them any place in Christian theology. Therefore, we must flee from such reasonings, lest at some point we unknowingly sink into the depths of evils and be placed in extreme danger.

REFUTATION XXXIV.

FOURTY-FOURTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - TENTH SYLLOGISM

194. Moreover. The Father indeed generates the Son, but spirates the Holy Spirit. That He generates is characteristic and constitutive of His Person, as is evident from the name: for He is named Father. But that He spirates is by no means characteristic, for He does not receive His name from this. If it is not characteristic, then it is not proper either; and if it is not proper, it is common to the Father and the Son; it would also be common to the Holy Spirit, were it not absurd for Him to proceed from Himself.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

195. But truly, who could tolerate with equanimity such an accumulation of sophisms? For he says that the Father is not distinguished by this name from the fact that He is the Producer, and also that the Person of the Father takes His character from that whence He obtains His name. However, to show that both are false, we shall not need many words. For the Father receives His designation not only because He generates, but also because He spirates. Therefore, in chapter thirty-two it was demonstrated that the name Father in Scripture is not taken peculiarly as related to the Son, so as to indicate only the generator, but indeed this term is found to be accepted simply as referring to one who is cause; and therefore, under it, both concepts—of generating and of spirating—can be preserved. Thus, if according to their reasoning, that which is most distinctive of the Person of the Father is that from which the appellation is derived, and what is

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characteristic is also proper, as they themselves say, then surely it will be proper to the Father that He spirates.

196. Now, if theologians are to be trusted in theological matters, just as geometers are in matters pertaining to geometry, we have shown that they also call the Father the Producer; and this especially when their discourse concerned the distinction of the divine Persons. For it is entirely manifest that those who affirmed that the Father alone is the font of Deity, and by this reason distinguished Him from the Son, also apply the name Father by virtue of spiration.

197. But further, even if the Father were not so called by reason of spiration, it would not necessarily follow from this that spiration is therefore not distinctive of the first Person, and proper to Him. For the term Unbegotten certainly does not lie in the Scriptures, since the Father is not explicitly called by this name; nevertheless, it too is distinctive of the hypostasis of the Father. What just assent, therefore, could be given to this syllogism, if it intends to conclude something necessary, with premises so drawing in falsehood? Indeed, that the faculty of generating is predicated as characteristic of the Paternal hypostasis contains nothing absurd; but that the same should be called constitutive, to what the Latins are looking when they utter such things, I truly do not know. For the usage of theologians does not bear calling those things that are personal "constitutive." And indeed, even if they were so called, it would by no means be right to affirm that the Person of the Father is constituted from the faculty of generating.

198. For the matter stands thus: of those things that are held as personal in the Trinity, some are both proper and show the mode by which each Person exists, such as Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding, of which the first is accommodated to the Father, the second to the Son, the third to the Spirit, as we have shown. And Unbegotten indeed demonstrates simultaneously the mode by which the Father exists, who, being first from Himself and depending on no other principle in existing, refers His existence as received from no one; but through Begotten the Son is designated, as by this term it is indicated that He has a cause from which He has come forth, namely, according to generation; similarly, through Proceeding the Holy Spirit is constituted, as is evident, who also has existence from a cause, not by way of generation, but of spiration. But to generate and to spirate, although they are personal and constitute properties of the Father, nevertheless do not indicate in what mode the Father exists; but they are His idioms, which declare what relation He has toward the Son and the Spirit, since He gives existence to both from His essence, as their cause. Therefore, the divine Gregory in the first oration concerning the Son says: "For Father is not a name of essence, nor of action; but it indicates the relation that the Father has toward the Son, or the Son toward the Father."

199. But if someone should still contend that the mode of existence of the Father is indicated by the property of generating, first indeed, let him know that he speaks contrary to what is said by the theologians, who assigned such a thing through the appellation of Unbegotten. Then, we

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judge that both names can by no means preserve the mode of existence of the Father, since they are different: but to attribute different modes of existing to the Father will be too audacious, in my opinion. Therefore, however much generating and spirating take on the nature of properties of the Father from eternity, and give proper existence to other [Persons], nevertheless it is necessary, before the property of generating is conceived, to observe the proper mode of existence in the Father; for it must be thought that He first exists, and then that He generates or spirates.

200. And indeed, since just as generating shows the relation of the Father toward the Son, so also spirating demonstrates His relation toward the Spirit, if the mode of the Father's existing is believed to be designated by the property of generating, no less ought to be thought of the property of spirating, and we shall say that the mode by which the Father exists is also indicated through it. For if the former obtains, so does the latter; but if the latter is absurd, the former will also be impious. Come then, since in the Trinity, for the reason we have stated, those things that are personal are distributed into different classes, if some of them may be called constitutive, certainly it will be right to adorn with such a name those that are found to be manifestative of modes of existence. Of such kind will be being Unbegotten in relation to the Father; also being begotten and proceeding, the former, that is, with respect to the Son, but the latter with respect to the Holy Spirit: but by no means generating and spirating, which are indeed among the proper things, but show the relation that exists between the first cause and those who, as has been said, are derived from it in different ways.

201. Furthermore, if the spirative power is said to be common to the Father and the Son, but those things that are common to them are considered entirely common also to the Spirit, as the concordant opinion of the theologians maintains, then not absurdly will the Holy Spirit also seem to spirate. Certainly, if this conclusion were not refuted by any absurdity, it would be a different matter; but if not even they themselves would dare to proffer such things, let them inquire why this is so. But they will openly find that the minor premise is associated with absurdity; since we will not tolerate the major being brought into question, lest we appear to be impious toward benefactors. But if to some it seems sufficient for defense, what is also said—that the spirative power would also be common to the Holy Spirit, were it not absurd for Him to proceed from Himself—we will respond that this is characteristic of those who are either unskilled in logic or take care to feign ignorance of it. For if they could demonstrate that nothing absurd follows from their premises, surely they would demonstrate it; but since this is impious for them, no assent can be given to them: for they themselves, understanding what fearful thing flows from such reasonings, for this reason turn their eyes to ignoble excuses, for thus it is also permitted to say anything, and to avoid all absurdities. How, therefore, could they obtain the necessary force of the conclusion or truth in any way from those things from which the greatest impossibilities

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follow? Therefore, the spirative power is by no means common to the Father and the Son; and if it is not common, it will clearly be proper, and consequently whatever hope the Latins placed in this syllogism has certainly perished for them.

REFUTATION XXXXV.

FOURTY-FIFTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - ELEVENTH SYLLOGISM

202. Further. When theologians say that the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Son, it is necessary that He also be believed to be from His hypostasis, just as when we say He is from the essence of the Father, we also affirm that He exists from His hypostasis. Otherwise, it is absurd to say one thing about the Son, but not to say the other; for essence could not exist without hypostasis. But if we must necessarily think that He is from the hypostasis of the Son, how will the Son not be considered by common consent the Producer and cause of the [Holy] Spirit, and the Spirit caused by the spirative power of the Son? For in the Trinity, according to the hypostases, there are the causing and the caused, to generate and to be begotten, to spirare and to proceed.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

203. That the Spirit is said to be from the essence of the Son, insofar as, namely, this is manifestative of the participation in one essence and of the natural conjunction in the divine Persons, we have demonstrated at length above. But that He is said to be from His hypostasis, as if this should be taken to mean the same as proceeding from the Son as from a cause, will perhaps be affirmed by the Latins; nevertheless, it is not necessary that, even if one is of the same essence with another, one should trace the cause of one's existence from the same, whether the discourse is about divine or human matters. And in fact, the divine Persons are indeed consubstantial with one another, but by no means causing one another. Similarly, all humans are of the same nature, but in no way do they derive origin from one another. Nor indeed should it arouse wonder that, when speaking of the Father, we affirm both: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from His hypostasis and also at the same time from His essence. For since we have explicitly learned from the Lord that the Father is the cause of the Spirit, and indeed that He is the cause flows from the hypostasis, it is said altogether accurately that [the Holy Spirit] is from the hypostasis [of the Father]. But if it is also maintained, namely, that the Father produces the Spirit and is of one essence with Him, we can clearly also assert that He is from the essence of the Father. Nevertheless, it is absolutely not permitted to convert the statement. For not whatever is from the essence would immediately be said to proceed also from the hypostasis. Consider, I ask, Abel and Seth: both can certainly be said to be from both the hypostasis and the essence of

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Adam; but both are from the essence of each other, entirely also, just as the divine Isaac said: "He is your brother and of your nature," but from the hypostasis, by no means; since brothers cannot have existence from brothers, such that one of them would be simultaneously father and brother of the other, and this one simultaneously son and brother.

204. But if it seems absurd to anyone why we, who say [the Spirit] is from the essence of the Son, do not think it right that He is also from His hypostasis, we consider it much more absurd to find difficulty in such matters. For why would something be from the hypostasis of anyone at all, for the reason that it is from his essence? Is it because hypostasis and essence are the same? But then we have an absurdity. What then, are they different? Therefore, we should rather doubt why it could be that, with a distinction intervening between hypostasis and essence, both would be affirmed, as they themselves think. But if they respond that it should be feared lest perhaps essence be posited without hypostasis, and therefore both this and that should be asserted, then it would be better if they themselves did not distinguish the divine Persons from one another, since there is one and the same essence in each, lest perhaps that fearful evil should befall them. But truly this is not the case: for the Trinity is discerned without division, and coalesces distinctly into one, as the theologians led by the Spirit would say. Which indeed we think to be true beyond what you can express, and we confess to be ignorant of; but we expect the reward of this faith from God, which He, due to His munificence, will suitably prepare, not such as we would obtain as a payment of merits.

REFUTATION XXXXVI.

FOURTY-SIXTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - TWELFTH SYLLOGISM

CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE OF THE LATINS: ELEVENTH SYLLOGISM

202. Further. When theologians say that the Holy Spirit is from the essence of the Son, it is necessary that He also be believed to be from His hypostasis, just as when we say He is from the essence of the Father, we also affirm that He exists from His hypostasis. Otherwise, it is absurd to say one thing about the Son, but not to say the other; for essence could not exist without hypostasis. But if we must necessarily think that He is from the hypostasis of the Son, how will the Son not be considered by common consent the Producer and cause of the [Holy] Spirit, and the Spirit caused by the spirative power of the Son? For in the Trinity, according to the hypostases, there are the causing and the caused, to generate and to be begotten, to spirate and to proceed.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

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Persons, we have demonstrated at length above. But that He is said to be from His hypostasis, as if this should be taken to mean the same as proceeding from the Son as from a cause, will perhaps be affirmed by the Latins; nevertheless, it is not necessary that, even if one is of the same essence with another, one should trace the cause of one's existence from the same, whether the discourse is about divine or human matters. And in fact, the divine Persons are indeed consubstantial with one another, but by no means causing one another. Similarly, all humans are of the same nature, but in no way do they derive origin from one another. Nor indeed should it arouse wonder that, when speaking of the Father, we affirm both: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from His hypostasis and also at the same time from His essence. For since we have explicitly learned from the Lord that the Father is the cause of the Spirit, and indeed that He is the cause flows from the hypostasis, it is said altogether accurately that [the Holy Spirit] is from the hypostasis [of the Father]. But if it is also maintained, namely, that the Father produces the Spirit and is of one essence with Him, we can clearly also assert that He is from the essence of the Father. Nevertheless, it is absolutely not permitted to convert the statement. For not whatever is from the essence would immediately be said to proceed also from the hypostasis. Consider, I ask, Abel and Seth: both can certainly be said to be from both the hypostasis and the essence of Adam; but both are from the essence of each other, entirely also, just as the divine Isaac said: "He is your brother and of your nature," but from the hypostasis, by no means; since brothers cannot have existence from brothers, such that one of them would be simultaneously father and brother of the other, and this one simultaneously son and brother.

204. But if it seems absurd to anyone why we, who say [the Spirit] is from the essence of the Son, do not think it right that He is also from His hypostasis, we consider it much more absurd to find difficulty in such matters. For why would something be from the hypostasis of anyone at all, for the reason that it is from his essence? Is it because hypostasis and essence are the same? But then we have an absurdity. What then, are they different? Therefore, we should rather doubt why it could be that, with a distinction intervening between hypostasis and essence, both would be affirmed, as they themselves think. But if they respond that it should be feared lest perhaps essence be posited without hypostasis, and therefore both this and that should be asserted, then it would be better if they themselves did not distinguish the divine Persons from one another, since there is one and the same essence in each, lest perhaps that fearful evil should befall them. But truly this is not the case: for the Trinity is discerned without division, and coalesces distinctly into one, as the theologians led by the Spirit would say. Which indeed we think to be true beyond what you can express, and we confess to be ignorant of; but we expect the reward of this faith from God, which He, due to His munificence, will suitably prepare, not such as we would obtain as a payment of merits.

CHAPTER FORTY-SIX OF THE LATINS: TWELFTH SYLLOGISM

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205. Moreover. When we say that the Father and the Son constitute one principle of the Spirit, we do not think that this happens because they are one God, for by this reasoning the Spirit would be considered a creature; nor from the fact that the Father and the Son are considered one father, for this is impossible, and the [Holy] Spirit would become a son. But we confess that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Spirit, by reason of the spirative power. It is certainly not at all surprising if we contemplate one power in two Persons, to whom one and entirely the same nature in number underlies. But just as when we attribute divinity itself, and wisdom, and goodness, and royal majesty, and all other things to the Son, we are not ignorant of whence these flow to Him (for He possesses those things received from the Father, just as being itself, and consequently the Father and the Son are named one God, and one King, and one wise one); so also the Son indeed has the principle of the [Holy] Spirit in Himself, but He has it received from the Father through the spirative power, which, being one and the same in number to the Father and the Son, constitutes one principle of the Spirit from the Father and the Son. But we know well that the Lord revealed this, when He said: "He will glorify me, because He will receive from what is mine, and will announce it to you," by which words He showed Himself as the principle of the Holy Spirit. Then, referring all His things to the Father, as to the font, He added: "All things whatsoever the Father has are mine. Therefore I said: because He will receive from what is mine, and will announce it to you."

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

206. If we ought not, O most candid man, to feel wonder when we hear that the spirative power is common to the Father and the Son, since one and the same nature in number underlies them, I would not wish you to be disturbed either, if someone should apply that same power also to the Spirit, since the nature of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is the same. But if you believe this reasoning to be absurd, inasmuch as the Spirit cannot proceed from Himself, or be the cause of another Spirit, yet whatever absurdity there is in this has sprouted from your premises. For when something absurd follows from something, it is plainly necessary that that thing also be absurd.

207. But furthermore, for what reason is spiration common to the Father and the Son? Is it perhaps because essence is common? But spiration pertains to the personal properties, while not personal, but natural properties accompany the essence. Or perhaps from the fact that the Father and the Son constitute a common Person? But neither is this the case. Now then, if the common spirative power is not produced from the community of essence, and it is not permitted even to think that the Person of the Father and of the Son is common, from where, I ask, does the [common] spiration of the Father and the Son blossom, such that the Father and the Son are considered one Producer? Nevertheless, just as those things which are essential commonly

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underlie the whole Trinity and impress a common seal in the three Persons, so also it entirely follows that, if those things which are personal are communicated to the Father and the Son, it must also be fashioned that the Person of the Father and of the Son is common.

208. But also that which is said: The Father is indeed Spirator, and the Son is also Spirator, but there is one Spirator, because the Son refers the spirative power as received from the Father, just as being itself, just as they are called wise and wise, but there is one wise one; and good and good also, but there is one good one, not even this involves any necessity whatsoever. For it would be necessary first to demonstrate that this spirative power is possessed by the Son, and then to indicate from where it arises for Him. With these things not shown, it is asked out of order whether they should be called two spirators, or one. For it happens just as if someone had affirmed that the Holy Spirit is the father of the Son, and afterward, being asked by what reason led he has presented himself so audaciously, he himself would respond that there is only one begetter of the Son, namely, the Father and the Spirit, because the generative power is derived to the Spirit from the first cause. But it is not so.

209. Nevertheless, wisdom, and goodness, and divinity, and other such things are indeed essential, and each befits the three Persons, and therefore they are rightly said in the singular number, since they are manifestative of one essence. But spiration is something personal, and therefore if it were said to be in the Father and the Son in the same way, nothing on this part would prevent these two Persons from being believed to constitute one person. Moreover, it has already been demonstrated in the first dissertation by many arguments that it is impious to call the Father and the Son one cause or one spirator of the Spirit (if to spirate befits the Father and the Son); but that altogether two causes, and as many spirators, must be counted. But as for the word of the Lord: "He will glorify me, because He will receive from what is mine, and will announce it to you," we have also discussed it at length, when we were examining this statement, and we said that it contributes nothing to this [argument]. Therefore, this syllogism, which is rather burdened with the reproaches of which it is worthy, far from bringing anything for the truth, betraying all the hopes of the Latins, collapses.

REFUTATION XXXXVII.

FOURTY-SEVENTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - THIRTEENTH SYLLOGISM

210. Furthermore. Just as the Father and the Son share one divinity, wisdom, and royal majesty, so too must the spirative power be one in both, constituting one principle and one cause of the Spirit in both the Father and Son, unless we wish to be partisans of such impiety as to strip the Son of the natural equality he possesses with the Father. However, the same cannot be said reciprocally about the Spirit: for the Father in no way communicates the spirative power to the

REFUTATION OF THE LATINS PART 2

Spirit, since there is an absolute necessity to preserve the distinct differences of the Persons. Indeed, the difference that exists between the Father and the Spirit is personal, since the Father produces the Spirit. But, conversely, it is entirely permissible to conceive of the Son as spirating, since the Father is not his Producer in this respect. Besides, the Son and the Spirit [fol. 340] could not otherwise be perfectly distinguished, unless the Spirit were said to proceed from the Son.

SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER

211. Against those who continually repeat the same arguments, we surely cannot be blamed if we frequently respond with the same words. Thus, in this passage, three causes are presented by which [the Latins] wish to justify that the Spirit proceeds from the Son: yet none of them appears to have the force of necessity. We have already engaged in a lengthy discourse on these matters above; but more must still be added. For if the Son must be said to spirate because the Father and Son share one essence, then [it must be supposed] either that the Spirit also possesses the spirative power, or that the Spirit is somehow distant from the identity of Father and Son which belongs to them according to essence. But both are absurd. And if spiration belongs to the Son because the Father does not exist as Producer in relation to him in this respect, then the Spirit would have the generative power, since the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father, and moreover the Father is not called Generator in relation to the Spirit, as the [Holy] Spirit has no father. Therefore, if because of these remarkable premises the Son must be said to spirate, then for precisely the same reasons the Spirit could eventually obtain the name of father. This is in no way possible; nor is the distinction between the Son and the Spirit removed, even if the latter does not proceed from the former, since the mode of generation is one thing and the mode of spiration another, as has been discussed at length in what has already been said.

212. Add this moreover: since it has been demonstrated more than sufficiently that both generating and being generated, [fol. 341] as well as spirating and proceeding, do not pertain to those things which are natural, how can it be tolerable to seek to derive from these the equality of nature? For according to their reasoning, the Persons would not seem to be of the same divine substance, because the personal [properties] of each are not predicated of all. Furthermore, there is great danger in saying that the spirative power should be judged in the same way as the unique divinity, wisdom, and royal sovereignty of the Father and Son. For unless we consider divinity, wisdom, royal power, and the other essential attributes to be common to the Father and Son, we clearly do not attribute the same essence to both; but conversely, even if the Son does not possess the spirative power, no fear arises from this that he might be alien to the common nature, since it is something personal. Therefore, just as the essence is endangered if essential attributes are not attributed to each Person, so too when dealing with personal properties, when such properties are

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not predicated of all, the distinction of Persons is preserved. This is indeed believed to be eminently correct in Christian theology.

213. And indeed since the spirative power is personal, if we affirm that the Father and Son are one according to it, it will seem to anyone that the Father and Son converge in some personal attribute. But this is absurd. That spiration is sometimes said to be a natural communion of the Father and Son, but at other times is called a personal distinction of the Father in relation to the Spirit; and moreover [fol. 341] that because of the first, the Son is also considered to produce the Spirit, but because of the second, the Spirit is not considered to be a Producer; this, I say, is characteristic of one who confuses everything and undermines Christian theology from every angle. For since essential attributes are contrasted with personal ones, as has been shown, such that what is essential never becomes personal, and personal attributes are in no way interchanged with essential ones; therefore, either these must be removed from the catalog of divine names, or they will appear as a monstrous fiction, more suitable for sophists than for theologians. Indeed, to think that this is correct is the same as saying that the generative power, in relation to the Spirit, expresses its natural communion with the Father, and for this very reason to consider the Spirit a father; but in relation to the Son, to call it a personal difference, and consequently to maintain that the Son cannot participate in it. But truly we will neither concede this nor ever judge that to be correct.

214. But if this reasoning is rejected by them, on the pretext that it does not compel a necessary conclusion, for it is acknowledged that to generate is proper to the Father, but even if any other hypothesis were granted, such as considering the Holy Spirit to be a father, not even that would prevent "to generate" from being believed to be a property of the Father. But if the hypothesis is absurd, then nothing prevents the Father, just as through the property of generating he is distinguished not only from the Son but also from the Spirit, since the latter does not generate in any way (and yet this would not be said to constitute an essential distinction between the Spirit and the Father); so also through the spirative power he [fol. 342] is distinguished not only from the Spirit, but also from the Son, albeit in a different way: from the Spirit, because he spirates it; from the Son, because the Son does not have such a property received from the Father, even though he is of the same essence with him. Finally, if it has been demonstrated that to generate, and likewise to spirate, and, in a word, to be the source of divinity, is proper to the Father, how could it be that what is a personal distinction of the Father in relation to the Spirit is, in relation to the Son, a participation in the common nature? For either something similar must hold with respect to the property of generating, or, if that is not compatible with it, then it should not be affirmed of the spirative power either.

REFUTATION XXXXVIII.

FOURTY-EIGHTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - FOURTEENTH SYLLOGISM

215. Furthermore. From the fact that the Pope cannot deviate from the truth, as blessed Agatho asserts in his writing to the Roman Emperors—an epistle which the Sixth Ecumenical Council embraced as an apostolic utterance—it is clearly evident that one who considers the Holy Spirit to proceed from the Son does not hold an erroneous view. Not only this, but sufficient testimony to its truth is provided by the varied and manifold wisdom with which the Roman Church is enriched, and through which it arrives at the interpretation of the Scriptures, according to the Lord's word. For we do not wish to entrust such matters to the indolent, the ignorant, and those who know nothing.

RESOLUTION OF THE CHAPTER

216. We have also discussed this matter in a unique and sufficient manner in our work on the Primacy of the Pope. For there we demonstrated that the Roman Bishop can both do and suffer any absurdity, just like any human being. Honorius serves as a witness to this, who, although he was the Bishop of Rome, was struck by the thunderbolt of anathema in the Sixth Synod as a supporter of heresy—a decision of the Synod that was approved by the Bishop of Rome, Leo, the successor of Agatho. Another Pope, whom they call Liberius, after falling into the folly of the Arians, ultimately departed from life in that state. And the Latins themselves report that a certain Caelestinus desired the Roman episcopate in such an unusual manner that he considered of no importance whatever machinations might contribute to his goal; they further say that he abjured the faith, holding God in contempt, inasmuch as he employed practitioners of magic and their arts, and finally, after having attained his wish, surrendered himself to demons for destruction.

217. As for that manifold and varied wisdom, where it is truly present, it should by no means be despised; but where it is not possessed, it should certainly be sought, yet not in such a way that without it there can be no correct understanding regarding the faith. For the forerunners of our religion did not deliver their discourses with persuasive words of human wisdom, and they considered the wisdom of this world to be an evacuation of the power that resides in the cross. And indeed, the Roman Church as it presents itself now overflows with worldly wisdom, and relying on this, it undertakes the study of divine matters. However, there was a time when the Romans conducted their lives in great rusticity, while our affairs flourished greatly; but neither at that time was a sound understanding regarding the faith lacking in their Church due to the scarcity of learning, nor will the current outpouring of wisdom compel us now to believe that the Son is also the Producer of the Spirit.

218. That what we have said is founded on truth is evident from the following. An excerpt from the letter of Pope Agatho to the Roman Emperors: "...we are sending our present fellow

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servants (such and such)." Then he immediately adds: "For among men placed in the midst of nations, and earning their daily bread with utmost uncertainty through bodily labor, how can the knowledge of the Scriptures be found in its fullness, except that we preserve with simplicity of heart and without ambiguity what has been defined according to rule by our holy and apostolic predecessors and the venerable five Councils, as handed down by the Fathers of the faith, always desiring and striving to have one preeminent good: that nothing of what has been regularly defined be diminished, nothing changed or added, but that these things be preserved intact both in words and in meaning?" Now then, if it is absolutely necessary today, due to the abundance of wisdom, that the Latins possess the truth while we are positioned on the opposite side, why was it that when the Latins were found to be so ignorant of the sciences that they could not attain even a simple understanding of the Scriptures, they were by no means of an erroneous opinion?

219. And indeed, among Christians there was also Origen, most wise and most zealous in investigating the Scriptures, who nevertheless derived no fruit from his wisdom for preserving pure and sincere faith. Also in the Holy and Universal First Synod, Eusebius of Caesarea surpassed all bishops in eloquence, as Gregory the Theologian used to say, and was one of those who formed that holy assembly; but he advanced so many matters before those holy men filled to the utmost with blasphemies, that there was even doubt as to what name it would be proper to call him: whether an inventor of impious dogmas or a contentious enemy. And what shall we say about the philosophers of those times who, ignorant of the truth, came to the aid of Arius, and after a period of time had elapsed, it was with difficulty that some of them turned their eyes toward the truth, when the disciples of the Fishermen led the way for them? Therefore, it is by no means necessarily the case that the Latins, who superabound in much wisdom, should be believed to be strengthened also in faith, when the facts themselves so loudly testify against them.

REFUTATION XXXXIX.

FOURTY-NINTH CHAPTER OF THE LATINS - FIFTEENTH SYLLOGISM

220. They also object that in certain Councils it is found prohibited under threat of anathema to add anything to the Symbol established in the Councils, in which, however, no mention is made of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Hence they argue that the Latins are guilty of anathema for having added this to the Symbol. But these arguments have no force. For in the determination of the Council of Chalcedon it is said that the Fathers gathered at Constantinople corroborated the doctrine of the Nicene Synod, not as though they were introducing something that was lacking, but declaring their understanding of the Holy Spirit against those who attempted to reject His lordship, by testimonies from the Scriptures. And similarly, it must be

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said that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son is implicitly contained in the Constantinopolitan Symbol, in that it is stated there that He proceeds from the Father: because what is understood of the Father must also be understood of the Son, as has been said. And the authority of the Roman Pontiff was sufficient for making this addition, by which also the ancient Councils are found to have been confirmed.

RESOLUTION OF THE CHAPTER: WHERE ALSO CONCERNING THE SYMBOL OF FAITH

221. In these matters the Latins seem to defend themselves from the accusation of anathema, by which we say they are ensnared, because they have added to the divine Symbol the procession of the Holy Spirit also from the Son. Indeed, the blessed Fathers, after the addition made in the Second Council, prohibited anyone from daring to disturb anything in the Symbol of Faith, even any word whatsoever contained in it, or to change anything, or to add, or to take away. Against the disobedient, moreover, they employed the threat of anathema.

222. But so that a fitting order in treating these matters may be preserved by us, and at the same time a clear exposition may be rendered, a few things must be explained concerning the Symbol of Faith. Arius raged against the truth: but Pope Julius did not assume judgment for himself, nor did he alone sit to pronounce sentence, but gathering the other brothers (adhering to apostolic laws), he condemned him, and proclaimed the Son of God, who had been divested of the nobility that came to Him from the Father, as much as was in his power, to be both true God and one with the Father in essence; since both Father and Son are one, not indeed in number, but certainly in nature and in the attributes by which nature is manifested.

223. With Arius expelled from the Church, the definition of Faith is set forth by those blessed Fathers, which reads literally as follows. The Exposition of Faith of the three hundred and eighteen holy and blessed Nicene Fathers: "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of all things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, born of the Father as Only-begotten, that is, from the substance of the Father; God from God, light from light, true God from true God; born, not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made, both those in heaven and those on earth. Who for us men, and for our salvation came down, and was incarnate, and was made man; suffered, and rose again on the third day: and ascended into heaven: (and sits at the right hand of the Father:) and will come again to judge the living and the dead. And in the Holy Spirit. But those who say: 'There was a time when He was not,' and 'Before He was born He was not,' and 'Because He was made from things that are not,' or who say that He is from another substance or essence, (or created, or changeable, or convertible, the Son of God; these the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes)."

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224. This indeed is the definition of Faith, which was proposed in Nicaea by the blessed Fathers of the holy and First Ecumenical Synod. After the passing of (fifty-six) years, war was waged against the [Holy] Spirit, and by order of the Emperor Theodosius a General Synod was convened, whose Acts were ratified by Damasus, the Bishop of Rome. Therefore they [the Fathers], aided by the Holy Spirit, investigated matters pertaining to the Spirit; and while they struck Macedonius with anathema, they defined the Holy Spirit to be consubstantial with the Father and the Son, proclaiming one God in three Persons. But indeed, when it was necessary to set forth a definition of what had been investigated, they did not compose another Symbol; but ratifying that of the Nicene Fathers, when they saw together that the old clause concerning the Holy Spirit was unexplained, and therefore not clear, for the sake of clarity they added these definitions: "The Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is to be adored and glorified." There are also other things that were changed, either by adding some things, or even by taking away: for the sake of clarity, as is evident.

225. For divine Gregory, who was regarded as the leader of that assembly of Fathers, writes thus in his epistle to Cledonius: "We have written to you that we have not preferred nor can prefer anything ever to the Nicene Faith, which was issued by the holy Fathers who assembled there to overthrow the Arian heresy; but that by God's gift, we are and will be of that Faith: [and besides] explaining that which was said less fully by them concerning the Holy Spirit." And in the Acts of the fourth Synod, Diogenes, the most reverend [bishop] of Cyzicus says: "He (namely, Eutyches) deceitfully proposed the Synod of the holy Fathers, which was held in Nicaea. For it received additions from the holy Fathers, on account of the perverse understanding of Apollinaris and Valentinus and Macedonius, (and those who are like them). And there was added to the Symbol of the holy Fathers: 'Who descended, and was incarnate of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary.' For Eutyches omitted this, as an Apollinarist. For even Apollinaris accepts the holy Synod which was held in Nicaea, understanding the words according to his own perversity; (and) he avoids (that) 'Of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary,' so as not to confess the union of the flesh at all. For the Holy Fathers who assembled in Nicaea said that 'He was Incarnate'; but the Holy Fathers who came after them explained, saying: 'Of the Holy Spirit from the Virgin Mary.'" And the Sixth Synod, which knew there was one Symbol of Faith, drawn up indeed by the first Council, but confirmed by the second, spoke thus in its definition: "That which was issued by the three hundred and eighteen Fathers, and was thence confirmed by the hundred and fifty, by God's ordination; which also the other holy Synods eagerly received (and confirmed the Symbol) to extinguish every pestilent heresy; (and this our Holy and Universal God-inspired Council has sealed)."

226. Thus, therefore, this venerable Symbol of Faith reads verbatim: "We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible. And in one

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Lord Jesus Christ, the Only-begotten Son of God, who was born of the Father before all ages; light from light, true God from true God, born, not made, consubstantial with the Father, through whom all things were made; who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, and became human, and was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered, and was buried, and rose again on the third day according to the Scriptures, and ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of the Father, and will come again with glory to judge the living and the dead, whose kingdom will have no end. And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father, who with the Father and the Son is to be adored and glorified, who spoke through the Prophets. And in one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church. We confess one baptism for the remission of sins; we expect the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen."

227. This being the case, since the Holy Spirit convoked against Nestorius those who were inspired by himself for the defense of truth, and the third Synod was assembled, and a tribunal was established at Ephesus, the Priests of the Lord gathered from all sides; divine Cyril had also assembled, who showed himself an apostolic man in all things. Therefore, such men, by the force of their words and of the Holy Spirit, pronounced sentence against the impiety of Nestorius, and of the things done by them they composed a definition; a definition, I say, of whatever kind you wish, but they thought that the Symbol of Faith should in no way be disturbed; but in this manner they placed these things, overflowing with threats and indignation, in their definition: "The Holy Synod has decreed that it is not lawful for anyone to present, or to write, or to compose another faith, besides that defined by the holy Fathers, who were gathered in Nicaea with the Holy Spirit. Those who have dared either to compose another faith, or to produce or offer it to those wishing to be converted to the knowledge of the truth, whether from Gentilism, or from Judaism, or from any heresy whatsoever; these indeed, if they are bishops or clerics, it has decreed that bishops be estranged from the episcopate, and clerics from the clerical state: but if they are laymen, that they be subjected to anathema."

228. These things indeed were stated in the third (Synod) concerning the Symbol of Faith; but the fourth holy and Universal (Council) proposes the same thing, and moreover speaks thus in its definition: "In no way do we allow that faith or Symbol of Faith to be shaken by anyone, which was once issued by the holy Nicene Fathers. Nor indeed do we permit either ourselves, or anyone else whatsoever, to alter even a single word placed there, or to pass over even a single syllable, mindful of him who said: 'Do not transfer the ancient boundaries, which your fathers have set.' For they themselves did not speak, but the Spirit of God and the Father Himself, who indeed proceeds from Him; but is not alien to the Son, as the nature of essence requires." Thus also blessed Cyril, in harmony with these statements, says about the Symbol of Faith, writing to Acacius: "For it is not permissible to add to it, nor to take away from it."

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229. What more? The Sixth Synod also, after reciting the Nicene Symbol with the additions of the second Council, brought forth these things in its definition: "We define that it is not lawful for anyone to produce or write, or to compose or to believe, or even to teach otherwise. Those who presume to compose another faith, or to produce, or to teach, or to deliver another Symbol to those wishing to be converted to the knowledge of the truth from Gentilism, or Judaism, or from any heresy whatsoever; or who introduce novelty of expression or invention of speech for the subversion of those things, which have now been determined by us: these, if they are bishops or clerics, that they be estranged, bishops indeed from the episcopate, clerics indeed from the clerical state: but if they are monks or laymen, that they be anathematized."

230. Nor therefore did the blessed Fathers merely say these things in words, then use the decrees differently themselves. For concerning those matters about which there could always be free inquiry, each one set forth his own opinion; but concerning the Symbol of Faith, all always ratified that which remains written above; moreover, they also added those threats, about which mention was made before. In this way the fifth Synod, and the sixth also, and furthermore the seventh, and each of the Ecumenical Councils rendered the Symbol of Faith impregnable. To these things one must add also the Roman Bishops, present in different ways at different times through Legates, who conformed themselves to these acts. As an example, there is blessed Agatho, the Bishop of Rome and president of the sixth Synod, who, in his epistle to the Roman Emperors, urges and entreats them "that nothing of those things which have been canonically established be diminished, nothing changed or added, but that the same things be preserved untouched both in words and in meanings."

231. This being the case, if the argument adduced is of no concern to the Latins, let them say so plainly, and we shall cease from further troubling; but if, while continuing to be Christians, they do not say such a thing, let them show their esteem by their deeds, and let the Symbol be read also among them without the disturbance of any addition. Thus, while this is not done, reverence toward the holy Fathers is indeed diminished; but the fear of anathema is not small: for God also is girded with wrath. But no hope of concord shines forth, and yet we well know how highly God esteems the peace of the Churches.

232. But what indeed do the Latins respond to these things? Come, they say, this befits us: either not to give a reason (because of [the lack of] hope, which we have in you), when something new is proposed, or indeed to provide one, but as uncertain, lifeless, obscured by shadows; for it is not permitted, as you assert, to give a perfect reason for those things which are inquired about everywhere, but to look only to the Symbol. By no means, I say: for I am not so ignorant of your curious nature as not to know that you are always delighted with novelties, who also incessantly seek other and different things. But nevertheless, though I know this, I do not hinder the just remedy, which would that it might come to you through the oracles of the [Holy]

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Spirit, so that you might also be able to preserve reverence toward our ancestors. But I consider it would be audacious to introduce any addition whatsoever into the Symbol, when it is so prohibited by the Fathers.

233. But the laws of the Fathers, they say, do not simply prohibit an addition to the Symbol, but to the Nicene Symbol. However, that concerning the Spirit proceeding from the Son, which indeed seems most correct to us, was not added to the Nicene Symbol, but to the Constantinopolitan Symbol. But, first of all, whether the addition is true or not has already been shown and is no longer our concern; now the question that is proposed is simply this: whether the Latins had the right, even while speaking truth, to add anything to the Symbol of Faith, and whether they are freed from the anathema into which they have fallen because of the addition.

234. Then it has also been demonstrated that the Church is not distinguished by two Symbols, but that it uses only one, namely the Nicene, which was indeed explained through the addition made by the Fathers at Constantinople. Besides this, I would believe it to be similar to a riddle that the Ecumenical Synods after the second prohibited with all diligence adding anything to the Nicene Symbol, when an addition had already previously been made, as we have shown, in the second Council; for this would not be consistent with them, as they would appear to speak foolishly, and moreover to wage war against the second Synod.

235. Nevertheless it is also certain that the sixth general Council prohibited addition, after it read the Nicene Symbol with those things that were added at Constantinople. Hence if the Latins, even if their addition were supported by truth, could in no way escape the guilt of anathema; of what punishment, I ask, will they be considered worthy, when we have shown that addition to be laden with absurdities and blasphemies, and found to be most contrary to the divine Scriptures, overthrowing apostolic traditions and hostile to the Ecumenical Synods?

236. With these things thus defined, Thomas would not speak correctly (or anyone else who would undertake to defend the cause of the Latins), if he were to say that the addition made by them to the Symbol belongs in the same category as what was accomplished in the second Council with respect to the Symbol established in Nicaea. For those blessed Fathers then had the right both to add and also to take away, as members of an Ecumenical Council; but to the Roman Bishop, alone, from where is a similar power attributed? If they should say, by reason of Primacy; nevertheless the Apostles did not see it this way: for they forbid that he who has obtained the Primacy should do anything in the Church concerning matters common to all, without the knowledge of others; just as the rest also should not, unless the Primate has also consented.

237. For in their thirty-fourth canon we read as follows: "It is necessary that the Bishops of each nation know who is first among them, and esteem him as head, and do nothing of great importance without his opinion; but that each one should only do those things that pertain to his

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own parish and the villages subject to him; but neither should he do anything without the knowledge of all; for thus there will be concord, and God will be glorified through Christ in the Holy Spirit: Father and Son and Holy Spirit."

238. Therefore when the Constantinopolitan Fathers introduced the addition, they are shown to have done this according to apostolic traditions. For they all did that together, and indeed not without the knowledge of the Pope, for an Ecumenical Synod was being celebrated. But the Romans, in the absence of the others and without their opinions being sought, with apostolic precepts entirely disregarded, arrived at their addition. Moreover, those Fathers, when there were still no threats in existence, introduced the addition; but the Latins, with the penalty of anathema threatening, once and again inflicted, and with innumerable voices protesting, have fallen into this audacity. Finally, they added when it was permitted both to them and to others who were constituted in the same manner as they were; the Latins, however, when this was granted not only not to one alone, but not even to a general Council. By what reasoning, therefore, can they invoke parity?

239. And indeed those things which the Fathers happened to add to the Nicene Symbol (that we may speak also about these) were openly an explanation of those holy Fathers gathered at Nicaea, just as Thomas himself confesses, who regarding this proposes the same as the fourth Synod; but the addition which the Latins introduce is shown to be entirely contrary to the definitions of the Universal Councils, as has been declared far and wide in the above dissertations. Therefore, the same reasoning does not apply for the Latins as for the Fathers.

240. But if they respond thus: what is affirmed of the Father must necessarily be understood also of the Son; I say that this is a sophism, and a covering, and a splendid falsehood. For if the discourse were about essential attributes, we would certainly concede that; but since we are dealing with personal properties (such as spiration certainly is), we find no necessity for this, that the same personal properties should be suitable to both Father and Son. Indeed, rather it is necessary that the spirative power should by no means be considered to exist in both, since they are not the same in hypostasis, but different, Father and Son. For just as those things which are personal, if they remain uncommunicated, manifest the diversity of Persons, so also if they are the same, it follows that the identity of Persons is understood. For why will those things which are natural, when they are the same, be said to show the character inherent in nature itself, while those which are personal, in the same case, will not be able to manifest the identity of Persons? Therefore it is not simply true to say that all that which is understood of the Father must also be understood of the Son.

241. But that which is asserted, that for this addition the power of the Roman Pontiff was sufficient, through which also the ancient Synods are found to have been confirmed, how will this not be intolerable, since it both opposes Apostolic ordinances and wages war against the

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common peace of the Church? For it was certainly just that the ancient Synods were strengthened also by the suffrage of the Ruler of Rome, since nothing of those things which are common is ever permitted to happen without the opinion of the Primate; but in the same way, the Pope would have no authority unless the communion of others was also accepted at the same time. For both are provided for by apostolic law.

242. But if he who is the Primate despises the law which offered him the primacy, and considers his own opinion to be the law, it would no longer be just to demand the Primacy according to the decree of the Apostles; but any excuse rather than this will need to be adduced. Nevertheless, let us leave the argument drawn from the laws, against whom was the Primacy given to the Roman Bishop? Or how could it rightly be said that the power of the Roman Bishop was sufficient for that addition? For rather it would be correctly said that placing the addition solely because of the Primate's autonomy was sufficient to dissolve the peace of the Churches, since the apostolic saying is true which says: "For thus there will be concord," namely, if neither he nor we transgress the precept of the canon.

243. And indeed, that the addition was made to the Symbol by the Primate is not at all in accordance with the mind of the Apostles: for the matter is not approved by the others. We, however, desire the ancient economy of things, and are ready to be subject to him, provided, of course, that the apostolic ordinances are fulfilled, so that neither he, with us opposing, should dare to do anything, nor we likewise, with him refusing. If therefore he who is the Primate opposes, and considers the matter as an injury, who is it, I ask, who introduces division and dissolves the concord of minds? Is it not he who removes from the midst the first part [of the canon] and the second and, in a word, the entire ordinance? Therefore, by no means, as far as can be drawn from those words in which Thomas or anyone else trusts for the defense of the Latins, do they seem to be freed from the reproach of anathema.

244. But indeed why do we speak of this or that Synod, in what manner they discussed the Symbol, and what penalties they threatened against those who dare to introduce something new, even a single syllable, when we seem to leave aside what was done concerning the addition itself, of which we speak? For there exists an Ecumenical Synod, namely, that which was held after the seventh; the complete number of whose Fathers (as the Latins themselves say in their own canons) was raised to three hundred and eighty. This Synod, therefore, whose aim consisted in attempting means to restore peace to the Churches, made this addition, namely that the Spirit is from the Son, as far as possible an exile from the divine Symbol as a cause of scandals. Those who held the place of the Pope in this Ecumenical Synod, that is, Bishops Paul and Eugene and Peter the Cardinal Priest, were considered the presidents of the whole affair. Moreover, Pope John himself, under whom these things were happening, with letters and edicts sent with a certain apology, strengthened by his authority what had been done. Come now, for some reason

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unknown, the Latins indeed disapproved of the inactivity of all these men; but they never changed their opinion. How much all these things are supported by truth will be clear from what follows.

245. From the sixth Action of this holy and Universal Synod: "The Most Holy Legates (and representatives) of ancient Rome said: it is expedient that no new formula be fashioned, but that the old one itself, received and glorified throughout the whole world, be read and confirmed. And again in this same sixth Action the sacrosanct Symbol of Faith was pronounced by them in a common definition, which indeed sounded in the same way as that which is now held, in which, with those Romans and others of the great thrones present, that phrase 'proceeding from the Father' was in no way found at fault." Then: "Wherefore this holy and Ecumenical Synod, embracing and celebrating with divine affection and rectitude of mind the definition of Faith which was from the beginning, and founding and building the solidity of salvation upon it, thus proclaims to all to think and preach: 'I believe in one God, (the Father Almighty),' and the rest up to the end. And after certain things: "After the reading (of the divine Symbol), the sacred assembly which was present exclaimed: We all think thus, we all believe thus, in this confession we were baptized and considered worthy of the priestly rank. Those who think otherwise than these things, we regard as enemies of God and of the truth. If anyone should dare to write another besides this sacred Symbol, or to propose, or to detract, and should presume to call it a definition, let him be condemned, and cast out from every Christian confession. For to detract or to add shows our confession concerning the holy and consubstantial Trinity, which has descended to us from our ancestors up to this day, to be imperfect: and it condemns the tradition of the Apostles and the doctrine of the Fathers. If therefore anyone should be carried forward to such folly that he should dare, as was said above, to set forth another Symbol, and to call it a definition, or to add or to take away from that which was handed down to us by the holy and Ecumenical (first at Nicaea) great Synod, let him be anathema." This indeed is what the Synod pronounced concerning the addition to the Symbol, about which we now have a dispute with the Latins, which are so clear that they inspire horror; but the bishop of Rome, blessed John, under whom these things were taking place, writes thus in a letter given to Photius about all these matters.

246. From the letter of Pope John to Photius the most holy, Patriarch of Constantinople: "... For your brotherhood knows that when the one who was recently sent by you came to us, he inquired about our opinion concerning the holy Symbol; and he found that we preserved it inviolate, as it was handed down to us from the beginning, adding nothing, taking away nothing: since we rightly know that those who dare such things await a grave condemnation. Again therefore we make known to your reverence, that concerning this article, on account of which scandals have arisen between the Churches of God, you may have certain persuasion about us,

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that not only do we not say this, but also we consider those who first dared in their foolishness to do this to be transgressors of the divine oracles: who pervert the sacred doctrine of the Lord Christ (and the Apostles) and of the other Fathers, who coming together in synod handed down the holy Symbol. These we place with Judas, since they have dared to commit the same crime as he; not indeed delivering to death the Body of the Lord, but dividing believers, who are members of His Body, and cutting them off from one another, and thus leading them to everlasting death, or rather, like the aforementioned perverse disciple, strangling themselves."

247. Who therefore will there still be who will dare to bring forward the opinion of the Pope and his Primacy and authority, when the addition has been so expunged by the Holy Synod! In no way therefore will the Latins be believed to be prudent and sensible men, nor to have a sound mind, nor to be consistent with themselves, if they attempt to dissolve what they have rightly built up; but on the contrary they will appear to be playing in matters that are not childish, but against their own head. Let them therefore delete that addition; or otherwise one must consider what worthy excuse there will be for them on the common day of judgment, when the Judge will present to them his autonomy and his torn body, I mean the Church of God. He will also present the laws of the Apostles, and will indicate the separation from Himself, which they who have received the direction of ecclesiastical affairs in common assemblies have prophesied against themselves.

248. Nevertheless, O good Paraclete! May these things never happen, we pray you, nor may you look upon us as singing to deaf ears. Rather grant them knowledge of You, according to the sacred traditions, which You Yourself inspired to the Apostles; but grant to us that they may not be punished, who through division have been placed so far apart from one another, that they both are mutually ignorant of each other, and in a pitiable manner hurl weapons at one another, judging the calamities of others to be each one's own gain. See therefore, O Lord, the struggle of your Churches that has lasted so long, and may You be willing to bestow upon us the prize of peace and to calm the turbulent storm. Would that through Your grace we may have mutual understanding, lest we forever remain ignorant of the mystery of Love and of the Economy of the Word, consubstantial with You and of the same nature. May we not be excluded, we beseech You, from that most divine prayer, which the Lord Himself poured forth for us, when He was hastening to His voluntary Passion: that we may be one, that we may be united to one another, that we may think the same things, that we may live for You, and for the Father, who is without beginning, Your Producer, and His Only-begotten Word. For You are life and love, and peace, and truth, and sanctification. May these things therefore flow abundantly from You for all, and we will adore You and glorify You forever. Amen.

GLORY BE TO YOU, O GOD!

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